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Abstract 
Giulio Maria Mancini 
Education and Security: Design and Evaluation Tools for Deliberate 
Disease Risks Mitigation 
Keywords: Biological weapons, biorisk, BTWC, securitization, biosecurity, 
education, training, constructivism. 
This thesis addresses the role of education to mitigate the risks of 
deliberate disease, including biological weapons. Specifically, it aims to 
analyse how education was constructed as a potential instrument to 
mitigate specific security risks; if and how education could impact on risks; 
and how effectiveness of education as a risk mitigation measure could be 
improved. The research framework combines concepts of security, risk 
and education within a general constructionist approach. Securitization is 
used to analyse attempts to construct education as a tool to mitigate 
specific security risks; risk assessment is used to identify and characterize 
risk scenarios and potential for risks mitigation; and instructional design 
and evaluation models are used for the design and evaluation of education. 
The thesis contends that education has been constructed as a mitigation 
tool for what were presented as urgent security risks of deliberate disease. 
Nine attempted securitization moves are identified and assessed. 
Improved competences identified in four thematic areas, and built with 
education, can mitigate risks in specific scenarios via impacting factors 
that primarily influence risk likelihood. The thesis presents several 
examples of achieved learning objectives, and tools that can be useful to 
evaluate behavioural and risk impacts, though empirical results on these 
levels here are still scarce. Design and evaluation tools, illustrated through 
a large amount of original and pre-existing data from a range of countries 
and contexts, are presented that can improve effectiveness of education 
as a deliberate disease risks mitigation measure. 
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1. Introduction & Methodology 
1.1 Introduction 
Life and health-related sciences and technologies continue to advance 
and provide significant benefits globally in terms of health, economic 
growth and quality of life. At the same time, the potential for harm arising 
from hazards in these fields also exists. While this may be true for virtually 
any area of human endeavour, the potential damages connected with 
misuse in these fields have been described, in the last few decades and 
the evolving global context, as particularly pressing. Some concerns 
focused on toxins or infectious microorganisms, and their potential for 
harm described in terms of “risks”. This thesis presents a critical analysis, 
in the broader context of those risks, of the risks of deliberate disease, or 
that sciences and technologies are intentionally exploited and misused to 
cause disease. Capacity building for people with technical roles and, within 
that rubric, “education” of young and future scientists and practitioners, 
has been indicated as a possible useful measure to mitigate the risks of 
deliberate disease. However, to date it is not clear if, why and how exactly 
education became a potential measure in an arena traditionally focused on 
“security”; how the mitigation potential of education could be assessed; 
and, in case risk mitigation through education is possible, how could 
education be designed in ways that maximize mitigation, and its effects 
evaluated. This complex is the research problem addressed by this thesis, 
which will be explored by trying to answer three research questions. 
1.2 Research questions 
Research question 1: how was education constructed as a measure 
to mitigate the security risks of deliberate disease? 
The identification of the role of education into mitigation strategies for 
deliberate disease risks will be analysed and discussed basing on the 
evolution of policy and scientific discourses. 
Research question 2: how could education mitigate risks of 
deliberate disease? 
As it will be discussed, it would be unfair to expect education to be a silver 
bullet for addressing those concerns, but it is interesting to investigate the 
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potential mechanisms in which education could influence deliberate 
disease risks. 
Research question 3: what would the tools be to improve 
effectiveness of education as a mitigation measure of risks of 
deliberate disease? 
Without claiming a generally applicable meaning for the concept of 
“effectiveness”, how the attribute is interpreted in this thesis for the third 
research question is education that can be relevant, generalized and 
sustained. With relevant, I mean that it generates capacities that contribute 
to the objective of risk mitigation; with generalized, that is taken by all 
those who may have a role in mitigating those risks; and with sustained 
that it is repeated over time to all those who acquire those roles and have 
those responsibilities. 
1.3 Research framework 
This research constructs and employs a framework to tackle the above 
research questions, mobilizing and connecting resources from three 
conceptual areas: security, risk and learning. These areas are not 
independent from each other, but rather interact and are mutually 
influenced through complex, yet hopefully clearly described, relationships. 
The theoretical background and models are described in more detail in the 
next Chapter, however here I present a summary of the three conceptual 
areas and of their interactions. 
The security conceptual area intervenes in the research framework in 
relation to the conceptualizations around security and disease, security 
and risk, and security and education. The securitization approach is used 
as a lens to investigate the role of education in security risk mitigation, as 
well as the how and the why of the construction of such role. The 
conceptual area of risk intervenes to identify and justify specific patterns in 
which education has the potential to mitigate the risks of deliberate 
disease. Risk assessment and risk management approaches are used to 
identify what are we talking about when we talk of “deliberate disease 
risks”; discuss what may constitute those risks; what exactly would 
“mitigation” mean; and if, how and what education has the potential to 
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mitigate those risks. The conceptual area of learning intervenes to identify 
and discuss features of education that have the potential to mitigate 
deliberate disease risks. Instructional design and evaluation approaches 
are used to present and test practical aspects of education.  
While these three main areas are not unequivocally matched with the 
three research questions, in the research framework the conceptual area 
of security is primarily used to address the first question; the conceptual 
area of risk is primarily used to address the second question; and the 
conceptual area of learning is primarily used to address the third question. 
Combining these conceptual areas, the thesis aims at providing insights 
on the role of education as an instrument to mitigate the security risks of 
deliberate disease, and on design and evaluation tools for such education. 
After a detailed discussion on the theoretical framework underpinning the 
research in the next Chapter, the thesis firstly will identify the dimensions 
of deliberate disease risks in Chapter 3; secondly analyse the 
securitization of education as a possible risk mitigation measure for these 
risks in Chapter 4; and thirdly apply science of learning models to design 
and evaluate education as a deliberate disease risks mitigation measure in 
Chapters 5 to 9. Two main models are leveraged from educational science, 
one on instructional systems design and one on evaluation of the impact 
of education. Both models are applied on two plans that I call “education” 
and “instruction design”. The former focuses on design and evaluation of 
education to mitigate deliberate disease risks, in which the target and the 
audience of interventions are future and young scientists and practitioners. 
The latter focuses on design and evaluation of instruction for educators of 
those future and young scientists and practitioners that, as I will argue in 
the thesis, is one factor to facilitate the “sustained” component of 
“effectiveness” of education. Applying these models, I will present design 
and evaluation tools for both plans of research, however they should not 
be considered as disconnected. The instruction design plan is somehow 
consequential to the education plan 1  as we move from discussing the 
second to the third research question. Furthermore, implementation under 
each plan is connected to certain levels of evaluation, as will be explained 
                                                      
1 If and once it should be realized that education does offer risk mitigation potential. 
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in the next Chapter; evaluation of outcomes applying the design and 
evaluation tools developed in the thesis is done against the risks 
characterized in Chapter 3; and how those design and evaluation tools 
could be applied, their opportunities and limitations, are discussed in the 
light of the role of education as a security measure argued in Chapter 4. 
This is how the different areas of the research framework come together; 
crossing and in common to the whole research approach there is a 
general (weak) constructionist approach that I keep as a researcher. In the 
next Chapter I explain in more detail how such an approach is compatible 
with the models I use and indeed how features of constructionism can be 
related even to those aspects (such as from the risk management and 
educational science areas) that may almost appear of a positivistic style. 
This stance leads to specific ontological and epistemological 
considerations that are thoroughly discussed in the next Chapter, however 
the research design also influences methodology (as well as ontology, 
epistemology and methodology influencing each other), which is reflected 
on the range and mixture of data collection and analysis methods used in 
the research. Before presenting those data and methods, and due to their 
very nature, however, it’s important that I tell how I became involved in the 
subject researched, and clarify my role as researcher. 
1.4 Genesis of the research and the role of the author 
This research was carried in the course of a part-time, extramural PhD 
programme I followed between 2011 and 2016. In the meanwhile, I was 
working as analyst and project officer, at the international non-
governmental organization Landau Network-Centro Volta based in Italy 
until 2012 and at the Sandia National Laboratories in the US between 
2013 and 2015. This situation meant that the research was carried in 
parallel but also in connection to my professional career, which led me to 
become familiar with, and actually contribute to, policy discussions and 
implementation of actions on biosafety and biosecurity; biological weapons 
non-proliferation; the work of the BTWC and other processes; risk 
assessment and management of deliberate, accidental and natural 
disease risks; and capacity building on those risks in many countries and 
contexts, but particularly in higher education. The situation also allowed 
me to develop a broad and deep picture regarding education, security and 
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risk mitigation. My first involvement in the subject was when I designed 
and coordinated a project titled “Fostering the Biosecurity Norm”, 
implemented in 2008-2009 by LNCV and the University of Bradford.2 That 
experience suggested to me and other colleagues in Italy, the UK and 
elsewhere that the space, and indeed the need, existed for an academic 
analysis on education as a tool to mitigate the security risks of deliberate 
disease, which could go beyond and deeper than the mere implementation 
of projects responding to policy programmes and decisions. Hence, further 
projects funded by research grants or commissioned by governmental 
agencies in which I was involved since 2011 have been also considered in 
the light of the questions posed by this research. Furthermore, in my 
professional capacity I attended BTWC Meetings of Experts and/or 
Meetings of States Parties each year between 2007 and 2011, including 
those in 2008 when education and awareness raising were one of the 
specific topics of discussion, and the 7th Review Conference; meetings of 
the G8GP between 2009 and 2012 discussing scientists engagement, 
capacity building and education as possible means to reduce risks of 
misuse of science and technology; meetings of the European 
Commission’s Task Force on a CBRN Action Plan in 2008; and over thirty 
workshops and conferences between 2008 and 2013 organized by 
governmental, non-governmental and academic organizations in several 
countries on engagement of scientists on CBRN security risks issues and 
specifically on education and awareness raising on, and to mitigate, 
biorisks. While this situation opened many opportunities that I believe 
contributed to the originality and significance of the research, it also 
influenced the implementation of the research and exposed a series of 
criticalities.  
1.4.1 Opportunities and challenges of the research situation 
The main challenges consisted in: the time span of research data; timing 
of data collection in the research process; the influence of projects’ 
objectives on research; the lack of detachment of the author; and the 
control by the author on research data and methods. Each challenge led 
                                                      
2 The project was co-funded by the Prevention of and Fight Against Crime (ISEC) programme of the 
European Commission. Project number EU JSL/2008/ISEC/AG/088  
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to decisions on if, why and how to include data; I address and discuss 
these challenges as justifications for inclusion can be argued. 
Data included in the research was collected between 2011 and 2015; 
previous relevant data is considered as literature. I decided to include 
research data (from two of the projects introduced below) analysed while I 
had just started the Post-Graduate Research (PGR) school in Bradford 
because they were particularly relevant for the research; allowed to extend 
the time window where to observe developments, as the same contexts 
were then observed by data collected in the following years and by other 
collection methods created specifically and exclusively for this research; 
they deserved additional and deeper analyses than the often narrow 
consideration in their specific projects and were not previously published; 
they allowed novel considerations and analyses when considered together 
with data from other countries and projects; they were collected with 
robust research methods, as they were based on, and improved, previous 
research efforts, were based on my pre-existing policy research expertise, 
and were consistent with research methods that were reviewed and 
approved during the PGR school at the University; and also to make a 
rather arbitrary boundary between literature and original arguments 
coinciding with the year when I started my PhD journey. 
Regarding the timing of data collection in the research process, collecting 
data that would be useful for this research often could not follow the order 
of research design that many PhD researches use, of hypotheses 
development, design of data gathering methods, data gathering, and data 
analysis. Rather, data gathering methods and data collection depended on 
the timing of projects that I was involved in, which was often exogenous. 
This meant, between 2011 and 2015, often going back, reviewing and 
improving consecutive versions of the same data collection tools as they 
were applied to new projects; as well as refining, confirming, changing and 
adding to research assumptions, findings and questions. On the other 
hand, the collection tools for the data considered in this research 
maintained common features that, I think, allow considering them together 
and most importantly to transversally apply the models for developing 
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possible design and evaluation tools for education as security risks 
mitigation that are proposed in the thesis. 
A third criticality regards the relationship and indeed the independence 
between this research and the projects from which some of the data and 
observations are included. The projects had their own priorities, goals and 
objectives in line with the specific programmes, and funders, to which they 
were responding. The choice of countries, for example, was opportunistic 
as depending on those available from projects. Even if parts of the data 
discussed in the research were originally collected for other projects, 
however, I have reviewed them to select what was relevant for my specific 
research problem and looked at them under an entirely original light, so 
that they could provide new insights when overviewed together and used 
to develop or test novel design and evaluation tools. Furthermore, data 
from projects were used in compliance with data management rules of the 
same projects; based on the indication to participants that they could be 
used for the project as well as for other academic work; with the 
authorization of the coordinating organizations’ management; and/or with 
anonymisation of details of individuals, organizations or countries, 
depending on the case. Finally, data from projects were complemented 
with entirely new data, collected for the exclusive purpose of this PhD 
research, that are particularly important for the original contribution of the 
thesis.3 
The fourth challenge is the potential lack of detachment of the author. This 
is a clear issue with a topic and processes in which I, as a researcher, am 
not only familiar but also, to some extent, embedded. Considering that part 
of this research is an analysis of the securitization of education as a 
measure to mitigate the security risks of deliberate disease, the doubt for 
example arises if I am not contributing (or did not contribute) to the same 
securitization that I am studying. While this is somehow inevitable given 
my situation, firstly it should be considered that I was never a “decision-
maker” on the subject but rather an implementer; and secondly that I did 
include measures to mitigate the risk of bias. The selected analytical tools 
                                                      
3 In particular interviews to describe and test evaluation tools in the education and instruction 
design plans of research. 
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were chosen to provide a variety of perspectives on the same issues; the 
same tools were selected to enhance objectivity, for example mixing 
quantitative and qualitative data; and most of the data analysis and the 
thesis write-up was conducted during October 2015 and June 2016, during 
a largely sabbatical period from my professional roles in order to focus on 
the research and regain some detachment. 
The fifth and final criticality is the control by the author on research data 
and collection methods. While this is not a problem for the data that was 
collected entirely and exclusively for the PhD, it could be relevant for those 
observed from other projects. In most cases I both designed and 
implemented data collection, keeping full control on the whole process. In 
some cases, I collaborated with colleagues and partners to design data 
collection tools, but data was materially collected and tabulated by others 
closer to participants or respondents. In other cases I include data I 
collected using tools and methods designed by others, as explained and 
credited below, that were particularly useful to shed new light or could be 
analysed in new ways to develop design and evaluation tools. 
1.5 Significance of the research 
Notwithstanding the above challenges, I think this research is significant 
and has the potential to make a relevant original contribution to knowledge 
about education as an instrument to mitigate security risks of deliberate 
disease. While projects and publications addressed before the topic of 
education and training on risks, security risks, and biosecurity risks, there 
has not been a structured analysis on the role attributed to education as a 
security tool in a security arena, and on how the construction of this role 
happened. This is the first area where this research hopes to provide a 
significant contribution.  
Furthermore, several projects have been carried in different contexts and 
by different actors (including some from which data is observed here), 
however analyses that merged and compared different experiences, data 
sets and data tools are scarce. Individual capacity building projects, 
furthermore, focus on completing their tasks and delivering products, often 
rather than investigating the deeper meanings, reasons and trends in 
capacity building regarding these risks. At the same time, they often collect 
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large amounts of data that may allow such subsequent investigations. This 
supports the need for a different, more structured, robust academic 
analysis that can go beyond just training implementation. This thesis 
designs and employs a research framework suggesting to connect 
outcomes in terms of learning to outcomes in terms of security risks. In 
doing so, it proposes some tools, based on the experiences that 
contributed to that research framework, to design and evaluate education 
that could be effective as a measure to mitigate the security risks of 
deliberate disease. This is a second area where this research hopes to 
provide a significant contribution. 
The above design and evaluation tools are based and tested on a large 
amount of data presented in the research, with both data collected and 
analysed specifically and exclusively for this research, and data observed 
from projects pre-existing or independent to the research, including 
original data. Furthermore, originality should be looked for not only 
regarding data but also and possibly more importantly on exercising 
“independent critical thought” (Silverman, 2005 p. 70). The amount of data; 
the consideration of these data sets together; the range of contexts they 
illustrate;4 the time window embraced by analyses for phenomena related 
to capacity building that are often long-term and may be challenging to 
observe with a “normal” PhD plan; the research framework based on the 
three conceptual areas and their interconnections; and the specific models 
applied to develop design and evaluation tools, represent occasions for 
originality, novelty and significance of this research. 
1.5.1 Published work 
Some of the work presented in this thesis has been published between 
2011 and 2015 by myself or in work co-authored with colleagues in 
relation to specific projects, even if this dissertation is the first occasion in 
which data is presented together. Parts of the results of the questionnaire 
                                                      
4 No claim of generalizability is included among these reasons for the significance of the research. 
As further discussed below, data is not generalized to any larger population than the groups and 
samples it is collected from. Nonetheless, the research represents an opportunity to discuss original 
data, or existing data in new ways, for an illustrative picture of information, examples and trends in 
many contexts; and to develop and operationalize the proposed design and evaluation tools for 
education as a potential risk mitigation measure. 
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from the Pakistan project was included in a booklet published in 2011 
(Shinwari et al., 2011). Experiences from the EUBARNet project were 
discussed by Revill et al. (2012), Mancini and Fasani (Mancini and Fasani, 
2012a; 2012b), and Mancini (Mancini, 2012b; 2012a). Results of that 
project were also used to discuss the value of collaborative and active 
learning methods for education on biosecurity risks (Novossiolova et al., 
2013). A paper on security and misuse risks in neurosciences, 
responsibility of scientists and the role of higher education was presented 
in a conference (Mancini et al., 2012). Finally, a version of parts of Chapter 
3 on the dimensions of the risks of deliberate disease constituted a book 
chapter (Mancini, 2015). 
1.6 Focus on higher education 
The research focuses on one particular context for education as a 
potential deliberate disease risks mitigation tool, which is pre-service in the 
framework of higher education in the life and connected sciences and 
technologies sectors. Clearly “education” could comprise a range of 
capacity building actions targeting different learners in different contexts, 
from primary to secondary and tertiary instruction, to vocational training, 
continuous professional training, adult learning and 
redirection/reemployment of professionals. Reasons for focusing on higher 
education firstly include that, as discussed in detail in Chapter 4, 
securitization moves often identified higher education as one specific 
venue for proposed measures.5 Other reasons can be both causes of the 
attention on higher education, and general considerations on the 
effectiveness potential of this educational channel. Higher education 
students constitute the next generation of scientists, professionals and 
managers.6 Targeting this population could contribute to the formation of 
technically and socially informed and responsible professionals on risks 
related to their professions, including deliberate disease risks. Secondly, 
educating students during their degrees would expose them to concepts 
early on, increasing the probability of capacity retention. Thirdly, if they 
already have foundational knowledge and skills, they will be more likely to 
                                                      
5  Hence a serious analysis on how that could be done, and what impacts it could have, is 
particularly relevant. 
6 They may also be referred to as “pre-service” to denote they have not yet entered the job market. 
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apply it as soon as they start working, as well as to look for additional 
information because they are aware of what they need to know. Fourthly, 
educating them on risks at the same time of, and embedded with, 
technical education, will facilitate integration of safety and security rather 
than they being “adds-on” to technical capacities. Fifthly, students may 
have more time and be more receptive to learning than more adult 
learners who come back to studying during their career.  
Higher education students could be targeted with actions in a range of 
formal and informal contexts. However, the first one to consider would be 
Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) providing formal post-secondary 
education.7 Reasons to work with HEIs include that education is already 
their principal mandate. 8  Second, education in HEIs is formalized in 
curricula and degree programs which are imparted year after year to 
different cohorts of students, and that last beyond individual educators 
who deliver them, contributing to diachronic sustainability. Third, education 
in HEIs would reach large numbers of students at the same time, with a 
range of potential future work careers, making sure that at least 
foundational capacity is widely spread and synchronically sustainable over 
several sectors.9 
1.7 Data description 
1.7.1 Projects 
This section describes the projects considered in this research from which 
pre-existing data was observed, besides data collected specifically and 
exclusively for the research. Most projects used a common set of data 
                                                      
7 HEIs include universities but also polytechnics, research centres and other denominations as long 
as they provide higher education. 
8 Which should make easier for them to introduce new topics of instruction, or review existing ones, 
and would require less investment in terms of time, funding or human resources with respect to 
institutes that sometimes do not have established training programs or trainers. 
9 Given the identification of higher education students as learner population, and of HEIs as the 
primary educational context for the research focus, there are some assumptions and differences 
with in-service education and training to consider. Firstly, pre-service students, for example, have 
different background, prerequisites, experience as well as less or not yet defined job tasks than 
professionals. Secondly, education content will be more basic and more generic than it would for 
professional learners: this may mean basic information applicable to a variety of sectors. 
Furthermore, the structured educational environments in HEIs may determine both opportunities 
and limits of educational actions. These points will be discussed in more details in Chapter 5 and 6. 
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collection tools, which allows analysing and interpreting data with the 
common research framework and analytical models mentioned above. 
Furthermore, all these experiences of promoting capacity can be 
described (and in many cases have been designed) with the instructional 
design models that are utilized along with this research.  
In 2010-2011, a project on university engagement on biosafety and 
biosecurity education10 was implemented by LNCV in partnership with a 
biosafety association in Morocco (Association Marocaine de Biosécurité, 
AMBS). The project included a questionnaire survey for educators and a 
workshop with representatives from several HEIs. 11  In the thesis this 
project is referred to as “Morocco”. A similar project was implemented in 
the same time frame in Pakistan by LNCV in partnership with Quaid-i-
Azam University (QAU) of Islamabad. The project included a questionnaire 
survey on life sciences and technology students in various universities; a 
workshop on biosafety and biosecurity for faculty members in Islamabad; 
and an educational seminar for students in Islamabad.12 In the thesis this 
project is referred to as “Pakistan”. 
Some of the European universities who had been engaged by the 2008-
2009 project “Fostering the Biosecurity Norm” (Mancini and Revill, 2008; 
Mancini and Revill, 2009; Margalho, 2009; EFE, 2009) and remained 
interested in promoting biosafety and biosecurity education, became 
                                                      
10 The project was funded by the Biosecurity Engagement Program (BEP) of the United States 
Department of State. 
11 The questionnaire was designed based on the model described below in cooperation with AMBS, 
administered by members of AMBS in each university via email and in-person interviews and 
surveyed 227 professors and lecturers of biosciences in thirteen Moroccan universities in 2011. I 
tabulated the data from the original questionnaires with the help of research assistants and 
analysed them in cooperation with AMBS. 
12  The questionnaire was designed on the model described below in cooperation with QAU, 
administered in 2011 by local research students via paper questionnaires, and surveyed 448 
students from 24 universities in Pakistan (Shinwari et al., 2011). I tabulated the data from the 
original questionnaires with the help of research assistants and analysed them in cooperation with 
QAU. Twelve life sciences and technology students from one university in Pakistan attended in 
2011 a one-day educational seminar on deliberate disease risks that I facilitated based on 
instructional materials from the Educational Module Resource (ERM) developed by the University of 
Bradford in collaboration with LNCV and the National Defence Medical College in Japan; the 
seminar included a post-instruction questionnaire for students. 
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partners in a project I coordinated between 2011 and 2012: the European 
Biosecurity Awareness Raising Network (EUBARNet) 13 . Among other 
tasks, the project included an online investigation on considerations given 
on biosafety and biosecurity risks in published syllabi and course materials 
in HEIs in seven EU countries; and seven educational seminars for 
students.14 In the thesis this project is referred to as “EUBARNet”. 
The ISIS Euro-Mediterranean Master in Neuroscience and Biotechnology 
is both a project and a graduate degree designed, developed and 
implemented since 2012 by a Consortium of eleven universities,15 funded 
by the European TEMPUS program and coordinated by the Université de 
Bordeaux.16 The engagement of myself and LNCV by a member university 
which had been involved in the previous “Fostering the Biosecurity Norm” 
and “EUBARNet” projects led the Consortium to include a module on 
biosecurity and dual use within the course on Bioethics, Regulations and 
Laws during the drafting of the Master syllabus.17 In collaboration with 
University of Bradford’s experts, I designed and taught 25 Master students 
                                                      
13 The project was co-funded by the Prevention of and Fight Against Crime Programme (ISEC) of 
the European Commission; project number HOME/2010/ISEC/AG/CBRN-001. See 
www.eubarnet.eu for more information.  
14 The countries included Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. I 
designed the online investigation protocol, based on the model described below, and carried out it 
in 2011 with the support of researchers in LNCV and Bradford, analysing 184 degree courses. I 
directly co-facilitated six out of the seven educational seminars, that reached 268 students in seven 
HEIs in six EU countries (according to signed attendance lists). Returned post-instruction 
questionnaires were lower. University of Coimbra, Portugal (27 April 2012, 20 students/9 post-
instruction questionnaire respondents), University of Milan, Italy (10 May 2012, 39 students/39 post-
instruction questionnaire respondents), University of Turin, Italy (11 May 2012, 16 students/ 16 
post-instruction questionnaire respondents), University of Uppsala, Sweden (31 May 2012, 30 
students/no post-instruction questionnaire respondents), Delft University of Technology, the 
Netherlands (15 June 2012, 24 students/15 post-instruction questionnaire respondents), University 
of Granada, Spain (21 November 2012, 109 students/101 post-instruction questionnaire 
respondents), and University of Bradford, UK (21 November 2012, 30 students/30 post-instruction 
questionnaire respondents). About three-quarters of the EUBARNet students completing post-
instruction questionnaires were undergraduate, 10% was graduate Master students and just two 
were PhD students. In case of mixed classes this was assessed through a specific question in the 
survey, while in the cases the whole class was from the same cohort the author computed it. 
15 In Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, France, Spain and Italy. 
16 See http://isis-master.org/ for more information 
17 The module amounted to one ECTS academic credit out of three credits of the course. 
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the distance-learning module during the 2011-2012 academic year. In the 
thesis this project is referred to as “ISIS Master”. 
The International Network of Universities and Institutes to Raise 
Awareness about Dual Use in Biotechnology was a project coordinated by 
LNVC in 2013-2014 that consortiated seventeen HEIs in fourteen 
countries. 18  Among other tasks, the project included a questionnaire 
survey on higher education professors in participating countries; 
educational seminars for university students; and workshops with faculty to 
share experiences among the network.19 I contributed to the project design 
                                                      
18 The project was funded by the CBRN Risk Mitigation Centers of Excellence (CoE) initiative of the 
European Union under the implementation of the United Nations Interregional Crime Research 
Institute (UNICRI). The Consortium included Landau Network-Centro Volta, Italy (Coordinator), 
Agrarian University of Georgia, Georgia, Royal Scientific Society, Jordan, Middle East Scientific 
Institute for Security, Jordan, National Council for Scientific Research, Lebanon, National Center of 
Public Health, Moldova, University Mohamed V – Agdal, Morocco, Faculty of Sciences of Tétouan, 
Abdelmalek Essaadi University, Morocco, Quaid-i-Azam University of Islamabad, Pakistan, College 
of Medicine at University of the Philippines Manila, Philippines, Palladin Institute of Biochemistry, 
Ukraine, Taiz University, Yemen, Universität Hamburg, Germany, University of Milan, Italy, 
University of Turin, Italy, Delft University of Technology, the Netherlands, University of Coimbra, 
Portugal, and University of Uppsala, Sweden. See http://landaunetwork.org/index.php/eu-cbrn-coe-
project-18-project-factsheet for more information 
19 The questionnaire survey for professors was designed based on the model described below, and 
in 2013 surveyed 376 HEIs faculty members from ten countries (Georgia, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Moldova, Pakistan, Philippines, Ukraine and Yemen.). Nine educational seminars 
reached 527 students in nine universities and institutes in seven countries (Quaid-i-Azam University, 
Pakistan (25 March 2014, 74 students/68 post-instruction questionnaire respondents), Hashemite 
University, Jordan (27 March 2014, 22 students/22 post-instruction questionnaire respondents), 
University Mohammed V-Agdal, Morocco (17 April 2014, 37 students/24 post-instruction 
questionnaire respondents), Palladin Institute of Biochemistry, Ukraine (25 April 2014, 79 
students/73 post-instruction questionnaire respondents), Saint Joseph University, Lebanon (30 April 
2014, 20 students/20 post-instruction questionnaire respondents), National Center for Public Health, 
Moldova (5-6 May 2014, 100 students/80 post-instruction questionnaire respondents), Abdul Wali 
Khan University, Pakistan (23-24 May 2014, 148 students/142 post-instruction questionnaire 
respondents), Al Akhawayn University, Morocco (24-25 June 2014, 29 students/no post-instruction 
questionnaire respondents), National Center for Disease Control and Public Health, Georgia (8 
September 2014, 24 students/24 post-instruction questionnaire respondents). An additional 
seminar was organized for faculty members rather than for students by University of the Philippines 
College of Medicine, Philippines (6 November 2014)) and included a post-instruction questionnaire 
for students developed on the models used for the “Fostering the Biosecurity Norm”, “Pakistan”, 
and “EUBARNet” projects, completed by 453 students from eight seminars. Among students who 
responded to the questionnaires, 11% were undergraduate students, 65% Master students, and 
23% during their PhD or post-doc. Both the questionnaire survey on professors and the post-
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and co-facilitated the final workshop of the project. 20  In the thesis this 
project is referred to as “Project 18”. 
Data on four additional countries is leveraged from six projects in which I 
was involved in, as Project Lead at Sandia National Laboratories’ 
International Biological and Chemical Threat Reduction (IBCTR) (Sandia 
National Laboratories, 2014a) during 2013-2015. Management of data 
from these projects required additional measures, including complying not 
only with the University of Bradford Humanities, Social and Health 
Sciences Research Ethics Panel’s requirements but also with those of 
Sandia’s Human Subject Research Board; and that countries of operation 
or partner organizations cannot be disclosed. Notwithstanding the required 
anonymization of countries and institutes, the Table below provides a 
characterization of these countries basing on some social, economic and 
scientific indicators21 to suggest how these countries provided experiences 
on education to mitigate deliberate disease risks within additional social, 
economic, academic and scientific contexts.22 
                                                                                                                                                  
instruction survey for students were administered and collected locally by partner HEIs, and results 
were organized, tabulated and analysed by project officer at LNCV. 
20  Held in Como, Italy, in 26-27 November 2014. See 
http://landaunetwork.org/index.php/2014/11/eu-cbrn-coe-project-18-international-network-
workshop-como-italy/ for more information 
21 This arrangement for data management has been discussed with Sandia National Laboratories 
managers and at the PhD Progression Review Meeting on 17 June 2014, described in the 
Progression Review Memo of 15 July 2014, and approved by the University’s Progression Review 
Panel on 28 July 2014. 
22 Implementation of these projects leveraged pre-existing instructional materials designed and 
developed by IBCTR on the education plan of research, notably the Global Biorisk Management 
Curriculum (GBRMC) (Sandia National Laboratories, 2013); and included the development of 
specific train-the-trainer materials on instructional design for the instruction design plan of research, 
based on Sandia’s pre-existing Trainer Development Program (TDP). Sandia’s original TDP is 
designed and developed to build training capacity in a professional and in-service context, while the 
new materials were adapted to build instructional, including curriculum design, capacities in a 
higher education and pre-service context. The new train-the-trainer materials were indicated as 
Trainer and Curriculum Development Program (TCDP). 
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Table 1 - Undisclosed countries characterization 
The project in Region A included activities in six countries of the region of, 
and including, Country A. The project was implemented in 2013-2014 and 
included an online investigation on curricula contents and a train-the-
trainer workshop on instructional systems design (ISD) for educators in 
higher education.25 In the thesis this project is referred to as “Region A”. 
University 1 of Country A is an animal health HEI in Country A. University 
1 was also included in the Region A project. University 1 was engaged in 
discussions on education on biorisk management and, due to the interest 
of its leadership and the assistance in design by Sandia experts, BRM was 
formally included in a course within the degree of Master of Veterinary 
Medicine. 26  In 2013, the author together with colleagues facilitated an 
educational seminar for thirteen students including introductory courses on 
                                                      
23 Language, religion and nominal GDP per capita per year from Wikipedia. 
24 “The SCImago Journal & Country Rank (SJR) is a publicly available portal that includes the 
journals and country scientific indicators developed from the information contained in 
the Scopus® database (Elsevier B.V.). These indicators can be used to assess and analyze 
scientific domains. […] SCImago is a research group from the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones 
Científicas (CSIC), University of Granada, Extremadura, Carlos III (Madrid) and Alcalá de Henares, 
dedicated to information analysis, representation and retrieval by means of visualisation techniques” 
(SCImago, 2016). See http://www.scimagojr.com/countryrank.php for more information. 
25 I carried out the online investigation in 2013, which was based on the model described below, 
and surveyed 138 degree courses in 14 HEIs. The ISD workshop lasted five days in 2014; 
participants included fourteen educators from the same number of either public health or animal 
health HEIs in the region, along with trainers-to-be from governmental bioscience institutes, 
Ministries of Health and Ministries of Animal Resources of the six countries, for a total of 24 
participants. The same participants were surveyed with the email questionnaire survey (21 
respondents out of 24 participants). 
26 Largely because the engagement on biosafety and biosecurity education happened at the same 
time when the curriculum for the Master’s, planned to start with the first edition in 2013-2014, was 
being drafted. 
Country Language23 Religion Nominal GDP per 
capita/year 
SJR intl Science 
Ranking24 
A Official 1 Religion 1 > 
80% 
< 1,000 $ 1-100 
B Official 2 Religion 2 > 
90% 
1,000 – 5,000 $  100-150 
C Official 1 Religion 3 > 
70% 
1,000 – 5,000 $  1-100 
D Official 2 Religion 2 > 
90% 
> 5,000 $ 1-100 
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biosafety and biosecurity from the GBRMC.27 In the thesis this project is 
referred to as “Country A University 1”. 
University 2 from Country A is a HEI offering degrees on science, 
technology and medicine. The author and colleagues worked with this 
university in 2014 and 2015 to introduce education on biosafety and 
biosecurity in the medical degree courses. University 2 was also included 
in the online investigation within the Region A project. The project included 
a questionnaire survey on faculty members from the Faculty of Medicine 
and an ISD workshop in 2014 with 29 participating faculty members and 
educators. In the thesis this project is referred to as “Country A University 
2”. 
The project in Country B has been pursued between 2013 and 2015. It 
included a questionnaire survey in two phases on HEIs educators and two 
ISD workshops.28 In the thesis this project is referred to as “Country B”. 
The project in Country C spans 2014 and 2015. Among other tasks less 
relevant for this research, it included an online investigation on curricula 
contents; an educational seminar for students on biosafety and 
biosecurity; a questionnaire survey for professors; and an ISD workshop 
for professors.29 In the thesis this project is referred to as “Country C”. The 
                                                      
27 The seminar constituted the biorisk management section of the course also covering diagnostic 
techniques in the Master syllabus. The seminar included evaluation questionnaires that are 
considered in the education plan of the research. 
28 The questionnaire surveys were designed in line with the model described below and involved 
ten participants from six Country B HEIs in the first year and seventeen in the second year. The 
same professors participated to the surveys and the ISD workshops, and were identified and invited 
from previous training courses on biosafety and biosecurity and by recommendations of previously 
engaged professors in Country B. The survey was administered via email in 2014 had 17 
respondents; the first ISD workshop was organized in 2014 and had ten participants from nine 
universities/schools in Country B and faculties of science, medicine, pharmacy, and veterinary; 
participants mainly included lecturers and professors but also two deans. The second ISD 
workshop was organized in 2015 with 16 participants, including twelve returning participants and 
four participants from HEIs not previously represented. The 2014 ISD workshop focused on the 
Analysis and Design phases of the ISD ADDIE model on the instruction design plan of research, 
while the 2015 ISD workshop focused on the Development, Implementation and Evaluation phases 
of the ISD ADDIE model on the instruction design plan of research. See below for the explanation 
of ISD workshops and the next Chapter on the theoretical background. 
29 I carried out the online investigation in 2014 based on the model described below and surveyed 
50 degree courses from fifteen HEIs in Country C; I facilitated with one colleague the seven-days 
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project with Country D was implemented in 2014, and the activities 
considered for this research include a questionnaire survey and an ISD 
workshop.30 In the thesis this project is referred to as “Country D”. 
1.8 Data collection and analysis methods 
The research combines different methods of primary and secondary data 
collection, generation and analysis in terms of mixing qualitative and 
quantitative data but also in a “multi-strategy” (Robson, 2011 p. 161) to not 
only best exploit different tools but also to reflect the variety of contexts 
offered by pre-existing data, reflect that supported by literature on science 
in society (Letherby et al., 2012), reflect my situation and mental model as 
researcher,31 and improve validity. As Mason (2006) explains, there are 
different underpinning logics in the decision to mix methods of research.32 
In the case of this research, the decision on mixing quantitative and 
qualitative methods relies on both Mason’s “corroborative” and “integrative” 
logics. Data collection from a variety of sources and methods also 
strengthens the research with “triangulation” (Bryman, 1998).33 Finally a 
                                                                                                                                                  
educational seminar for students to thirteen PhD students from one HEI in 2014 using GBRMC 
materials; carried out the questionnaire survey for professors; and facilitated with one colleague the 
five-days ISD workshop with nine participants from five HEIs in 2015. 
30 The same professors participated to the survey and the workshop, and were identified from a 
range of universities, and representing a variety of Country D’s provinces, scientific sectors 
(medicine, biology, biotechnology, veterinary), and roles (lecturers, heads of departments, deans), 
thanks to the advice of previously engaged institutional partners in Country D. The survey was 
administered via email in 2014, and I facilitated the five-days ISD workshop in 2014 to 20 
participants from ten HEIs of Country D. This workshop included introductory materials on biosafety 
and biosecurity from GBRMC and for the ISD section only covered the Analysis and Design phases 
of the ISD ADDIE model on the instruction design plan of research. 
31 I would describe a mental model as a way to think, view or shape the world, which summarizes 
personal ontological and epistemological convictions, and is at the same time the result of, and the 
influence on, personal history, experience, education and beliefs. Mental models are described by 
Greene (2007 p. 12) as the sets of “assumptions, understandings, predispositions, and values and 
beliefs with which all social inquirers approach their work”. 
32 Including a “rhetorical” logic to illustrate with a broader picture in-depth analysis; a “parallel” logic 
to answer separate questions; an “integrative” logic to address strongly linked questions; a 
“corroborative” logic that uses triangulation to reinforce results; a “multi-dimensional” logic standing 
in between of the “parallel” and the “integrative” ones; and finally designs mixing methods for 
opportunistic reasons. 
33 See also Hakim (2000 p. 173) for a discussion on the “triangulation” term. The integrative logic of 
mixing quantitative and qualitative methods is also key as the research aims to assess and 
investigate different parts of the problem of “promoting education on a specific subject” that can 
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multi-strategy design is attractive for research with multi- and inter-
disciplinary aspects, as suggested by Bryman (2006). The research 
combines data collection and analysis methods including content analysis; 
questionnaire surveys; educational interventions for students on the 
education plan of research and train-the-trainer workshops for professors 
on the instruction design plan of research (both including evaluation 
questionnaires); and semi-structured interviews. Following Johnson (2001), 
such a design can be considered as an exploratory non-experimental34 
part of a multi-strategy exploratory and explanatory research project 
(Creswell, 2003). Indeed the research did not aim to gain statistically 
significant or representative results to be generalized to any larger 
population than the groups and samples they are collected from, such as 
the countries of collection, any other context, as well as “scientific HEIs”, 
“students”, “science educators”, or even “scientists”. The samples of HEIs 
in online investigations are not randomized, but opportunistic, and often 
selected on the criterion of the “best HEIs” in the country or region, as 
discussed later. Participants in questionnaire surveys have also been 
sampled opportunistically based on contacts identified by the online 
investigation; existing relationships; or participation in other phases 
depending on the project. While not claiming generalizability, however, 
discussing this data the research provides firstly a valuable illustrative 
picture of information, examples, and trends from groups and samples in a 
large number of contexts; and secondly the opportunity to develop and 
operationalize the proposed design and evaluation tools for education as a 
potential risk mitigation measure. 
The data collection and analysis tools are interlinked. Content analysis for 
securitization processes allowed identifying possible features of education 
as a security tool as envisaged by its proponents, while content analysis of 
                                                                                                                                                  
each be best assessed with different methods: some data, such as number of educational 
opportunities and their place in the academic context, for example, are numerical, while others, 
such as the value of those opportunities for the students or the professors, or indeed the feelings, 
the attitudes and the priority settings of the actors involved are best investigated and explained with 
qualitative data. 
34 Because of the two combined limitations of non-randomization of samples, as discussed below 
and impossibility of controlling the independent variable, i.e. the “inputs” others from those 
researched. 
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the educational offerings of the HEIs provided the opportunities to study 
them but also to collect contacts to include in subsequent surveys. 
Surveys enlarged and explained the information and collected quantitative 
and qualitative data on levels of awareness, opinions and attitudes. 
Educational interventions and ISD workshops were organized with the 
data from content analyses and surveys in mind and included post-
instruction questionnaire surveys and/or tests. Finally, interviews involved 
professors who had participated in one or more of the projects outlined 
above and could provide data for both the education and the instruction 
design plans of research. 
1.8.1 Content analysis 
This research method was applied to securitization analyses and to the 
Analysis phase of the ISD ADDIE model. The former has been used 
mainly to discuss the first research question and identify securitization 
agent(s); securitization argument(s); context; targeted audience; and 
emergency measures urged by the attempted securitization moves. 
Theoretical background of securitization analysis is discussed in further 
detail in the next Chapter, and results are presented in Chapter 4. 
Regarding the latter, publicly available documents from HEIs were 
consulted regarding contents of educational offerings, including online or 
paper programmes, syllabi of degree courses, learning objectives, 
descriptions and guidelines. Content analysis35 is recognized as useful for 
                                                      
35 Content analysis is “the quantitative analysis of what is in the document” and an unobstrusive 
measure “which is non-reactive, in that the document is not affected by the fact that you are using it” 
(Robson, 2011 p. 349). Content analysis is a data collection and analysis technique to 
systematically characterize a text or other meaningful material (Neuman 1997) and that can include 
quantitative and qualitative features. In social research, the technique has been applied inter alia to 
the analysis of political discourses, media, academic publications and legislation. As minimal 
common characteristics, content analysis would require a coding scheme based on decided 
categories, the analysed text, and a coder, either human or automated. Sampling of the body of 
knowledge analysed is acceptable, common and often desirable – in a sense content analysis 
shares features of survey research, though looking at “non-human” samples for gathering 
information. Though content analysis is a developed and widely applied approach, here it is used in 
a basic version that complies with a general definition such as “an interactive process between a 
careful reading of the text, design of preliminary coding categories, fitting of texts into these 
categories, and refinement of categories till most test can be fitted into the existing set of categories 
given the specific research needs of the investigator” (Franzosi 2008 p. xxv, emphasis in the 
original). 
 21 
studies involving educational establishments (Robson, 2011, p. 351) and 
had already been used in studies on biosecurity in universities (Mancini 
and Revill, 2008; Mancini and Revill, 2009; Revill and Mancini, 2010; 
Minehata, 2010; Minehata and Shinomiya, 2009; Minehata and Friedman, 
2009). Content analysis, especially that based on online-available 
documents of HEIs and here indicated with “online investigations” 
(Franzosi, 2008) was carried out by running searches of relevant keywords 
and noting the number of occurrences and the relationships with key 
features of the context in which they were embedded. Pages of university 
websites were scanned looking for mention of learning objectives; syllabi; 
or bibliography of degree courses, courses, curricula and modules to look 
for existing references. Keyword selection based on the experience of 
previous research and included terms such as: “security”, “safety”, “dual-
use”, “misuse”, “risk”, “prevention”, “weapon”, ethics”, “responsbility”, 
“hazard”, “threat”, “conduct”, “hygiene”, “PPE”, including their local 
translations if applicable, and making judgment calls if references were 
actually relevant for deliberate disease and connected risks 
management.36 This led to the information discussed in Chapter 5 and 
opportunities to leverage for what was discussed under Chapters 6 and 7; 
as well as to identify individuals to engage with other methods described 
below. Advantages of online investigations include that they could offer a 
preliminary overview not depending on availability or bias of individuals 
and local partners.37 A limitation though is that it fundamentally relies on 
information available online: in some cases that information may be scarce, 
non-existent, unclear or outdated.38 Another disadvantage is that such an 
investigation may take a long time, searching large numbers of webpages. 
Another strategy is to look at samples of universities. This has been done 
                                                      
36 Information was then coded and categorized under the biosafety, biosecurity, bioethics, biorisk 
management and/or dual-use categories. See Berelson (1952) for guidance on categorization in 
content analysis and Schiffrin (2001) for discussion on markers and language. 
37 Content analysis on curricula content gives an important contribution to internal validity and 
reliability: it bases on data from the “official source” of the HEIs, and does not risk to be biased by 
opinion (or ignorance) of people. 
38  For example, contacts with Moroccan and Pakistani universities demonstrated that online 
investigations I had previously carried out had portrayed a very incomplete image of the existing 
educational offering. Hence online investigations have not been pursued in those projects and 
those incomplete results have not been retained. 
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in the EUBARNet, Region A and Country C projects selecting the “best”39 
HEIs to survey.40 Online investigations on educational offerings in HEIs 
was used in the EUBARNet (184 surveyed degree courses), Region A 
(138 degree courses surveyed), and Country C (50 degree courses 
surveyed) projects. A model of data tabulation is reported in the 
Appendices. 
1.8.2 Questionnaire surveys 
Questionnaire surveys have been used to gather data on existing 
educational offerings, considerations in higher education programmes 
relevant for education on deliberate disease risks, opinions and attitudes 
of educators and/or students, levels of awareness and competences on 
biosafety and biosecurity, and processes to introduce education to 
mitigate deliberate disease risks. Data from questionnaire surveys is used 
to discuss the second and third research questions, is leveraged on both 
the education and instruction design plans of research, and is mainly 
presented in Chapter 5 on Analysis and Chapter 6 on Design. 
A questionnaire survey on students was used in the Pakistan project (448 
respondents), while questionnaire surveys on professors were used in the 
Morocco (227 respondents), EUBARNet (20 respondents), Project 18 (376 
respondents), Region A (21 respondents), Country A University 2 (27 
respondents), Country B (17 respondents), Country C (9 respondents), 
and Country D projects (9 respondents).41 
                                                      
39 According to HEIs rankings such as The Times Higher Education World Ranking of Universities 
(THE, 2016) or the Webometrics national rankings (CSIC, 2016). 
40 This sampling strategy is firstly practical and due to the better chance of obtaining information 
from those universities, that often describe with larger detail their educational programs; secondly, 
the issue of generalizability is addressed with a modelling (or “championing”) driven approach, 
assuming that an educational policy change in the best universities would eventually push the other 
institutes to follow those “models”, as it happens in other educational offerings. Generalization is 
turned to the future and to the possible/probable educational policy trends, rather than on the 
current status of the populations from which the samples are taken; apart from this, the results of 
the research should be seen as an illustrative picture of just those leading institutes included in the 
project. 
41 The questionnaires used in the Pakistan and Morocco projects were designed based on the 
experience from the 2008-2009 “Fostering the Biosecurity Norm” project (Mancini and Revill, 2008; 
Mancini and Revill, 2009; Revill and Mancini, 2010), designed with in-country partners and piloted 
before final administration. I designed the questionnaire for the EUBARNet project already with the 
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1.8.2.1 Administration 
Questionnaires were administered via the Internet, email, in paper or 
compiled through telephone or in-person interviews. 42  The EUBARNet 
questionnaire survey 43  was administered through the Internet with a 
private link included in an email invitation.44 One of the risks of a web-
based survey is a coverage error due to accessibility to the Internet. 
However, literature shows that university communities may be a case in 
which response rates to Internet surveys are higher than with others 
methods (Fricker, Jr., 2008). Another risk is response bias, in particular 
that only contacted participants who have an interest in the subject 
complete the survey (Coomber, 1997). This was a concern as previous 
experience show how many in academic communities may see deliberate 
disease risks as an irrelevant subject (Dando and Rappert, 2005). 45 
Another risk was to get a low response rate; previous similar surveys 
(Mancini and Revill, 2008; National Research Council and American 
Association for the Advancement of Science, 2009) got response rates 
lower than 20%. Roster et al. (2004) say that web based surveys generally 
get lower response rates than those using other methods. 46  Mitigation 
measures for these methodological risks included: the stress on the 
                                                                                                                                                  
present research in mind and submitted it as an assignment for the PGR School in 2012. 
Subsequent questionnaires for professors used in the Project 18, Region A, Country A University 2, 
Country B, Country C and Country D projects were somehow based on, and developed, that same 
model. Project 18 also included a questionnaire survey directed to students, but was implemented 
as part of the educational interventions methods and is mentioned below. In Pakistan, partners 
carried out a new questionnaire survey using the same data collection tool in 2014-2015 (Tanveer 
and Shinwari, 2015b). 
42 In some cases, multiple administration methods were used in the same survey to increase 
response rates. 
43  The survey was realized with the WPQuiz plugin for Wordpress, the Content Management 
System used for the EUBARNet website, which allowed the use of sections, HTML and hyperlinks. 
44 As Coomber (1997) explains, there is little point in setting up a page and waiting people to come! 
The email was personalized, translated in the language of the invited participant, and quoting their 
courses as emerged from the online investigation. It pointed to an attached cover letter for more 
information and provided the link for the survey. The link landed on a password-protected page, set 
to prevent bots from search engines to index it, but with the password embedded in the link so that 
the participant did not have to actually type it. 
45 To face this, the presentation in the letter stated that reports to the European Commission would 
include positive and negative feedback. 
46 Reasons for a low response rate may vary and include: scarce interest in the subject; message 
identified as spam or undesired; unwillingness to provide profile questions. 
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objectives of the research; copying in the message colleagues of the 
participant, who already participated to the project; stressing that I already 
had the public information on curricula contents; and other good practices 
(Dillman et al., 2009). A further risk was that somebody outside the 
population of faculty members would compile the survey. Both technical 
checks and triangulation with the other data collection methods mitigate 
this risk.47 
The questionnaire survey on students in the Pakistan project was 
administered in paper with the collaboration of professors and researchers 
from several HEIs, who distributed the questionnaires to their classes.48 
Returned questionnaires were mailed, or scanned and emailed, to QAU 
and collected by local colleagues and me. The questionnaire survey on 
professors in the Morocco project was administered via email and/or 
compiled during in-person interviews with the collaboration of members of 
AMBS in each Moroccan HEIs having courses of biology, biotechnology, 
medicine or pharmacy.49 Returned questionnaires were emailed to AMBS 
and collected by local colleagues and me. The questionnaire survey on 
professors in Project 18 was administered via email and/or compiled 
during face-to-face interviews by partner organizations in each country 
reached by the project.50 Returned questionnaires were emailed to LNCV 
and collected by LNCV researchers. The questionnaire survey on 
                                                      
47 The completion of the survey was limited to one per computer; the survey was not reachable 
without the link provided in the invitation, nor was indexed by search engines; thirdly, the 
information gathered could be cross-checked with that from the online investigation. Finally, a quote 
on the interest of the European Commission may have led professors to think, “my course does not 
include something it should” and to socially desirable answers. I also tried to mitigate this risk, 
reiterating the condition of anonymity, and being clear in the introduction that there was not a strong 
“desirable position”. 
48 The target community being students (undergraduate, graduate or postgraduate) of life sciences 
and technologies. 
49 The criteria to identify an interviewee were to be a professor, other faculty member or a practicing 
scientist who are involved with the education of students; and to teach in degrees (“filieres”) of 
Licence or Master of life sciences or biotechnology.  This led to a population of mainly life scientists, 
but also medical doctors, chemists, veterinaries and other scientists, sharing the fact of teaching to 
life sciences and technologies students. 
50 Inclusion criteria were to be professors or other faculty members from the same or other HEIs in 
the country teaching in life sciences and technologies, public health, medicine or pharmacy degree 
courses. 
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professors in the Country A University 2 project was administered by 
colleagues at the local HEI and collected by them and then me. The 
questionnaire surveys on professors in the Region A, Country B, Country 
C and Country D projects were administered via email to invited 
participants to ISD train-the-trainer workshops a few weeks prior to the 
event. Compiled questionnaires were returned to me and other colleagues. 
1.8.2.2 Samples 
Samples surveyed with questionnaires were non-probabilistic and the 
result of opportunistic or snowballing sampling. For the EUBARNet survey, 
contacted professors were identified from the online investigation on 
curricula contents; for the Morocco, Pakistan and Project 18 surveys, they 
were identified by local partners based on pre-existing contacts and trying 
to reach a large number of respondents in a range of HEIs, sectors and 
degrees. For Region A, Country A University 2, Country B, Country C, and 
Country D surveys, participants were professors invited to ISD train-the-
trainer workshops who had been identified from previous trainings on 
biosafety and biosecurity or by suggestions from local partners trying to 
reach a range of HEIs, sectors and degrees in each country. Twenty 
respondents, for a very low response rate of around 10%, completed the 
EUBARNet questionnaire. In the Pakistan project, 507 questionnaires 
were returned and 448 validated; 51  not all participants answered all 
questions. 52  In the Morocco project, 227 individuals completed the 
questionnaire, even if not necessarily answering all the questions.53 The 
questionnaire survey in Project 18 was completed by 376 professors or 
faculty members. Twenty-one out of 24 invited participants completed and 
returned the questionnaire Region A survey; 27 out of 29 participants for 
the Country A University 2 survey; seventeen out of twenty participants for 
the Country B survey; nine out of nine for the Country C survey; and nine 
out of 20 for the Country D survey. 
                                                      
51 The rest being double submissions. 
52 The students in this sample were from 24 HEIs in Pakistan, roughly one-fifth of the institutions 
previously identified as offering higher education in the life sciences and technologies. 
53 From thirteen HEIs in the country, all those offering higher education in the life sciences and 
technologies. 
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1.8.2.3 Structure 
The questionnaires had a common structure, with variations due to local 
needs identified by interaction with partner organizations or feedback from 
pilots and improvements in subsequent versions. Questionnaires were 
drafted with good practices to improve internal validity in mind such as 
clear and not leading questions, ensuring respondents have the 
knowledge needed to understand them, and asking each only one thing 
(Robson, 2011; De Vaus, 2001; Saris and Gallhofer, 2007).  
Questionnaires started with an introduction or a cover letter outlining 
objectives and framework of the research, links to the project responsible 
persons or organizations, information on personal data management, and 
in some cases on the number of questions and the time estimated for 
completion. Questions were then organized in a profile section and 
sections on levels of awareness and competences; educational 
opportunities; and opinions and attitudes. Profile questions typically 
included country;54 scientific area of the institution or faculty of affiliation; 
the specialization area of the respondent and the level at which they 
taught55 and in some cases the approximate number of students taught 
per year. Questions on current awareness and competences were 
included in different forms in the Pakistan, Morocco, Project 18, Region A, 
Country B, Country C and Country D surveys. The Pakistan questionnaire 
asked students if they had ever heard of key terms and to provide a brief 
definition showing their own understanding of some terms. 56  Other 
questions assessed knowledge levels on organizations and initiatives 
regarding dual-use research, legislation, and codes of conduct, and/or if 
the respondent had ever received training on biosafety, biosecurity or 
biorisk management. The third section generally aimed at getting 
information about existing educational opportunities and references 
relevant for deliberate disease risks given in higher education 
                                                      
54 For multi-country projects like EUBARNet, Project 18 and Region A. 
55 Or, for students, in which they studied. Scientific fields were categorized according to what 
emerged by online investigations or feedback from pilots. Respondents were allowed to select 
multiple options and/or to indicate additional ones under “other”. 
56  Including bioethics, biosafety, biosecurity, bioweapons, bioterrorism, dual-use research, the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and Codes of Conduct. 
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programmes. 57  The concept of “considerations currently given” was 
operationalized in the information that the respondents were able to give 
about the contents of courses, either directly because they taught those 
contents, on indirectly because they coordinated, or were aware of, work 
of others. The dimensions selected to describe existing considerations 
were: their existence; their extent, quality and nature in case of inclusion; 
and reasons for not inclusion. Answers were given with a combination of 
options, with variables in the closed questions decided according to replies 
to previous similar studies and feedback from pilots. Generally a fourth 
section of the questionnaire aimed at eliciting the opinions and attitudes of 
respondents on deliberate disease risks and the role of education 
(including its perceived relevance, importance and urgency), in some 
cases including questions on risk perceptions, learning objectives, and/or 
on the systems to introduce or change educational programmes and 
related challenges and opportunities. Questions formats included multiple-
choice closed questions58, Likert scales59 to assess opinions on different 
items, and/or open questions. Questionnaires were circulated in English 
for the Pakistan, EUBARNet,60 Project 18, Region A, Country A University 
2 and Country C projects. The questionnaire for the Morocco project was 
                                                      
57 Definitions of key terms such as biosafety, biosecurity or biorisk management from sources 
including the WHO Biosafety Manual and Biosecurity Guidance (WHO, 2004; WHO, 2006) or the 
CWA15793 (CEN, 2011) were indicated before this section or in a glossary. 
58 The questionnaire for the Pakistan survey was distributed in two waves in 2011 with slightly 
different versions, with some questions being presented in binary closed questions (yes/no) in the 
first version and in Likert scale in the second version. In these cases, the answers to the second 
version were recoded as binary accordingly. 177 respondents answered the first version and 271 
the second version. 
59 Guidance on how to develop Likert scale questions, items, and ranking systems has been 
followed from Robson (2011). 
60 Given its multi-country scope, it was discussed with pilots participants if using English would have 
been a disadvantage, or if translating to the local languages was a better strategy. Accepting a 
generally agreement that in the European scientific academic community, English is universally 
used, it has been suggested by pilot participants how using English in the questionnaire would have 
helped the internationalization of the project. Furthermore, using only one language made much 
easier the administration of questionnaire. In the view of personalization and to facilitate 
engagement, however, we decided to translate in the respondent’s language (Italian, Portuguese, 
Spanish, etc) the email message accompanying the invitation. 
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circulated in French.61 Questionnaires for the Country B and Country D 
projects were circulated in a bilingual version, and respondents had the 
option to answer in English or in their language. Questionnaires explained 
how data would be managed, by whom and under what conditions. As a 
general rule, anonymity was granted to respondents, while confidentiality 
was granted with regard to personal information, which could be used only 
for the purposes of the project (for example for follow-up activities), in case 
they expressed interest to be further involved. 62  Sample models of 
questionnaires are reported in the Appendices. 
1.8.2.4 Data analysis 
Answers to closed multiple-choice or Likert scale questions were codified 
and tabulated into software applications to generate quantitative data. 
Microsoft Excel was used to organize and analyse data from all surveys.63 
Excel and/or the other applications were used to generate frequency 
distribution tables, cross-tables, descriptive statistics and/or graphs. 64 
Answers to open questions, such as from the section on levels of 
awareness and competences and the section on opinions and attitudes, 
were anonymized, collected and coded into categories (such as for 
                                                      
61 Questions and answers in French are translated (by the author) into English in the thesis. 
Original text is provided in the footnotes. 
62 Respondents were explained that personal information under the profile section was, anyway, 
optional. The questionnaire model for the EUBARNet survey explained that data (besides personal 
information) could be used for the project and other academic research. 
63 The SPSS and R packages were also used for the Morocco and Pakistan surveys. The WPQuiz 
plugin for Wordpress used for the EUBARNet survey also provided automatic tabulation, however it 
only recorded answers of individual respondents, so results were then compiled into Microsoft 
Excel. 
64  Statistical analyses including statistical significance tests of individual shares of answers to 
multiple-choice questions; and statistical independence analysis of data from cross-tables with chi-
squared goodness of fit tests and Fisher exact tests were carried out on results of the two largest 
questionnaire surveys, that on professors in Morocco and that on students in Pakistan. While tests 
results were generally positive, given the above considerations on the intended representativeness 
and significance of the research results, and that statistical analysis has not been carried out in the 
other projects for the same reasons, tests results are not reported in the thesis. 
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prioritized learning objectives suggested by professors) or flagged for 
particularly relevant quotes.65 
1.8.3 Educational interventions 
Educational interventions on deliberate disease risks, targeting students of 
higher education degrees in life sciences and technologies, public health, 
medicine or animal health fields, have been carried out as part of the 
education plan of the research. These experiences, and data from relative 
evaluation questionnaires, are used to discuss the second and third 
research questions, and are mainly presented in Chapters 7 and Chapter 
8. 
Educational interventions took the form of one or multi-day seminars or 
workshops, and in-person or distance courses. They included lecturing 
and active learning techniques to different extents. Contents spanned a 
range of topics within the biosafety, biosecurity, biorisk management and 
bioethics subject matters. Instructional materials were developed 
specifically for the research (such as for the Pakistan and ISIS projects 
and some seminars of the EUBARNet and Project 18 projects) or 
leveraged pre-existing resources, such as the EMR (for some seminars of 
the EUBARNet project) and the GBRMC (for the Country A University 1 
and Country C projects). Participating students were selected in concert 
with their local professors, and/or basing on their enrolment in degrees 
where the course was inserted. Educational interventions were realized in 
the Pakistan (1 intervention, 12 students from one HEI and one country, 
one-day seminar); EUBARNet (7 interventions, 268 students from 7 HEIs 
and 6 countries, one-day seminars); Project 18 (9 interventions, 527 
students from 9 HEIs and 7 countries, one or two-day seminars); ISIS (1 
intervention, 25 students from one HEI and one country, distance learning 
course); Country A University 1 (1 intervention, 12 students from one HEI 
in one country, five-day seminar); and Country C (1 intervention, 15 
students from two HEIs in one country, five-day seminar) projects.66 
                                                      
65 Quotes are reported with a coding system for respondents, with letters indicating the project and 
the HEI of the respondent and numbers indicating the individual respondent. Codes are indicated at 
the end of quotes in square brackets. 
66 More detailed information on educational interventions is provided in Chapters 7 and 8. 
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Educational interventions included post-intervention evaluation 
questionnaires to gather feedback from students as well as to test learning 
objectives. Two main models were used, the former developed basing on 
the experience of the 2008-2009 “Fostering the Biosecurity Norm” project, 
itself based on widely tested reaction questionnaires that students 
compiled on regular courses in their HEIs and which were offered as 
examples by engaged professors. That model was further developed and 
integrated with knowledge questions relevant to deliberate disease risks, 
and versions were used in the Pakistan, EUBARNet and Project 18 
projects.67 Post-instruction questionnaires used in the interventions in the 
Country A University 1 and Country C projects were based on 
standardized surveys developed by Sandia National Laboratories and 
made available to trainers as part of the GBRMC. The ISIS and the 
Country A University 1 projects also included specific post-instruction 
evaluation and assessment methods to evaluate learning.68 
Post-instruction evaluation questionnaires were anonymous and students 
were told that no personal information would be used for scopes outside 
that of the projects, and that aggregated data could be used for the 
specific projects and academic work. Data from questionnaires was 
anonymized were necessary, coded and compiled into Microsoft Excel for 
analysis to generate quantitative data. Answers to open questions were 
anonymized, collected and coded into categories or flagged for particularly 
relevant quotes.69 Sample models of post-instruction questionnaires are 
reported in the Appendices. 
                                                      
67 The EUBARNet and Project 18 questionnaires for students were designed and administered with 
two parts, one to be compiled before the educational intervention and one post the educational 
intervention. Questions for the pre-seminar section have been developed on the model of the 
Pakistan survey for students and other questionnaires for professors and are included in the 
discussion in Chapter 5. 
68 Response rates to post-intervention surveys included all participating students except for the 
interventions in the EUBARNet (210 in six seminars out of 268 students in seven seminars; 
questionnaires could not be used in the seminar in Sweden) and Project 18 (453 in eight seminars 
out of 527 students in nine seminars; questionnaires could not be used in the second seminar in 
Morocco) projects. 
69 Quotes are reported with a coding system for respondents, with letters indicating the project and 
the HEI of the respondent and numbers indicating the individual respondent. Codes are indicated at 
the end of quotes in square brackets. 
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1.8.4 ISD train-the-trainer workshops 
Workshops on instructional design for professors and educators to create 
education as a tool to limit deliberate disease risks have been carried out 
as part of the instruction design plan of research. They have been used 
mainly to discuss the third research question, and their results are 
presented in Chapter 7 and Chapter 9. Workshops were organized along 
the phases of the ADDIE ISD model70 and typically had a format of a five-
day in-person workshop.71 ISD workshops were realized in the Region A 
(24 participants), Country A University 2 (29 participants); Country B (10 
participants to the first workshop, and 16 to the second workshop); 
Country C (9 participants); and Country D (20 participants). Post-
workshops questionnaires for participants were also used, based on the 
standardized surveys model developed by Sandia National Laboratories. 
Post-workshops questionnaires were anonymous and participants were 
told that no personal information would be used for anything outside that 
of the projects. Data from questionnaires was anonymized where 
necessary, coded and compiled into Microsoft Excel for analysis to 
generate quantitative data. Answers to open questions were anonymized, 
collected and coded into categories or flagged for particularly relevant 
quotes.72 ISD workshops included templates for exercises on instructional 
design that generated qualitative data.73 Sample models of post-workshop 
questionnaire are reported in the Appendices. 
1.8.5 Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews of professors who had been actively engaged 
in promoting and implementing education as a potential tool to mitigate 
deliberate disease risks is a tool specifically designed for this research, 
                                                      
70 See the next Chapter for further details. 
71 However, in the Country B project it was split into two workshops, a first one covering Analysis 
and Design and a second one covering Development, Implementation and Evaluation; and in the 
Country A University 2, Country C and Country D projects it only covered the Analysis and Design 
phases. Subsequently to the workshops, the author and colleagues mentored participants on 
refining their designs; and to practice implementation. 
72 Quotes are reported with a coding system for respondents, with letters indicating the project and 
numbers indicating the individual respondent. Codes are indicated at the end of quotes in square 
brackets. 
73 Quotes are coded with a code for the type of document (such as “DD” for design documents), 
letters for the project, and numbers for the individual respondent. 
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collecting data that is exclusive to the thesis. Data from interviews are 
used to discuss the second and third research questions, and their results 
constitute a major contribution to Chapter 8 and Chapter 9. Eligibility 
criteria for interviewees included having been involved for at least one full 
academic year in one or more projects that I had coordinated or was 
involved in, and who had implemented education to their students. The 
interviews were semi-structured in that I prepared a schedule and checklist 
of points that included a recollection from the respondent on how they 
became involved in education on deliberate disease risks; and then 
touching the four levels of evaluation on the educational and instruction 
design plans of research.74 The interview schedule, and an information 
and consent sheet for interviewees, were reviewed and approved by the 
Chair of the Humanities, Social and Health Sciences Research Ethics 
Panel at the University of Bradford. I interviewed nine professors, all 
involved in one or more of the projects presented above. I contacted 
professors via email explaining the interview proposal and to arrange an 
appointment; all invited professors accepted the interview. Five interviews 
were carried out in 2014; three in 2015; and one in 2016. The shortest 
interview lasted 23 minutes, the longest one hour and seven minutes. Six 
interviews were carried out in English, two in French and one in Italian.75 
At the beginning of the interview, I presented the Information and Consent 
Sheet to be signed, retained the signed copy76 and asked permission to 
                                                      
74 See the next Chapter for further theoretical details, and Chapters 8 and 9 for results. A semi-
structured interview denotes when “the interviewer has an interview guide that serves as a checklist 
of topics to be covered and a default wording and order for the questions, but the wording and order 
are often substantially modified based on the flow of the interview, and additional unplanned 
questions are asked to follow up on what the interviewee says” (Robson, 2011 p. 280). The semi-
structured design “is most appropriate when the interviewer is closely involved with the research 
process (e.g. in small-scale project when the researcher is also the interviewer)” (Robson, 2011 p. 
285) like in this case. In designing and carrying the interviews I considered suggested good 
practices such as the use of probes, prompts, schedule, introduction, taping, and analysing 
(Robson, 2011; Weiss, 1995). 
75 In the thesis, I translated into English the quotes from the French and Italian interviews, keeping 
originals in footnotes. The translation was focused on the “functional equivalence” rather than 
“literal identity”, as suggested by Hakim (2000). 
76 I also anticipated the document via email. 
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record the conversation. I then transcribed 77  the recordings and 
anonymised 78  all references to the interviewee, other individuals, 
organizations, HEIs and countries. 79  Transcripts were analysed using 
thematic coding and identification of themes. 80  The semi-structured 
interview schedule and the Information and Consent Sheet are reported in 
the Appendices. 
Table 2 - Use of different data gathering tools in the projects considered by the research 
 
1.9 Ethical Issues 
This research involved a number of ethical issues. Firstly, there are 
considerations related to data collection and generation, in particular for 
those methods involving people such as questionnaires and interviews. 
                                                      
77 In the transcriptions, underlined text denotes emphasis; a comma (“,”) and points (“…”) denote a 
short and a long pause in talking, respectively; the “…” at the end and beginning of lines indicate an 
interjection as the person continued talking. 
78 Quotes from interviews are reported in the thesis with a coding system for respondents, indicated 
from “Professor 1” to “Professor 9”. Codes are indicated at the end of quotes in square brackets. 
The acronym “GMM” indicates my questions and interventions. 
79 Knowing the projects considered in this research, it may have been possible otherwise to identify 
respondents, who were granted anonymity. Transcripts are stored according to the procedures 
mentioned in the Information and Consent Sheet. 
80 See Robson (2011) and Silverman (2005 pp. 154–155). Also referred to as first and second level 
coding (Miles and Huberman, 1984). 
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The conditions and purposes for data collection and management have 
been explained to participants; particularly for semi-structured interviews 
signature of Information and Consent Sheets was required. Anonymity, 
planned in order to encourage honest replies on educational contents and 
opinions, was used as a general rule. When participants provided contact 
details and expressed interest in being further involved, confidentiality was 
granted. As this research involved a range of different geographical, 
socioeconomical and cultural contexts, I considered different sensitivities 
in countries when approaching participants for questionnaires surveys and 
interviews. Data was managed according to guidelines of specific projects; 
the Board of Ethics of the University of Bradford; Sandia’s Human Subject 
Research Board when applicable interpreted in a restrictive way;81 and/or 
if they were already been reviewed and approved for publication. There 
was no potential harm to participants envisaged from their participation in 
the projects or the research.82 Furthermore there could have been the 
possibility of, in some cases, configuring a dependent relationship 
between some participants and the researcher. Measures to mitigate 
these risks included inviting professors to not force students to participate 
in questionnaire surveys or educational interventions, and explaining to 
both students and professors that there were no “desirable” answers to the 
questions in data gathering. Finally, and generally, I tried to uphold high 
professional standards for reporting and discussing results.83 
                                                      
81 As results are not considered generalizable to larger populations than those surveyed; and they 
do not identify specific individuals, organizations, institutions or countries. 
82 Given the subject of the research, and potential security risks, a remote but existing possibility 
was to find situations that were unsecure, unsafe or illegal under national or international guidelines 
and laws. This could have potentially put colleagues and me in a “whistle-blowing” dilemma 
(Robson, 2011 p. 219) of deciding to report such situations, possibly causing problems to 
participants to the research. No such situation arose in the research, and when minor (or general, 
rather than critical) issues were identified, participants were eager to discuss potential solutions as 
well as to engage with their generally collaborative management and leadership. However, should 
major issues have been encountered, whistle-blowing should have been seen as a duty of the 
researchers, and reporting to competent authorities something eventually helping a more secure 
context for the participants. 
83 Including accuracy and comprehensiveness in data reporting, avoid over-interpretations from 
data, and make explicit errors or problems (Sarantakos, 1999). 
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1.10 Structure of the thesis 
While this Chapter presented the research scope and methodological 
approaches, the next one discusses the theoretical framework informing it. 
Together, the two Chapters provide the framework used by this research 
to investigate education as a potential tool to mitigate deliberate disease 
risks. The next Chapter discusses the social constructionist approach; 
implications of research on security and disease; approaches of 
securitization and discourse analysis; concepts of risk; theories from 
educational science (in particular the ADDIE model of ISD; the learning-
by-design and the learner-centred-delivery pillars for education; and the 
four-levels model of evaluating impacts of education); and the concept of 
the web of prevention in which education could be inserted.  
Applying that outline, Chapter 3 starts the discussion from the conceptual 
area of risk. It discusses an assessment of the risks of deliberate disease 
going through risk identification, risk characterization, and factors that 
have a role in risk evaluation. It identifies three risk scenarios of deliberate 
disease risks and it discusses if and how education could potentially lower 
those risks. 
Chapter 4 deals primarily with securitization analysis of education as a 
security tool, and focuses on the first research question. It explains how 
education has been co-opted by security actors as a strand of the web of 
prevention and presents an overview of attempted securitization moves on 
education. Calls for education are analysed and evaluated applying the 
historico-political securitization approach described in Chapter 2. Finally, 
open questions on education as a security tool are discussed. 
As Chapters 3 and 4 focus primarily on the conceptual areas of risk and 
security, and present the application of two strands of the theoretical 
framework, Chapters 5 to 9 focus on the conceptual area of learning and 
the second and third research questions, applying the third strand of the 
theoretical framework with the selected methods from educational science.  
Chapters 5 to 9 are organized along the phases of the ADDIE cycle for 
both the education and the instruction design plans of research. Chapter 5 
deals with Analysis and, after an overview of results from literature before 
2011, presents data from projects on demographics of student learner 
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populations; their mastery of contents relevant for deliberate disease risks; 
existing educational opportunities; educators’ experience and mastery of 
relevant contents; perceptions and assessments of deliberate disease 
risks; attitudes and opinions on the importance and the role of education, 
and on challenges and strategies for implementation. 
Chapter 6 focuses on Design, firstly identifying learning objectives on the 
education and the instruction design plans of research. Subsequently, the 
Chapter presents instructional design tools used to match objectives with 
Analysis information, as well as examples of designed education on 
biorisks (including deliberate disease risks) from considered projects. 
Finally the Chapter addresses the design of proposed strategies for 
evaluation of education to mitigate deliberate disease risks in the 
education and instruction design plans of research, proposing specific 
evaluation tools. 
Chapter 7 discusses the Development and Implementation phases within 
the ADDIE model of ISD for education to mitigate deliberate disease risks. 
The Development phase consists in preparing instructional material 
needed to realize the educational programme; while the Implementation 
phase consists in carrying instruction to students according to Design and 
using the developed materials. The Chapter presents guidelines on 
Development that retain the learning-by-design and learner-centered 
delivery pillars, as well as examples of practical applications taken from, 
and informed by, experience from the projects.  
Chapters 8 and 9 describe data and experiences from the projects in 
relation to the evaluation tools presented in Chapter 6, to understand how 
education on deliberate disease risks could be evaluated after instruction 
has been implemented. Chapter 8 discusses Evaluation on the education 
plan of research and if and how education could influence assessed 
deliberate disease risks in the three risk scenarios. Chapter 9 discusses 
Evaluation in the instruction design plan and if and how instructional 
design based on the learning-by-design and learner-centred-delivery 
pillars could be useful in promoting examples of effective education on 
deliberate disease risks. 
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Chapter 10 provides an overview of the themes and findings of the thesis, 
discusses what contributions it had made to knowledge, reviews the 
research questions, the research’s limitations as well as opportunities for 
further research.  
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2. Theoretical Framework 
This Chapter presents and discusses the theoretical framework informing 
the research. The first section presents the social constructionist approach 
and its application in the research. The second section presents 
implications of doing research on security and disease. The third section 
discusses different approaches to securitization, how it has been applied 
to public health and biology, and key aspects of discourse analysis 
relevant for the securitization of deliberate disease and the construction of 
education as a security risk mitigation tool. The fourth section discusses 
the conceptualization and approaches to risk and the application of a 
mitigated constructivist stance to risk. Section five presents the theories 
from educational science used in the research. The sixth section describes 
the web of prevention as the framework where education would be placed 
as a security risk mitigation tool. The last section summarizes the 
theoretical framework choices.  
2.1 An application of the social constructionist approach  
Concepts of social constructionism and their application to studying the 
relations among security, life sciences, disease and risk, are vital for the 
design of this research. The constructivist approach in security studies is 
largely based on its application to international relations (Agius, 2013) by 
Onuf (1989), itself based on the social constructionist and constructivist 
tradition in social science (Burr, 2015). 84  According to social 
constructionism and constructivism, social entities and properties are 
fabricated (constructed) through interactions among people and groups, 
and those entities and properties can be only known through interaction 
regardless of a possible “objective” reality.85 Ontologically, constructivist 
                                                      
84 The constructivist approach in international relations sustains the importance of identities for 
international political action and decision-making, and that reality(ies) and ideas are socially 
constructed (Reus-Smit, 2005), as well as the central role of beliefs, cultures and norms  (Agius, 
2013). Ruggie (1998) contends that rather than a theory of international relations, constructivism in 
the field should be seen as a “theoretically informed approach to the study of international relations”. 
85 Social “constructionism” usually identifies approaches that describe interactions among groups, 
while “constructivism” would more often identify theoretical approaches looking at individuals (rather 
than groups) actively creating their own meanings (Robson, 2011; Burr, 2015). 
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research generally opposes positivism and empiricism86, and contests the 
notion of objective reality. Epistemologically, according to constructivists 
all knowledge is relative (Burr, 2015), and the focus cannot be on “reality” 
but rather on how the world is represented, described and made to appear 
real (Holstein and Miller, 2006). 87  The extent to which constructionist 
researchers view reality as “real” varies, with degrees between relativism 
and realism. 88  Other differences include at least one on ontological 
stances between “strong” (also referred to as “light” or “micro”) 
constructionism focusing on language structures, and “weak” (also 
referred to as “macro”) constructionism focusing on the role of social 
structures utilizing language to shape the world, as well as being shaped 
by language (Burr, 2015). 89  Common traits, however, include always 
keeping a sceptical stance towards claims of truth, including the 
researchers’ own, and the stress on the role of language90  in shaping 
representations of the world, if not the world itself. “Micro” social 
constructionists study language in the everyday interactions of individuals 
                                                      
86 “The belief that we can only know what we can immediately apprehend. That which exists is what 
we perceive to exist” (Burr, 2015 pos. 4452) and “the view that the only valid knowledge is that 
which is derived from observation and experiment” (Burr, 2015 pos. 4425), respectively 
87 Ontology regards how we consider the nature of the (social) world (Robson, 2011) and the 
assumptions we make on the social entities (Jabri, 2006). Epistemology regards how we consider 
the nature of knowledge, how we create knowledge about the world (Robson, 2011), and if and how 
we can understand social realities. Every research has ontological and epistemological foundations 
depending on the researcher’s beliefs, the researched subject, and the context of the research. 
These foundations influence the research design as well as its tools and claims of any “result”. 
88 Relativism argues that reality, if it exists, is inaccessible, and that any representation of the world 
cannot be checked for “accuracy” against it. Hence, no account can be preferred as “truer” than 
another. Realism posits that the (an) external world exists independently from the social actors that 
interact with it, and with properties that are given and do no change based on different descriptions 
or interpretations. Reality exists, and while descriptions are not necessarily able to depict it, it at 
least underpins them (Burr, 2015). Social constructionists accepting some tenets of realism are 
often considered closer to critical realism, according to which real structures and cause-and-effect 
relations exists, even if they are not always observable or measurable. Research can however infer 
them through analysing the effects and try to unveil structures, assumptions and consequences 
possibly to the benefit of people. 
89  Furthermore, epistemological differences include that modern constructivists believe that a 
positivist epistemology can be used to analyse, describe and explain constructed reality, while post-
modern constructivists are more radically interpretivist in refusing firm concepts of reality and the 
possibility of explanation (Reus-Smit, 2005). 
90  Broadly including not only speech and text, but also any representation and form of 
communication. 
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constructing different, “personal”, views of the world.91 For “macro” social 
constructionists, on the other hand, language not only constructs but is 
also used to support, challenge or enforce social structures, relations and 
practices. In this sense and especially in the poststructuralist vein of macro 
constructionism, language is connected with competition and power. For 
both approaches, “discourse” is a central concept and tool of language, 
but for macro constructionists it extends beyond just the contingent speech 
or text. According to approaches derived from the work of Foucault, 92 
discourses are all “practices that systematically form the objects of which 
they speak” (Foucault, 2002 p. 54), combinations of meanings, attributes, 
representations that create versions of reality. Mobilizing language, 
discourses create competing knowledge, and hence are also instruments 
of power. One of the main lines of argumentation in the thesis advances 
that discourses can be, and are, used to depict (at least certain aspects of) 
life and associated sciences and technologies in terms of security and 
insecurity, of generating “risks”, be associated with “threats”, requiring 
security “measures”, and that new areas such as education became 
constructed as instruments of security. 
I will maintain some inputs of the micro, or strong, constructionism, for 
example in the application of securitization analysis,93 that are very much 
linked to the idea of language as action-oriented and creating performative 
acts (Burr, 2015). However, my approach is mostly with macro, or weak, 
constructionist. A first reason is that categories of security, risk and 
disease will be discussed in the perspective of how they are constructed 
by competing discourses. Secondly, discourses are regarded as attempted 
moves of protection by different groups such as governments, civil society 
                                                      
91 Examples including the work of discursive psychologists, which studies how people “put their 
linguistic skills to use in building specific accounts of events, accounts which may have powerful 
implications for the interactants themselves. It is therefore primarily concerned with the performative 
functions of language” (Burr, 2015 pos. 400). 
92 In Michel Foucault’s view, philosophy is the “politics of truth”, and truth is always the winning 
result of a power struggle (Foucault and Napoli, 2005 p. 14). The exercise of power determines 
what position or, using a Foucaultian category, discourse, will be validated to constitute “true 
knowledge” and rule out other positions (Mills, 2003). Discourse is also what informs and shapes, 
through its procedures, knowledge. 
93 Yet with a critically applied alternative approach to securitization analysis, that makes it closer to 
the general macro stance of the research, as detailed below. 
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and the scientific community. Securitization, risk assessment and 
management, as well as education, can all be described as discourses 
that suggest or prescribe what should or should not, can or cannot, be 
done. Thirdly, and especially in relation to the conceptualization of risk, I 
assume that ontologically and epistemologically speaking there can be a 
“relatively objective” (in the sense of comparable, because of its 
relativeness) analysis. At the same time I maintain the sceptical 
constructivist stance to truths, including any that could be suggested by 
my own analysis. The main concepts interacting in the research, including 
security, risk and learning, will be presented as different actors have 
constructed them94 and how they are constructed by the research itself in 
possible, non-exclusive, meanings. World-views borrowed from 
traditionally empiricist, if not realist, approaches such as risk management 
will be re-presented to uncover their actual components of relativity and 
subjectivity and integrated in the macro (weak) social constructionist 
approach. 
2.2 Security, life science and disease 
Investigating deliberate disease raises fundamental ontological, 
epistemological and methodological challenges to the research.95  Such 
challenges derive from the complexity of the contested concept of security 
and are reflected throughout the security discourse. On one side there are 
traditional approaches which tend to be identified with political realism, a 
positivist epistemology, a focus on the military dimension, and the 
consideration of states as the main, if not exclusive, referent objects and 
actors of security (Smith, 2005). On the other side, there are approaches 
that have flourished as reactions to the theoretical and methodological 
limitations of traditional approaches. Alternative approaches to security 
refute, to varying degrees, positivist explanations, and are more or less 
accepting of constructivist accounts and interpretations.96 
                                                      
94 Not least considering their social context and identities. 
95 Not only ontology and epistemology approaches influence each other, but they also have a 
bearing and are affected by research methodology, that has been described in Chapter 1. 
96 According to constructivist security studies, there is no objective security reality, so security 
categories such as actors, referent objects and issue areas are mutually created by the 
relationships of the social actors (Agius, 2013). As such, ideas and norms can be changed and 
promoted. 
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The most important differences of alternative security studies approaches 
from traditional approaches 97  are firstly the recognition that other 
phenomena, besides states, are relevant for security, and secondly, that 
so is the move to widen the scope of security studies beyond the military 
dimension, what Booth (2005) has termed respectively the deepening and 
the broadening of security. 98  Rothschild (1995 p. 55) has depicted 
broadening security as extending the referent objects from nation-states to 
individuals, groups, society as well as the biosphere; actors of security 
from nation-states to international organizations, NGOs, interested 
individuals and public opinion; and dimensions of security from military to 
political, economic, social, environmental and human.99 
Regarding security and disease, Fidler and colleagues (Fidler, 2007a; 
Fidler, 2007b) discussed the evolution of the relationship between security 
and public health and, even recognizing that already in 1983 Ullman 
proposed an ante litteram definition of human security that included 
among risks “decimating epidemics” (Ullman, 1983 p. 133), they explained 
that the convergence between public health and security that would be 
accepted by “experts” on both sides is much more recent. This would 
imply that public health migrated from “low politics” to the “high politics” 
areas (Booth, 2005 p. 7) considered by security studies. Indeed, 
traditionally these studies paid little attention to security issues related to 
                                                      
97 And indeed what makes possible to apply them to the investigation of relationships among 
science, life and security. 
98 According to Booth, deepening security studies means looking at “a more extensive set of 
referents for security than the sovereign state, from individuals to the whole of humanity” (Booth, 
2005 p. 14). Broadening would entail expanding security studies to issue areas beyond the military 
one. 
99 The development of the human security concept is particularly relevant for the broadening of 
security studies. This concept emerged in the early 1990s largely thanks to the promotion by the 
United Nations Development Program as protection of people from both long-term threats and 
sudden disruption of daily life conditions. Supported by other multilateral developments (such as the 
use of the term by the United Nations and NGOs alike, and the UN Secretary General and Security 
Council being involved in “broadened security” via human security), the paradigm had increasing 
fortune describing the evolving security needs in the post Cold-War era. Pereira (2008) summarized 
characteristics of human security in being emancipatory, pacifist and human rights centred. Human 
security proponents embraced the deepening and broadening of security paradigms possibly before 
their formal theorization, and one of the issue areas that were more strongly introduced was that of 
public health and disease.  
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public health. According to Fidler and Gostin, the constitution of the WHO 
in 1948 was an initial shift from the purely realist100 positions of states 
protecting their own trade interests, to the consideration of people’s health 
conditions as rights. However, despite the development of international 
public health, this did not have an impact on how states saw security. The 
two policy worlds only collided in the early 21st century, and because of 
factors the authors present as exogenous and objective: “dramatic 
developments” (Fidler and Gostin, 2008 p. 136) in the threats of a 
changing context that shaped new policies. Among these, primarily were 
the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 and the subsequent 
bioterrorism events, and secondarily the salience of naturally occurring 
disease problems such as SARS, avian flu outbreaks and the 
development of microbial resistance. The authors maintain that infectious 
diseases were characterized as a security problem, and a novel link 
between security and public health was created. Public health also 
became a tool in domestic and international security policies: the 2002 
national security strategy in the US (White House, 2002), the United 
Nations Secretary General High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change (United Nations, 2004), and the 2005 edition of the WHO 
International Health Regulations (WHO, 2005), all mentioned the role of 
public health to ensure security and would be examples of this integration. 
Deepening, broadening and converging of security also presents potential 
problems. It has been noted that broadening security could result in 
“making security studies too amorphous” (Morgan, 1999 p. 64), or diluting 
the important military dimension of international and global security (Ayoob, 
1997). However, if we accept that there are security issues linked to the 
life sciences including the potential for deliberate disease, we may follow 
Krause and Williams’ point when they say that “it may be necessary to 
broaden the agenda of security studies (theoretically and 
methodologically) in order to narrow down the agenda of security” (Fierke, 
1997 p. 249, emphasis in the original), in order to be able, on the one 
                                                      
100 The “realism family” of theories of international relations in its basic common elements posits 
that states are the key, rational, actors in an anarchic – though not chaotic – international system; 
and power (mainly in its military form) as the main defining feature of inter-state relations (Glaser 
2013). 
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hand, to consider all relevant aspects of contemporary security issues, but 
on the other hand to analyse specific issues and assign appropriate roles 
and responsibilities to the extended range of security actors involved – not 
only states and international organizations, but also scientists and civil 
society. 
2.3 Biosecurity, biosafety and biorisk management 
Issues related with security and disease are often presented as lying along 
spectra. One spectrum is the source of harm and would include natural 
outbreaks of infectious diseases, chronic diseases, accidental 
contamination or release of (dangerous) biological materials, unexpected 
consequences of research and of application of life sciences, and 
deliberate harm caused (by people) using (dangerous) biological materials 
(i.e., deliberate disease). Another spectrum looks at the causative agent of 
harm: infective pathogenic agents (virus, bacteria, fungi, rickettsia), 
chemicals with effects on biological systems like bioregulators (Bokan and 
Orahovec, 2004), toxins produced by biological organisms, living 
genetically modified organisms, invasive animal or plant species. A third 
spectrum would be potential consequences: death, incapacitation, injuries, 
material destruction, economic loss, and psychological stress.101 The 2013 
Global Risks Report of the World Economic Forum considered 
“vulnerability to pandemics”102 and introduced “unforeseen consequences 
of new life science technologies”103 in its yearly risk landscape analysis 
(World Economic Forum, 2013). In this research, I primarily focus on 
deliberate disease risks. However, it appears important to understand how 
issues are, in some cases, connected both in terms of challenges and 
security measures; and to consider the relative importance, perceptions, 
and responses regarding deliberate disease compared to the other issues 
                                                      
101 Life sciences and biotechnology are also present at different sides of the security risk equation: 
they can be referent objects (i.e. to ensure people’s survival and safety from harm, science and 
health have to be preserved), sources of harm (i.e. biological agents or potentially misused 
scientific research or technological applications), and security tools (to prevent, mitigate and 
respond to harm). 
102 Described as “inadequate disease surveillance systems, failed international coordination and the 
lack of vaccine production capacity”. 
103 Described as “advances in genetics and synthetic biology produce unintended consequences, 
mishaps or are used as weapons”. 
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outlined above, within the security policy, life science, and civil society 
communities. 
Overlaps between different conceptualizations and boundaries attributed 
to security issues related to life sciences, biotechnology and public health 
are epitomized by the analysis of the term biosecurity. As the composite 
word may suggest, biosecurity could refer in general to “security related to 
living organisms”, and in this sense it would generally represent security 
issues related to biology. However, the term evolved in parallel in different 
contexts and is used with different meanings in different fields such as 
animal health, agriculture, ecology, food supply, public health, laboratory 
management and arms control. FAO describes biosecurity as a “strategic 
and integrated approach” comprising policy and regulatory measures that 
“analyse and manage risks in the sectors of food safety, animal life and 
health, and plant life and health, including associated environmental 
risk. Biosecurity covers the introduction of plant pests, animal pests and 
diseases, zoonoses, the introduction and release of genetically modified 
organisms and their products, and the introduction and management of 
invasive alien species and genotypes” (FAO, 2016). Some countries use 
biosecurity in the same context, even if narrowing its focus on the 
protection from particular biological sources of harm. New Zealand’s 
biosecurity system, for example, aims to “keep out, remove, or effectively 
manage the harm that pests or diseases can do to our economy, the 
environment and our health” (New Zealand, 2016); similarly Australia sees 
biosecurity as the protection of “the country from exotic pests and 
diseases through quarantine, surveillance, and detection” (BTWC, 2003a p. 
125, statement by Australia). Generally, the veterinary and agriculture 
meaning of biosecurity has come to denote the protection of national 
biological resources from foreign or invasive biological agents. This 
conceptualization of biosecurity does not distinguish between accidental or 
intentional acts, focuses on selected biological agents as potential sources 
of harm, does not distinguish between pathogens and other biological 
agents, and comprises technical, policy and regulatory measures. An 
alternative interpretation of biosecurity has been offered by the WHO, 
which in the third edition of its Laboratory Biosafety Manual defined 
biosecurity in the public health context as the “protection of microbiological 
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assets from theft, loss, or diversion which could lead to the inappropriate 
use of these agents to cause harm” (WHO, 2004). This conceptualization 
of biosecurity focuses on people as potential sources of harm, on the 
intentional nature of the unwanted events, on one subset of biological 
agents, and comprises both technical and public health policy measures. 
The concept has been further specified by the WHO, restricting the use of 
the word to laboratory environments. Laboratory biosecurity is defined as 
“the protection, control and accountability for valuable biological materials 
within laboratories, in order to prevent their unauthorized access, loss, 
theft, misuse, diversion or intentional release” (WHO, 2006). Laboratory 
biosecurity focuses on the prevention of intentional acts; several types of 
biological materials such as pathogens, toxins, pharmaceutical products, 
food products, GMOs, non-pathogenic microorganisms, extraterrestrial 
samples, genetic materials and radiolabelled biological material; and both 
technical and procedural measures, but limited to the laboratory 
environment. Laboratory biosecurity measures have been further 
described as comprising five categories: physical security, personnel 
security, material control & accountability, and program management 
elements (Salerno and Gaudioso, 2007). The boundaries of the laboratory 
environment have been relaxed with the approach of the OECD, which 
developed biosecurity guidelines for Biological Resource Centers (BRCs) 
(OECD, 2007), defined as “service providers and repositories of the living 
cells, genomes of organisms, and information relating to heredity and the 
functions of biological systems.104 In the context of the BTWC, biosecurity 
is mostly used to refer to measures to maintain security and oversight of 
pathogenic organisms and toxins, not necessarily limiting to laboratories 
(or BRCs), but generally regarding all work with relevant materials that 
could be used for purposes prohibited by the Convention. Discussions of 
this concept took place in the first year of the first Inter-Sessional Process 
(ISP) in 2003, which included among topics of discussion “national 
mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of 
                                                      
104  BRCs contain collections of culturable organisms (e.g. micro-organisms, plant, animal and 
human cells), replicable parts of these (e.g. genomes, plasmids, viruses, cDNAs), viable but not yet 
culturable organisms cells and tissues, as well as data bases containing molecular, physiological 
and structural information relevant to these collections and related bioinformatics” (OECD, 2001). 
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pathogenic micro-organisms and toxins”. On that occasion, some States 
Parties already used the term biosecurity (or bio-security), however in 
some cases underlining how a unique and clear-cut use of the term was 
not yet achieved, and how biosecurity was still an evolving concept 
(BTWC, 2003b). States Parties noted their common understanding that in 
the context of the Convention biosecurity refers to “the protection, control 
and accountability measures implemented to prevent the loss, theft, 
misuse, diversion or intentional release of biological agents and toxins and 
related resources as well as unauthorized access to, retention or transfer 
of such material” (BTWC, 2008b p. 10). 105  Furthermore, while in the 
context of the BTWC the difference of the conceptualization is marked 
from the other foci, the different meanings can still connect and overlap.106 
The conceptualization of biosecurity in the context of the BTWC focuses 
on the prevention of intentional or unauthorized acts, biological agents 
(mainly, but not only, pathogens) and toxins, legislative, procedural and 
technical measures, and including but not limited to the laboratory 
dimension. 
Biosecurity, especially in those conceptualizations that underline the 
prevention of intentional acts, is also distinguished but closely related to 
biosafety. This term also experiences different meanings in different 
contexts, however they are more established in indicating two alternative 
concepts. The first one regards regulation, containment and prevention of 
undesired effects of GMOs, such as in the context of the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, which 
defines biosafety as “efforts to reduce and eliminate the potential risks 
resulting from biotechnology and its products” (Convention on Biological 
Diversity, 2016). The second concept is in the context of public health and 
defined by the WHO as “the containment principles, technologies and 
                                                      
105 States Parties made clear this should not be considered a definition, recognizing the competing 
meanings used in several countries (BTWC, 2008a). 
106 As Brazil (Brazil, 2008) stated, the lack of agriculture or veterinary biosecurity “could lead, by 
means of criminal insertion of such foreign and/or invasive species, to the intentional destruction of 
crops and/or livestock, with deleterious effects not only to the economy but also - and most 
importantly - to food security around the globe. These concerns are related to the concepts of 
bioterrorism and biopiracy, which are also of relevance to the BWC. It is the Brazilian view, 
therefore, that the excessive narrowing of the definition of biosecurity should be avoided”. 
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practices that are implemented to prevent the unintentional exposure to 
pathogens and toxins, or their accidental release” (WHO, 2004). States 
Parties to the BTWC also considered the latter understanding of biosafety 
as relevant to the Convention, adopting a slightly enlarged definition that 
uses “biological agents” instead of “pathogens” (BTWC, 2008b). A 
recognized issue for definitions has been to achieve clarity on how 
biosafety and biosecurity are distinguished but connected, concerning 
respectively unintentional/accidental and intentional events. Common 
understanding is complicated by the fact that several languages do not 
have the same distinction among the “security” and “safety” terms as in 
English. 107  One effort to overcome these issues has been the 
conceptualization of a framework that integrates biosafety and biosecurity, 
recognizing that some measures are common to address both accidental 
and intentional events, as in the case of biorisk management. Biorisk 
management has been particularly codified in the context of managing 
safety and security risks in the laboratory environment, especially with 
guidelines issued by the Comité Européen de Normalisation in 2008 and 
renewed in 2011 (CEN, 2011); however management of both safety and 
security biological risks can be addressed with assessment and mitigation 
measures that go beyond the laboratory. 
The concept of biosecurity hence has evolved in parallel to the 
conceptualization of agricultural and biodiversity contamination, using the 
focus on intentional threats. Initially this debate was limited to theft and 
unauthorized access and subsequently expanded to intentional misuse 
(Koblentz, 2009). In parallel to this process, measures evolved from a 
focus on the laboratory dimension to a multilevel and multidisciplinary 
rubric going beyond the doors of biological facilities. Biosecurity will be 
addressed in the context of this research in its “broader” concept within the 
idea of preventing deliberate disease. This choice espouses the multilevel 
                                                      
107 Many romance languages such as Spanish (Cuba, 2008) and Italian, for example, use the same 
term for both concepts which may be mirrored in national implementation measures or institutions 
addressing prevention of biological harm of either accidental or intentional nature, and/or from 
pathogens, GMOs or invasive species. In some cases, such as French (France, 2008), Portuguese 
or Arabic, two different terms are used at the regulatory level, but only one term is used in the 
common practice of scientific or health sectors. 
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idea of biosecurity and is located conceptually in the context of the so-
called web of prevention described later as a set of measures to prevent 
the multifaceted constructed risks of deliberate disease. Not only is it a 
component of the web, biosecurity is also a web in itself containing 
complementary stands of mitigation integrated into the range of measures 
and dimensions that make up the wider mitigation structure. 
2.4 Securitization and deliberate disease 
In the analysis and construction of educational messages, this research 
will leverage a critical application of securitization studies. The model was 
originally proposed by a group of scholars known as (Smith, 2005; 
Sheperd, 2013) the Copenhagen School, including Barry Buzan, Ole 
Waever and Jaap de Wilde, that here will also be referred as the 
“traditional” securitization model. Securitization studies have a 
constructivist discourse analysis approach, described by Waever (1995) 
and integrated into a more general framework sketched by Buzan (Buzan, 
1991, Buzan et al., 1998). According to them, securitization occurs when a 
securitizing actor successfully performs a securitization move, i.e. 
proposes a discourse that, with a specific rhetoric structure, presents an 
issue as an existential threat to an audience who accepts it. The process 
of securitization builds on the concept of speech act (Austin, 1962; Potter 
and Wetherell, 1987), an utterance that constitutes an act in itself, that by 
saying something, does something and has concrete consequences.108 
2.4.1 The traditional securitization model 
According to the securitization model, the securitization speech act would 
be a performative speech act having four constituent elements which 
“must be met for a successful securitization to occur: a) securitizing actors 
must declare a b) referent object to be existentially threatened and must 
make a persuasive call for the adoption of c) emergency measures to 
counter the threat and d) the audience must then also accept that 
argument to a sufficient degree for it to become possible to do things 
                                                      
108 Like naming a ship, declaring war, declaring a state of emergency. Austin explains that any 
sentence can convey one of three types of acts: a locutionary speech gives sense and reference to 
a performing act; an illocutionary sentence is one performed during the act; and a perlocutionary 
sentence aims to evoke in the audience specific acts. Onuf (1998 pp. 66–8) also addressed the 
category of speech act and identified three types: assertions, that relate to knowledge about the 
world; directives that give instructions; and commitments that imply promises. 
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politically that would not have otherwise been possible to do under normal 
or routine political conditions” (Buzan et al., 1998 p. 36). 109  Saying 
“security”,110 is the traditional method used by the authority to designate 
emergency, which implies the possibility of using exceptional means and 
the suspension of normal practices, as an issue is presented as “more 
important than other issues and should take absolute priority” (Buzan et al., 
1998 p. 24). According to the Copenhagen School, any policy issue can lie 
(and be moved) along a continuum that includes non-politicization, 
politicization - becoming “part of public policy, requiring government 
decision and resource allocation” (Buzan et al., 1998 p. 23) - and 
securitization. For the Copenhagen School, the security utterance is the 
security act itself: the conditions of possibility of a reality of security are 
“constitutive of the speech act of saying ‘security’” (Waever, 1995). 
Security analysis is really discourse analysis, as the attention is on the 
speech acts and their messages of existential threats and urgency, and on 
the acceptance by the audience(s). As such, there are not objective 
security threats; however, security is also not purely subjective, because it 
is the result of interaction between the involved actors: “securitization, like 
politicization, is intersubjective” (Buzan et al., 1998 p. 30). 
The Copenhagen School regards security as a socially constructed 
concept (Emmers, 2013) and with a primarily constructivist approach 
(Balzacq, 2010). Scholars of the Copenhagen School are “broadeners”, 
and proposed the expansion of security studies to four new sectors 
(environmental, economic, societal, political) (Buzan, 1991), however 
maintaining a structured division of issue areas as well as a distinct 
attention to the military sector. The most traditional part of their approach 
regards referent objects and actors of security. While Buzan (Buzan, 1991) 
criticises hard divisions between individuals, states and the international 
system, he still sees states as major referent objects and actors of 
international security. Later, states are still the objects of security 
discourses, but the “middle scale of limited collectivities” (Buzan et al., 
1998 p. 39) is presented as an ideal securitisable unit. On securitizing 
                                                      
109 Applying Onuf’s reasoning, a securitization speech act would be assertive, and a successful one 
(i.e. one that is accepted by its audience) would also be directing and committing. 
110 And applying the relevant rhetorical categories, such as those of survival, priority, urgency. 
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actors, the primacy of states is maintained, with pragmatic reasons before 
ideological ones: “some actors are placed in positions of power by virtue of 
being generally accepted voices of security” (Buzan et al., 1998 p. 39), but 
other common players are also accepted including pressure groups, as 
long as they can be seen as authoritative speakers by their audiences. 
They also believe that “even the socially constructed is often sedimented 
and becomes so relatively stable as practice” (Buzan et al., 1998 p. 35); 
eventually what is important for the securitisation analysis is its practice, 
not the actors.  
In this research, states, scientists and civil society are regarded as 
potential securitising actors; and life sciences and technology are framed 
as both potential referent objects and potential source of risks, even if our 
sector of analysis is not explicitly included among Copenhagen School’s 
security issue areas. However, not only its authors recognize that issues 
as diverse as religion or culture have been securitized in some cases, but 
others have extensively applied securitization studies to science and 
public health.  
2.4.2 Alternative securitization models 
Alternative applications of securitization have been proposed. Balzacq 
(2010) criticizes the traditional model, that he labels “philosophical 
approach” to securitization and thinks it is actually post-structuralism 
focusing too much on the text of the securitization move. According to him, 
securitization should really focus on perlocutory (performative) speech 
acts as it tries to stimulate responses from the audience. 111  Balzacq 
underlines what he sees as inconsistencies between the philosophical 
approach and, on the one side, the post-structuralist methods of analysing 
security that it ends up using and, on the other side, social modern 
constructivism that should use an anti-essentialist ontology and a positivist 
epistemology. In opposition, Balzacq proposes what he calls a “pragmatic” 
or “sociological” model of securitization, which would consistently base on 
constructivism not having to “hide” post-structuralist methods, rather 
“blending discourse analysis and process tracing” (Balzacq, 2010 p. 3).  
                                                      
111  According to this vision, what the Copenhagen School’s approach has overlooked, as a 
pathological consequence of the focus on the practice rather than the actors, is the audience and 
the context. 
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According to this “sociological” securitization approach, and moving 
towards a more macro constructionist approach of securitization analysis, 
security is influenced by discourse but it’s more than a mere speech act, 
it’s rather a pragmatic act, i.e. “a sustained argumentative practice aimed 
at convincing a target audience to accept the claim that a specific 
development is threatening enough to deserve an immediate policy to curb 
it” (Balzacq, 2010 p. 9). Securitization is an “argumentative process” by 
securitizing actors in the social field; as such the text is sustained by a 
rationale that will be important in the acceptance by the audience. The 
analysis hence should look not just at the rhetorical rules but also at the 
arguments backing the discourse. The context is not just shaped by the 
speech act but also contributes itself to the decisions of the securitization 
discourse, which now becomes action and can differently contribute to the 
securitization discourse if it is, for example, embedded rather than 
episodical in its environment. The relationship with other discourses on the 
same subjects, the resulting policy tools and events (and not just the 
speeches), the routinized narratives, etc. also gain relevance in the 
process-tracing component of this pragmatic securitization model. Similar 
critiques have been moved to the traditional securitization model of the 
Copenhagen School, as that it analyses discourses but does not check if a 
norm becomes “embedded in bureaucracies, enforced, practically 
accepted” (Vieira, 2007 p. 139).  
2.4.3 Securitization of public health and disease 
Contemporary examples of securitization could include terrorism after 9/11 
and, in the biological sector, swine flu in the UK in 2009 (Ricci, 2009). 
Agriculture in the European Union has been successfully securitized 
against GMOs in the early 2000s (European Union, 2001), while later the 
discourse on the “existential threat” has been relaxed (European 
Commission, 2010a). Victims of toxic weapons have been securitized in 
Syria by the United States government establishing the “red line” of 
biological or chemical weapons use (DeYoung and Gearan, 2012). 
Applications of the securitization framework occurred in literature on public 
health issues, including naturally occurring and deliberate disease or 
consequences of potential misuse of life sciences, which obviously 
analysed (and maybe contributed?) to the convergence between public 
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health and security. Kelle (Kelle, 2005a; 2005b; 2005c; 2007a) analysed 
the process of securitization of public health at the global level and in five 
countries. He described how, on the one hand, terminology traditionally 
used for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) was gradually associated 
with infectious disease starting from the 1990s and, on the other hand, 
public health became increasingly quoted by security policies as one 
necessary tool to defend from deliberate disease. Kelle explicitly referred 
to the Copenhagen School as the model for securitization studies. 112 
However, and more in line with the alternatives to the traditional 
securitization theory described above, Kelle, rather than the textual force 
of the statements, looked at their related action and the relationships 
between narratives and the pragmatic impact in their context, in some 
cases describing threats as historical events and seemingly contributing to 
the same construction of securitization messages besides their analysis. 
Another analysis on securitization and public health came from Fidler, who 
proposed that international health already entered a securitized phase 
where “the policy belief that public health can be improved by framing and 
approaching problems through security-related tactics and strategies has 
become a leading driver of public health performance” (Fidler, 2007b p. 
41). Fidler (2007b) explains his view on how prevention, protection and 
response to humanitarian catastrophes (including international health 
assistance) has been shifting from an approach based on peoples’ rights 
to wellbeing to one based on security. Fidler presents some of the 
disastrous threats addressed by securitization as not just the product of 
intersubjective construction: according to him, the three main threats are 
CBRN weapons; infectious diseases; and (other) natural disasters. In his 
analysis, the referent objects of securitization are “individuals and 
societies”, and he introduces the concept of securitism, which is a 
prerequisite for the securitizing actor: “the belief that framing an issue as a 
security threat can lead to more political attention, economic resources 
and policy action” (Fidler, 2007a). Fidler and Gostin (2008) describe as 
                                                      
112 And he included in his reviews the analysis of relevant discourse sources (securitizing actors) 
such as, inter alia, declarations from the World Health Organization, statements to meetings of the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, US Department of State policy documents and Centers 
for Disease Control reports, texts of legislation of the countries considered 
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novel the “shift” in policy that brought public health and security – both 
“quintessential public goods” - closer, and identified the cause of 
securitization in the constructed (but, to some extent, still presented as 
“exogenous”) new threat of biological weapons and bioterrorism, and then 
expanded to natural infectious diseases; the authors describe a “dual-use 
securitization” that brings improvements to the management of both 
natural and deliberate disease threats (Fidler and Gostin, 2008 p. 124). 
The authors underline how securitization of public health has moved it out 
of humanitarianism (as such often neglected) to the area of national and 
international security. An increasing interest on international assistance in 
the last two decades would be due to the fear of bioterrorism and 
infectious diseases threats (now security matters) rather than to a 
humanitarian response. 
Other scholars contributed to the theorization of securitization of public 
health as response to the disease threat (Elbe, 2010; Leboeuf and 
Broughton, 2008). Vieira (2007) looks at the global discourse since the 
late 1990s on the HIV/AIDS epidemic as the construction of an 
international securitization norm that presents HIV/AIDS not (only) as an 
infectious disease but as an emerging threat to international peace and 
stability. Vieira analyses the rhetorical practices of the discourses of 
promoters of the HIV securitization norm; however, he also joins the critics 
on how the Copenhagen School overlooks context. Indeed the “semantic 
articulation of security should be analytically integrated with the larger 
process of securitization that involved social/political phenomena other 
than solely the speech act” (Vieira, 2007 p. 153). He goes further in 
reprising Elbe (2005) who, on the construction of HIV/AIDS as a security 
threat, had considered the Foucaultian 113  view of biopolitics and 
                                                      
113 As in many other fields of social science, Foucault’s philosophy has also been used in security 
studies, recognizing that he detected “new figures of truth in the early history of the political modern, 
especially in its mechanisms of power and in how new problematisations of politics were allied to 
new security problems” (Dillon and Neal, 2011 p. 3). Foucault dealt directly with issues of security 
at the political and societal levels and analysed it in relation to the penal system, discipline and risk. 
His focus on security is however also disputed (Bigo, 2008) as Foucault’s “dispositifs de sécurité” 
have not only to do with coercion and discipline but are also a feature of liberty, mechanisms used 
to ensure circulation and operationalization of life, distinguishing modern “sécurité” (security of 
population and life) from the ancient “sûreté” (safety of the prince and territory). To use the French 
 55 
biopower. 114  Both authors advance the contention that adding the 
biopolitical dimension to securitization of HIV/AIDS helps in addressing the 
limitations on context and securitizing actors of the traditional securitization 
school. The transposition of biopower to securitization “allows for an 
holistic understanding of the securitization process. This process is not the 
act of one securitizing actor but a chain of events and actors and 
something that historically mutates and evolves into something else” 
(Vieira, 2007 p. 154). Vieira’s conclusion, using this biopolitical approach 
to securitization of HIV, is that “the historical and social construction of the 
                                                                                                                                                  
term is interesting not only as an etymological exercise, as the difference will resurface when we’ll 
deal with the competing terms of biosafety and biosecurity, chance and intention, and their 
translations between different languages as well as the technical and political communities. 
114  Foucault explains (Foucault and Zini, 2005) how since the XVIII century, the object of 
government moved from goods and individuals (people) to the population. This shift is linked with 
the rise of liberalism that changed the jurisdictional scope of government of raison d’état and self-
perpetuation, to the external ‘bio-economical’ objective of protecting the new subject of civil society 
(Foucault and Zini, 2005 p. 262). Increasingly, power dealt with, and regulated issues of, living 
beings in the population, and life became the issue at stake for politics, establishing biopolitics. 
Biopolitics is really how the new governmental issues of liberal societies constituted by groups of 
beings joint in populations have been addressed, and is strictly connected with the rise of the civil 
society as an intermediate actor between economy and public law. Biopower is the active force that 
shapes, modifies and directs life, and normalizes it establishing rules via the 
biomedical/bioeconomical knowledge (Foucault et al., 2002). The mechanisms of power/knowledge 
have to work according to the properties of life: to prosper, knowledge needs to reproduce and 
circulate, and the product of a winning discourse is knowledge that is allowed to circulate, 
increasing its strength. Foucault’s meaning of biopolitics is useful, as we have seen above, in the 
analysis of securitization of public health, and is particularly interesting to look at the threat of 
deliberate disease. Biological weapons are “life turned against life” and, in case of infectious 
diseases, they not only are but also make other living beings bearer of death, by contagion. In this 
sense, they reverse the biopolitical imperative of making life live promoting circulation. The 
discourses of biosecurity (the “lock up” of dangerous pathogens) as well as of securitization of 
public health are also strongly biopolitical. As epidemiology, birth controls, eugenetics, dietary 
practices or neural enhancement, biosecurity also “makes life the referent object of power relations” 
(Agamben, 1998). Beyond that, biosecurity follows the biopolitical evolution of security and war, 
which as Dillon and Neal’s (2011 p. 10) commented, has become more focused on life and often 
conducted “in the name of life itself”. Also relevant for the biopolitical analysis of biosecurity as 
securitization of life sciences, Bruno Latour developed a different concept of biopolitics, that he 
views as the “authority via which scientists and biologists avoid discussion on scientific disciplines 
and political life” (Latour, 2005). Latour posits that politics reclaims its power on science as soon as 
experts touch key nodes of public life – something we see in relation to tensions between security 
and science communities. Latour also hints on hybridation of nature and culture, between science, 
politics, economy and technology that constitutes our modernity; and calls himself for hybridation of 
governance between science and policy (Latour and Lagomarsino, 2009). 
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disease eventually led to the creation of a hegemonic grammar that 
portrays the epidemic in terms of a special type of problem which 
demands special institutions and policies”; and it goes on in the sense that 
after a grammar successfully becomes hegemonic, to ensure 
securitization one still needs the practical application of principles and 
policies – hence the rhetorical speech act and the socially embedded 
discourse are not enough to ensure securitization; and the analyst should 
remember to check their applications. This holistic and “socio-political” 
concept of securitization in public health is further advanced by Pereira 
(2008) who analyses the securitization of infectious diseases in Western 
liberal democracies. While recognizing that the topic of infectious diseases 
has been included in recent strategy and security concepts, Pereira 
opposes what he labels Fidler’s juridical approach to securitization which, 
according to him, is a limited legalist analysis that doesn’t help in 
understanding who and what is behind the power reordering in speaking 
(about) public health. Instead, he advances a political, historical and 
critical version of securitization in which the recent attention to natural and 
deliberate public health threats is actually the continuation of “three 
hundred years of Western public health intervention as a global 
securitizing practice under an assemblage of dispersed and multifaceted, 
though hierarchized, liberal powers” (Pereira, 2008 p. 12). In this historico-
political model of securitization, securitizing actors are not only the 
traditional governmental élites, but also all those influent agents that can 
represent authority including NGOs, private companies, networks, 
influential individuals, and the civil society.115 
                                                      
115 Explicit is again the connection of the historico-political securitization analysis with biopower as 
a) we look at the securitization of, ultimately, biological bodies of individuals and of biological issues 
in the society; b) the securitization of infectious diseases indeed “can be traced back to public 
hygienist surveillance since the 1830s” (Pereira, 2008 p. 8) that inspired Foucault’s reasoning on 
biopower; c) biopower is not exclusive nor concentrated in the state, but diffused “in a 
comprehensive web of institutions and practices”; d) as a product of liberal democracies, a 
condition of governamentality is that biopower needs to be justified, hence the importance of the 
(securitization!) discourse(s); and e) biopower, as in the result of a successfully implemented 
securitization move on public health, does not only need discourses but also “institutions, 
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws […]” (Pereira, 2008 p. 9). 
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The securitization analysis framework, and in particular its historico-
political approach, has points in common with other Foucaultian categories, 
within discourse analysis. For Foucault, security is exercised on population 
and on life; the implementation of dispositifs de sécurité is used to reduce 
the aleatory (Foucault and Napoli, 2005), which includes disease; power 
determines which discourse will be validated to constitute “true knowledge” 
and rule out other positions (Mills, 2003). Language, the productive and 
maintaining force of knowledge (and hence of power), can be a dividing 
and oppressive tool to exclude discourses that are not aligned with the 
dominant one, rendering them false. To achieve this, categories and 
principles of the order of discourse are used, including external and 
internal procedures of exclusion; restriction systems; and principles of 
limitation.116  The modalities to put into action the securitization “threat-
defence” sequence, resemble Foucaultian rituals, and in the case of 
                                                      
116 The three external procedures of exclusion are imposed on the discourse and include interdits 
(prohibitions), partages (partitions) and the will of truth. Prohibitions are limitations on who can 
speak and what can be told, for example taboos and speaking rights. Partages include limitations 
against those whose discourses are not accepted or cannot circulate – such as the mad. Discursive 
procedures include the necessity of a particular terminology constituting the boundary of a 
discipline or the authority for a partage: in case of epidemics, a bioterrorism attack or a major 
incident involving toxins, for example, information would be sought by the population from 
institutions such as the Centre for Disease Control, the World Health Organization or the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, depending on the context for authority. The will of truth compels that “true 
and “strong” discourses can be told by who has the right, and follows the proper ritual, to speak. 
Scientific progress for example can be read as changing wills of truth. There exist also three 
internal procedures of exclusion, or “principles of rarefaction” as they distribute, reproduce or limit 
discourse starting from it: they include the commentary, the author and the discipline. The 
commentary reprises narratives and, while repeating the original text, also adds new information; it 
limits the discourse as “an identity having the form of repetition of the self” (Foucault, 2004 p. 16). 
The author is not necessarily the speaking individual, but the role that gives coherence to the 
discourse, and in some fields (like the scientific one) attribution is key in reinforcing the claim to 
truth; it limits the discourse as “an identity having the form of individuality”. The discipline is a 
defined group of objects, methods and propositions considered “true”; to be accepted as part of a 
discipline, a discourse does not only need to be true, but also to follow some conditions. Restriction 
systems are more complex procedures that restrict access to the discourse and assure distinction 
among subjects. The simplest restriction systems are rituals, which define qualities of speakers, 
gestures and signs. Thematic discourses like the scientific ones use rituals of the word (think to 
medical diagnostic practices, or the steps of the academic peer review system). Societies of 
discourse are another example of restriction system, where discourses are protected and circulated 
only in a restricted space. The meaning given to terms defines the boundaries of disciplines and is 
used for self-positioning. 
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securitization from deliberate disease risks would include the 
establishment of international weapons controls, vaccination campaigns, 
strengthening of public health regimes, investments in military biodefense 
research, import/export controls, scientists engagement – in short, a web 
of prevention.  
2.4.4 Choices within the securitization approach 
This research could face a dilemma, as it aims at investigating ways to 
engage different constituencies, and primarily the scientific community into 
policy issues. This would be nearly impossible given the rigid exclusion 
procedures of partage and discipline, leaving the “security” and the 
“biology” communities playing with the same terms but different meanings, 
doomed to never speak the same language. One solution would be to 
push the boundaries of exclusion to a larger common denominator, 
including all “security implications from life sciences and biotechnologies”, 
as we said regarding security issues and very compatible with the 
securitization of international public health.  
In this research, securitization theory is used to analyse if and how 
education has been advanced as a possible security tool to limit the risks 
of deliberate disease, and how securitization discourses could be drafted 
in education initiatives specifically targeting students and young scientists 
as a risk mitigation measure. While not overlooking the importance of the 
speech act analysis, I accept the proposals of a more socially embedded, 
historico-political securitization analysis: this means that, besides and 
beyond analysis of the textual messages of awareness raising I also look 
at the contexts influencing them and, secondly, not stop at the message 
but also look at what it has led to, or been accompanied by, impact or 
change, including using categories and tools of the science of learning as 
described below. 
The embedding into practices and bureaucracies can really be one of the 
tests of success of the securitization move. These decisions do not mean 
that I don’t try to avoid what I think is a limitation of the judicial analysis of 
public health securitization, i.e. to consider policy shifts and “new” threats 
as necessarily exogenous, but the opposite that their historical paths will 
be more rightfully considered. The historico-political stance to 
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securitization, furthermore, is theoretically consistent with our idea of 
considering non-state actors as potential securitizing actors, such as civil 
society including academia, networks of individuals and NGOs, besides 
state policy makers, and scientists as audience for the securitization 
messages.117 Hence the historico-political model of securitization will be 
applied firstly as an analytical tool and secondly within the generation of 
educational design and evaluation tools. In the first role, the approach will 
be utilized on analysing education as security. I will look at what is the 
securitizing actor, what the referent object, and what the audience. In the 
second role, I will connect securitization with the methods and models 
provided by educational science, to design, develop and evaluate the 
impact of educational messages of security value. In this context I will look 
at if and how the measures suggested by the contents of the messages 
were accepted by the audiences and were implemented. 
There are, however, considerations to take into account on the use of a 
securitization approach. Securitization theorists in primis sustain that 
securitization is not always good, and it may actually be undesirable: 
Waever (1995) already argues that we should aim at desecuritization, to 
bring back issues in the realm of normal politics and subtract them from 
the state of emergency. Securitization has also been criticized as possibly 
silencing underrepresented constituencies and their interests. 118 
Regarding the life sciences, biotechnology and public health, securitization 
opens further challenges: how could (if it should at all) science be 
overseen to prevent and respond to potential threats; and how could at the 
same time a securitized sector enjoy the necessary spirit of innovation, 
freedom and communication levels? These are sensitive points as we 
indeed aim to not only study but also somehow to create securitization (of 
collectivities from biosecurity threats, on one side, but also possibly of 
science from excessive regulation, on the other side) through education. It 
has also been observed (Charrett, 2009) that a normative dilemma of 
                                                      
117 Compatible with the “middle level collectivities” that are the ideal intersubject of securitization 
moves. 
118 As Hansen (Hansen, 2000) noted, the Copenhagen School’s approach to the securitization 
speech act may leave some constituencies silenced and unprotected, because of the impossibility 
of voicing threats or because their threatened identity is subsumed by other aspects. 
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securitization studies is to generate negative securitization processes, 
replicating dominant modes. 119  This reproduction may especially occur 
through the confusion between analyst and securitizing actor, a tendency 
that has been described, among others, by Eriksson (1999). In this sense, 
securitization seems to have an implied negative meaning. However, we 
don’t think it has necessarily to be that. Our historico-political approach 
would be compatible with Hansen’s guidance of not limiting to the textual 
epistemological focus for securitization. Also we think securitization may 
play a restraining or an enabling role, depending on the reasons why it is 
employed and the normative framework it is inserted in. We think some of 
the above challenges could indeed be mitigated as we insert the tool of 
historico-political securitization analysis and creation of education within 
the web of prevention framework, that would employ education not only as 
a (restraining) security tool but also as an enabling tool and help in 
promoting the positive role of scientists and operators to counter deliberate 
disease. 
2.5 Defining and discussing risk 
The second key category in the research is that of “risk”, both because of 
the prominent use of the term in the technical arena of biosecurity, 
biosafety and biorisk management, and because of the aim of the 
research of measuring the impact of education as a tool to reduce the 
security risks of deliberate disease. However, “risk” means different things 
to different people and is a contested concept as, and possibly more, than 
“security”. 
2.5.1Quantitative approaches to risk 
One main approach to risk is the realist one, mostly applied in technical 
fields such as engineering and epidemiological risk management. While 
recognizing that decisions based on risk are not value-free (Bradbury, 
1989), this approach sees risks as objective, endogenous and natural, 
resulting from hazards that pre-exist observation and measurement. 
According to this approach, “risks are measures of the likelihood of 
specific hazardous events leading to certain adverse consequences” 
(Kates and Kasperson, 1983 p. 7029). The idea of risks being influenced 
                                                      
119  According to critics, the constructivist approach “reproduces the security agenda when it 
describes how the process of securitization works” (Huysmans, 1995 p. 69). 
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by, or a measure of, possibility of an adverse event and its consequences, 
is widely shared in this approach (Bradbury, 1989; Hadden, 1984; Stern et 
al., 1996; European Commission, 2010b). There are, however, different 
ways to conceptualize possibility and consequence, including, inter alia, 
probability and severity (Hadden, 1984), and conditional probability and 
harm (Hohenemser et al., 1983), or magnitude (Stirling and Mayer, 2000). 
Certainly risk “involves both uncertainty and some kind of loss or damage” 
(Kaplan and Garrick, 1981 p. 12); the preference for probability to describe 
uncertainty is common in the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) that 
first developed in the nuclear safety sector120 and later expanded to wider 
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). From this approach, the concept 
that may best fit this research is that of considering risk as a function of 
likelihood and consequences (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981; Kaplan, 1997; 
Garrick, 2008; Apostolakis, 2004). 
2.5.2Qualitative approaches to risk 
Other authors identified problems and limitations with QRA and the realist 
approach to risk. This includes not capturing influences of human and 
design errors, or of cultures (Apostolakis, 2004), and considering risks as 
detached from society and not embedded as social facts (Bradbury, 1989; 
Lupton, 1999). QRA would necessarily simplify a complex reality and hide 
uncertainty (or ambiguity) as different and complex parameters are 
reduced and aggregated (Stirling, 2003; 2006). Also, QRA is accused of 
depicting humans as strictly utilitarian and rational (Douglas, 1985), and to 
only focus on the individual as assessor or decider. The realist approach 
to risk also tends to divide between, and value differently opinions from, 
“experts” and “lay people”, where the former are treated as neutral and 
bringing the objective and replicable measurement of risk, and the latter as 
unable to correctly assess it.  
On the opposite side of realist approaches to risk, qualitative approaches 
view risk as socially constructed. The risks we identify, measure and 
manage do not pre-exist analysis but, on the contrary, are constituted via 
pre-existing knowledge, values and cultural codes (Caygill, 2000). Three 
                                                      
120 Modern research on technological risk is regarded as started by Starr’s (1969) seminal paper on 
technology and social benefits. 
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main social constructionist approaches to risk include the critical 
structuralist and weak constructionist position of the risk society theorized 
by Ulrich Beck; the functional structuralist and strong constructionist 
cultural-symbolic position by Mary Douglas; and the post structuralist 
position of Foucaultian governamentality (Lupton, 1999). According to 
Beck (Beck, 1992; Beck et al., 1994; Beck, 2002a; Beck, 2002b; Beck, 
2013), hazards are real and natural, but risks are social constructions and 
their cultural mediations. Beck is not far from the realist point of view in 
many instances, however, which makes his position a weak constructionist 
one: risks are a (given, unavoidable and irreversible) outcome 121  of 
modernization122 , and globalization introduces novel risks123 . Risk is a 
“systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and 
introduced by modernization itself” (Beck, 1992 p. 21). There are options – 
both technical and socially constructed rules – to deal with risk, such as 
attribution and insurance, but the potentially catastrophic adverse events 
introduced by modernity break them. In the cultural symbolic position 
(Douglas, 1985; 1998), on the other hand, risk is a cultural device to 
identify and maintain boundaries and order, and as such is used by groups 
                                                      
121 Risks are “manufactured uncertainties” (Giddens, 1991) and an “inescapable indeterminacy” 
(Wynne, 1983). 
122 The “risk society” (Beck, 1992) is the post-industrial one that self-creates, through modernization, 
new risks that despite being created are less predictable than “classical”, external risks. The 
“constellation in which new knowledge serves to transform unpredictable risks into calculable risks, 
but in the process it gives rise to new unpredictabilities, forcing us to reflect upon risks” (Beck, 2013 
p. 15) is what Beck called “reflexivity of uncertainty”. At the same time it is a society that no longer 
relies on the guidance of traditional or natural laws. According to Giddens (1999), risk society can 
be traced back to two transformations: the end of nature, as no aspect of life remains untouched by 
humans; and the end of tradition, where fate does not govern life anymore. Hence, it uses other 
decision-making tools constructed around risk, such as risk assessment or risk mitigation. 
123  With the evolution from “risk society” to “world risk society”, Beck introduced a series of 
innovations specific for the international nature of risk society in the 21st century, including risk as 
(globalized) anticipated catastrophe and, especially relevant for the security discourse, 
transnational terrorism as an entire new category of global risk subverting calculations with 
“intention” in the place of “chance”. A type of global risk that is even more peculiar when coupled 
with cutting-edge technologies that are continuing, as predicted twenty years earlier, to contribute to 
uncertainty. “Those responsible for well-intentioned research and technological development will in 
future have to do more than offer public assurances of the social utility and the minimal ‘residual 
risk’ of their activity. Instead, in the future the risk assessments of such technological and scientific 
developments will have to take into account, literally, intention as well as chance, the terrorist 
threats and the conceivable malicious uses as well as dangerous side effects” (Beck, 2013 p. 14). 
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and individuals who however are already influenced by “culturally learned 
assumptions and weightings” (Douglas, 1985 p. 58). While the cultural 
symbolic position on risk is often described as considering hazards (or risk 
sources) as socially constructed, coming to existence only when people 
identify them (Fox, 1998), Douglas actually posits that “real” dangers do 
exist: “the reality of dangers is not an issue… this argument is not about 
the reality of dangers, but about how they are politicized” (Douglas, 1992 p. 
29). Finally the Foucaultian governamentality position sees risk as a 
regulatory strategy to manage populations and individuals. Risk strategies 
are discursive, and they select some or other phenomena as “risky” to 
impose management on them. Risk is hence unbound from any “external” 
or “objective” notion of danger. 
2.5.3 Bridging quantitative and qualitative approaches to risk 
There have been efforts to bridge the realist and constructionist 
conceptualizations of risk. Scientific behavioural research has, on the one 
side, demonstrated that the divide between “experts” and “lay people” can 
be pretentious. Experts are not exempt from bias, while lay people can124 
and actually regularly perform risk assessment, often with richer 
information than experts (Slovic, 1987), and can themselves become 
experts, identifying and processing new information (Jasanoff, 1993). On 
the other side, risk analysis research introduced the concept of risk 
perception and described factors that would lead to assess risks as “higher” 
or “lower” (Douglas, 1985; Slovic, 1987; Slovic and Peters, 2006). An 
integrated, interdisciplinary and pluralist risk management framework125 
would include both technical and social sciences and factors (Royal 
Society, 2009), indispensable to deal with modern technological and 
natural hazards (Renn, 1998), and based on the recognition that “scientific 
risk analysis is unavoidably and inextricably intertwined with subjective 
framing assumptions, values, trade-offs and expectations of surprise”  
(Stirling, 1999). It has been advanced that quantitative and qualitative 
approaches could co-exist and their use would be determined by the 
amount of uncertainty (increasing uncertainty would increase the influence 
                                                      
124 Especially, lay people seem to be better able to estimate consequences or risks rather than their 
likelihood (Jungermann and Slovic, 1993) translated in (Hampel, 2006). 
125 Or of “decision making under uncertainty” (Stirling, 2003) 
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of cultural factors) (Jasanoff, 1993) or type of risk: risks for which extent of 
damage and probability are known could be dealt by mainly quantitative 
risk management strategies; risks with high uncertainty on damage and 
occurrence would require precautionary measures (Stirling, 2007; 2008); 
risks with high ambiguity on damage and occurrence will require discursive 
practices (Klinke and Renn, 2001).126 
One way to mediate between the realist and constructionist approaches to 
risk in this research is accepting that they can co-exist in the process of 
risk assessment. Assessment is the first phase of the basic model for 
managing biological risks described by the IRGC Risk Governance 
Framework (Renn, 2006) as well as the WHO (Astuto Gribble et al., 2015). 
Assessment is followed by Mitigation (i.e., decisions on measures to 
control the risk) and Performance (measurement of impacts of mitigation 
measures, review and improvement of the system).127 Risk assessment 
includes the identification of hazards and scenarios of adverse events, the 
characterization of the risks of such events in terms of estimating their 
likelihood and consequences, and the evaluation or weighting of the risks 
(Kates and Kasperson, 1983).128 The idea that risk mitigation decisions are 
not directly based on description of uncertainties, but rather inform and 
                                                      
126 Klinke and Renn (2002) label these three classes Damocles/Cyclops, Puthia/Pandora, and 
Cassandra/Medusa, respectively. Interestingly, the risk of deliberate disease discussed in this 
research could fall under each class depending on what “risk scenario” we are considering. A 
laboratory biosecurity incident may fall under the first one, an advanced gain-of-function experiment 
with potential biosecurity implications could fall under the second one; and the potential misuse or 
weaponization of biological agents against the norm prohibiting biological weapons would fall under 
the third one. Education as a security tool would fall under their risk management category of 
discursive measures (they mention awareness raising campaigns and codes of conduct), mainly 
devoted to mitigate the third class of risks in their model. However, it could also be (indirectly) used 
to mitigate the first two classes of risks as well (for example, by regulating mandatory education, or 
by teaching scientist the precautionary principle with relation to dual-use). 
127  The Assessment, Mitigation, Performance model is consistent with management systems 
literature (Labodová, 2004; Moen and Norman, 2006; Brenner, 2007; Du et al., 2008; CEN, 2011; 
Sokovic et al., 2010; ISO, 2015). 
128 The IRGC Risk Governance Framework groups risk assessment phases in a slightly different 
way, with a “pre-assessment” phase including framing or risk and definition of the problem; “risk 
appraisal” corresponding to risk characterization but explicitly including perceptions of stakeholders; 
and judgement based on tolerability and acceptability that could correspond to risk evaluation. 
These assessment phases would be followed by “decisions” informing mitigation, and by 
“communication”. 
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support decision-makers who perform an evaluation (Aven and Zio, 2014; 
Apostolakis, 2004) based not only on opportunity but largely on values and 
beliefs (Hansson and Aven, 2014), is widely accepted. However, I accept 
the position that evaluation should be an integral part of risk assessment 
and not an intermediate step between assessment and mitigation. This 
does not only include “the so-called objective activities of risk identification” 
and characterization, but that they “need to be integrated with, rather than 
separated from, the subjective process of evaluation” (Bradbury, 1989 p. 
381)129. The process for risk identification and characterization phases 
derives from the model by Kaplan and Garrick (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981; 
Kaplan, 1997; Garrick, 2008) that is based on triplets of “fundamental 
questions”: what could go wrong? How likely is it that that will happen? If it 
does happen, what are the consequences? However, even the “objectivity” 
of risk identification and characterization are questionable: would different 
assessors identify the same “wrongs”? Are likelihood and consequence 
going to be equal in different analyses?130 The authors warn that risk is 
relative “to the observer” and “it is a subjective thing – it depends upon 
who is looking” (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981 p. 17). Furthermore, risk is 
relative to other risks131, and it cannot be conceived alone or in absolute 
terms (it makes little sense to say something is “high risk” - if we do, we 
are implying a comparison to other risks, with some explicit or implicit 
scale).132 
There are components of both realism/objectivity and 
constructionism/subjectivity in all approaches to risk, from the identification 
of “real” hazards or dangers, to the concept of relative risk, to the 
components of risk assessment and the motivations for risk management 
                                                      
129 Bradbury uses “estimation” in lieu of characterization. 
130 As Slovic (1986 p. 404) notes, “people are at the mercy of how information is presented to them”, 
or take different choices if they are presented with, for example, absolute or relative 
characterization data. 
131 “Given two meaningful statements (or propositions or events), it makes sense to say that one is 
more (less, equally) likely than the other. That is, we accept as an axiom the comparability of 
uncertainty” (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981 p. 17). 
132 If we said that one scenario is “low risk”, without any comparison, it would be meaningless. We 
could, for example, introduce a second scenario that is less likely and has less harmful 
consequences, and by comparison the first scenario would be “higher risk”. Risk is always “higher” 
or “lower” than other risks: either explicitly or implicitly if using a pre-defined scale. 
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decisions. As studies confirmed (Marris et al., 1998), the inclusion of 
constructivist or even relativist assessment into objective or quantitative 
models doesn’t preclude that risks can be categorized and ranked 
according to a number of factors. Some observe that risk management 
literature uses a “subjectivist interpretation within a realist paradigm” 
(Bradbury, 1989). Given the considerations on risk assessment 
components, this research would rather try to answer questions posed 
with a “realist” approach (such as how to manage security risks, and how 
to measure the impact of education as a security risks mitigation tool) 
within a weak constructionist epistemological position. We recognize that 
some dangers exist in themselves, but also that some are constructed, or 
may be assessed differently in different contexts. We accept that risk 
assessment should integrate risk identification, characterization and 
evaluation. 133  This stance is consistent with both the securitization 
approach used to analyse the movement of education into the security 
toolbox, as well as Ulrich Beck’s world risk society position. 134  Beck 
recognizes that separating between “perceived risk” and “risk” (whatever 
the latter may really be) is difficult and unnecessary: risk is really the 
(staged) anticipation of a catastrophe, that “obliges us to take preventive 
action” (Beck, 2013 p. 11).  
2.5.4How to assess risk 
Following the outlined approach to risk, it remains to discuss how to 
answer the three questions. Answering “what could go wrong?”, i.e. risk 
identification, is really an inventive part135 to find the possible undesirable 
scenarios (Kaplan, 1997). The first step is identifying the possible 
hazard(s)136 and threats137 in the activities and subsequently the adverse 
                                                      
133  Something that, although from a more quantitative point of view, has been advanced by 
managerial applications of the quantitative definition of risk. Wall (2011) for example adds to the 
Kaplan and Garrick definition the fourth dimension of decision-maker preferences. 
134 Which is itself compatible with the historico-political securitization approach, as global risks 
(including transnational terrorism) are constructed through struggles of competing definitions.  
135 Kaplan (1997), for example, suggests using TRIZ to project trajectories from a Scenario 0 
situation. 
136 The hazard is the source of harm through an adverse event, while risks are a measurement of 
the conditional probability of experiencing harm (Hohenemser et al., 1983). 
137 Threats are people with the intention to cause harm, additional sources of risks for security risks 
with respect to safety risks. 
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events that they may cause in risk scenarios (Haimes et al., 2002). The 
second and third questions constitute the risk characterization step within 
risk assessment. It implies collecting and analysing all factors that may 
influence likelihood and/or consequences of the identified risk(s). 
Proposed structured methods to analysing factors in risk assessment 
include criteria filtering and ranking and Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis 
(MCDA), that characterizes, relatively, various risks factors using 
qualitative definitions; these methods are used to inform decisions in 
situations of limited and evolving knowledge from multiple sources (Leung 
et al., 2004; Linkov et al., 2007; Caskey et al., 2010). MDCA methods are 
based on weighted sum algorithms of multiple factors evaluated against 
each other (Caskey et al., 2010).138 
Factors may include characteristics of the hazard and of the situation, 
including where and when the scenario is taking place, who is involved 
and what are the available mitigation measures. The characterization of 
security risks adds the consideration of threats as intelligent adversaries, 
including their adaptation to the defender’s moves (Cox, 2008; Golany et 
al., 2009; Brashear and Jones, 2010; Parnell et al., 2010 p. 1758; Aven 
and Zio, 2014) based on the information available to them (Brown and Cox 
Jr., 2011), and to the system’s vulnerabilities to intentional attacks (Depoy 
et al., 2005; Sandia National Laboratories, 2014b). 139  Criteria to 
characterize risk may include probability of occurrence, extent of damage, 
incertitude, ubiquity, persistency, reversibility, delay effect and potential of 
mobilization (Hohenemser et al., 1983; Klinke and Renn, 2001). Likelihood 
can be measured depending on the type of uncertainty and available data 
(Aven, 2011); consequences may be represented, for example, with 
number of lives lost or cost for repair. Uncertainty can be embedded in the 
                                                      
138 Caskey et al (2010), for example, compare each factor pair-wise attributing weight factors from 1 
(equal importance) to 9 (significantly more important). 
139 The US National Research Council (National Research Council, 2008), among others, has 
criticized the US DHS’ Risk Analysis Methods reliance on PRA, on the basis that it does not take 
into sufficient account the nature of intelligent adversaries. Hence for including factors of threats as 
intelligent adversaries, a dynamic risk characterization model (that employs, for example, 
probability, event and decision trees; game theory; influence diagrams; or Bayesian network 
analysis) may be more effective than static PRA characterization (Ezell et al., 2010). Consider also 
how terrorist actors may not follow rational planning and adaptation (Cox, 2008). 
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representation through exceeding probability curves, indicating the 
probability that certain levels of losses will be exceeded (Kunreuther, 
2002). We assume that risks can be described relative to each other, to 
other risks, or over time.140 A number of characterized risk scenarios can 
hence be related to each other and plotted on a graph where on one axis 
lies relative likelihood and on the other axis is relative consequence.141 
Our goal however is not measuring the risks (or better, as we shall see, 
various risk scenarios) of deliberate disease, but rather to discuss the 
impact of education on it. Instead of developing a(nother) characterization 
of the risks of deliberate disease, we are interested in identifying what are 
the factors affecting likelihood and consequences of the risks of deliberate 
disease that may be influenced by education. 
                                                      
140  It has been argued on the other hand that also characterization, besides evaluation as 
discussed later, can not allow comparisons: “the relative priority attached to the different 
dimensions of risk is intrinsically a matter of subjective value judgement” (Stirling, 1999 p. 10). 
While it is true that with high degrees of uncertainty to incorporate some risks become 
incommensurable, this is not necessarily the case of any risk; and decoupling characterization and 
evaluation allows relative characterization and subjective evaluation to be both discussed 
addressing the limits of “narrow notions of risk” pointed out by Stirling (1999; 2006). 
141 This is also used with quantitative measurement of risk. In that case, logarithmic scales are often 
used, that are “practical for cases where successive occurrences range over a factor of 10 or more 
in magnitude and where estimated errors easily differ by the same amount. Logarithmic scales may 
also mark human perception better than linear scales, as seen by the success of the decibel scale 
[…] and the Richter scale” (Hohenemser et al., 1983 p. 280). However, especially for security risk 
scenarios in which certain information on intentioned threats are limited, relative qualitative scales 
of consequence and likelihood are preferred (Leung et al., 2004 p. 976). Scales may also be 
defined for each element between “absence” and “highest possible value”, or “best case” and 
“worst case” (Caskey et al., 2010). 
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Figure 1 - Characterization of four risk scenarios and their different evaluations 
Regarding risk evaluation, literature discusses what would be 
“acceptable”142 risk and what are acceptability criteria. Discrete thresholds 
of risk acceptability have been proposed143, however we will follow the 
thesis that evaluation is the (most) subjective feature of risk assessment, 
and that acceptable risk is that that is accepted.144 Criteria for acceptability 
could include “absolute” terms, such as number of lives,145 lifetime spent 
versus gained (Lind, 2002), dollars of potential damage, degree of 
certainty; or ratios between risk and benefit.146  Evaluation could also be 
influenced by feelings, sensitivity (Slovic and Peters, 2006), closeness, 
controllability, trust (Hampel, 2006), voluntarity, available resources (Hattis 
and Minkowitz, 1996), spectacularity of accidents (Vrjling et al., 1995), 
                                                      
142 It has been proposed (Kasperson et al., 1988) that “tolerable” may be a better term than 
“acceptable”, since one doesn’t really accept an adverse event, but rather lives with it. Despite the 
sense of the proposition, we follow the use of “acceptable” that is more widespread in literature. 
143 “Acceptability of risk is roughly proportional to the third power of the benefits for that activity and 
the public will accept risks from voluntary activities that are roughly 1000 times as great as it would 
tolerate from involuntary hazards that provide the same benefits”(Starr, 1969). 
144 As an illustration of the relation between the relative but objective process of characterization 
and the subjective one of evaluation, see reports by Hohenemser (1983) and Tversky and 
Kahneman (1975) where risk assessments by lay people were highly correlated with scores derived 
from the scientific literature, but deviated with strong biases towards risks characterized highest and 
lowest. 
145 For example, the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment defines as 
acceptable the death of 10 or more “people in case of failure of a LPG station with a probability of 
10-5 per year” (Vrjling et al., 1995 p. 249). Thresholds of acceptable risk can be expressed in 
absolute or relative (as low as reasonably possible, or ALARP, model) terms, each denoting policy 
and possibly ethical choices (Aven, 2007). 
146 People may be as more willing to accept a risk, as higher is the benefit from that activity. 
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regulatory requirements, value of the work, public perception (Caskey et 
al., 2010), and how results of characterization are presented147 (Stone et 
al., 1994). People can be likelihood- or consequence-averse, and 
particularly tend to neglect likelihood in case of consequences generating 
strong feelings (Loewenstein et al., 2001).  
As exemplified in the figure above, in a graph where different 
characterized relative risk scenarios have been plotted (1-4), evaluation 
can be depicted as lines or curves connecting the points where one’s 
evaluation is the same and would pass from “acceptable” to 
“unacceptable”, hence they are referred to as isoquants. All characterized 
risk scenarios below an acceptability isoquant would be “acceptable” (or, 
equally, all characterized risk scenario below a “low risk” isoquant would 
be evaluated as low risk). Different evaluation isoquants would depict 
different evaluations, with lower isoquants only accepting lower risks than 
higher isoquants. Isoquants can have a variety of shapes, for example be 
flatter on the likelihood or consequence axes for people that are especially 
reluctant to accept risks relatively more likely or with relatively higher 
consequences, respectively. Isoquants would have a negative coefficient, 
reflecting a substitution rate between acceptable likelihood and acceptable 
consequence. In this sense, they reflect the preferences payoff functions 
advanced by the managerial approach (Wall, 2011). In the figure, assessor 
α is more consequence averse in their evaluation than assessor β, who is 
more likelihood averse. The former would accept risk scenarios 1 and 2, 
while the latter would accept risk scenarios 1 and 3. Assessor γ would 
have higher risk acceptability in general, and the same relative value of 
likelihood and consequence; they would accept risk scenarios 1, 2 and 3. 
No assessor would evaluate risk scenario 4 as acceptable.148 
Though it’s important to have the determinants of risk evaluation clear, this 
research won’t suggest the acceptability of specific deliberate disease 
risks. Rather, we will focus on the determination of any impact from the 
                                                      
147 It has also been observed that knowing of the risk may make it more likely, hence influencing 
characterization: “the likelihood that a single event will occur increases when this event is 
cognitively available” (Hampel, 2006 p. 8). 
148 The evaluation of the same characterized risk can also change due to a new accident or other 
factors (Vrjling et al., 1995). 
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use of education as a tool to mitigate the risks of deliberate disease on 
factors influencing the characterization of relative risks. 
2.6 Education on security in science: insights from the science of 
learning 
The third category and research tool used in this work is that of education. 
A research that looks at the role of education to advance security 
objectives – in particular that of reducing deliberate disease risks - has to 
combine educational theory with security studies. Educational science 
developed especially since the 1960s and based on insights about how 
people learn as well as empirical results of instruction. As the US National 
Research Council and others noted, the impact of the science of learning 
on contemporary education is emerging regarding both effective delivery 
methods and contents of education that increasingly look at 
interdisciplinarity (National Research Council, 2000; Salas and Cannon-
Bowers, 2001; National Research Council, 2010; Haak et al., 2011). This 
includes attention to the role and responsibilities of scientists in the society 
(National Research Council, 2003a). Specific insights from educational 
science that will be applied in this research will be models of instructional 
design; evaluation methods to assess impact of education on both 
learning and risk; and learner-centred instruction methods as effective 
delivery of education. It’s worth noting though that this research does not 
focus on education per se, but rather we utilize theories and instruments 
from the science of learning as tools within a security risks discourse. 
2.6.1Instructional design and the ADDIE model 
Instructional systems design or development (ISD),149 is both a discipline 
and a professional field concerned with creating instruction. It has been 
noted (Ely, 1992; Bassi and Van Buren, 1999; National Research Council, 
2003a) that the major trend in education technology is to base education 
on instructional design and development principles. As its name suggests, 
systems have an important part in ISD. As Andrews and Goodson (1980) 
note, the ISD process is systematic, as it is a problem-solving approach 
                                                      
149 The concept is sometimes, and was originally, referred as Instructional Systems Development. I 
prefer to use Instructional Systems Design not only for consistency with prevalent recent literature 
but also, as we shall see, because Design is the core concept and predominant phase of creating 
instruction. 
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proposing a defined cycle that includes input, output and feedback 
phases. 150  At the same time ISD is also systemic as each of its 
components impacts directly or indirectly the others. ISD is explicitly based 
on systems theory, and in particular on the work by von Bertanlanffy 
(Hodell, 2011). According to Banathy (1987), a systems approach 
addresses “highly complex, large scale problems, it is non-linear, 
synthesis oriented and holistic, and employs strategies that represent a set 
of interrelated concepts and principles”. Other roots of ISD are, in the 
social sciences, behaviourism (Hodell, 2011 p. 13) and constructivism, and 
more specifically in the science of learning, the work of Benjamin Bloom 
on the taxonomy of cognitive thought (Bloom, 1956).151 The taxonomy is 
frequently used in the design of scientific and medical education (Patel et 
al., 2009), and it describes how learning occurs in subsequent stages from 
basic assimilation to more advanced elaboration. The original taxonomy 
used six categories of “cognitive domains”: knowledge, comprehension, 
application, analysis, synthesis and evaluation. Each domain was a 
prerequisite for the student to achieve the next one. Krathwohl (2002) 
proposed a revised version of the taxonomy with the following cognitive 
domains: remember; understand; apply; analyse; evaluate; and create.152 
He furthermore proposed singling out “knowledge” as a cognitive domain 
and breaking it up in three dimensions: factual, conceptual and procedural. 
I will use a similar approach in that I will adopt “cognitive domains” to 
describe three dimensions of theoretical knowledge (“know”), attitude 
(“feel”) and practical skills (“do”). These domains as I intend them are not 
ranked in terms of cognitive challenge, as there can be more or less 
advanced capacities both in the theoretical and practical fields. Rather, 
and much in line with the revised taxonomy above, they would intersect 
                                                      
150 Edmonds et al (1994) interpose a “process” phase between input and output of the systematic 
ISD approach. 
151 Several of the models from the science of learning that we introduce, such as ISD but also 
Gagné’s events of instruction and the Bloom’s taxonomy, are influenced by a behaviouralist 
approach. This is not an absolute choice however, as some tools that will be introduced later such 
as Kolb’s contribution on learning styles claim to be “experiential” rather than behavioural. 
152 Krathwohl (2002) explains, firstly, that it is better to use verbs instead of nouns to describe 
learning actions, and to do it consistently; that the original knowledge domain is better described by 
the remember category to avoid confusion with the introduced different plans of knowledge; and 
that synthesis would change place with evaluation and be renamed “create”. 
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“learning levels” (that are really levels, as they require incremental 
cognitive capacities) as per revised Bloom’s categories. Furthermore, I will 
keep “evaluate” as the highest learning level, as I think it stresses the 
required advanced component of critical thinking from the student, while 
“create” may well be present in other learning levels. 
The earliest among applications on a variety of topics and disciplines, ISD 
has also been used to create teaching on safety and security related to 
biotechnology and the life sciences. Delarosa et al. for example started 
with the identification of job tasks and desired competencies for 
laboratorians (Delarosa et al., 2011). Within the wide rubric of ISD, a 
variety of models have been proposed and identified. As Andrews and 
Goodson (1980) noted, it is not always clear if models have been 
empirically validated, and how to choose the most appropriate one. 
However, a number of comparative studies on ISD models (Andrews and 
Goodson, 1980; Edmonds et al., 1994; Gustafson and Branch, 2002) 
identified their recurring components, such as: formulation of observable 
goals and sub-goals; tests; characterization of audience, instructor, and 
constraints; type of instruction; size and context of instruction; delivery 
methods; development of educational materials; results assessment, 
feedback and revision. Among these components, the most defining one 
for the ISD approach is stating specific educational objectives or desirable 
learning outcomes. These are defined as “specific, measurable learning 
goals, i.e. what students will know, understand and be able to do” 
(Handelsman et al., 2007 p. 20). Education and professional development 
(training) based on desired competencies has also become particularly 
popular in life science and health education (Koo and Miner, 2010). 
However, all major components of ISD could be reduced to a higher-level 
model as the one that we use in this research. The ISD model described 
by the American Association for Training Development (ASTD) (Hodell, 
2011) is one of the most structured and refined applications of what has 
been informally termed the ADDIE model for ISD, and the one that is 
mostly applied in this research. ADDIE comes from the initials of the five 
main phases of this highly flexible instructional design model: Analysis, 
Design, Development, Implementation and Evaluation. ADDIE is not a 
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formalized model in itself, nor is it clear who firstly described the process 
using this label (Molenda, 2003). The early instructional design model that 
later developed into the ASTD approach is the Interservice Procedures for 
Instructional Systems Development (IPISD) designed for the United States 
Army by Branson et al. (1977). 153  Nonetheless, as emerges from the 
classifications of instructional design models, the ADDIE approach 
includes all the components advanced by other instructional design 
scholars (Bonner, 1982; McCombs, 1986; Gustafson and Branch, 
2002).154 These components can be grouped under the analysis, design, 
development, implementation and evaluation categories.155 
2.6.2Four levels of impact of education 
Methods to evaluate education in structured training and its impact is 
regarded as an important aspect by educational science contributions 
(National Research Council, 2003b; Bober and Bartlett, 2004). 
Kirkpatrick’s (1976; 1979; 1996; 2006; Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick, 2007) 
model for evaluating training programs will be leveraged in this research to 
evaluate education regarding both learning and security objectives, 
according to specific indicators and metrics. Kirkpatrick’s model has a long 
history of application in training programmes, traditionally and most 
popularly in business organizations (Bates, 2004) and project 
management (Steensma and Groeneveld, 2010; Buganza et al., 2013). 
However, the model has also been used in other instructional contexts 
(Arthur Jr et al., 2003) as well as applied in higher education (Praslova, 
2010). The model helped to highlight the importance of design for 
evaluating training programmes (Steensma and Groeneveld, 2010), and in 
general to base evaluation of education on learning objectives. 
                                                      
153 That model was extensively applied in the US military before being applied in other sectors. That 
IPISD model (Branson et al., 1977; Branson, 1978) used the same phases summarized in ADDIE, 
though Evaluation was labelled “Control”. 
154 As Gustafson and Branch (2002) note, the IPISD model, at the root of the ADDIE model, can be 
classified as systems-oriented in contrast to more classroom-oriented and product-oriented 
instructional design models. 
155 I will use the capitalized words to refer to the structured five phases of the ADDIE model we use, 
and lowercase initials when I refer more in general to the categories or the actions of analysis, 
design, development, implementation and evaluation. 
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The model describes objectives of educational programs in four levels. 
The first Level is the reaction, or how participants (students) are satisfied 
about the education. The second Level is properly learning, or what 
knowledge, skills, and attitudes have changed as a result of education, i.e. 
if learning objectives have actually been achieved. Level three looks at if 
and how what is learned is transferred into usual practice; instructional 
designers also label it “behavioural change”. Finally, Level four looks at the 
broader results of education, and if and what change has occurred 
because of the education in terms of organizational change. The 
distinction among different areas or levels of evaluation for education is 
common to other training evaluation models: Kraiger et al (1993) for 
example distinguish between “training effectiveness” and “training 
evaluation”, with the former being more general and looking at the system 
perspective, and Praslova (2010) distinguishes between “internal” and 
“external” evaluation.156 Criticisms of Kirkpatrick’s model of evaluation of 
education and training contend that it is incomplete and does not consider 
factors such as culture, organizational goals and adequacy of resources 
(Bates, 2004); and that it assumes causal relations while some analysis 
suggest a lack of correlation between the levels (Alliger et al., 1997). 
However, studies have also found indications of strong linkages especially 
between level one and the following levels (Kraiger et al., 1993), though 
less among the higher three levels (Dixon, 1990; Alliger et al., 1997; 
Morgan and Casper, 2000; Arthur Jr et al., 2003). Though relationships 
between levels two, three and four have been also reported (Buganza et 
al., 2013), the modesty suggested by some studies could be due to lack of 
opportunities to investigate the impact (Arthur Jr et al., 2003) and hence a 
problem of integration of the four levels model into instructional design, 
rather than of the evaluation model itself (Praslova, 2010). In this sense, 
the biggest challenge is to design appropriate indicators and metrics to 
populate the four levels model. In particular, the stress on level four is 
noteworthy as it focuses on evaluating ultimate results of training, as 
stressed early by science of learning literature (Likert, 1958). Level four 
                                                      
156 These distinctions could be paralleled to Kirkpatrick’s first and second level, on the one hand, 
and third and fourth levels, on the other hand. In this sense, we prefer Kirkpatrick’s model also 
because it provides a higher “resolution” of analysis. 
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goals are determined by designers and reflect some worthy results, that in 
some contexts can be related to production, financial assets, or quality 
(Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick, 2007). In our case, they will be related to 
lowering the risks of deliberate disease. Level four goals in this model 
have also been discussed before in relation to higher education, as 
reflecting the goals that “accreditors, governments and workforce 
representatives” expect will be served through the competences and skills 
that higher education institutions will prepare students with, before they 
enter the labour market. In general, Kirkpatrick’s typology “has served as a 
good foundation for training evaluation for many decades” (Salas and 
Cannon-Bowers, 2001 p. 487). This model of evaluation is also compatible 
with ISD and the ADDIE model, as it stresses the importance of setting 
desired outcomes upfront and of proceeding backward to development 
and design.  
2.6.3Learner-centred as effective education 
Literature on education about security issues in the life sciences explicitly 
mentioned that the particular nature and objectives of these efforts would 
be best delivered by the use of modern teaching methods. The US 
National Research Council (National Research Council, 2010) advanced 
that the complex, subjective and multidisciplinary dimensions of the 
subject require educational methods that promote critical thinking and 
application. Successive initiatives built on this consideration, as 
development of educational content on responsible conduct and security 
risks was coupled with development of active learning techniques 
(National Research Council, 2013). The recognition of modern teaching 
techniques as effective to deliver education is, however, not exclusive to 
health and security issues nor the life sciences. Over the last century, 
understanding of how people learn suggested pedagogies that leverage 
the natural ways of learning for improved and lasting effects. Though often 
connected with practical activities and based on the experiential learning 
theory (Kolb, 1984), “active learning” does not necessarily involve 
movement. Its characteristic is being learner-centred rather than instructor-
centred as traditional lecturing: the learner is endorsed of not only 
receiving information but also of producing it, collaborating in their own 
learning process and according to their learning style (Gardner, 2011). 
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Evidence on active learning pedagogies, such as problem–based and 
learner-centred approaches, supports that it leads to improved training 
results in terms of the first level of training impact, i.e. satisfaction of 
students (Weimer, 2002), and of the second level, i.e. learning outcomes, 
versus traditional lecturing in science, engineering and mathematics (Scott 
Freeman et al., 2014) and undergraduate biology (Armbruster et al., 2009). 
Clearly learner-centred instruction has positive impact on training 
outcomes (Ruiz-Primo et al., 2011), particularly on problem-solving and 
higher order learning (Prince, 2004; Haak et al., 2011; Michael, 2006). The 
US National Academy of Sciences collected results from active learning 
literature. In particular, a report underlined the impact of active learning on 
students’ abilities to transfer knowledge and skills to new situations, and 
that learner-centred instruction should be applied in different adult 
education contexts, levels and disciplines (National Research Council, 
2000). Active learning is also more effective in achieve learning objectives 
in cognitive domains of skills and attitudes, while traditional methods focus 
only on the knowledge cognitive domain and leave the development, in the 
other two areas, largely to the learner’s initiative (Colliver, 2000; Michael, 
2006; Prince, 2004). With regard to teaching of scientists, it has been 
noted (Johnson, 2012) how active learning formats may be particularly 
useful to teach philosophy and ethics to students of life sciences and 
biotechnology who do not have the skills for philosophy, do not know the 
expectations of philosophy, or are hostile to philosophy.157 There are also 
accounts of less clear evidence of the effects of active learning and/or their 
benefits are worth extra investment, as Colliver (2000) analysed with 
regard to problem-based learning curricula, or as Halloun and Hestenes 
(1985) suggested that while innovations had a positive effect on learning, 
it was variable and not clearly measured. However, more recent and 
comprehensive meta-analyses seem to reinforce the case for positive and 
worthwhile effects of learner-centred instruction on academic performance, 
                                                      
157 The role-playing active learning format, for example, may be more impactful than a typical 
learning format of the humanities like essay writing. Johnson’s (2012) experience suggests that the 
context of C.P. Snow’s (2012)  “two cultures” between sciences and humanities would still be valid, 
at least for education. In this research I present and discuss different experiences of mixing both 
contents and formats of science and humanities education. 
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versus traditional lecturing especially in the sciences (Freeman et al., 
2014). 
This research employed learner-centred instruction principles in the design, 
development and implementation of education, compatibly with the 
freedom in design possible in the different contexts where the research 
was carried out. Besides the design principles introduced above, models 
applied in the Development and Implementation phases of the ADDIE 
cycle include the scheme of learning events proposed by Robert Gagné 
and Leslie Briggs (Gagné and Rohwer, 1969; Gagné et al., 1992), 
instruction agendas for learner-centred instruction (Jensen, 2005; National 
Research Council, 2000), consideration of learning elements or principles 
(Thorndike, 1932), and learning activities according to Kolb’s experiential 
learning model (Kolb, 1971; 1973; 1976; 1984; Kolb et al., 2001). 158 
Characteristics of the experiential learning model include the interaction 
between theory and practice, and the consideration of different learning 
styles of students. Kolb posits that “learning is a process whereby 
concepts are derived from, and continuously modified by, experience” 
(Kolb, 1984 p. 38). 
It was not possible to apply active learning designs in part, or completely, 
in all contexts, not least because “there are similarities and differences in 
education philosophies, approaches to teaching and learning, facilities, 
and resources among nations” (National Research Council, 2013 p. 5). 
The experiences with different educational techniques and methods, 
though not always optimal, provided, however, the opportunity to discuss 
variances among educational methods. The approaches leveraged from 
educational science are also connected with the general weak social 
constructionist approach of the research. On the one hand the above 
discussion suggested that social constructionism has an influence in 
pedagogy and the science of learning;159 on the other hand we recognize 
                                                      
158 Experiential learning is explicitly based on the cognitive psychology work by Lewin, Dewey and 
Piaget and, as hinted before, instances from behavioural traditions of Hull and Skinner, among 
others. 
159 At the least with the general recognition that education and learning are socially situated, if not 
dependent. A social constructionist influence on the conceptualization of learning includes 
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that instructional design takes place and has to consider cultural and 
socio-economic contexts. 
2.7 Education in the web of prevention 
The web of prevention is the end state in which this research would place 
education of scientists as a potential tool to prevent the risks of deliberate 
disease. The concept of the web advances that, in order to ensure security, 
a range of measures, stakeholders, and disciplines, has to be involved. It 
opposes views that see security in the life sciences as field-limited: 
laboratory safety, national legislation, ethical deliberations, and/or 
international treaties. The concept of the web of prevention for the life 
sciences originated in the 1990s (Feakes et al., 2007), and is based on the 
idea that no single solution can exist to assure security related to this 
scientific and societal aspect. Pearson described a “web of deterrence” for 
biological weapons that should comprise comprehensive, verifiable, global 
arms control; export control and monitoring; effective defensive and 
protective measures; and effective national and international responses to 
acquisition and/or use (Pearson, 1993). Over the years, the concept has 
been enlarged to include measures that are not only in the sphere of 
governmental activities but that also include professional associations, 
editors, academia and the scientific community in general (Feakes et al., 
2007). The web of prevention envisaged by the International Committee of 
the Red Cross is a “broad and integrative approach that should be taken 
by all those concerned to minimize the risk” (ICRC, 2003). 
2.8 Conclusions 
This Chapter presented the theoretical framework to study education as a 
security tool to prevent the risks of deliberate disease. Three main 
conceptual areas and categories interplay in this research: security, risk, 
and education; all within a social constructionist approach. Securitization 
and risk assessment will be used in order to analyse attempts to advance 
education of scientists (particularly focusing as pre-service education) as a 
                                                                                                                                                  
considering that it happens in historical, socio-economical and cultural contexts that education has 
to take into account. Furthermore, learner-centred approaches are compatible with constructionist 
views in believing that learners have an active role in learning and in shaping their competence, 
while the teacher’s role if more similar to a facilitator than an instructor (Lebow, 1993; Prawat and 
Floden, 1994; Phillips, 2000). 
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tool to manage the risks of deliberate disease. The concept of risk is 
leveraged to identify and characterize risk scenarios of deliberate disease 
and understand if education interventions may impact factors influencing 
likelihood and consequence, as well as on how risk assessors evaluate 
risk. Educational models are applied to design instructional systems for 
scientists during their formative period, as well as to assess their impacts 
on learning, behaviour and risk. Three main models from educational 
science are leveraged: ISD, the Kirkpatrick model of four levels of impact, 
and techniques responding to the principles of “learner-centred” teaching. 
The framework leverages theoretical bases from social, security and 
educational studies, and critically combines components of securitization, 
discourse analysis, risk assessment, science of education, and the web of 
prevention. Even with the mobilization of varied components, the research 
relies on a common denominator of macro (weak) constructionist 
approach to security, risk, and education. For what regards the scope of 
such a research, Rappert (2007a) discussed what the contribution could 
be of a social analysis on the concerns of biological research with the 
potential to be misapplied to intentionally cause harm. One option from a 
more “objectivist” point of view would be that to propose “definitive 
assessments” (Rappert, 2007a p. 50) on risks. Another approach, a 
“constructivist” one, would treat disagreement as a “phenomenon for 
examination itself” and devote attention to how claims are made and, 
actually, constructed. This lens, very compatible to our approach, is just a 
prerequisite choice to determine the type of contribution the research can 
offer. Rappert mentions among possible contributions an understanding of 
the different discourses applied by actors to the issue; an analysis of the 
interests of those actors and how discourses may serve their goals; and/or 
an analysis of the argumentative resources employed by actors. The 
ultimate intended contribution of this research is to understand how claims 
of education as a security tool to mitigate the risk of deliberate disease 
have been made, if education can actually have an impact on that risk, 
and, if yes, how can it be effective.  
Regarding ontological and epistemological stances, my approach remains 
with constructionism, and as such not necessarily endogenous as 
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described by the judicial-legalist approach to securitization and most of the 
technical risk management literature. I accept the deepening and 
broadening of security, and I consider a natural consequence to place the 
topic of this research as a security tool within the web of prevention of 
deliberate disease.  I will apply securitization analysis to speech acts and 
discourses, as prescribed by the Copenhagen School, however expanding 
its methodology. My analysis, accepting the historico-political model of 
securitization, looks at: before the speech act, arguments of the 
securitization discourse; during the speech act, context and audience(s); 
and after the speech act, success of the discourse in becoming hegemonic 
grammar, and actual embedding of what urged by the discourse in 
institutional and bureaucratic practices. The tool of historico-political 
securitization, and the insertion of educational messages in the web of 
prevention framework, would be employed, besides the epistemological 
reasons, also to mitigate the potential implications of silencing 
constituencies or reproducing negative securitization practices. Building 
from the deepening of security, we will consider as acceptable securitizing 
actors not only states (both at the national level and as international 
governmental organizations), but also components of the civil society such 
as national and international NGOs, academia, and scientific organizations. 
The discussion on risk will include identification of possible risk scenarios 
of deliberate disease, and of factors that would influence those risks 
characterization and evaluation, within risk assessment, to then argue 
what factors have the potential to be influenced by education. While this 
approach to risk may seem accepting entirely a quantitative risk analysis 
approach, I have argued as those tools can be actually unveiled as 
considering risk as always relative in characterization, and influenced by 
perception, identities and several other constructed factors in subjective 
evaluation. My approach is also integrated with the concepts of the macro 
(weak) constructionist vision of risk. This framework will allow the research 
to discuss the questions on how education was constructed as a potential 
security tool to deal with deliberate disease risks; if and how could 
education influence deliberate disease risks; and what could be effective 
options for education to mitigate deliberate disease risks.  
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3. The Risks of Deliberate Disease 
This Chapter will discuss an assessment of the risks of deliberate disease, 
and identify where and how education could potentially lower risks. 
Following the approach described in the previous Chapter, I will apply it to 
deliberate disease risks firstly going through risk identification, describing 
what are the dimensions of deliberate disease risks, and what specific risk 
scenarios we focus on. Secondly I will discuss risk characterization, 
identifying several factors influencing likelihood and consequences of 
deliberate disease risks, and discussing if and how education may 
influence them. Thirdly I discuss what factors impact evaluation of those 
risks.160 
3.1 The possibilities of deliberate disease 
Risks related to the life sciences and technologies may include natural 
disease outbreaks, loss of biological diversity, accidental release of 
pathogens, other harmful biological materials or toxins, and biosecurity 
risks. Biosecurity risks regard events where a threat has a malicious 
intention “focused upon an item of value or asset” (Caskey and Sevilla-
Reys, 2015 p. 46).161 Deliberate disease risks refer to biosecurity risks in 
which the intention is to acquire and/or use the asset to cause disease. In 
this paragraph I will discuss the history and dimensions of deliberate 
disease risks.  
Science and technology raising security concerns for their potential to 
enable destructive applications is neither a new nor a specific issue of 
                                                      
160 This is consistent with other studies applying the framework to biological and other risks (WHO, 
2004; Caskey et al., 2010; Gormley et al., 2011; CEN, 2011; Caskey and Sevilla-Reys, 2015). The 
first phase corresponds to the first question in the Kaplan & Garrick model, “what could go wrong?” 
and integrates identification of hazards and risk scenarios; while the second (“how likely it is that it 
will happen?”) and third (“if it does happen, what are the consequences?”) questions correspond to 
risk characterization. 
161 Examples of biosecurity risks scenarios could include a farmer intent on infecting a competitor’s 
flock of birds; an employee upset with someone and making them sick; a criminal with the intention 
of stealing and selling assets; an adversary intent on damaging a research project; a competitor 
intent on producing a competitive vaccine; someone intent on sabotaging an institution’s reputation 
(Caskey and Sevilla-Reys, 2015 p. 55); the non-peaceful application of biology in states’ military 
programs; and the misuse of results of peaceful research for non-peaceful uses. 
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biology. 162  Within CBRN weapons, including WMD, the potential 
intentional application related to biology is devised in the deliberate 
inducement and/or spreading of disease, and the means to achieve this in 
biological weapons (BW). BW share with chemical, nuclear and 
radiological weapons a label of unconventionality, international prohibition 
regimes, as well as a commonly perceived stigma. However, BW are 
peculiar under a number of aspects. Under the technical aspects, first, 
most agents involved in traditional BW are naturally occurring and more 
accessible than chemical precursors, fissile or radioactive material. 
Second, they are self-replicating, and small quantities may lead to 
extensive cultures difficult to detect and account for. Third, while the 
technology to produce nuclear and chemical weapons has remained 
substantially the same in the last decades, advancements in life sciences 
and biotechnology are making potentially dangerous agents increasingly 
easy to obtain, manipulate and even create; are reducing the resources, 
technology and knowledge needed to do so in many countries, facilities, 
public or private sectors; and with other converging and emerging 
technologies are opening entirely new challenges. Fourth, BW are almost 
entirely based on dual-use materials, equipment and knowledge with much 
more blurred lines between hostile and peaceful applications than in the 
case of nuclear technology. This makes it challenging to verify hostile 
applications, while impeding excessive restrictions on scientific 
advancements that bring enormous benefits in the fields of public health, 
                                                      
162  Historical examples date back to hesitations of Leonardo da Vinci on potential military 
application of his inventions (Bezuindenhout and Rappert, 2012), or to considerations on 
mechanical arts by Francis Bacon, who stated: “certainly human life is much indebted to them, for 
very many things which concern both the furniture of religion and the ornament of state and the 
culture of life in general, are drawn from their store. And yet out of the same fountain come 
instruments of lust, and also instruments of death. For (not to speak of the arts of procures) the 
most exquisite poisons, also guns, and such like engines of destruction, are the fruits of mechanical 
invention” (Bacon, 1858 p. 753). In the twentieth century, an example of discussions about potential 
destructive applications of science and technology regarded nuclear energy. Contemporary 
examples may include nanotechnology, cybertechnology, and 3D printed firearms. A report of the 
US National Academies assessing ethical, legal and societal issues (including aspects of security 
issues) of Emerging and Readily Available (ERA) technologies chose to evaluate three 
“foundational technologies” and four applications domains: information technology, synthetic 
biology, and neuroscience; and robotics, prosthetics and human enhancement, cyber weapons, 
and nonlethal weapons, respectively (National Research Council, 2014). 
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food security, and energy, inter alia. BW are also different from other WMD 
under military aspects as they can constitute force multipliers for 
conventional military operations as well as being poorly suited to serve as 
strategic deterrence (Koblentz, 2009). Under political aspects, BW are 
different to other WMD as they “do not present a traditional, state-centric 
‘disarmament’ or ‘arms control’ security problem, because they are banned 
and should not exist” (McLeish and Nightingale, 2007), there is no 
discrimination between biological weapons and non-biological weapons 
states like for the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and no oversight on 
destruction such as in the chemical disarmament regime (Littlewood, 
2004). Moreover, under societal aspects, the flourishing of BW in sci-fi 
imagery and the waves of panic triggered by global epidemics, suggest the 
power of deliberate disease in social imagination, but are also detrimental 
to a reasoned risk analysis. 
Defining the risks of deliberate disease is challenging already from the 
definition of BW. The BTWC prohibits “microbial or other biological agents, 
or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in 
quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other 
peaceful purposes” along with relative means of delivery. BW are hence 
defined by the non-peaceful intention on using biological agents. This 
definition leads to distinctions along a number of spectra. First is the 
relationship between biological and chemical weapons (CW): biochemical 
threats range from classical chemical weapons to genetically modified 
biological agents (Pearson, 1990), and both the BTWC and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC) cover toxins and mid-spectrum agents acting 
on the nervous system. Second is the spectrum of effects: besides WMD, 
it includes “non-lethal” BW to induce incapacitation or psychophysical 
modifications; limited scope weapons; and weapons designed to cause 
terror or social disruption rather than physical harm. Third, the range of 
targets includes humans but also livestock, plants, the environment and 
materiel (Schaad et al., 1999; OIE, 2011a; OIE, 2011b). Fourth is the 
spectrum of sophistication, with crude BW such as those in pre-scientific 
era, military optimization (“weaponization”) of natural agents, and 
advanced biowarfare possibilities. Finally, BW discussions have 
traditionally focused on pathogenic microorganisms, but debates about 
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other biological agents used to cause harm have also occurred, such as 
on infestation (Sims, 2006). 
3.1.1 State biological weapons programs before the BTWC 
Conflicts have historically been accompanied by disease because of poor 
hygienic conditions, weakened health of populations, or lack of medical 
supplies. Despite references to ancient practices of tainting arrows or 
poisoning wells, it is difficult to talk of cognizant biological warfare before 
the nineteenth century. In his analysis of BW before WWI, Wheelis 
(1999b) sets out stringent criteria for considering historical examples of 
actual biowarfare.163 The increased understanding of mechanisms of germ 
disease allowed a grasp on how to control it. During WWI, Germany 
carried out sabotage operations to infect Allies’ livestock supplies (Wheelis, 
1999a). France started a BW program in 1922, basing it on misperceptions 
of activities continuing in Germany. 164  A BW research program is also 
documented in Hungary in the 1930s, possibly linked with one in Italy 
(Geissler, 2001; Labanca, 2000). 
Between 1931 and the end of WWII, Japan developed a vast program of 
BW development and use, including defensive and offensive measures 
carried in occupied Manchuria (Harris, 1999).165 The UK BW program was 
more limited but also more scientific, and focused, in its offensive 
component, on anti-animal attacks. 166  In the 1950s, BW declined in 
importance in the UK, because of the nuclear deterrent and technical 
                                                      
163 Accounts from the Middle Ages include episodes where attackers hurled dead bodies into 
besieged cities, such the siege on the seaport of Caffa in 1346; however evidence that outbreaks 
were caused directly and only by the catapulted infectious material is not conclusive. The only 
episode satisfying Wheelis’ criteria regards an attack carried out by British traders and officials in 
1763, when blankets from a smallpox hospital were included in a trade with Native Americans. 
164 This largely defensive program included research on a variety of pathogens, infesting insects, 
delivery methods, and dispersion tests (Lepick, 1999). The program, curtailed with the German 
occupation, resumed in 1947 but suffered lack of priority in comparison to nuclear weapons (Lepick, 
2006). 
165 Operations led by the specialized Unit 731 included human experimentations, research and 
attacks using disease-carrying animals, artillery shellfire, aircraft spraying, and air balloons. 
166 Anthrax-laced cattle cakes were produced, while field trials of explosion-produced aerosolization 
(van Courtland Moon et al., 1999) were carried out on Gruinard island in Scotland, which would 
have been contaminated until the 1990s (BBC, 2001). 
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difficulties (Balmer, 2006).167 Towards the end of WWII, the United States 
gained interest in BW, entering a collaboration with Canada and the UK. 
The program included research on anthrax, plague and turalemia, as well 
as anti-crop projects (van Courtland Moon, 1999). After the war, BW were 
overshadowed by nuclear in strategic policy, but the belief that the USSR 
was developing a BW capability supported the continuation of the 
program.168 In the 1960s, US BW policy started to be reconsidered; factors 
included perceived limited military value and an increasing criticism of the 
use of anti-plant agents in Vietnam. In November 1969 the US declared 
the renunciation of its biological warfare program. Reasons for the 
decision included encouraging the adoption of an international ban to 
prevent proliferation, and sanctioning the separation between biological 
and chemical disarmament. US BW facilities were converted to civilian and 
biodefense, such as the United States Army Medical Research Institute of 
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). The latter focuses on preparedness 
against BW attacks, which became a key element in US defence and often 
requires secrecy, opening the sensitive issue of keeping offensive and 
defensive research - the former prohibited, the latter necessary - distinct. 
3.1.2 State biological weapons programs after the BTWC 
After the entering into force of the BTWC in 1975, three countries have 
been discovered as in breach of the Convention: the Soviet Union, Iraq 
and South Africa. Allegations of illegal activities also occurred on and by 
several states, however with no definite evidence or independent analysis 
of accusations (Furmanski and Wheelis, 2006).169 
                                                      
167 Increasing disaffection towards BW, and the entry into force of the BTWC, moved the British 
program to a defensive-only nature. 
168 It researched ways to make agents more resistant to stockpiling and stress from delivery or 
meteorological conditions, and large area coverage tests were carried out with simulants (van 
Courtland Moon, 2006). 
169 Accusations included those on the US, Myanmar and Rhodesia (Furmanski and Wheelis, 2006; 
Dando, 2009b), Libya, Iran, Syria (Leitenberg, 2005); in many cases allegations were politically 
motivated propaganda or poorly sustained. Accusations with no substantive account included the 
Soviet, Chinese and North Korean ones against the US during the Korean War (Furmanski and 
Wheelis, 2006 p. 261), the US ones over Soviet mycotoxin use in Afghanistan (Furmanski and 
Wheelis, 2006 p. 275), and the Cuban accusations over infestation perpetrated by the US 
(Furmanski and Wheelis, 2006 p. 268). 
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The USSR had a limited interest in BW until the early post-WWII period 
(Bojtzov and Geissler, 1999), with an impetus after 1973.170  Defensive 
activities as vaccine research were coupled with production of Bacillus 
anthracis, Marburg virus, Yersinia pestis, and the smallpox virus with 
offensive focus.171 During the 1970s, suspicions rose in the West that the 
USSR was violating the BTWC; the most debated case became an 
anthrax outbreak in Sverdlosk in 1979, which killed at least 60 and was 
attributed by the Soviet Union to contaminated meat, but that further 
research by others attributed to a leak from a military biological facility.172 
After Russia’s disclosures in 1992 on the BW programme and delays in 
implementing the BTWC, the BW complex was dismantled or redirected to 
civilian or defensive activities. However, Russia is still reluctant to 
openness on the fate of former military and biodefense facilities 
(Leitenberg et al., 2012). 
In the 1980s, Iraq started a BW program focusing on obtaining capabilities 
for rapid production and deployment. Most information comes from the 
UNSCOM and UNMOVIC Commissions, which, however, could not reach 
a definitely clear picture (UNMOVIC, 2003). Production focused on 
botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and anthrax (Pearson, 2006), as well as anti-
crop wheat cover smut (Dando, 2009b), to be deployed in operational 
warheads between 1990 and 1991. After the Gulf War, the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) required Iraq to destroy WMD and ratify the BTWC. 
Complete verification was difficult, as UNSCOM could not account for all 
estimated CBW (Wahlberg et al., 2000). UNMOVIC was able to recognize 
that Iraq in 2003 had no BW active program, even if it was not possible to 
exclude it had conserved the capability to restart it. 
                                                      
170 During the Cold War most information on the program came from Soviet defectors, on whose 
accounts most details are still based (Alibek, 2008). Estimates report for up to 60,000 staff involved 
in the program, comprising the military and the ostensibly civilian organization Biopreparat, and 
tens of thousands of tons of agents produced, with at least a hundred tons supposedly ready for 
deployment (Domaradskij and Orent, 2006). 
171  Research introduced new scientific techniques such as genetic manipulation to improve 
effectiveness, insert antibiotic resistance, cause autoimmune reactions; and work on bioregulators. 
172 Later studies suggested the unusual pattern of infection originating from the military facility and 
confirmed the inhalation route of infection for anthrax (Meselson et al., 1994; Wampler and Blanton, 
2001). 
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In the 1990s, materials disclosed by the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission revealed a South African CBW program started in 1983, 
(Gould and Hay, 2006). Initiated to research protective measures, it 
evolved to offensive capabilities using commercial companies as front 
organizations. Research suggests that BW were intended for crowd 
control and assassination (Gould et al., 2002), while unsuccessful study of 
anti-fertility vaccines for the black population was also carried out. The 
post-apartheid De Klerk government, after introducing criminalization of 
BW, terminated the programme.  
3.1.3 Bioterrorism and biocrimes 
Biological weapons also attracted the interest of non-state actors; these 
cases include biocrimes and bioterrorism. The former exclude political or 
ideological goals, while the latter has been the subject of enormous 
attention especially since 2001, on the rationale that deliberate disease 
would be attractive for terrorists because of their relative accessibility in 
light of potentially devastating effects.  
Well-documented bioterrorism acts against humans include the Rajneesh, 
Aum Shinrikyo and Amerithrax cases. 173  In 1984, the religious sect of 
Rajneesh contaminated salad bars with salmonella in a town in Oregon.174 
They failed in their goal, but the result was that hundreds were sickened. 
The group used simple ways to obtain, produce and disperse salmonella; 
the outbreak was noticed as unusual, but its intentional nature was not 
recognized until members of the sect confessed the plot (Wheelis and 
Sugishima, 2006). Aum Shinrikyo, an apocalyptic Japanese cult, attracted 
several thousands followers and had extensive financial resources. It 
planned destructive acts proclaiming the need to “purify society”. 
Beginning in the early 1990s Aum invested in a BW capacity, employing 
members with microbiology training. They obtained botulinum toxin and 
anthrax, however they failed to develop them due to ill preparation and 
bad management (Furukawa, 2011). Aum switched to CW, being 
successful in disseminating sarin in the Tokyo subway in 1995. The attack 
                                                      
173 Accounts of early documented bioterrorism against animals include a small-scale campaign to 
infect cattle in Kenya by the separatist movement Mau Mau in 1952 (Carus, 2002 p. 63). 
174 The motivation was to incapacitate voters in a county election and gain freedom of action for the 
local cult’s commune. 
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killed thirteen and injured several hundreds; the cult was dismantled, and 
many members convicted for murder. In the US in 2001, letters containing 
weaponized anthrax were mailed to media and political figures. Twenty-
two cases of anthrax were identified; five people died, and others suffered 
disability. The attack prompted a prophylaxis program, the shutdown of 
public facilities, decontamination and widespread panic. The strain of 
anthrax was matched with those in a flask at USAMRIID (Guillemin, 2011), 
the FBI closed the investigations only in 2010 identifying the sole culprit in 
a scientist from the biodefense lab, who had died in the meanwhile. 
Achievements of bioterrorism attacks suggest considering this threat in 
perspective. A global chronology of CBRN incidents identified 91 bio-
related events between 1952 and 2005, including possession, threats of 
use or actual use, and mostly crude criminal use of biological materials 
(Mohtadi, 2006). Another compilation identified two thirds of CBRN 
incidents between 1900 and 1999 as hoaxes (Tucker and Sands, 1999). 
Indeed there are several challenges in the preparation of effective BW. 
These include obtaining a pathogenic strain; conserving, handling and 
growing it correctly (Leitenberg, 2005); determining the host range, routes 
of infection, minimal response doses, how to achieve targets, ensure 
survival in the environment, and overcoming immune systems and 
therapeutics (Zilinskas, 2000). This requires knowledge, time, equipment, 
organization and funds, which may be large obstacles for private actors. 
However, past failures do not necessarily predict the future, and the risk 
may be increasing in the last decades (Salerno et al., 2004). Technological 
advancements, which are positively impacting public health, are also 
making the above steps less complex. Also while the bioterrorism hype 
may have increased the attention of potential perpetrators, the enhanced 
preparedness, biodefense and legislation brought by policy attention may 
have prevented attacks in the last years. 
3.1.4 The issue of dual-use 
Formerly used to design military technologies transferred to civilian uses, 
the dual-use concept has today at least three dimensions: ostensibly 
civilian facilities actually intended for weapons development; legitimate 
equipment and agents that could be misappropriated and misused; and 
the generation and dissemination of scientific knowledge that could be 
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misused (Atlas and Dando, 2006). While dual-use potential may be 
intrinsic in every technology, with life sciences the challenge is unique as 
equipment, technologies and materials applied to peaceful purposes could 
almost entirely be also applied to cause deliberate disease. As Tucker 
(2012) observed, defining dual-use control measures in biotechnology can 
be a double-edged sword: assigning them too narrowly would exclude 
potential threats, while doing it too broadly would put excessive restriction 
on innocuous technology. This is the dual-use dilemma in the life sciences, 
which was often debated on the occasion of publication of research such 
as those rendering an animal variant of the smallpox virus resistant to 
know vaccines (Jackson et al., 2001), or reconstructing the 1918 Spanish 
influenza virus (Tumpey et al., 2005). 
3.2 Identification of deliberate disease risks 
Optimal risk scenario identification defines a unique failure event in a 
detailed characterized system, pairing all possible sources of risk with all 
potential targets (Leung et al., 2004). This allows higher resolution in 
characterizing likelihood and consequences, as the more general a 
scenario, the less resolution can its characterization have. However, such 
a level of detail also leads to very large numbers of risk scenarios, making 
it impractical and calling for prioritization; furthermore, in our case we are 
interested in looking at broad deliberate disease risk scenarios as our aim 
is understanding if, and how could education influence them, rather than 
specific assessment.175 
Deliberate disease risk scenarios are evolving. On the one side, there is a 
multiplication of potential threats: in the twentieth century, they mainly 
came from nation-states with political motivations and resources to 
develop BW programs. In the current context, the state-run BW 
proliferation threat is multifaceted with the assimilation of science and 
technology advancements in military programs, while non-state actors with 
increasing access to technology represent additional threats. These 
include terrorists acting for ideological motives, and others acting on 
private or economic reasons. 
                                                      
175 See for example Caskey et al. (2010) on biosafety risk assessment, where they limit to 13 
biosafety risk scenarios identified. 
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There are also technological advancements constituting both challenges 
and opportunities in dealing with security risks. These may be categorized 
in new capacities, rapidity of developments, increased access, and 
convergence of different disciplines, that all allow beneficial progress but 
also challenge current instruments for preventing misuse (BTWC, 2012a; 
National Research Council, 2011a).176 The rapidity of advancements in 
biotechnology outpaces other scientific fields. 177  At the same time 
biotechnology becomes widespread: more countries have advanced 
biomedical sectors; affordable commercial services allow students 
(Arsenic Biosensor Collaboration, 2013; Simonite, 2005) and amateur 
biotechnologists to perform activities formerly requiring expensive 
equipment and facilities, and to merge with growing trends of open 
technology. Biology is converging with other disciplines; bioinformatics 
allows working on models of biological systems and exchanging DNA 
sequences over the Internet. Biotechnology, thanks to sequences’ banks 
and predictive models, crosses with engineering making development and 
production easier (Carlson, 2010).  
A converging field that raised concern over ensuring it is only applied to 
peaceful purposes is neuroscience. Military interest in neuroscience falls 
under performance enhancement and degradation (National Research 
Council, 2009c; Royal Society, 2012), which both pose legal, political and 
ethical issues. Performance enhancement military applications may 
include brain-machine interfaces and actions on sleep, fatigue or fear 
(Tennison and Moreno, 2012). Performance degradation may include the 
                                                      
176  Regarding capacities, for example, genetic engineering opens new production options for 
deliberate disease including the expression of toxic proteins, or using plants or animals as 
bioproduction reactors; systems biology may allow to target specific systems within organisms, in 
what have been termed Advanced Biowarfare Agents (Petro et al., 2003); gene synthesis makes it 
easier to construct agents; bioregulators to modify functions of the immune, nervous and endocrine 
systems (Kagan, 2001); microencapsulation allows a more precise delivery, including crossing the 
blood-brain barrier. At the same time, progress in bioforensics, biosensors, epidemiology, 
countermeasures and vaccine research, inter alia, improve the capacity to prevent and respond to 
BW. 
177 It has been argued for example that the DNA sequencing performance, a function of the number 
of sequenced base-pairs and cost, followed a pattern similar to the Moore’s law (Carlson, 2003) for 
computational power - that the number of transistor per integrated circuit doubles every two years, 
but it is actually moving hyperexponentially. 
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development of CBW acting on the nervous systems, prohibited by 
international law, as well as incapacitants, chemicals or toxins with a 
temporary harmful effect.178 In general, deliberate disease risks in other 
studies look at the risk of agent(s) to be acquired and used by a threat in 
an attack (Gaudioso et al., 2009; Sandia National Laboratories, 2014b). 
3.2.1 Three deliberate disease risk scenarios 
Based on these considerations, we identify three general deliberate 
disease risk scenarios from the spectrum of contemporary deliberate 
disease risks. The first risk scenario focuses on nation-states carrying out 
programs to cause deliberate disease, while the second and third 
scenarios look at bioterrorism carried out by non-state actors. 179  The 
second and third scenarios are different in that the second looks at the 
case of terrorists who do not have access to protected assets (materials 
and skills) seeking to obtain capabilities to cause deliberate disease 
including from public dual-use information; while the third scenario regards 
terrorists with direct access to materials or skills capable of causing 
deliberate disease, i.e. including an insider threat or compromised scientist 
component.180 
Table 3 - Deliberate disease risk scenarios 
                                                      
178 Incapacitants are so-called non-lethal weapons and pose their own ethical and legal challenges. 
The CWC includes in the permitted uses of toxic chemicals “law enforcement including domestic 
riot control”; while it does not define law enforcement, it is believed to be a larger category of riot 
control. Also the label of “non-lethal”, as it suggests a “more humane” property, is a slippery legal 
and ethical concept, as lethality can be relative to doses, targets, and use in conjunction with 
conventional weapons (Davison, 2009). 
179 The three risk scenarios mainly focus on planned attacks directed to humans, among other 
targets that may also include property, animals, or the environment. While the focus on human 
targets of deliberate disease is a limitation, it should be noted firstly that human BW have 
historically gained the largest interest by threats, and that attacks on other targets would also have 
indirect consequences on humans. 
180 From the considered risk scenarios we hence exclude biocrimes, or deliberate disease acts by 
non-terrorist threats, such as those for revenge, assassination, personal gain or financial motives, 
as well as biosecurity risks beyond deliberate disease such as stealing of financially valuable 
assets, intellectual property rights frauds, counterfeit pharmaceuticals, etc. 
No. Threat Scenario 
1 State Programs by nation-states to cause deliberate disease 
2 Terrorist Non-State actors seeking access to assets and/or capabilities (outsider) 
3 Terrorist Non-State actors with access to assets and/or capabilities (insider) 
 93 
 
3.2.2 Consequences of deliberate disease risks 
The specific consequences of these deliberate disease risk scenarios 
depend on the events considered, but generally they can be from two 
categories or a mix thereof: consequences measureable in quantity or 
quality of human lives, and consequences measureable with economic 
losses.181  Consequences mainly measured with human life parameters 
would include deaths, disabilities, illness, chronic diseases or reduced 
quality of life due to infection (Isukapalli et al., 2008; Hokstad and Steiro, 
2006); or in terms of years of reduced life expectancy. Consequences 
mainly measured in economic parameters may include decontamination 
costs (Isukapalli et al., 2008), disruption of operations of critical 
infrastructures (Li et al., 2009) and recovery, or intellectual property 
damage. Some consequences of deliberate disease risks could be 
expressed in both quality of human life and cost parameters, such as 
public anxiety, fear, public “no confidence” in responders or the 
government, loss of reputation, and discomfort (Clevestig, 2009), 
disruption of an eradication program (Gaudioso et al., 2009), biodiversity 
loss, food supply instability (Stirling, 1999), as well as secondary infections. 
In a few cases, consequences, such as some permanent environmental 
damage, could go beyond a financial loss estimation (can be 
characterized as “inestimable”), and be a category in its own. 
3.3 Characterization of deliberate disease risks 
Risk characterization entails answering the questions “how likely is it to 
happen” and “if it does happen, what would be the consequences”, i.e. 
determining the relative182 likelihood and consequences of different risk 
scenarios. Some terrorist risk researchers regard “intentional harm” risks 
                                                      
181 Assessors can decide to consider consequences from both categories at the individual or at the 
societal level, “where individual risk gives the probability of dying on a certain location, the societal 
risk gives a number for a whole area, no matter precisely where the harm occurs within that area” 
(Jonkman et al., 2003 p. 6). 
182 We have discussed before that risk characterization relies on values that can be objective, yet 
can only be relative to other risks, either contemporary or across time. It should also be noted that 
for security risks “it is often impractical to apply quantitative risk analysis to a large number of risk 
scenarios at this phase. In such a case, qualitative risk analysis offers an adequate alternat ive.” 
(Leung et al., 2004). 
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as a product of threats, vulnerability and consequences (Willis et al., 2006; 
McGill et al., 2007; Paté-Cornell and Guikema, 2002). I think such an 
approach mixes layers of analysis, as characteristics of threats and 
vulnerabilities actually affect, among others, the likelihood of risks. Anyway, 
as I noted before, I am not focusing on providing another estimation of the 
relative values of likelihood and consequences for specific deliberate 
disease risk scenarios, but rather in identifying what factors contributing to 
them may be influenced by education. 
Deliberate disease risk characterization has to look at characteristics of 
three factors: hazards, threats, and situations. Hazards are pathogenic 
biological materials; threats are actors with the intention to cause harm; 
and situations are the contexts where hazards and threats could cause 
harm. No deliberate disease risk may exist without any of the three, as a 
threat would not pose a biorisk without a biological hazard; a biological 
hazard would not pose a security risk without a threat; and neither can 
pose a deliberate disease risk without a target or occasions to carry an 
attack. 183  Factors that affect likelihood precede the occurrence of the 
considered adverse event with the potential to cause harm (a state or non-
state threat acquiring BW capability or carrying a BW attack), while factors 
that affect consequences occur following that event. Characteristics of 
hazards largely affect consequences, while characteristics of threat and 
situation largely affect likelihood.184 
3.3.1 Hazard and threat characterization 
3.3.1.1 Hazard 
It’s common to find biological hazards categorized in “risk groups” (WHO, 
2004; ABSA, 2014; European Union, 2000; European Agency for Safety 
and Health at Work, 2014), which are the results of characterizations only 
based on the hazard’s factors. While pathogen risk groups are useful to 
                                                      
183 Obviously, a threat and a situation could cause other risks with access with other types of 
hazards, and biological hazards and a situation can cause biosafety risks without the presence of a 
threat. 
184 As an example, think to the risk of a terrorist group acquiring BW capabilities, within the second 
deliberate disease risk scenario considered. Consequence of infection will be influenced by the 
transmissibility and mortality of the pathogen. Likelihood will be influenced by the threat’s means 
and opportunities to acquire materials and skills, by mode of delivery, weather, and especially 
available risk mitigation measures.  
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inform decision-making on managing biorisk, including deliberate disease 
risks, they cannot be considered the product of a complete risk 
assessment. Obviously, pathogen risk groups cannot account for specific 
threat or situation factors that would be different from case to case. Risk 
assessors should hence use risk groups “only as a starting point” (Caskey 
and Sevilla-Reys, 2015 p. 47) to consider all factors contributing to risk 
characterization, which may lead to a different risk assessment.185 Hence, 
hazard characteristics may be reviewed within the general characterization 
of likelihood and consequence of deliberate disease risks.  
Characteristics would include the type of pathogenic material (virus, 
bacteria, toxin, spores, fungi, etc); related sensitive information (research, 
procedures, formulae, genetic information, etc); the pathogen being 
naturally occurring or engineered (modified living organism or synthetic); 
the form in which it is stored (human sample, culture, dried spores, 
information); its quantity and concentration. Characteristics of the 
pathogen would also include virulence, morbidity, mortality, infectious dose, 
routes of infection, host range, dose-response models, available vaccines 
and therapeutics (National Research Council, 2004), its persistence 
including transgenerationally, recurrence and delay (Hohenemser et al., 
1983), sequalae, endemicity, survivability (Gaudioso et al., 2009). 
3.3.1.2 Threat 
The necessity to consider the threat is what makes security risk 
characterization very different from safety risk characterization, as we 
have to include an intelligent actor. Characterization of the threat involves 
looking at motives, means and capabilities, and opportunities to cause 
deliberate disease. Some argued that motives would be the most 
important threat factor as it’s the generative one of the intention to cause 
disease (Brown and Cox Jr., 2011).186 Motives would be characterized by 
                                                      
185 For example, the risk associated with a pathogen from a “high-risk group” may be assessed 
differently by an organization in a situation when no credible threat exists, or where the pathogen is 
endemic in nature and potential threats have other opportunities to acquire it. Conversely, the risk 
associated with a “low-risk group” pathogen may be assessed relatively higher where the pathogen 
is not endemic and/or where there are inappropriate risk mitigation measures, leading to prioritizing 
it in terms of resource allocation. 
186 And a motivated threat can wait until they have means and opportunities. 
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intensity (Depoy et al., 2005) and nature, which should be considered by 
assessors. They should be analysed based on threat’s known values and 
beliefs (Keeney and von Winterfeldt, 2010), and objectives can include 
causing casualties, fear, gaining publicity, revenge, etc.187 Also a motive 
that may lead a threat to focus on one particular asset is if the asset has 
unique potential to cause harm, and/or if the target facility is unique as a 
source to acquire the hazard (Gaudioso et al., 2009). Threats’ factors 
relative to means and capabilities, that may influence the likelihood of 
deliberate disease risks, would include funding, technical capacity, 
equipment, organization, and time. Finally, risk likelihood depends on the 
threats’ opportunities to access hazards and related materials and 
information. A threat will be greatly facilitated by compromised personnel 
from a technical facility with access to hazards (insider threat), while 
different types and extent of opportunities may come from available dual-
use materials and information, including publicly available research. 
Certainly the characterization would be different of different factors of the 
state and the terrorist threats affecting risk likelihood in our three 
deliberate disease risk scenarios. In general, we can consider that means 
and opportunity factors are higher for state threats than for terrorist threats, 
but the latter may still find BW more accessible when compared with other 
WMD. Motives, on the other hand, would be lower for state threats than for 
terrorist threats, given that for the former the international stigma and 
prohibition regimes provide a greater obstacle and challenge, while for the 
latter the destructive and dreadful potential provide a potentially stronger 
incentive. 
3.3.2 Situation characterization 
Characteristics of the situation that impact (mainly) consequence of 
deliberate disease risks pertain to the context in which the adverse event 
happens. In the case of a BW attack, for example, they include position, 
spatial extension (Hohenemser et al., 1983) and timing of the release or 
contamination, and weather conditions such as temperature, humidity, 
                                                      
187 We focus on motives that may be linked to the deliberate disease risk scenarios and the 
possible consequences discussed above. Other threat’s motives may obviously include money, 
intellectual property, etc. 
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precipitation and wind. Characteristics of the target would also be part of 
situation characterization with population distribution, human activity 
patterns and health conditions (Isukapalli et al., 2008). Another situation 
characteristic is the mode of delivery, such as aerosolisation, spraying, 
lacing of food and drinks, use of animal vectors or crude dispersion. This 
and other characteristics may increase the risk depending on the hazard 
characteristics: for example the risk involving a pathogen infecting through 
inhalation will be higher if the chosen mode of delivery is aerosolisation 
versus lacing (or, say, by adding something to water) contamination. 
However, the situation characteristics that would most influence deliberate 
disease risks are the available risk mitigation measures to reduce system 
vulnerabilities.  
3.3.2.1 Deliberate disease risk mitigation measures 
Risk mitigation measures primarily aim at lowering likelihood of an event 
happening, such as rules, good practices and physical barriers, but in 
some cases can focus on lowering consequences (such as the case of 
therapeutics).188 Deliberate disease risks need the web of prevention of 
measures targeting situations both within and beyond the physical space 
where hazards are present (such as laboratories), as well as risk 
scenarios involving state or non-state threats. In the following paragraphs I 
will discuss deliberate disease risk mitigation measures aimed at state BW 
programs; laboratory biosecurity risk mitigation measures; and security 
awareness and culture risk mitigation measures. 
3.3.2.1.1 The international prohibition regime on biological weapons 
The international prohibition regime on BW is a key component of the web 
of prevention and a group of deliberate disease risk mitigation measures 
primarily focused on reducing likelihood and consequences of the 
deliberate disease risk scenario with a state threat, but also seeing states 
cooperating to reduce deliberate disease risks from the terrorist threats. In 
the nineteenth century, the prohibition on poison as a weapon was 
codified with the Brussels Convention of 1874 and conferences in The 
Hague of 1899 and 1907. The horror of the use of CW in WWI led to 
                                                      
188 In some cases, even the implementation of consequence mitigation measures lead to practices 
lowering likelihood as well: see helmets reducing not only motorcycle fatalities (risk consequence) 
but crashes (risk likelihood) as well (Lee, 2015). 
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efforts to reach international agreement on limiting their use, and in 1925 
the Geneva Protocol prohibiting use was signed.189 While membership of 
the Protocol grew to 140 parties,190 the prohibition on CBW use is now 
considered part of international customary law (Sims, 2006) even for those 
states that have not lifted reservations (i.e. limiting conditions to the 
commitment to the prohibition) or are not Parties to the treaty. The 
Protocol did not prohibit production of CBW; on BW this was reached with 
the first international agreement to ban an entire category of weapons, the 
BTWC of 1972. 191  The BTWC obliged signatories to destroy existing 
arsenals; take national implementation measures; consult in solving 
problems; cooperate in investigations arising from complaints to the UNSC 
on alleged use; negotiate a CW disarmament treaty; and pursue 
cooperation on peaceful uses of microbiology. Membership of the BTWC 
now 192  includes 175 States Parties; universalization of its prohibitions 
remains one of its main objectives.  
Despite not providing systems for verifying that Parties were living up to 
their obligations, nor an organization to oversee implementation, the treaty 
mandated a Review Conference after five years, and such Conferences 
have been held in similar intervals, establishing a mechanism to develop a 
“BTWC regime” (Sims, 2001). The First Review Conference already 
showed the problems of lack of reliable verification, as it took place amidst 
the allegations on the Sverdlovsk incident. Addressing the compliance 
issue, the 1986 Second Review Conference established a system of 
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) to “prevent or reduce the 
occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions, and in order to improve 
international co-operation” (BTWC, 1986). The Third Review Conference 
                                                      
189 Language on “bacteriological methods of warfare” was inserted in the final document on the 
proposal of Poland (Mierzejewski and van Courtland Moon, 1999). Later interpretations considered 
the term “bacteriological” applicable to all BW (Goldblat, 1971). 
190 As of August 2016. 
191 Difficult negotiations on a CBW prohibition had been held in the 1960s, on British proposals; the 
US renunciation of BW, and a new Soviet openness to discuss BW separately from CW, unblocked 
them. The final text of the Convention, however, was less ambitious than previous drafts: it didn’t 
include a prohibition on use, which would have reinforced the Geneva Protocol, and it did not have 
a system to verify compliance. Still, it completely prohibited all activities “related to possession” 
(Sims, 2006) of BW. 
192 As of August 2016. 
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mandated a group of Governmental Experts known as VEREX to 
investigate technical verification measures. The group identified 21 
possible measures concluding that, while none alone could determine 
compliance, in combination they could be useful in improving transparency 
(BTWC, 1993). At that point, a Special Conference commissioned a 
political Ad Hoc Group (AHG) to produce a proposal on a legally binding 
protocol to strengthen the Convention. The AHG worked among tensions 
on verification, transfer of sensitive technology, protection of commercial 
information, and access to science and technology. The “composite text” 
tabled by the AHG chair in 2001 had still to face several issues among 
States Parties. The US rejection of the text, led by the conviction that it 
would not have provided reliable verification, and hardened by the anthrax 
letters case and doubts of other delegations, prevented the finalization of 
the process. With the failure of the protocol, new modes to keep alive the 
cornerstone of the international prohibition on BW had to be devised.  
The resumed Review Conference in 2002 established an Inter-Sessional 
Process (ISP) of annual meetings “to discuss and promote common 
understanding and effective action”. Started as what was seen by many as 
a mere fill-in, the ISP served to be a useful, even if minimal, solution. 
States Parties discussed national implementation measures, security of 
pathogens, disease surveillance, and codes of conduct for scientists. The 
Sixth Review Conference agreed to establish a second ISP and a small 
“secretariat”, the Implementation Support Unit (ISU). New topics included 
legislation, cooperation, biosafety and biosecurity, education, and 
assistance in case of alleged use. The ISP accomplished a number of 
achievements: States Parties engaged in discussions and exchange of 
best practices; the variety of national implementation measures needed 
was underlined; the object of the BTWC was recognized as increasingly 
multidisciplinary; representatives of the scientific communities were 
engaged; universalization of the Convention and participation to CBMs 
were annually monitored. At the same time the limitations of the ISP 
became clear: the lack of decision power in between Review Conferences; 
the absence of an organization supporting the Convention; the 
inconsistency of changing topics annually. The Seventh Review 
Conference in 2011 should have addressed these limitations, but had 
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mixed results. States Parties could not agree to strengthen the ISU, nor to 
giving limited decision power to the Inter-Conference meetings, however 
they decided on a third revamped ISP for 2012-2015.193 
The BTWC would still be the keystone of the prohibition regime, and one 
of the main open issues remains verifiability. The example of UNSCOM 
allowed unravelling a covert program (Smithson, 2011), but also indicated 
that definite verification is difficult if not impossible. Since the failure of the 
BTWC protocol in 2001, the issue of verification has been kept marginal in 
the Convention, even if some States Parties underlined it remains their 
long-term objective. However recently there have been new proposals on 
how to reassure compliance and transparency. Components of the failed 
protocol have been analysed on how they could be adapted to voluntary 
mechanisms: supporting a declaratory regime; extending the UN Secretary 
General’s Mechanism for investigation on alleged use to alleged 
production; reciprocal visits to biodefense facilities (Lennane, 2011). The 
importance of CBMs has been stressed, and some States Parties now 
make their CBMs publicly available.194 
Almost sunk in 2001, the BTWC was able to find innovative ways to 
address security issues of life sciences. It is also today very different from 
other WMD control regimes. Using what has been termed an “evolved 
networked model”, it brings together “all the various stakeholder 
communities, which then implement the treaty through their initiatives and 
efforts” (Millett, 2010), and it gained input from scientific communities, 
academia and civil society. The Convention made clear that its prohibitions 
cover any advancement and “naturally or artificially created” pathogens 
(BTWC, 2006), and it is also a forum to nurture collaborations and 
                                                      
193 The new ISP included three Standing Agenda Items (SAIs): cooperation and assistance, review 
of science and technology, and national implementation, kept for the whole period; CBMs reformed 
to allow larger participation and information sharing; and a database system to facilitate requests 
and offers of cooperation. 
194 Furthermore, the US announced in 2011 an initiative inviting other states parties to visit US 
biodefense facilities (Rodham Clinton, 2011). France presented a detailed analysis on a possible 
peer review system of compliance, inspired by existing international mutual monitoring systems 
(France, 2012). A group of States proposed a discussion on defining “what constitute compliance” 
and “how to demonstrate” (Australia et al., 2012), which received considerable feedback (Japan, 
2013; UK, 2013). 
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technological transfers. However, it remains remarkable that the main 
international instrument to prevent malign exploitation, and promote 
peaceful cooperation, in the face of advancing technological endeavour, 
has few resources in comparison to the nuclear and the chemical regimes. 
The 1993 CWC is also part of the regime on BW as it covers toxins from 
biological organisms. The CWC is almost universal with 192 States Parties, 
includes a precise and legally binding verification system, and is supported 
by an organization monitoring destruction of stockpiles, re-emergence of 
weapons, and international cooperation on peaceful uses of chemistry. 
International legal prohibitions are completed by other elements: states 
defeated in WWII are bound by prohibitions on BW in the treaties 
stipulated between 1947 and 1956 (Sims, 2006); the UNSC Resolution 
1540 of 2004 binds all UN states to refrain from providing support to non-
state actors attempting to acquire CBRN weapons; export control regimes 
control transfers of dual-use items, such as the Australia Group focusing 
on CBW, and the EU dual-use export controls (European Union, 2009; 
Australia Group, 2013). 
3.3.2.1.2 Laboratory biosecurity risk mitigation measures 
Laboratory biosecurity risk mitigation measures would primarily influence 
the likelihood of non-state threat deliberate disease risks, as we assume 
that the organization to which the facility pertains is not voluntarily involved 
in a state program of research and development of life sciences and 
technology to cause harm. In this case, the facility is considered as a 
target that should be defended against a terrorist threat because it has 
assets valuable for those with the intention of deliberately causing disease, 
for example because it works with hazards or has information necessary to 
weaponize a hazard. 
Laboratory biosecurity risk mitigation measures couple with laboratory 
biosafety risk mitigation measures within the laboratory biorisk 
management framework.195 Laboratory biorisk management approaches 
                                                      
195 Laboratory biosafety measures are primarily designed to lower likelihood and consequence of 
biosafety risks, i.e. risks of accidental and unintentional nature. However, many biosafety measures 
are also effective in mitigating biosecurity risks. Furthermore, an approach to mitigation that is 
based on risk assessment can be easily applied to different types of risk, so better capacity on 
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(WHO, 2004; Astuto Gribble et al., 2015) reprise hierarchies of mitigation 
measures from the occupational health and safety literature (Boyle, 2008; 
OSHA, 2008) that ranks categories of measures based on their 
effectiveness in mitigating risk.196 The category of most effective biorisk 
mitigation measures is elimination of the hazard or its substitution with a 
less pathogenic strain (Gressel, 2005), but this may clearly have 
unacceptable impacts on science needs and operations, and is often not 
viable. Second are engineering controls, or physical modifications and 
devices that decrease risk likelihood, like containment facilities, cabinets, 
filtration systems, locks, doors and fences, cameras, biometric access 
controls, etc. Engineering controls have the advantage of being predictive 
and reliable in their functioning; however they may be costly, complex and 
depend on maintenance and correct operation that often requires specific 
capacities. Third, administrative controls are rules and policies issued by 
management with the authority to do so. They have the advantage of 
establishing clear standards but depend largely on the recognized 
authority of the issuer, need enforcement and to be efficiently 
communicated. Fourth, practices and procedures codify in detail practical 
behaviours demonstrated to lower risk likelihood. Practices have the 
advantage of being standardized so to lead to the same results;197 but 
depend on the human factor and may need extensive training. Fifth, 
personal protective equipment (PPE) are devices worn by personnel to 
lower the likelihood of personal exposure. PPE are relatively easy to use 
but only protect the wearer, may be uncomfortable, and also need training 
for proper use. Specific biorisk mitigation measures can relate to different 
categories of the hierarchy: for example, a biorisk incident preparedness 
                                                                                                                                                  
biosafety risk spills over to improving biosecurity risk management. Finally, both laboratory 
biosafety and laboratory biosecurity risk management are integrated in the laboratory biorisk 
management framework, including the categories of risk mitigation measures. Technical and 
professional bodies have developed international standards and guidelines to address biorisks at 
the level of laboratories (WHO, 2004; WHO, 2006; CEN, 2011). 
196 The more effective measures in reducing likelihood and consequence of risk are not necessarily 
the more efficient choice for all facilities. That will depend on factors such as financial resources 
available, training, maintenance, equipment, organizational culture etc. Identification of the most 
appropriate complex of risk mitigation measures is a task of risk assessors. 
197 Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) lead to the same results when performed by different 
people with the same inputs and in the same context. 
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and response system would include engineering controls such as first aid 
kits or quarantine and containment facilities; administrative controls, 
including laws and regulations; practices and procedures on maintenance, 
evacuation, or communication with external emergency services; and 
specific PPE to use in case of incident. Also, increased capacity is a key 
risk mitigation measure influencing risk likelihood, that is relevant at all 
levels of the risk mitigation hierarchy.198 
Specifically on laboratory biosecurity risk mitigation measures, these have 
been categorized in five areas or pillars (Salerno and Gaudioso, 2007). 
Physical security practically prevents (or at least deters or delays) 
threats’ 199  access to assets through barriers and access controls. 
Personnel management and reliability focuses on the likelihood of insider 
threat and includes background checks and monitoring. Material control 
and accountability involves keeping track of all material assets employing 
a variety of inventory procedures. Transportation security regards making 
sure that only authorized persons have access to the assets while moving 
them from one facility to another. Information security focuses on 
protecting sensitive information on the assets, or the sensitive information 
asset itself. Finally, the security awareness pillar is presented as an 
underlying necessary component of any complex of laboratory biosecurity 
risk mitigation measures, as it implies understanding the rationale and 
importance of measures and commitment by all personnel. In this sense, 
laboratory security awareness would contribute to an organizational 
culture similar to organizational safety cultures or climates.200 Pillars of 
laboratory biosecurity risk mitigation are related to the general hierarchy of 
categories of laboratory biorisk mitigation measures, as illustrated in the 
table below. All measures are factors that primarily influence the likelihood 
of (mainly non-state) threats acquiring the hazards and the capabilities to 
                                                      
198 Such as in the capacity of managers to design, issue and communicate relevant policies; or of 
staff of correcting operating or maintaining equipment, perform a task safely and securely, or 
correctly choosing and rapidly donning and doffing PPE. 
199 As a reminder, “threat” is here used to indicate a persons, or group of people, intent on causing 
harm, as distinguished from “hazard” while both originative causes of risks. 
200  Based on organizational management, values, norms, activities and/or history to shape 
employees behaviours or outcomes (Guldenmund, 2000), commitment of top management, 
collaboration with colleagues, regular incident reporting and communication (Reader et al., 2015). 
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inflict deliberate disease, and hence would reduce especially the 
deliberate disease risks in the second and third considered risk scenarios. 
Table 4 - Laboratory biorisk mitigation measures categories and laboratory biosecurity 
pillars 
3.3.2.1.3 Risk mitigation beyond the laboratory 
The inclusion of “security awareness” underlying laboratory biosecurity risk 
mitigation suggests that technical-only measures are insufficient to 
effectively reduce likelihood and consequence in deliberate disease risk 
scenarios. 201  The security awareness pillar presented by Salerno and 
Gaudioso (2007) however, would not have to be limited to technical 
facilities where either assets (hazards or information) are, or practitioners 
work, and the description of risk scenarios involving dual-use suggests it 
should not. 
Indeed measures to reduce likelihood in deliberate disease risk scenarios 
would have to go beyond those of laboratory biorisk management and 
truly encompass the web of prevention of deliberate disease. The web 
should include measures issued and implemented not only by technical 
laboratories or governments, but also professional associations, editors, 
academia and other scientific organizations (Feakes et al., 2007). The web 
extends to regulations (“administrative controls”) in various issue areas. At 
the national level, this includes appropriate legislation and regulations. 
Public health and disease control are another key element to prevent, 
detect and respond to deliberate disease; the implementation of the 
International Health Regulation (WHO, 2005) is important to assure 
internationally coordinated preparedness.  
                                                      
201 Also note how “effective refresher training” is presented as first mitigation measures in risk 
governance by Gaudioso et al. (2009). 
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Especially in the US there have been efforts in designing administrative 
controls to mitigate the risk of dual-use in the life sciences. A 2004 report 
by the National Research Council (National Research Council, 2004) 
identified seven classes of experiments posing particular concern. 202  A 
subsequent report (National Research Council, 2006) focused on the 
impacts of scientific advancements and future risk characterization, 
concluding that the focus on “traditional” biowarfare agents was 
“dangerously narrow”. The National Science Advisory Board for 
Biosecurity (NSABB) identified a subset of research labelled Dual-Use 
Research of Concern (DURC): “research that, based on current 
understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, 
products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied by others to 
pose a threat to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other 
plants, animals, the environment, or materiel” (NSABB, 2007). However, 
even this guidance framework did not prove optimal in front of growing 
challenges of dual-use, a major illustration being the case of the H5N1 
gain of function experiments. In 2011, a Dutch team announced research 
showing how the avian influenza virus was rendered transmissible among 
ferrets, an animal model for humans. A similar independent American 
study was also being published.203 In the US, the NSABB for the first time 
advised against the detailed publication of the studies. The international 
research community decided a moratorium on influenza experiments, and 
the WHO convened a conference on dual-use (WHO, 2012). After the 
WHO recommended in favour of publication, the NSABB reversed its 
decision and the papers were published in their entirety. In the meanwhile 
the Dutch government had applied export controls regulations on dual-use 
against the “export” of the research manuscript, starting a judicial quarrel 
with the researchers. The debate ignited by the H5N1 experiments 
highlights limits of country-based administrative risk mitigation measures 
to dual-use in rapidly advancing and globally interconnected research. 
Those experiments were funded by the US National Institute of Health: an 
                                                      
202 Importantly, good examples of completely legitimate research can be found for each of those 
categories. 
203 The natural avian influenza virus has a high mortality rate but is not directly transmissible among 
humans: those experiments allowed understanding if and how the virus could mutate, but also 
created a new potentially dangerous organism. 
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improved oversight system could intervene earlier in the research process, 
but also similar scientific activities carried out by private institutions would 
be less likely to be detected by regulatory agencies.204 
So widespread security awareness in the scientific community would itself 
be a factor influencing the likelihood of deliberate disease. Research 
ethics have also been described as a factor to reduce the likelihood of 
deliberate disease risks, proposing decision-making frameworks (Miller 
and Selgelid, 2007) that may apply to both the first (in case of scientists 
working in governmental research programs) and third risk scenarios. It 
has been argued that duties such as stopping research, limiting 
publications, or communicating with authorities should be shared between 
scientists and institutions (Ehni, 2008), and that dual-use should become 
the object of collaborative ethical deliberations (Bezuindenhout and 
Rappert, 2012). A precautionary principle205 to refrain from activities of 
potential high risk has also been proposed (Kuhlau et al., 2011). At the 
same time, the opportunity of applying largely Western-based ethical 
principles to global biomedical fields is discussed (Bezuidenhout, 2014). A 
statement by the Journal Editors and Authors Group recognized that “on 
occasion an editor may conclude that the potential harm of publication 
outweighs the potential social benefit” (Journal Editors and Authors Group, 
2003), similarly to some professional codes of conduct (IASB, 2009; 
EuropaBio, 2016). These latter examples would primarily have an impact 
on the second risk scenario. 
3.4 Impact of education on characterization of deliberate disease 
risks 
Given the above discussion of hazard, threat and situation factors that 
affect relative likelihood and consequences of deliberate disease risk 
scenarios, what factors could education influence, that would reduce 
likelihood and/or consequences, and how? 
                                                      
204 In 2013, a new Chinese study created over a hundred combinations between the avian flu and 
the H1N1 human influenza viruses (Zhang et al., 2013). 
205 One exemplar enunciation of a precautionary principle is that from the 1992 Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, stating that “where there are threats of serious irreversible damage, 
lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures 
to prevent environmental degradation” (UNCED, 1992 p. 879). 
 107 
Education that improves capacities on material control and accountability 
security, for example, would reduce the opportunity of a threat to access 
hazards. Similarly, education on the dual-use issue and on scientists’ 
responsibilities in assessing risks deriving from distribution of research 
results would lower the opportunity for a threat to access and exploit dual-
use information. Education that includes the history of, and the prohibitions 
on, BW, as well as the implications for responsible scientists, would 
reduce the availability of scientists to be employed in state programs, and 
increase their ability to recognize the offensive nature of applications of life 
sciences, hence potentially reducing the risk likelihood in the state threat 
scenario. On the other hand, such awareness of deliberate disease risks 
and of security measures would reinforce the prohibition for the individual 
and also increase their capacity to recognize insider threats, hence having 
the potential to reduce the likelihood in the third risk scenario. Increased 
and widespread capacity on laboratory biorisk mitigation measures, 
including laboratory biosecurity measures, would influence the impact on 
both hazard and situation characteristics. Furthermore, a risk mitigated 
through education would decrease the pressure for adopting “harder” 
administrative controls that could slow down and potentially hamper 
research, making it easier to work on research such as that on vaccines 
and therapeutics when is safe and secure to do so. These measures 
would impact both likelihood and consequence for all three deliberate 
disease risk scenarios (see Table 5). 
Ultimately and generally, education would reinforce and spread a norm 
that prevents and safeguards scientists to indirectly contribute to (raising 
the factors affecting them) the risks of deliberate disease, and commits 
scientists to actively prevent those risks (lowering the factors affecting 
them). This way education has the potential to reduce, primarily 
influencing likelihood, the risks of deliberate disease by state and non-
state threats. 
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Table 5 - How education could impact risk likelihood and consequence factors206 
3.5 Evaluation of deliberate disease risks 
As presented in the previous Chapter, risk evaluation is an integral phase 
of risk assessment and a key step between characterization and taking 
actions to mitigate risk (Caskey and Sevilla-Reys, 2015). While risk 
characterization can be objective, yet relative and with the caveats 
expressed earlier, risk evaluation is subjective as it depends on the risk 
acceptance of risk assessors. The same characterized risk can be 
evaluated higher or lower207 by different risk assessors. So what factors 
would affect risk evaluation, in particular in the case of deliberate disease 
risks; who would evaluate deliberate disease risks; and how could 
education affect risk evaluation? 
3.5.1 Factors in evaluating deliberate disease risks 
A widely used approach to risk evaluation is relying on cost/benefit ratios 
(Hokstad and Steiro, 2006), setting risk acceptance using a comparison 
between the reduction of risk likelihood, and consequence, and the use of 
resources to do so. Some mitigation measures would require larger 
investments than others in terms of funding, time and staffing. A relatively 
cheap and easy mitigation measure could in some cases greatly reduce 
risk, while the marginal risk reduction of additional mitigation measures 
                                                      
206 Orange: state threat (first risk scenario); Green: non-state outsider threat (second risk scenario); 
Blue: non-state insider threat (third risk scenario); Purple: multiple risk scenarios. 
207 “High” or “low” if comparing within pre-determined scales. 
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may be smaller below a certain risk level. 208  Indeed a popular risk 
management principle is “do the very best you can” 209  with available 
resources, not least because “the use of economic, technical and 
management resources to abate one specific hazard may have the 
practical consequence that those resources are not used to abate another, 
perhaps similar, hazard” (Hattis and Minkowitz, 1996 p. 108).210Common 
risk evaluation factors that may be particularly relevant for evaluating 
deliberate disease risks may include voluntarity, economic incentives, 
reversibility and cognitive factors. Voluntary risks are accepted more easily 
than imposed ones, as they are associated with positive feelings, benefits 
and enjoyment, or because it is felt that the choice can be reverted if risks 
turn out to be higher than expected (Vrjling et al., 1995 p. 246). Connected 
to voluntarity is access to information, as people with clear information on 
risk characterization would be more likely to accept risks (Hattis and 
Minkowitz, 1996). This may explain why unlikely deliberate disease risks 
are often highly evaluated by risk assessors, given the lack of information 
primarily on threats factors. Economic incentives may raise acceptance, 
including the possibility of insuring against risk. Irreversible consequences 
are more likely to lead to lower risk acceptance (Haimes et al., 2002). Risk 
assessors, including the public in general, tend to be consequence-averse 
and evaluate higher those risks with relatively large consequences despite 
relatively little likelihood, as well as evaluating higher those risks 
originating from new hazards, including new or unknown pathogens. 
These cognitive factors (Lee and Lemyre, 2009) all contribute to lower 
acceptance and higher evaluation of deliberate disease risks. Cognitive 
factors may also include “perceived” characterization, which would 
different from evaluation, as in the former risk assessors “wrongly” 
characterize the relative likelihood and consequence of various risks. In 
terms of possible measurements of risk acceptability, proposed metrics 
                                                      
208 And the only risk mitigation measure bringing the risk to zero would be the elimination of the 
hazard. 
209 Or bringing the risk “as low as reasonably possible”. 
210 Note how here “hazard” is used as we use “risk”. 
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may include increase of consequence probability, 211  or efficiency 
measured in invested and earned lifetime.212 
3.5.2 Who evaluates deliberate disease risks 
Evaluators of deliberate disease risks include, at different levels, individual 
scientists, management of scientific organizations, the public, and political 
decision-makers. In many cases, some risk evaluation is performed at the 
level of national or international policy-makers that issue rules or 
regulations dictating “a minimal level” (Caskey and Sevilla-Reys, 2015 p. 
50) required for risk mitigation. In addition, individual scientists or scientific 
organizations have to make risk evaluation decisions on specific deliberate 
disease risks, often combining the scientific evaluation with security and 
intelligence input (WHO, 2006). Anyway in the case when an assessor, 
such as a public health laboratory, has to take laboratory biorisk 
management decisions to mitigate a specific characterized deliberate 
disease risk, it will have to take into account the community’s evaluation. 
Indeed “the most stringent of the personally and socially acceptable level 
of risk determines the acceptable level of risk” (Vrjling et al., 1995 p. 250, 
emphasis in the original). 213  Education can hence have an impact on 
evaluation via giving practictioners the tools to inform both the community 
and political decision-makers to make informed evaluation decisions; and 
to understand what factors can influence risk characterization that will 
determine necessary risk mitigation measures. 
                                                      
211 For example, a deliberate disease risk could be defined as acceptable if it adds “less than 1% to 
the already existing probability of death” (Vrjling et al., 1995 p. 249). 
212 Lind (2002), with his time principle of acceptable life risk, argues that “a measure of acceptable 
risk should be based on human values and expressed in human terms. The cost of life saving is not 
so many dollars; rather, the cost of a dollar is so much life”, so “a prospect to save life or produce 
wealth is preferable in comparison with an alternative if the net increase in quality-adjusted life 
expectancy is greater than the increased work time. That is, a prospect is said to be preferable to 
an alternative if its efficiency relative to that alternative is greater than one”. 
213 If the risk evaluation from the community is higher than the scientists’ one, the latter may have 
three options: apply additional mitigation measures until the characterized likelihood and 
consequence are lower and lay within also community’s acceptance; educate the community to 
correct a “wrong” characterization of relative risks; or introduce factors to modify the community’s 
evaluation and raise their risk acceptance. Otherwise, they may not be able to operate. 
 111 
3.6 Conclusions 
This Chapter discussed the risks of deliberate disease, applying the 
framework presented in Chapter 2. The possibilities of deliberate disease 
have been presented in a historical and comparative perspective. The 
challenges of defining deliberate disease risks became clearer, as I 
presented concepts and a concise history of biological weapons, as well 
as of biocrimes and of dual-use, and discussed the role of scientific and 
technological advancements. For an assessment strategy of deliberate 
disease risks, I went through firstly their identification and explained why I 
choose three specific possible risk scenarios: one with state threat; one 
with non-state outsider threat; and one with non-state insider threat. 
Subsequently, I discussed characterization of deliberate disease risks 
giving reasoned examples of factors that may influence likelihood and 
consequence, and ascribable to the hazard, threat or situation 
components. I explained the limits of characterizations based on “hazard 
risk groups”; motives, means, capabilities and opportunities of threats; and 
the range of mitigation measures, including the international prohibition 
regime on biological weapons, and risk mitigation within and beyond 
facilities. I then argued what factors generally presented as characterizing 
risks have the potential to be influenced by education under the three 
considered deliberate disease risks scenarios. For example, education 
could improve capacity on laboratory biorisk management measures, thus 
impacting on hazard factors and reducing risk likelihood under all three 
scenarios; it could instil the ethical norm of prohibition of deliberate 
disease thus impacting on threat factors and reducing risk likelihood under 
the non-state insider threat scenario; it could introduce responsible 
management of research with dual-use potential thus impacting on threat 
factors and reduce risk likelihood under the non-state outsider threat 
scenario; or could increase the potential for whistleblowing thus impacting 
on situation factors and reduce risk likelihood under the state threat 
scenario. I also discussed risk evaluation, what factors could affect this 
explicitly subjective portion of risk assessment, and how education could 
inform evaluation. In the following Chapter, I will introduce the analysis of 
securitization of education and then, in Chapters 5 to 9, integrate the 
research components of security, risk and education. In that sense, I will 
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discuss if and how education could be designed and evaluated to 
influence risk factors as it was introduced in this Chapter. 
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4. Education as a security tool 
This Chapter analyses the securitization of education as a security tool to deal 
with deliberate disease risks. The first and second paragraphs explain the 
concept of scientists engagement, which includes education, and how it has 
been co-opted by security actors as a strand of the web of prevention. 
Subsequently, the Chapter presents an overview of attempted securitization 
moves in chronological order, or how education entered in the traditionally 
disarmament toolbox of preventing BW and deliberate disease, with particular 
attention to the BTWC context: before the 2005 BTWC meetings on codes, 
between 2006 and the 2008 BTWC meetings on education and awareness-
raising, and between 2009 and 2015. Calls for education are analysed and 
evaluated applying categories of the historico-political securitization 
approach. 214  Finally, open questions on education as a security tool for 
mitigation of deliberate disease risks are discussed, with particular attention to 
roles, contents and audience of education; implementation in higher education 
systems; and the issue of – assuming success of the securitization moves – 
evaluating the actual impact of education on both learning and risks. 
4.1 Engagement of scientists 
Educating scientists on security issues is one component of a policy that can 
itself be considered a component of the web of prevention, i.e. “engagement of 
scientists”. This generally means to address, rather than the protection of 
physical hazardous components such as materials or equipment, the 
knowledge that may raise security concern when applied for non-beneficial 
purposes.  
The terms “scientists engagement”, “science engagement” and “security 
engagement” have been used in a variety of contexts to indicate a range of 
activities, not limited to security concerns or to the life science subject matter.215 
Usually, when promoters of the engagement are scientists, the term refers to 
“scientists working together with a shared understanding that objectives include 
both science and relationship-building, and where there is a clear, if sometimes 
                                                      
214 Which looks at securitizing actors; intended audiences; referent objects; securitizing arguments; speech 
act discursive devices; proposed security measures; and post-speech act acceptance and implementation. 
215 Activities may include outreach and education of the public about science; but also to attract people to 
science careers; and foster relations, exchanges or partnerships involving science and technology 
between public or private actors nationally or internationally. 
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unstated, agreement that none of the participating parties are policy 
representatives of their country” (Seo and Thorson, 2013). The US National 
Academy of Sciences referred to scientific engagement as “the work of 
individual scientists who seek to contribute to global understanding and human 
welfare” (National Research Council, 2011b p. 1). This conceptualization of 
“engagement” at the international level is connected with “science 
diplomacy”.216 
“Security engagement” has also been used, including in relation to the WMD 
and CBRN security discourses. However in this case, the promoters and 
subjects of the engagement are political, state-level actors. An example is the 
Global Security Engagement label used for the model of the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction programs of the United States (National Research Council, 2009a). 
In this case “engagement” denotes a departure from subordinate, donor-
recipient relations among States, to partnerships where challenges, risks, 
resources and solutions are shared. 
“Scientists engagement”, in the conceptualization that emerges from the CBRN 
security policy discourse, is promoted by both state-level actors and security-
interested civil society, and is directed towards the global scientific, 
technological and academic communities. It regards the forging of relationships 
between the traditional depositaries of security policy (nation-states), on one 
side, and the private and civilian actors who hold the knowledge to understand 
foreseeable risks in technology and contribute to design and enforce security 
policies. “Scientists engagement” aims at the inclusion of scientists into security 
policy discussions, and includes activities such as education, training, 
development of codes of conduct, inclusion of security considerations in 
responsible conduct of research, outreach to scientific communities, their 
inclusion in security policy processes and events. Scientists engagement not 
                                                      
216 “Science diplomacy” was largely explored especially during the Cold War and on nuclear science 
issues, and is about allowing people to use science in order to cross geopolitical boundaries, and about 
the independent relationships in the international scientific community to facilitate communication between 
states and cultures in the absence of official channels. The history of science diplomacy (Royal Society, 
2010) demonstrates the value of these relations as a “deep water anchor” and open channel that would 
allow respectful and durable international relations at non-political levels, even when the latter are in crisis. 
One historical example of this type of “engagement” is the 1975 Asilomar conference, when scientists and 
representatives of civil society gathered to discuss the safety and health risks of creating new organisms 
using recombinant DNA techniques (Berg et al., 1975; National Research Council, 2013). 
 115 
only acknowledges that the capacities of science and technology communities 
are essential for effective security policies, but also promotes that a proper 
engagement (rather than, for example, a mere consultation) is necessary to 
ensure that those communities accept to participate to the design of such 
policies. This approach would be one that “allows scientists to perceive 
themselves as actors engaged in socially beneficial activities which could be 
misused and offers them an identity as ‘guardians of science’ in the fight against 
BW and bioterrorism, rather than the passive recipients of bureaucratic 
regulations” (McLeish and Nightingale, 2007 p. 1654). 
4.2 History of scientists engagement in security issues 
It was with the end of the Cold War that “scientists engagement” was 
increasingly used in security discourses, mainly in dealing with the WMD legacy 
of the collapsed Soviet Union.217 Engagement was, besides disarmament and 
dismantlement, one of the keywords of the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
program that the US established in 1991 (National Research Council, 2009a), 
even if during the 1990s the main focus of CBRN security programs regarding 
scientists was “redirection”, or reemployment, of former weapon scientists to 
civilian activities.218 
In 2002, the G8 launched (G8, 2002) the Global Partnership Against the Spread 
of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (G8GP). The Partnership initially 
focused on physical dismantlement of risk sources like chemical weapons 
stockpiles and nuclear submarines, and the redirection of former weapon 
scientists, in the former Soviet Union countries. Later the term “engagement” of 
scientists substituted “redirection”, and the geographical focus expanded. This 
shift began in 2008 and was strengthened at the G8 L’Aquila Summit in 2009 
                                                      
217 Notable examples of involvement of scientists in security discussions during the Cold War include 
international gatherings of scientists such as the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs 
(Pugwash, 2013). 
218 The International Science Centres are another important example of CBRN security policies targeting 
the “human factor of proliferation” between the 1990s and 2000s, both for mitigating potential CBRN risk 
sources and for and co-optimizing technological solutions to CBRN security challenges. The International 
Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow and the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine 
(STCU) in Kiev were established in the 1990s as international organizations partnering former Soviet 
Union countries, Canada, the EU, Japan, the US and the Republic of Korea, and addressing the “human 
dimension” of CBRN risks. 
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(G8, 2009).219 The rationale of the shift from “redirection” to “engagement” was 
that recipients of initiatives should no longer be just those with military-grade 
knowledge, but also those employed in civilian activities that could, on the one 
hand, represent a potential dual-use risk, or sources of accidental harm and, on 
the other hand, be important allies and sources of technological solutions for 
security challenges. 
Other intergovernmental projects promoted the engagement of science 
communities, as well as international science collaboration, to directly or 
collaterally pursue CBRN security objectives.220 The program by the WHO on 
global health security includes scientists engagement in the intersection of 
health and security (WHO, 2010). In the nuclear and chemical fields, 
international governmental organizations inserted engagement of scientific 
communities into the security discourse.221 Besides governments, also national 
                                                      
219 Where “scientists engagement” was recognized a full status of security-improving tool, being mentioned 
in the title of a document which outlined policies to prevent WMD, the Recommendations for a Coordinated 
Approach in the Field of Global Weapons of Mass Destruction Knowledge Proliferation and Scientist 
Engagement. 
220 One example of a regional project is the establishment of the International Centre for Synchrotron-Light 
for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East (SESAME). SESAME was created under the 
auspices of UNESCO in 2002, and it is located in Jordan. The founding members are Bahrain, Cyprus, 
Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, the Palestinian Authority, and Turkey. Another, also regional, 
example, is the Brazilian-Argentinian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material (ABACC) that 
verifies the peaceful use of nuclear material, including the development and implementation of 
technological verification and control measures. 
221 Chemistry scientific communities have partnered with governmental organizations at the international 
level on the specific issue of education. The International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) 
for example partnered with the OPCW after its leadership recommended that the Union should promote 
education and outreach to the scientific and technical communities to increase their awareness on the 
CWC. A workshop organized by the scientific organization in 2005 identified target audiences for education 
among the chemistry community, contents, roles and responsibilities. The Union partnered with the OPCW 
in the project on Multiple Uses of Chemicals, which created and promoted educational materials and 
resources for instructors at the secondary and tertiary levels, as well as on the subject of codes of conduct 
(Hay, 2007). The OPCW itself become involved in the discussion of education and outreach as the 
Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) established a Temporary Working Groups (TWG) on analysing the issue 
of education and outreach on the problem of chemical weapons. According to the OPCW, education and 
outreach efforts should also target the public at large, but the priority is the engagement of scientists. As 
the TWG recommended in a report, “the OPCW should promote education and scientist engagement 
through professional societies, such as the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC). 
Education and outreach should be seen as an essential element of national implementation and is of the 
view that it will play an important role in preventing the misuse of toxic chemicals” (OPCW, 2013). The 
OPCW partnered with educators to bring education on security issues in chemistry and the chemical 
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and international non-governmental organizations, civil society and academia 
interested in security issues related to science and technology have been active 
in establishing and promoting links between the security and the scientific 
communities. 222 One particular concept that has been used in relation to 
scientists engagement is that of Centres of Excellence (CoE). The concept of 
CoE turned useful as it allows including a variety of initiatives that can 
collectively contribute to chemical, biological and nuclear security. 223 CoE is 
very relevant for scientists engagement as its common denominator is seeking, 
with different degrees, to provide an interface between the policy and the 
science and technology aspects of security.224 
                                                                                                                                                            
weapons problem to high school students (Schouteten, 2013). Initiatives on education on nuclear security 
education and nuclear security culture were also promoted by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), including creating an implementing guide for nuclear security education, and a proposed Master of 
Science curriculum in nuclear security (Novossiolova and Pearson, 2012). In March 2010 the IAEA 
organized a workshop inviting experts from academia, international organizations, and professional 
nuclear material management associations. At the workshop, consensus was reached on the creation of a 
collaboration network for higher education in nuclear security, as this was considered an important and 
suitable mechanism to support and promote the sustainable establishment of nuclear security education 
(IAEA, 2010). The resulting International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) is a partnership 
between the IAEA and educational and research institutions to “promote excellence in nuclear security 
education” for young and future nuclear scientists, exchanging information, building capacity for faculty, 
raising awareness. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization 
(CTBTO) in Vienna organizes conferences on the scientific and technological aspects of verifying the 
prohibition of nuclear tests, involving and reaching out to researchers and practitioners. The CTBTO 
launched the Capacity Development Initiative to train existing and new experts on the legal and technical 
matters of nuclear test verification. 
222 Examples of non-governmental scientists engagement initiatives include, inter alia, those of NGOs like 
the Civilian Research and Development Foundation, later CRDF Global, in the US and of the Landau 
Network Centro Volta in Italy, and of academia like the US National Academies of Science, and the British 
Royal Society and the University of Bradford in the UK. These initiatives promoted international scientific 
and technical collaboration through grants, technical resources, training and services, analysis, 
multidisciplinary joint research projects, collaborative production of informative materials, sharing of 
scientific data. 
223 In general, CoE include a system of different skills (at the national and international, legal, scientific and 
political levels) that should help synergies. Activities carried out by CoE may include technical measures, 
facilities improvement, research, capacity building, and information sharing; involve physical equipment or 
intangible data; be “centralized” in a building or in a virtual hub. 
224 The current major example of CoE at the international level is the EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of 
Excellence initiative, a network connecting European institutions, EU Member States, extra-European 
partner countries and the United Nations; and within them, internal and external policy officials, experts, 
public and private, civilian and military scientists and technologists – to address the risk spectrum from 
natural to accidental to intentional CBRN incidents. 
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Scientists engagement has hence gained relevance and support within security 
discourses, and described as a security instrument. It has been especially 
described as a component of the web of prevention of BW and deliberate 
disease. The reasons for this may be linked with the difficulties225 to design risk 
mitigation frameworks for deliberate disease risks only based on policy norms 
that can at the same time provide sufficient security and enable development 
and application of life sciences. 
4.3 Education as a security tool before 2005 
A component of scientists engagement increasingly mentioned in the security 
discourses on deliberate disease, is the education of scientists about security 
issues from life sciences and biotechnology. Security discourses on deliberate 
diseases were traditionally dominated by political discussions on biological BW 
focusing on material disarmament and inter-state relationships. With – at least 
attempted - securitization moves, education became regarded as a potential 
instrument to prevent non-peaceful applications (Rappert, 2007c).  
Support given to education within strategies to address deliberate disease risks 
date back a few decades, even if details on what education should be about, 
who should be educated and the role of education in respect to other security 
measures, vary. In the BTWC context, the Second Review Conference in 1986 
noted the importance of the “inclusion in textbooks and in medical, scientific and 
military education programmes of information dealing with the prohibition of 
microbial or other biological agents or toxins and the provisions of the Geneva 
Protocol” (BTWC, 1986 p. 4).226 
Scientific and academic institutions also raised the importance of awareness 
among life sciences, biotechnology and public health communities, rather 
indirectly such as in the 1985 code of ethics of the American Society for 
Microbiology which committed members to “discourage any use of microbiology 
contrary to the meaning of human kind” (ASM, 2005), to the more explicit such 
as the appeal by the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for 
                                                      
225 Peculiar characteristics of the life sciences and biotechnology, as well as the needs and challenges of 
public health, such as unpredictable and rapid research development; wide and expanding availability; low 
barriers to entry; convergence of scientific field; increasingly intangible and knowledge-based potential 
hazards; and dual-use. 
226 The note was repeated with slightly different wording in the Final Documents of the Third and Fourth 
Review Conferences in 1991 and 1996 (BTWC, 1991; BTWC, 1996). 
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Global Responsibility (INES) (INES, 2013b). In 1999, the British Medical 
Association published the first edition of a report aiming to raise awareness 
among doctors on the risks of biological weapons, stating that they should “be 
prepared to recognize and respond to the use of such weapons, and to advise 
governments on plans and policies to minimize their effect” (British Medical 
Association, 1999).  
The attention devoted to education increased after the failure of the BTWC 
verification protocol in 2001 (Rappert, 2004). Particular attention was devoted to 
one possible way to raise awareness, that of using codes of conduct, ethics or 
practice. A Green Paper by the UK (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2002 p. 
15) suggested that a code developed by academic and professional bodies, and 
stating that scientists “will not conduct activities directed towards the use of 
micro-organisms or toxins or other biological agents for hostile purposes or in 
armed conflict”, could strengthen the BTWC. The UN Policy Working Group on 
the United Nations and Terrorism issued recommendations on the production of 
“proposals to reinforce ethical norms, and the creation of codes of conduct for 
scientists, through international and national scientific societies and institutions 
that teach sciences or engineering skills related to weapons technologies” 
(United Nations, 2002 p. 14). In response to the recommendations, UNESCO 
developed guidelines on possible codes, while the United Nations International 
Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB) focused specifically 
on the life sciences and biotechnology, drafting parts of a Code of Conduct for 
Scientists in Relation to the Safe and Ethical Use of Biological Sciences 
(Ripandelli, 2005). 
The subject was gaining relevance also outside governments. The World 
Medical Association adopted a Declaration on Biological Weapons urging “all 
who participate in biomedical research to consider the implications and possible 
applications of their work” (World Medical Association, 2002). The International 
Committee of the Red Cross issued an appeal227 “on the potentially dangerous 
developments in biotechnology” (ICRC, 2003).228 The securitization arguments 
                                                      
227 Directed to “the political and military authorities and to the scientific and medical communities, industry 
and civil society”. 
228  The Appeal mentioned codes as awareness raising tool, and calling on political authorities to 
encourage their development by scientific and medical associations and by industry, and to scientific and 
medical communities and pharmaceutical industries to adopt them. 
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are straightforward, as “if biotechnology is put to hostile uses, including to 
spread terror, the human species faces great danger”, suggesting a 
consideration of the potential for deliberate disease as an existential threat for 
the humankind.229 
The same year, the resumed BTWC Review Conference established the ISP of 
topics for meetings up to 2006, including “consideration of the content, 
promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists” for 2005. 
However, already in the meetings in 2003 education had been underlined by 
States Parties. In this case, targets of proposed education were mainly officials 
and employees in national authorities or law enforcement agencies, rather than 
the scientific, medical, professional or academic communities. However there 
were also broader references to, for example, “all those working with biological 
agents and toxins” (BTWC, 2003a p. 116, statement by Poland), “specific 
facilities” (BTWC, 2003a p. 26, statement by the United States), “personnel 
working in laboratories and industries” (BTWC, 2003a p. 125, statement by the 
Republic of Korea). Proposed content of education would include “elements 
under a comprehensive legal framework” (BTWC, 2003a p. 87, statement by 
Australia), “biosecurity culture”, and “prohibitions of the Convention”; but in 
general it regarded laboratory biosecurity components (BTWC, 2003a p. 116, 
additional comments by the Chairman). The intended audience of these 
statements were primarily fellow States Parties of the Convention, and though 
they could be described as securitization speech acts, 230  they didn’t 
characterize education as urgent or responding to an existential threat – rather 
as a “useful”, “complementary”, “best” practice for the national implementation 
of the Convention. 
In 2003, civil society groups interested in biological security issued 
recommendations for a code of conduct for scientists working in national 
biodefence programs (Rosenberg, 2003). In the run-up to the BTWC 2005 
meetings on codes, calls on this education measure multiplied. In the UK there 
was particular attention, with the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of 
                                                      
229 Certainly the appeal adopts an urgency language, including expressions such as “essential”, “before it 
is too late”, “taboo”, and “barbaric”. 
230 As they described education within a range of measures to improve implementation and enforcement of 
a weapons treaty. 
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Commons recommending that “the Government take steps to promulgate an 
international code of conduct for scientists working with dangerous pathogens, 
even before the BTWC considers this matter in 2005” (House of Commons, 
2002).231 The Wellcome Trust, a biomedical research funder based in the UK, 
considered that members of the international scientific community should be 
“aware of potential risks and concerns relating to terrorist misuse of research, 
and of the regulatory and ethical responsibilities that they hold” (Wellcome Trust, 
2003). Feedback from the academic and scientific communities however, 
suggested a broader consideration of safety, security and ethical issues in 
science and technology than just focusing on the life sciences, and a more 
enforceable approach rather than an ethical one (Rappert, 2009).232 Opinions 
suggested the primary reason for scientists becoming interested in 
engagements on deliberate disease risks discussions was more of avoiding 
regulation rather than participating in a mutually beneficial endeavour: “if 
scientists can’t take a few steps to police themselves, others will have to do it 
for them – and make a mess of it” (New Scientist, 2003), in a sort of alternative 
securitization move where the referent object is science, and the threat is 
excessive or unduly restriction. In parallel, research publishers issued a 
statement through the Journal Editors and Authors Group recognizing that “an 
editor may conclude that the potential harm of publication outweighs the 
potential social benefit” (Journal Editors and Authors Group, 2003). 
In 2004, the report Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism advanced 
the argument that biotechnologies “could also be used to create the next 
generation of biological weapons” causing harm “potentially on a catastrophic 
scale”. The very first recommendation of the report, directed to professional 
societies, academia, the government and scientists in general was “Educating 
the Scientific Community”, creating “programs to educate scientists about the 
nature of the dual-use dilemma in biotechnology and their responsibilities to 
mitigate its risks”, in order to minimize the possibility that scientific knowledge 
would further biological weapons or bioterrorism (National Research Council, 
                                                      
231 The UK government would go on organizing meetings and engagement occasions with scientists to 
discuss codes, primarily in partnership with the Royal Society. 
232 Importantly, as accounted by Rappert in his ethnography of the process of discussing and advocating 
for codes on preventing biological weapons (Rappert, 2009), the issue did hit the radars of parts of the 
scientific community, but there was not really an universal support on the idea of codes. 
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2004). In 2005, a group of over 60 academies of sciences around the world, the 
InterAcademy Panel on International Issues, issued a statement on biosecurity 
which included that “scientists should be aware of, disseminate, and teach 
national and international laws and regulations, as well as policies aimed at 
preventing the misuse of biological research” (IAP, 2005). 
4.4 Education as a security tool 2005-2008 
Meetings of the BTWC in 2005 extensively debated codes of conduct, with the 
ambitious objective of promoting an international code for scientists related to 
the prohibition of biological weapons and the relevance of deliberate disease 
risks. The idea of such an international code proved problematic, but 
nonetheless some useful debate occurred among States Parties on what codes 
are, who should be their promoters, what functions they would have as 
deliberate disease risks mitigation tools, and what limits would they have. As 
the pre-2005 discussion between policy and science representatives 
demonstrates, the “codes” rubric can be interpreted differently. Codes could be 
categorized as aspirational (or codes of ethics), stating ideals and ethical 
standards; educational (or codes of conduct) providing guidelines on roles and 
responsibilities; and enforceable (or codes of practice) describing required 
procedures (Rappert, 2004). 
Consensus seemed to be widespread on that the main objective of codes would 
be to raise awareness, as the UK stated “promulgation of a code would involve 
raising awareness of the existence of the code; clarifying content and assuaging 
concerns; publishing information; encouraging ownership within the scientific 
community; establishing expectations and objectives related to adoption by 
appropriate bodies” (UK, 2005). Suggestions include that a code of ethics or 
conduct for biologists and biotechnologists should be inspired by already 
existing similar ones (Russian Federation, 2005b; 2005a), something also 
underlined by academia (Revill and Dando, 2006).233 
                                                      
233 As identified by the ISU in its Background Paper on codes (BTWC, 2005a), a number of professional 
and scientific associations already possessed codes that included mentions of biological weapons and 
could be used as examples, such as “opposing the use of biotechnology to develop or produce any 
biological or other weapon” (AusBiotech, 2005); “we support the Biological Weapons Convention banning 
development and use of biological weapons and will not undertake any research or other 
activities  intended for use in developing, testing or producing such weapons” (EuropaBio, 2016), also 
reprised and translated by national associates such as the Italian ASSOBIOTEC (ASSOBIOTEC, 2013). 
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A general understanding however was that no code for scientists should be 
developed by a security policy intergovernmental forum like the BTWC, as the 
Meeting of States Parties indicated that professional or academic organizations 
should take the lead (BTWC, 2005b). 234  States Parties basically declared 
themselves interested but not competent on codes. Potential weaknesses of 
codes were also voiced; interestingly these often related to the relationship with 
“hard” norms, i.e. binding regulations and legislation that are the traditional 
realm of government authorities. Canada provided a summary of what were 
seen as weaknesses of codes as instruments to support security objectives.235  
Considerations on codes were also included in securitizing moves from the civil 
society. Dando and Rappert’s (2005) discourse, addressed to the BTWC States 
Parties as the audience called for action, 236  moved from the argument that 
“large sections of the worldwide life sciences community have hardly begun to 
address the question of their responsibilities in regard to the dual-use potential 
of the results and techniques of their work” to require that measures “in the form 
of codes should be carefully examined”. At the same time, they also noted that 
if States Parties were expecting to delegate the implementation of codes back 
to scientists, “a significant awareness-raising exercise” including “educational 
provisions” would be needed for codes. Scientists were instead the primary 
intended audience of Somerville and Atlas’ (2005) call for “adoption of a code of 
ethics to govern research in the life sciences” as the necessary way to secure 
advances in molecular biology (the referent object) because of the “possibility 
                                                      
234 The challenge of establishing international codes was also underlined in light of the geographical, 
cultural and technological differences, which apparently were considered stronger than the “global 
language of science” on this matter. 
235 First, they can be interpreted as “replacement for legislation”, relaxing the pressure on the need for 
appropriate national legislation; on the other hand, they could contribute to an overload of lower-than-laws 
rules and regulations imposed by government, resulting in wasted time by scientists or to being 
disregarded; third, idealistic codes could create false expectations that can be difficult to keep; fourth, they 
could create a “chilling effect” contributing to excessive concern and paranoia around life sciences, 
biotechnology and public health; fifth, they could create “negative economic” incentives for people to break 
a (non enforced) rule, if supply of skills is limited by a code; and finally, there is a challenges to define good 
practices and indeed ethics as they are strongly dependent on societal and cultural contexts (Canada, 
2005). 
236 As it was presented, "this Briefing Paper, with the specific purpose of assisting the deliberations in 
Geneva by States Parties in 2005…" 
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that an act of terrorism could involve biological agents” (the securitization 
argument). 
It seemed that codes would not be an instrument to prevent deliberate disease 
per se, but rather that their main scope would be raising awareness: awareness 
is the actual security instrument. The main criticism regarded the effectiveness 
of codes as an awareness raising tool, and commentators underlined that the 
scope of codes is flawed if they are not promoted and publicized among those 
who should be aware of the problem (BTWC, 2005b; Revill and Dando, 2006; 
Rappert, 2007b). 
In this regard, already during the 2005 BTWC meetings on codes other options 
for education were underlined. Germany suggested that codes “can only be 
applied if the scientist engaging in biomedical and bioscience research is aware 
of the dual-use problem and is well informed about ethical decision-making 
processes” and that “governments should therefore encourage universities to 
place such instruction into their biomedical and bioscience curricula as required 
courses” (Germany, 2005). Russia suggested “supplementing the textbooks 
and curricula of higher education medical, chemical and biological institutes with 
a lecture course on the subject” (Russian Federation, 2005b); while India 
suggested “training programmes and materials for educating scientists on 
biosafety and biosecurity issues” (India, 2005). The BTWC Sixth Review 
Conference in 2006 recognized “the importance of codes of conduct”, and 
called upon States Parties “to support and encourage their development, 
promulgation and adoption”; however, the Conference also urged States Parties 
to “promote the development of training and education programmes for those 
granted access to biological agents and toxins relevant to the Convention” 
(BTWC, 2006). It also decided that one of the topics for the 2007-2010 ISP 
would be “oversight, education, awareness raising, and adoption and/or 
development of codes of conduct with the aim of preventing misuse in the 
context of advances in bio-science and bio-technology research with the 
potential of use for purposes prohibited by the Convention”, to be addressed in 
2008. 
Calls about education (sometimes mentioning the technical aspects, others on 
the ethical ones) grew in the following couple of years. From the 
intergovernmental side, the WHO Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance mentioned 
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that responsibilities of laboratory directors included the promotion of “a culture 
of awareness, shared sense of responsibility, ethics, and respect of codes of 
conduct within the international life science community” (WHO, 2006 p. 30). The 
WHO focused on awareness of workforce, suggesting that “training should help 
understand the need for protection”, “the rationale for the laboratory biosecurity 
adopted”, and should “provide guidance on the implementation of codes of 
conduct”. The OECD mentioned staff training, suggesting it should develop a 
“biosecurity-conscious culture” (OECD, 2007).237  The European Commission 
went further in a Green Paper by the Directorate-General in charge of internal 
security addressing, inter alia, education for students and considering that it 
could be made mandatory: “compulsory academic courses in life sciences could 
focus on dual-use consequences of bioresearch and on ethics of bioresearch. 
The courses could cover issues such as the risks of misuse of research results 
in relation to biological terrorism and warfare and professional responsibility as 
well as liability” (European Commission, 2007 p. 13). A similar approach was 
suggested in the US by the NSABB, recommending, “awareness will be 
enhanced through ongoing, mandatory education about dual-use research 
issues and policies” (NSABB, 2007 p. 9). 
The 2006 report on Globalization, Biosecurity and the Future of the Life 
Sciences by the US National Academies argued that “there is a potential dark 
side to the advancing power and global spread” of biotechnologies, and they 
“may enable the development of a new generation of biological threats over the 
next five to ten years” (National Research Council, 2006 p. 2). To lower the 
likelihood of this risk, the Committee called for actions including “adoption and 
promotion of a common culture of awareness and a shared sense of 
responsibility within the global community of life scientists” (National Research 
Council, 2006 p. 10).238 A Code of Conduct for Biosecurity was developed and 
published in 2007 by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences at 
the request of the Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and Science 
(Netherlands, 2008). The Code included the provision for raising awareness 
                                                      
237 The OECD also created a website to collect and provide information on national and international 
activities, www.biosecuritycodes.org, which is not active anymore. 
238 Codes of ethics and conduct were regarded as a potentially useful option to achieve awareness, but 
they “could generally be expected to achieve their desired effect only when reinforced by a substantial 
educational effort” (National Research Council, 2006 p. 11). 
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through higher education and professional training and suggested topics for 
inclusion in education such as the “risks of misuse of biological, biomedical, 
biotechnological and other life sciences research and the constraints imposed 
by the BTWC and other regulations in that context” (Royal Dutch Academy of 
Sciences, 2007 p. 11). Reports from the University of Bradford reinforced civil 
society’s securitization moves. One focused on synthetic biology, where just a 
“brief look” would “illustrate the quantum leap in biological warfare or bioterrorist 
capabilities”, urging “systematic and sustained efforts at awareness raising and 
involving synthetic biology practitioners in the biosecurity” (Kelle, 2007b p. 3). 
Another report described education as a means for “in-depth implementation of 
the BTWC” and, justified by the “great need for education and outreach to raise 
awareness amongst the life science community”, called upon BTWC States 
Parties to incorporate codes of conduct into the Final Declaration of the Review 
Conference (Rappert et al., 2006). In 2008 the US Congress-mandated 
Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism contributed 
powerfully to the securitization discourse regarding bioterrorism. The report 
noted that “unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, 
it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a 
terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013”, and “that terrorists 
are more likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear 
weapon”; from these premises, they addressed the scientific community arguing 
that it could “wait until a catastrophic attack occurs before it steps up to its 
security responsibilities. Or it can act proactively in its own enlightened self-
interest, aware that the reaction of the political system to a major bioterrorist 
event would likely be extreme and even draconian, resulting in significant harm 
to the scientific enterprise” (Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism et al., 2008 pp. xv, 26). 
In the BTWC context, meetings in 2008 discussed experiences, approaches, 
formats, audiences and concerns of oversight, education, awareness raising 
and codes. Considerations included that bottom-up (self-regulatory, non-
governmental) approaches are “better tailored to the demands of the community, 
are self-sustaining, more easily harmonized, and can be more comprehensive” 
(BTWC, 2008a p. 32, statement by Brazil). Some States Parties however were 
not convinced that a bottom-up approach alone would promote effective 
education, as Ukraine noted, “there is still very limited awareness of the 
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Convention amongst life scientists. Indeed, the awareness of life scientists is 
such that they cannot be expected to spontaneously initiate a ‘bottom up’ 
approach to the development and implementation of codes of conduct” (Ukraine, 
2008).239 Japan posited that “programs for education and awareness raising 
among scientists are a basic means for preventing the misuse of biotechnology”, 
as “even well-intended research could bring about harmful results through is 
misuse” and suggested that targets of education should include students in 
universities and secondary schools, and researchers at universities, institution 
and industry as well as health care workers (Japan, 2008).240 Ukraine (2008) 
identified biotechnology and synthetic biology as the referent objects for its 
security discourse on education, justified as “misuse of these developments 
intentional or nonintentional may create biological threats, which are difficult to 
predict but necessary to overcome”, and urged to “foster the development and 
implementation of codes of conduct and educational processes.” Statements 
along similar lines were delivered by Kenya (Kenya, 2008), Korea (Republic of 
Korea, 2008), Iran (Iran, 2008), Morocco (Morocco, 2008), Pakistan (Pakistan, 
2008a) and Russia (Russian Federation, 2008). Regarding contents, it was 
noted how education should include ethics, information on dual-use risks, the 
management of sensitive information, and legal obligations from both 
international treaties and national legislation (Japan, 2008), as well as biosafety 
and biosecurity (BTWC, 2008a p. 27, statement by the US National Academies 
of Science). Certainly there were recognitions that the subject would be 
interdisciplinary, requiring contributions from experts from a range of fields such 
as government, academia, industry, civil society, social science and ethics (UK, 
2008; Pakistan, 2008b). During the meeting however, some States Parties also 
expressed concerns on education (in particular regarding dual-use) as an 
instrument to mitigate deliberate disease risks, that could be summarized in the 
danger of regulations depriving some States of the benefits of research for 
peaceful purposes (BTWC, 2008a pp. 26–27, statement by Brazil; Nigeria, 
2008; Pakistan, 2008b; Cuba (on behalf of NAM), 2008). From the civil society, 
States Parties were invited to “actively promote and fund collaborations” on 
education for those associated with the life sciences (Lentzos and Sims, 2008) 
                                                      
239 Regarding audiences, both pre-service education and in-service training were underlined. 
240 The value of starting education on security issues at an early stage, during the scientific formation, to 
reach researchers and scientists of the future, was also reiterated by the Netherlands (2008). 
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and to include in their report that “all those graduating from higher education in 
fields associated with the life sciences should be familiar with the international 
prohibition against biological weapons”, inter alia (Rappert, 2008). 
The Report of the 2008 BTWC Meetings invited States Parties to the 
Convention to “develop, implement and support education and awareness-
raising programmes that: 
i) Involve, and are developed in collaboration with, all relevant stakeholders 
from both public and private institutions and associations, as well as 
managers and administrators of universities, research institutions and 
commercial companies, and individual scientists;  
ii) Explain the risks associated with the malign use of the biological sciences 
and biotechnology and the moral and ethical obligations incumbent on 
those using the biological sciences;  
iii) Provide guidance on the types of activities which could be contrary to the 
aims of the Convention and relevant national and international laws and 
regulations, including on the export and import of biological resources;  
iv) Are tailored to the target audiences as not all stakeholders need to receive 
the same message”. 
The Report went on recommending that States Parties: 
i) “Establish formal requirements in relevant scientific and engineering training 
programmes and continuing professional education, such as mandatory 
seminars, modules or courses;  
ii) Create accessible teaching materials which address the Convention, 
relevant national laws and guidelines, and related issues […]”. 
Importantly, the second group of recommendations were indicated as 
“depending on national circumstances”, so that each country would have to 
consider who should implement them, and how (BTWC, 2008b pp. 14–15). 
4.5 Education as a security tool 2009-2015 
After 2008, calls on the importance of education as a security instrument further 
evolved and expanded to new constituencies. Among intergovernmental 
organizations, the EU kept the point on education and awareness raising in its 
EU CBRN Action Plan, which contained the recommendations for improving 
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CBRN security within the Union.241 One of the actions in the plan stated that 
“the Member States and the Commission should consider and develop:    
• Guidelines at the EU level for minimum training requirements for persons 
working with, having access to, substances on the EU list of high-risk 
biological agents and toxins; 
• In conjunction with universities and professional associations, minimal 
requirements for academic training on biosafety, potential misuse of 
information and biological agents and toxins and bio-ethics for 
undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate students”. (Council of the 
European Union, 2009 p. 74; European Commission, 2009). 
The G8GP looked to education as a non-traditional instrument to combating 
WMD, as countries should support, inter alia, the “development and adoption of 
codes of conduct and awareness raising tools in the scientific education at the 
national level” (G8, 2009). This was reiterated in 2011 (G8, 2011) and 2013.242 
The WHO published a guidance document on Responsible Life Science 
Research for Global Health Security, stating that “a culture of scientific integrity 
and excellence, distinguished by openness, honesty, accountability and 
responsibility” would be the “best protection against the possibility of accidents 
and deliberate misuse, and the best guarantee of scientific progress and 
development”. The report encouraged countries and institutions to invest in 
“training personnel (laboratory staff and researchers) and students in ethics, the 
responsible conduct of research, and biosafety and laboratory biosecurity” 
(WHO, 2010 pp. 1–2). 
Members of the civil society continued arguing that lack of awareness among 
life scientists would raise the “dual-use risk of proliferation of knowledge, 
materials and equipment” (Shinomiya, 2009) and urged that the BTWC adopted 
a plan “that includes as an essential integral element the requirement to carry 
                                                      
241 Furthermore, the EU Joint Action in support of the BTWC included among “concrete measures to 
enhance the effectiveness in the implementation of the WMD strategy” the promotion of “bio-risk reduction 
practices and awareness, including bio-safety, bio-security, bio-ethics” (Sweden (on behalf of the 
European Union), 2009). 
242  “Long term sustained efforts [are] needed across broad range of scientific and engineering disciplines, 
including promotion of education and awareness raising on dual use issues, biosecurity, biosafety and 
importance of the BTWC. There is a need to include social scientists and ethicists here too” (Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office, 2013 p. 9). 
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out such an education and awareness programme” (Whitby and Dando, 2010b). 
Consideration evolved also in the professional private sector, as suggested by 
the Code of Conduct issued by the International Association of Synthetic 
Biology (IASB) including extensive considerations on security risks (IASB, 
2009); the suggestion by the German association for the life sciences that even 
undergraduate students should at least know the biorisk management legal 
bases (Verband Biologies, Biowissenschaften und Biomedizin, 2010); or the 
internal training implemented by pharmaceutical companies such as 
AstraZeneca (AstraZeneca, 2014). 
In 2010 the US National Academies published the report Challenges and 
Opportunities for Education About Dual use Issues in the Life Sciences, which 
identified higher education as the most appropriate context to implement 
education; ethics and responsible conduct of research as the best existing 
channels in that context to incorporate education; and dual-use as the most 
appropriate focus to introduce education on deliberate disease risks using those 
channels. The report also identified challenges in lack of educational resources; 
the need for better use of science of learning and effective teaching; and 
crowded curricula and lack of support for teaching compared to research in 
graduate education. Recommended actions included the establishment of an 
international repository of educational materials on dual-use issues; 
collaborative production, commenting and vetting of materials; building 
networks of faculty and educators; and developing methods to assess 
outcomes of education on deliberate disease risks (National Research Council, 
2010). 
The 2011 BTWC Seventh Review Conference placed emphasis on education 
as a long-term way to implement the provision of the Convention. A group of 
States Parties reported their national experiences and recommendations in a 
Working Paper (Australia et al., 2011), underlining “that the frequent lack of 
awareness of aspects related to biosecurity and the obligations of the 
Convention among life scientists has to be addressed more urgently, 
strategically, and comprehensively”; and highlighted that decisions on the “form 
and nature” should be taken at the level of each State Party. The group 
proposed that States Parties inform on their awareness raising activities, 
possibly using existing CBMs forms, and that the ISP before the Eighth Review 
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Conference in 2016 considers more in detail education and awareness raising. 
The Final Declaration of the Seventh Review Conference reflected some of 
these recommendations. Regarding Article IV, the Conference noted the value 
of, inter alia: 
c) “encouraging the consideration of development of appropriate 
arrangements to provide awareness among relevant professionals in the 
private and public sectors and throughout relevant scientific and 
administrative activities, and 
d) promote the development of training and education programmes for those 
granted access to biological agents and toxins relevant to the Convention 
and for those with the knowledge or capacity to modify such agents and 
toxins”. 
The Conference included education transversally among the three Standing 
Agenda Items (SAIs) for the ISP 2012-2015. The first SAI on cooperation 
and assistance included as one of its points: 
a) “education, training, exchange and twinning programmes and other means 
of developing human resources in the biological sciences and technology 
relevant to the implementation of the Convention, particularly in 
developing countries”, 
whereas the SAI on review of developments in the field of science and 
technology related to the Convention included: 
d) “voluntary codes of conduct and other measures to encourage responsible 
conduct by scientists, academia and industry; 
e) education and awareness raising about risks and benefits of life sciences 
and biotechnology.” 
And the SAI on national implementation, while not explicitly mentioning 
education and awareness raising measures, included: 
e) “any potential further measures, as appropriate, relevant for 
implementation of the Convention” (BTWC, 2012a pp. 11, 22, 23, 24). 
Indeed subsequent BTWC meetings confirmed that education was at that point 
acknowledged as part of national implementation of the Convention. Poland 
stressed that “there is a need to enhance awareness […] to minimize the risk 
that life sciences products or knowledge may be misused or misapplied toward 
malevolent goals” and recommended that the Meeting agreed on “steps to be 
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taken nationally to ensure that biosafety, biosecurity and the prohibitions and 
obligations of the Convention are included within the provisions for education of 
all life scientists” and on reporting on initiatives taken “so that the experience 
gained and best practices can be shared for the benefit of all States Parties” 
(Poland, 2012 p. 2). Other States Parties made recommendations on similar 
lines (Canada, 2012; Chile et al., 2012; Benin, 2013). Education even became a 
potential tool of compliance assurance with the provisions of the BTWC, as 
Japan (Japan, 2013 p. 2) stated “education and awareness-raising for scientists 
could also be a means to prove compliance on BWC” and the UK (UK, 2013 p. 
7) included among “actions and activities indicative of compliance”, “sustained 
measures to promote awareness of the Convention and its requirements in the 
scientific community and to promote a culture of responsibility”. 
The idea of integrating education on deliberate disease risks in university 
curricula (Kenya, 2014; India, 2015), and in “an early stage” (Netherlands, 
2015), became increasingly salient. Austria (Austria, 2015 p. 2) explicitly 
included the “integration of biosafety and biosecurity into university curricula” as 
one of the measures of scientists engagement to manage “risks immanent in 
the ongoing advancement of the life sciences and biotechnology”. The German 
Ethics Council noted a need to introduce “a teaching module on the topics of 
dual-use and biosecurity into graduate studies” (Deutscher Ethikrat, 2014 p. 
158).  
Civil society strengthened the securitization effort,243 evaluating that progress 
on education “has been slow demonstrating the need for consolidated efforts 
and long-term commitment”. States were called to enact internationally 
coordinated efforts, educational requirements and standards mandated by 
governments, adequate funding, and reporting to BTWC meetings 
(Novossiolova, 2013; Switzerland, 2013; INES, 2013a). The very first 
recommendation of the Royal Society report on Neuroscience, Conflict and 
Security in 2012 called on “appropriate professional bodies to inculcate the 
awareness of the dual-use challenge […] among neuroscientists at an early 
stage of their training” (Royal Society, 2012 p. 60). A 2014 report from the 
InterAcademy panel focusing on opportunities and governance of synthetic 
                                                      
243 And reinforced the securitization message that technology “pose an unprecedented challenge to the 
integrity of the international prohibition of biological weapons” (Novossiolova and Pearson, 2012 p. 17). 
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biology had as first recommendation “preparing researchers for work in 
synthetic biology”, including preparing “the next generation of skilled 
researchers” through the incorporation of “collective learning about the relevant 
ethical and social issues” that should “embrace the social sciences and 
humanities” in an interdisciplinary approach (IAP, 2014 p. 2). 
4.6 Analysis of securitization moves 
As the above overview illustrated, a range of attempted securitization moves 
pushed education into the security toolbox to mitigate the risks of deliberate 
disease. These moves involved a number of securitizing actors, intended 
audiences, identified referent objects, arguments and proposed measures, and 
had various degrees of audience acceptance and of implementation to 
determine actual and successful securitization. 
4.6.1 Securitizing actors, audiences, referent objects 
Securitizing actors came from two main groups: governmental actors and civil 
society. The first group included States acting within and beyond the BTWC 
context as well as intergovernmental organizations and groups such as the 
WHO, the OECD and the G8. Within civil society, securitization speeches came 
from both those interested in, and with a background of, security, such as 
disarmament groups and academia; and from the scientific community such as 
professional associations, research institutions and publishers. Securitization 
messages were mainly directed at two intended audiences: States and the 
scientific community. Within the latter, different representatives were addressed 
by different securitization discourses, from the individual scientists to 
organizations of scientists or universities and other HEIs. Finally the referent 
object of securitization moves varied, being however always related to the life 
sciences and technologies.244 
4.6.2 Discursive devices 
Security terminology and language, applied to express the sense of urgency 
and emergency in face of threats, is recognizable when looking at the 
arguments brought in securitization speeches to justify proposed security 
                                                      
244 While some statements mentioned generally biotechnology, some identified more specific fields of 
attention such as molecular biology, genetics, or fields converging with chemistry like neuroscience. 
Synthetic biology received particular attention as a referent object, as did “advancements” in science that 
arguably, according to proposers of security measures, pose heightened risks than “old” ones. Some 
speeches focused on both or either (material) “products” or “knowledge” of the life sciences. 
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measures.245 The two main arguments were firstly the potential misuse of life 
sciences and technologies, a risk depicted as both likely246 and with destructive 
potential; and secondly the lack of awareness among scientists. Clearly the 
sense of urgency, the evaluation of the risk, the essentiality of education as a 
security measure, and the anticipation of dangers should the measures not be 
accepted, vary among different securitizing actors. 247  Uses of discursive 
devices can be recognized in these securitization speeches. It’s noteworthy as 
security proponents aspired to publish articles on life sciences and technologies 
journals such as Science Magazine (Somerville and Atlas, 2005), Nature 
(Dando, 2009a) or the EMBO Reports (Revill and Dando, 2006). This was not 
only to easily reach life scientists, who arguably are the primary readers of 
those publications, as respected generalist mass media would also work in that 
sense. It is also to respect the partages (using terminology identifying the 
boundaries of a subject matter), the discipline that may help considering uttered 
propositions as “true”, and the complex of the will of truth accepted within the 
population of life scientists.248 Another discursive device almost systematically 
used – primarily by civil society, but also by States – is the resort to the 
commentary or stressing the author. It was common that, between securitization 
arguments and proposed security measures, securitization statements reported 
quotes from sources supporting similar moves (Dando and Rappert, 2005; 
National Research Council, 2010). Several statements extensively quoted the 
very same audience they were directed to, almost to remind them of what 
themselves had uttered, recommended or committed on before, resorting to 
positive (coherence in the audience with what they had supported) and negative 
(wouldn’t the audience be in an uncomfortable position if not accepting these 
measures appeared inconsistent with their previous positions?) reinforcements 
                                                      
245 It’s interesting to note instances when statements drafted education as a weapon in the war against 
deliberate disease already from the title, such as in “Ethics: A Weapon to Counter Bioterrorism” 
(Somerville and Atlas, 2005)  
246 “Every major technology has been intensively exploited” (Meselson, 2001 p. 1); “as with all scientific 
revolutions there is a potential dark side” (National Research Council, 2006 p. 2); “information may be 
found on the internet” (Japan, 2008 p. 1). 
247 States – particularly in the BTWC context – used softer tones in their recommendation compared to civil 
society, often resorting to formulae such as “should”, “has the potential to be useful”, “can help”, etc. 
248 Ultimately, it’s the desire of security proponents of exploiting the aura of scientific truth and respect 
attributed by the audience to the journals, to help have their securitization moves accepted. 
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(Rappert et al., 2006; Whitby and Dando, 2010b; Novossiolova and Pearson, 
2012; INES, 2013a; Novossiolova et al., 2013; Novossiolova, 2015). 
4.6.3 Measures proposed by securitization moves 
In order to evaluate the acceptance and success of securitization moves – i.e. 
the actual implementation and institutionalization of proposed measures, it is 
useful to categorize the measures advanced by the acts described in previous 
paragraphs. We can recognize six main actions addressed to States: 
• Recognize the value of education as a risk mitigation measure in security 
venues; 
• Regard education as a necessary component of national implementation 
of, and compliance with, the BTWC; 
• Report and share on national efforts on education as a security tool 
against deliberate disease; 
• Work to promote education with organizations at the national level, 
especially professional associations and Ministries competent for 
education; 
• Develop national and international action plans on education, including 
goals, objectives, milestones, funding, and assessment methods; 
• Fund initiatives and projects on education to counter the risk of deliberate 
disease. 
And three main actions called upon scientific communities: 
• Be aware and recognize the relevance of the risks of deliberate disease; 
• Develop and implement educational initiatives and materials; 
• Integrate education on deliberate disease in higher education national 
systems for scientists. 
4.7 Implementation of securitization moves addressed to states 
Regarding the first measure urged on States, the move was successful in that 
the salience of education steadily increased between the early 2000s and 2015 
in consensus statements of governmental security venues (BTWC, 2005c; 
BTWC, 2008b; G8, 2009). Education became particularly recognized during the 
second BTWC ISP, being an explicit SAI sub-item and constantly reinforced in 
Meetings Reports (BTWC, 2012b; BTWC, 2013; BTWC, 2014). Education is 
something that everyone in the biological security governmental community 
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seems to accept as an instrument to mitigate deliberate disease risks, even 
those organizations that had previously resisted being securitizing actors of 
public health (Kelle, 2005c). The consensus acceptance on education as a 
security instrument may also be an example of what Kelle calls 
“institutionalization of a lower level” (Kelle, 2005c p. 36), easier to accept as 
less binding for States than harder security commitments. 
The call to States to consider education as part of national implementation of 
the obligations of the BTWC, or even as a measure of compliance to the 
Convention, had a mixed success. Educational initiatives became often 
reported under national implementation as well as described as covered by 
Article IV. However, educational initiatives were not systematically included in 
national implementation measures, BTWC Review Conferences did not expand 
CBMs to explicitly mention education, and no consequence for insufficient 
implementation or non-compliance are foreseen for States that do not act on 
education. During the second BTWC ISP, the SAI including education was 
review of science and technology advancements, not national implementation. 
So, while some States clearly consider education as implementation of the 
Convention, and no State clearly opposes such a view, by no means the whole 
audience took action on this basis. 
Regarding reporting to the BTWC on education efforts, so that others can learn 
and take advantage of previous experiences, the move was generally, but not 
completely, successful. Reports (often in the form of co-authored Working 
Papers) collected national experiences, and presentations in Geneva on 
education multiplied. However, the Sixth and Seventh Review Conferences did 
not formalize any requirement on reporting education in the BTWC. 
The call to governmental bodies traditionally involved in security issues (such as 
Ministries of Defence, Ministries of Foreign Affairs, or law enforcement 
agencies) to work at the national level with organizations competent on 
designing and mandating scientific education such as professional associations, 
Ministries of Education, universities boards, and professional-credits awarding 
agencies, had a mixed success largely depending on national systems. 
Certainly examples such as the work in the US by the FBI with universities 
(Lempinen, 2011; AAAS, 2013) suggest that the utterance was accepted, 
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however in many other countries national security actors diverted the duty to the 
science education community itself. 
One of the most called upon measures between 2005-2015 was the 
development and approval by States of national and international plans on 
education including goals, objectives, milestones, funding and impact 
assessment measures. This was not implemented as notwithstanding States’ 
recognition, they largely continued collecting and reporting initiatives led by 
other organizations, or supporting individual projects. 
Funding was something where securitization moves have been quite successful, 
as a trend can be observed in the plethora of supported biological security 
projects and programs that increasingly included educational actions. This 
seems apparent, for example, from the US Department of State’s Biological 
Engagement Program supporting, besides laboratory biorisk management, 
projects on bioethics and biosecurity education, to the largely training 
component of the EU CoE initiative consolidating all CBRN risk mitigation 
initiatives, which funded the creation of networks of universities to raise 
awareness about dual-use. 
4.8 Implementation of securitization moves addressed to the scientific 
community 
Success, or lack thereof, of calls for action directed at the scientific community 
is even more interesting for the purpose of this research. The urge on scientists 
to become aware and recognize the relevance of the risks of deliberate disease 
has gradually moved from being resisted (Dando and Rappert, 2005; Mancini 
and Revill, 2008) to being accepted by larger sections of the scientific 
community as the securitization speeches became more pervasive, though 
certainly is still far from widespread implementation. Scientists also attempted 
counter-securitization moves (Dando and Rappert, 2005) to protect science 
from unduly and possibly threatening regulation,249 in a dialectic confrontation 
between two opposite speech acts.250 
                                                      
249 As Rappert and Dando (2005) reported, particularly the “classic open science type” participants to the 
seminars used counter-securitization arguments including that “people who obey the regulations are not 
the people who are going to try and do, use science for these sorts of [malign] ends. So you end up 
actually just hurting the people who are trying to use the science for positive reasons, by putting more 
obstacles in the way” and “you are damning the technology just because it happens to be able to make 
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Some actions followed up to the calls to develop and implement educational 
materials, such as the Case Studies in Dual-Use Biological Research by the 
Federation of American Scientists (FAS, 2009) and the website on Dual Use 
Dilemma in Biological Research by the Southeast Regional Center of 
Excellence for Emerging Infections and Biodefense (SERCEB, 2010). The 
discussion-stimulating seminars in universities by Dando, Rappert and 
colleagues (Dando and Rappert, 2005) were an awareness raising effort, 
however not “an efficient method of raising awareness” (Rappert et al., 2006 p. 
28, emphasis in the original) as they addressed small groups and did not assure 
repetition for new faculty members. One way they suggested to reach larger 
numbers of scientists in different countries, limiting the time and effort spent, 
was the development of educational modules that educators could use as a 
resource.251 
One important specific measure urged by securitization speeches was the 
integration in relevant curricula by higher education institutions. From the 
experience of the seminars it seemed clear that it was “unrealistic to expect that 
simply adding a lecture to a standard course in the life sciences will make a 
great deal of difference”, leading to the proposal of introducing possibly 
mandatory modules covering deliberate disease risks in relevant degree 
courses (Rappert et al., 2006). 252  An effort was also undertaken by the 
University of Bradford in collaboration with the National Defense Medical 
College in Japan and the Landau Network-Centro Volta in Italy with the 
preparation and publication of the Educational Module Resource (EMR). 
                                                                                                                                                            
Ebola potentially in about three or four years’ time” thereby resisting measures such as pre-project or pre-
publication review systems. 
250 Some areas of the scientific community may have accepted the calls for actions to a larger extent than 
others, as can be suggested by the IASB code being a response to calls on specific concerns from 
synthetic biology from both the civil society (Kelle, 2007b) and governments (European Group on Ethics in 
Science and New Technologies to the European Commission, 2010). 
251 Another factor is using alternative methods than lectures to deliver the seminars: they report that using 
role playing exercises could have been both an effective (because of the impact of learning through 
experience) and appropriate (given the often divisive opinions related to dual-use) approach for teaching 
security issues (Rappert et al., 2006). 
252 This was perceived as one possible initial step, and as can be suggested by the importance impressed 
by the OPCW, IUPAC and IAEA on higher education as a channel for education on security implications of 
chemistry and nuclear physics, maybe one of the reasons of ignorance is precisely that these issues do 
not feature in life sciences and biotechnology university formation (Whitby and Dando, 2010a). 
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Designed as a resource of educational materials for instructors, organized in 
lectures so that professors would not need to research and assemble materials 
on security and dual-use issues but only select and customize what they deem 
more relevant for their students, the EMR assumes a final audience of 
university students in life sciences, biotechnology and public health with little or 
no prior knowledge of biosecurity (Whitby and Dando, 2010a).253 
Offering a comprehensive educational resource however would not ensure 
implementation by science educators, as the primary challenge remained the 
lack of priority and perceived importance in the scientific community. Other 
initiatives sought to address this engaging the academic community on the 
design and implementation of education. Within the “Fostering the Biosecurity 
Norm” project by the Landau Network Centro Volta and the Bradford 
Disarmament Research Centre, in 2009 there was a follow up to a survey on 
contents of degree courses in Europe and, based on the data collected and 
leveraging a network of life sciences and biotechnology educators engaged 
during the inquiry, as series of seminars were organized (Mancini and Revill, 
2009). Rather than being based on a format designed by the proposers, the 
seminars were collaboratively prepared and organized with the local professors, 
often embedded during their regular courses. 254  This not only certainly 
contributed to a better reception by faculty and students of the topics255 but also 
provided suggestions on how to frame them in a more acceptable way for the 
science community. 256  Questionnaires at the end of the seminars, which 
                                                      
253 Contents and key messages have been included based on the recommendations of the 2008 BTWC 
Meeting of States Parties on education, including the history of the threat of biological weapons, the 
international prohibition regime, the issue of dual-use and the responsibilities of life scientists, and the web 
of prevention. The EMR is freely available on the web and over the years has been translated to several 
different languages. 
254 Professors ensured students participated but also, with their endorsement, eased the acceptance of 
messages on security and dual use issues by the audience. To obtain this level of engagement from local 
professors, authors had to compromise and modify some of the messages and contents proposed, 
especially on what scientists felt too strong in underlining the dangers, or understanding the likelihood, of 
security risks. 
255  Which, while modified in the presentation and coupled with other subjects, maintained the core 
messages on deliberate disease risks including the dual-use potential, that was the aim of the project. 
256 Indeed all seminars included, as a minimum, information on the history of biological weapons; dual-use; 
and the web of prevention, including the BTWC. The EMR was the main source of materials (lectures, 
discussion questions, exercises) for the seminars, while local organizers provided additional lectures 
making interdisciplinarity a common feature of the series. 
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reached nearly a hundred students in seven universities suggested that 
“students generally appeared to feel that the seminars improved their 
understanding of issues such as biosecurity, the risk posed by dual-use 
research, the BTWC and the history of biological weapons” and that a clear 
majority of students felt that “awareness raising should be promoted among 
students” (Revill and Mancini, 2010 p. 172).257 The experience also suggested 
that networking among scientists in academia and between them and civil 
society organizations concerned with security issues may be a viable way to 
raise awareness on the relevance of the subject and promote implementation of 
education, as Whitby and Dando (2010b) and the US National Academies 
(National Research Council, 2010) noted. The experience suggested something 
similar to what Switzerland reported from seminars in the country: “life scientists 
consider awareness raising on aspects related to security as important, some 
even spoke of an ‘eye-opener’” (Australia et al., 2011 p. 12). 
In 2009, the University of Bradford developed a fully accredited online-based 
train-the-trainer module titled Applied Dual-Use Bioethics and Biosecurity (Sture 
and Minehata, 2010). The aim of the module was to introduce participants to 
bioethics as it relates to biosecurity, train them to integrate biosecurity issues 
into their teaching. 258  The University of Bradford also collaborated with the 
Public Health Agency of Canada to develop a university-level course for faculty 
members. Such an experience led Canada to consider the development of 
formal degree courses on biosecurity, dual-use, biosafety and bioethics 
(Australia et al., 2011 p. 8). Finally the University of Bradford developed a 
National Series of lectures focusing on the biosecurity situation of specific 
countries (Sture and Minehata, 2011; Espona and Dando, 2011).259 
Enemark (2010) summarized the initiatives to close the education gap in 
Australia.260 Impressions of the researchers were that almost all participants 
                                                      
257 Feedback from students underlined an interest in the topics, a demand for additional information, and 
the need to provide more complete and advanced modules. 
258 The module was delivered through the Elluminate software, allowing video and audio connections, 
group work and discussion between class members and students. 
259 This short course includes contents such as risks related to disease, including biological weapons; 
development of the prohibition regime on biological weapons; the dual-use dilemma and the 
responsibilities of life scientists; national implementation of the BTWC; and building a web of prevention. 
260  A multidisciplinary group of Australian academics, including scientists, bioethicists and political 
scientists, carried out seminars in 2009 adapting the model used by British colleagues. 
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were unaware of the existence and provisions of the BTWC, that they 
underlined the importance of freedom of publication and opposed increasing 
governmental regulations on biosecurity. However, scientists in universities 
seemed to start seeing the importance and the relevance of discussing the 
issues. 
Connell and McCluskey (2010 p. 152) summarized the efforts made since the 
early 2000s for introducing education and guidelines to the university 
community in the US, identifying four avenues for implementation: the federally 
mandated Responsible Conduct of Research education of trainees sponsored 
by the National Institutes of Health; the Institutional Biosafety Committee 
required to review recombinant DNA and infectious agents experiments; the 
laboratory safety training mandated by the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration for all lab workers; formal education on biodefence; and a 
mandatory in-service train-the-trainer path where dual-use awareness is 
included in periodic seminars. Also the US National Academies developed 
university teachers in various countries on teaching security in the framework of 
research ethics and responsible conduct of science, as well as on using the 
most effective pedagogical methods based on the science of learning (National 
Research Council, 2012). Sandia National Laboratories International Biological 
and Chemical Threat Reduction (IBCTR) Program (Sandia National 
Laboratories, 2014a) performs a number of projects related to biosafety and 
biosecurity, including education of scientists.261 
In Japan, the National Defense Medical College in collaboration with the BDRC 
introduced since 2008 education on deliberate disease risks coupled with 
bioethics and medical ethics and including dual-use issues, for both 
undergraduate and graduate students. Medical students go through a two-day 
course on dual-use and security just before their Hippocratic Oath and 
graduation, while PhD students receive further three days of training. 
Educational materials are obtained from the EMR blended with biosafety 
concepts and practical activities (Sture and Minehata, 2010 p. 25). Other 
                                                      
261 The Global Biorisk Management Curriculum (GBRMC) (Sandia National Laboratories, 2013) is largely 
focused on biorisk management in a laboratory context; it is also principally designed for the training of in-
service and practicing scientists rather than young scientists and students. However, it provides trained 
instructors with reference materials, ready-to-use lectures, exercises and activities for students based on a 
facilitated learning format. 
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universities in Japan, such as Waseda University, Keio University, Jikei 
University and Tokyo University organized educational initiatives on either the 
safety and response to bioterrorism events or the ethical and social issues 
related to potential misuse, but rarely involving students from science degrees 
(Australia et al., 2011 p. 9). 
In other countries, few individual universities developed educational 
programmes for their students; even if this often seemed the result of the 
interest of committed individuals rather than a concertized approach. At the 
Quaid-i-Azam University in Pakistan a course on Bioethics, Biosafety, 
Biosecurity and Dual-use was introduced for postgraduate students (Shinwari, 
2011). At Uppsala University in Sweden, lectures on security issues have been 
adapted from the EMR and included into ethics courses for biotechnology 
students (Smallwood, 2009). In 2012 Revill et al. (2012) collected experiences, 
achievements and challenges from life science professors implementing 
education on security issues, and specifically dual-use, in Austria, Italy, 
Pakistan and Sweden.262 These experiences further underlined the importance, 
and the potential increased acceptance by young life scientists and educators, 
of an interdisciplinary and holistic approach that both addresses the complex 
links between fields and broadens the narrow security perspective on potential 
misuse for terrorist purposes but blends with, for example, health and 
environmental security and sustainability. 
The securitization calls for action upon the scientific community to develop and 
implement education on the risk of deliberate disease, and particularly to 
formally integrate it within national higher education systems for scientists, 
received interest and were accepted by increasing sections of the audience. 
While this suggests that the securitization speech act was successful, 
implementation has not been widespread or sustainably integrated in formal 
structures, as well as rarely became mandatory for science students. The lack 
of systematic assessment makes unclear the extent to which measures were 
                                                      
262 The account from the University of Vienna showed how a laboratory biosafety course was incrementally 
expanded with materials on security issues and the problem of deliberate disease as one of the lecturer 
realized the importance of education after having participated to the work of UNMOVIC. In Italy, 
collaboration between interested life science professors and civil society organizations focused on security 
issues, led to the organization of some of the European seminar series, as well as to the recognition (CBUI, 
2008; 2009) by the Italian National Board of University Biologists of the need to develop and incorporate 
education about foundations of dual-use issues at the various levels of the academic cursus. 
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implemented, and hence if the securitization move was truly successful, as well 
as understanding how to facilitate their implementation in future endeavours.  
4.9 Constructing and assessing education as a security tool 
There have been a number of experiences and initiatives to close the education 
gap, which could also be considered as implementation of securitization moves 
that called upon the scientific community. These not only functioned as 
awareness raising tools, but also helped to understand what worked well and 
what was less efficient. 
Having demonstrated that raising awareness and educating the life sciences, 
public health and biotechnology communities on deliberate disease is feasible 
still leaves a number of questions open, unresolved or untested. Despite 
agreement among those involved in this sector that education is, at best, 
“patchy and ad hoc” (National Research Council, 2010 p. 64), gap analysis so 
far had a number of limitations. Most existing research on what educational 
offerings exist and what scientists already know, think and do with regard to 
security issues in the life sciences and technology, as well as attitudes towards 
the web of prevention including education, offer no quantitatively statistical 
representation or qualitatively deep analysis, and only a small number of them 
allow for comparative analysis among scientifically or culturally inhomogeneous 
regions. Furthermore, no structured analysis of changes over time in the same 
context have been performed so far, with inference being difficult comparing 
studies on different groups and using different methods; and this may be a key 
issue since the implementation of educational programs, and their impacts, may 
certainly be long-term ones. Finally, at this point carefully rethinking indicators 
may be useful to understand nuances and characteristics of awareness, since 
as Rappert (2010) pointed out a lower identification may either mean a lower 
risk or a low aware community. 
Among open or untested questions there are also those of the role of education, 
its content, targets, where should it come from, and what are the best methods 
to deliver it as a web of prevention component. Rappert (2010) has collected 
various roles that education may be considered or auspicated to have. Among 
those types, I think that as a part of the web of prevention of deliberate disease 
risks, education should be considered: i) as a prerequisite, necessary for other 
security-related activities to be undertaken; b) as a deficiency correction, 
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correcting the lack of knowledge that is deemed good and useful and; c) as 
guardianship, as it enables more cognizant communities to participate to 
relevant activities, help and scrutinize governmental actions, inform the society 
and reinforce the stigma against deliberate disease. 
Regarding proposed contents of education, positions to date can be 
summarized in two main groups: those who think that the priority should be on 
the laboratory context and technical safety and security, and those who see in 
ethics and responsible conduct of research a better framework to channel the 
complex aspects of deliberate disease risks. 263  Experiences in universities 
suggested that educational materials should acknowledge the benefits of 
scientific research; uncover the existence of past biowarfare programmes; 
mention national and international prohibitions; discuss the dual-use dilemma; 
refer to the wider economic, social and security implications of life sciences and 
biotechnologies (Mancini and Revill, 2009); and discuss relevant laboratory 
biorisk mitigation measures. Certainly, the interdisciplinarity of the deliberate 
disease risks subject seems agreed by most commentators. In our opinion, 
decisions on contents and messages would also determine who would be the 
educator, i.e. who is considered entitled and expert to teach about deliberate 
disease risks: clearly, this may not be a single individual. However, 
notwithstanding efforts to customize education and calls that “no one size fits 
all”, educational contents on deliberate disease risks still is much derived from, 
or targeted to, Western, and in particular American, cases and audiences, as 
well as largely in English (National Research Council, 2010). Furthermore, no 
specific analysis has been done on the construction and empirical testing of 
messages within the educational content.264 
Another point is who should be educated, i.e. who is the target audience of 
content. Rappert (2010 p. 6) asked: “should they be pathogen investigators, 
bioscientists as a whole, those associated with the life sciences in general, or 
the public?” According to the NSABB, all of those could be target audiences, but 
                                                      
263 Content would be informed by decisions on both what would be the most important risks to address 
(state-level biowarfare programs, bioterrorism, options opened by future technological and security 
developments) and what the most efficient methods of mitigation (technical, ethical, regulatory knowledge). 
264  Discussions on deliberate disease risks can be sensitive for life scientists, and ways to design, 
construct and deliver educational messages and programmes that are not confrontational but channel the 
reasons for concern have to be refined, so that the feasible partnership between the civil society interested 
in mitigating security risks and the scientific community is hardened. 
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they should be identified and their level of understanding assessed, so that 
specific messages could be tailored. In this research, I choose to focus on the 
education and awareness raising of one subgroup in the life sciences, 
biotechnology and public health community: that of undergraduate and graduate 
students in tertiary education. Reasons for this focus are both practical and 
functional and have been discussed in Chapter 1.265 
In the following Chapters, the thesis will try to contribute to these points, moving 
from what has been advanced so far. It has been suggested, for example, that it 
is often difficult and/or time consuming to establish new structures or 
programmes in higher education, and that expanding existing relevant offerings 
may be a more practical and quick solution. Another issue is making education 
compulsory or optional; the former would enable reaching all relevant future 
scientists, and possibly also do that on a common programme. This approach 
has been proposed in the past, however it must be considered that this would 
not be an easy nor a short process and would have to cope with many different 
academic and/or governmental systems at the national levels; moreover it is 
likely to encounter resistance in the scientific community and to result at best in 
a “tick-box” approach (National Research Council, 2009b). Especially in those 
systems with a historical academic autonomy, an imposition of content within 
the curriculum, if possible at all, would be met with scepticism (Australia et al., 
2011 p. 12). Commentators maintained that there may be scope for a bottom up 
approach, where scientists, especially in HEIs, may be engaged in the process 
of promotion of educational opportunities when involved in the design of 
education (Revill et al., 2012) using civil society networks between scientific and 
security communities (Whitby and Dando, 2010a). Even if this approach alone 
would not sustainably resolve the education gap, and even if it should be 
complemented by a top-down support at the national and international level (on 
which experience in the nuclear and chemical sectors may represent a model), 
                                                      
265 Similarly to what was presented by Rappert and Dando (2005), scientists in academia are more easily 
reachable. However, education in this context could also be efficient for a number of reasons: students 
would have at least basic scientific knowledge and skills to appreciate the topics; they would be reached 
during their formative period, with consideration on security issues being embedded in their technical and 
personal formation; students, due to their age and context, may be more open to novel information than 
experienced, practicing scientists; embedding it in the higher education programmes (formally, but also 
informally) would help reaching large number of students at the same time as well as large numbers year 
after year and cohort after cohort. 
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nonetheless it still seems a prerequisite to construct a line of communication 
between scientists and security-concerned civil society and governmental 
organization. 266  It seems clear that a variety of options are available, and 
decisions on which to use should be done based on each national academic 
system after mapping them and evaluating their feasibility and expected 
effectiveness. 
The final key question would be, assuming that the securitization move on 
establishing education as a deliberate disease risk mitigation measure has been 
accepted by its audiences, how can the efficacy of education be measured on 
competences, and, more importantly, on risks? Assessment on effectiveness 
are still to be completed (Rappert, 2007b), not only because of the recognition 
of the long-term (assumed) effects of education, as well as of the debates on 
establishing causative links between education and security, but also because 
indicators and metrics have not been directly addressed, drafted or 
systematically employed yet. 
4.10 Conclusions 
This Chapter discussed the securitization of education as a security tool to deal 
with deliberate disease risks, firstly explaining the role of education specifically 
and together with other measures of scientists engagement as described by 
security actors, and secondly presenting a number of attempted securitization 
moves. Calls for education have been analysed applying the historico-political 
securitization model. Securitizing actors, intended audiences, referent objects, 
and discursive devices have been analysed. Attempted securitization moves 
have been identified in discourses by international governmental organizations, 
national governments, scientific organizations, academia and civil society; and 
as mainly directed to two audiences, States and the scientific community. Six 
main securitization moves have been discussed addressed to States. I argue 
that the moves to recognize the value of education as a risk mitigation measure; 
on reporting to the BTWC on education efforts; and on funding initiatives and 
                                                      
266 Another point of tension is the compromise between top-down approaches, which would assure an 
enforced and capillary implementation of education programs, but risk to not win the “hearts and minds” of 
the scientific community; or a bottom-up approach, on the initiative of civil society and engaged life 
sciences communities in a self-regulation mode, which could serve as a deeper engagement and mutual 
trust among communities but risks to result in scattered, low-funded and disorganized activities. The use of 
independent university coordination bodies, when present, may be an effective compromise between a 
small-scale initiative and a top-down approach (Mancini and Revill, 2009). 
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projects on education were largely successful, albeit to different extents. The 
moves to consider education as part of national implementation of the BTWC; 
and to involve national organizations competent on education had mixed 
success; and the move to develop national and international action plans on 
education was largely not implemented. Three main securitization moves have 
been discussed addressed to scientific communities. I argue that the urge on 
scientists to become aware and recognize the relevance of deliberate disease 
risks has gradually moved from being resisted to being accepted, though far 
from wide implementation. Some actions following up to the calls to develop 
and implement education, and to integrate education in higher education 
systems, however I suggest that implementation has not been widespread or 
necessarily sustainable. Some issues have been finally discussed regarding 
constructing and assessing education on deliberate disease risks, including the 
role of education as a security tool; contents of education; target students of 
education; and implementation strategies. I argued that these issues, coupled 
with limitations of some gap analyses so far, sustain the usefulness of design 
and evaluation tools for education as a potential tool to mitigate deliberate 
disease risks. The next Chapters will apply the educational science strand of 
the theoretical framework to propose some tools that may be useful in this 
sense.  
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5. Analysis 
Chapters 3 and 4 presented the application of two strands of the theoretical 
framework for considering education as a tool to mitigate deliberate disease 
risks, discussing risk assessment and securitization moves. Chapters 5 to 9 
look at the application of the third strand, methods of educational science, for 
designing and evaluating education as a measure of deliberate disease risks 
mitigation.267 Chapters 5 to 9 address the various phases of the ADDIE cycle of 
instructional design (Analysis, Design, Development, Implementation, and 
Evaluation), both under the “education” and the “instruction design” plans. 
Chapter 5 starts with Analysis.268 
Securitization moves and widespread recognition of education being a potential 
tool to mitigate deliberate disease risks, didn’t necessarily include analysis of 
the learner populations or of the educational contexts on these subjects. 
Nonetheless, the need to gather information including on current levels of 
awareness was recognized as necessary to inform implementation initiatives 
(National Research Council, 2010). Indeed this would be part of Analysis, the 
first and data-gathering phase of the ADDIE model of ISD. Analysis is 
fundamental, as results will inform all subsequent aspects of instructional 
design, both for the Design and Development of education (the “education” 
plan) and for the success of initiatives aimed at supporting the adoption of such 
education (the “instruction design” plan). It’s important that analysis is carried 
out thoroughly and at the beginning of the cycle, as well as integrated with 
additional information that may be gathered later. Analysis is “often labeled as 
unnecessary, too expensive, or too time-consuming” (Hodell, 2011 p. 24) but it 
is what contributes to an ISD approach in line with the learning-by-design pillar. 
While all information, at all levels, may be useful during analysis, some is 
particularly important and should be considered first. Analysis should primarily 
determine where is education needed, on what, and who needs it (Goldstein, 
                                                      
267 As discussed in Chapter 2, three main areas from educational science are leveraged. The first one is 
Instructional Systems Design (ISD), in line with the learning-by-design pillar of educational science. 
Specifically, the ADDIE cycle model of instructional design is applied to education to mitigate the risks of 
deliberate disease. The second area is the evaluation of impacts of instruction, and specifically the model 
of four levels of impact. The third area is that of learner-centred teaching techniques, in line with the 
learner-centred pillar. 
268 The terms analysis, design, development, implementation and evaluation are used with the capital 
initial when referring to specific phases or corresponding activities within the ADDIE model of ISD. 
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1993). Hence early questions would be to define the problem and confirm it is 
instructional, i.e. a problem that can be fixed or ameliorated with education.269 
Answers to these questions have been proposed in previous Chapters.270  I 
discussed there is a sort of consensus that education may be one mitigation 
measure within the web of prevention, one that may lower deliberate disease 
risks in the considered risk scenarios. 
The second step is to check if and why we need new, more or different 
education than what we already have. In this Chapter, I present previous and 
original analyses on current educational opportunities as well as arguments on 
them being insufficient and in favour of improved education in terms of quantity 
and quality. 
Analysis includes other information to gather before designing education, on 
both the population of learners and the context. Learners should be identified 
and demographic details 271  are useful to then tailor objectives and content 
during Design and Development. Task analysis of learners272 can be particularly 
useful to understand their educational needs273, and an area where our two 
education and instruction design plans would differ: students would be profiled 
based on the job tasks they may be responsible for in their future technical or 
managerial jobs; while educators would be profiled based on their 
responsibilities in their current jobs of academic decision makers and/or 
curriculum designers.274 Another key area to analyse is the present level of 
content mastery by learners, or their current knowledge, attitudes and skills 
(Ree et al., 1995). For the education plan, this regards students’ mastery of the 
subject matter deemed relevant for deliberate disease risks, such as laboratory 
                                                      
269  Not all problems are instructional problems. Think for example to inadequate equipment, lack of 
communication, severe underfunding. Only instructional problems can be fixed with education or training. 
270 Where Chapter 3 defined the problem of deliberate disease risks and Chapter 4 presented attempts to 
securitize education on deliberate disease, presenting it as a (at least partly) instructional problem. 
271 Information as age or gender may be useful in some cases, but for our purposes specific details such 
as area of technical specialization and affiliation Faculty or department may be more relevant. 
272 This would involve description of the work functions to be performed, of their conditions or assumptions, 
to inform what would be needed to perform them (Salas and Cannon-Bowers, 2001). 
273 Some ISD case studies seem to suggest that Analysis should include definitions of the “topics” to be 
included in the course (Hodell, 2011 p. 27). Actually content should be determined by learning objectives 
(and not the other way around), which is done during the Design phase, and produced, based on learning 
objectives, during the Development phase. 
274 Such as Deans, Heads of Department, Course Coordinators, Professor, Lecturer, etc. 
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biorisk management and broader biosecurity, including dual-use; for the 
instruction design plan of work, this regards educators’ mastery of the subject 
matter of instructional design. The relationship between learners and content 
could highlight critical points such as translation, meaning and preconceptions 
on terminology, placement of concepts in current educational opportunities, etc. 
Knowing attitudes and opinions of the learner populations is fundamental to 
inform Design so that education can both be and be perceived as relevant. 
These include opinions of students and educators on deliberate disease risks 
and on education on deliberate disease risks. 
Important information on the educational context to gather and analyse includes 
number of hours; balance between “theoretical” and “practical” work; academic 
credits; evaluation methods; teaching delivery techniques 275 ; structure and 
processes of the higher education system, such as types of degrees, decision-
making bodies, and the academic credit system; etc. 
5.1 Analysis in education projects until 2011 
In 2004, Dando and Rappert (Dando and Rappert, 2005; Rappert et al., 2006) 
carried out seminars 276  in HEIs to investigate the views of life scientists 
regarding the dual-use potential of experimental work. What started as an 
investigation on how to prevent misuse soon became an educational activity 
when it was apparent that participants had little knowledge and consideration of 
deliberate disease risks. The researchers encountered resistance to proposals 
on governing dual-use, as well as an “overwhelming sentiment” that life 
sciences and biotechnology do not contribute to the problem of potential misuse. 
Researchers found “little evidence that participants: regarded bioterrorism or 
bioweapons as a substantial threat; considered that developments in the life 
sciences research contributed to biothreats; were aware of the current debates 
and concerns about dual use research or; were familiar with the BTWC” (Dando 
and Rappert, 2005 p. 25). The format allowed introducing the seminars into the 
regular seminar series and an easier acceptance from HEIs, however they did 
                                                      
275 For example, if learner-centred teaching techniques are known and applied in the context where the 
students learn; what innovative teaching implementation methods would be supported by educators; what 
teaching equipment is available; if distance or e-learning is a desirable and feasible option for designers. 
276 Involving twenty-four universities in the UK, one in another European country, and two pilots. Seminars 
included presentations showing information and questions to participants aimed to stimulate discussion. 
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not engage host universities in the Design or Development of the seminars and 
their contents.277 Subsequent experience involving over a hundred seminars 
and thousands of practicing scientists in universities over the same model, 
suggested similar insights on the levels of awareness and knowledge (Rappert 
et al., 2006; Whitby and Dando, 2010b). 
Other researchers used interviews or questionnaire surveys to identify the 
levels of awareness of life scientists; the existence and extent of considerations 
of deliberate disease risks (mostly including dual-use issues) in educational 
programs; or the opinions and attitudes of scientists. An investigation among 
European practitioners of synthetic biology (Kelle, 2007b) interviewed leading 
scientists278 finding that awareness was particularly rare regarding information 
and proposals from security perspectives. 
In the US, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) 
identified fourteen universities that had educational programs that to some 
extent dealt with dual-use (National Research Council and American 
Association for the Advancement of Science, 2009). A survey among the 
Association’s members on attitudes and actions on dual-use research received 
information from almost two thousands scientists, but with a low response rate 
making results not generalizable. 279  Among respondents, fifteen per cent 
indicated that they have taken actions based on concerns. On the other hand, 
two thirds of the respondents did not know if their scientific or professional 
societies had codes addressing dual-use issues. Respondents regarded more 
positively self-governance mechanisms, rather than mandatory regulation, and 
sixty-eight per cent of respondents agreed, “university and college students 
should receive educational lectures and materials on dual-use life science 
                                                      
277  Furthermore, seminars targeted faculty members rather than students and did not involved HEIs 
because of a specific focus on (higher) education, but rather as a reachable segment of life scientists, 
rather than students. 
278  Specifically asking on on the “experiments of concern” described in the Fink Report; the 
recommendations of the Lemon-Relman Report; options of possible regulation of synthetic biology and the 
activities of the NSABB in the US. 
279 Nonetheless, it provided illustrative empirical data on awareness, risk perception, and opinions towards 
governance proposals for deliberate disease risks. A preliminary consideration is that while ignoring the 
reasons of non-response for about 80% of those surveyed, it is reasonable to think that at least a share of 
them did not have interest in, or awareness of, discussions on dual-use. 
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research” (National Research Council and American Association for the 
Advancement of Science, 2009 p. 119). 
A 2007 survey focused on awareness and knowledge regarding bioterrorism 
among a sample of nurses and nursing students in Italy, on the basis that they 
would be the first responders in case of a security incident (De Felice et al., 
2008). Results suggested “inadequate knowledge about the management of 
bioterrorism risks”, with higher correct answers to questions related to biosafety 
and clinical practice than those related to deliberate disease risks. 
Undergraduate students had greater knowledge than both older students and 
practicing nurses, but the reason were not updated educational programs but 
rather that knowledge was “left too much to free initiatives (the press, Internet, 
etc.), whereas universities still only play a marginal role” (De Felice et al., 2008 
p. 107). The study suggested that deficiencies in educational programs and 
teaching models should be corrected. 
A year later, a survey on European universities reviewed 142 life sciences and 
biotechnology degree courses in 29 European countries, as well as attitudes of 
educators, regarding courses on biosecurity, bioethics and biosafety as well as 
references within courses to biosecurity, the BTWC, BW and/or arms control, 
dual-use and codes of conduct. Mancini and Revill identified only three courses 
that dealt specifically with biosecurity, which were optional. Only fifteen per cent 
of degree courses clearly included references to the studied items, although the 
lack of information prevented firmer data. Higher diffusion of bioethics (in 48 per 
cent of degree courses) and biosafety (in sixteen per cent of degree courses) 
suggested that these could be channels to introduce education on deliberate 
disease risks (Mancini and Revill, 2008; 2009). A similar process was used by 
researchers to survey degree courses in Japan, Israel, the UK, the Asia Pacific 
region and Ukraine. Researchers in Japan surveyed 197 degree courses 
(Minehata and Shinomiya, 2009; 2010), identifying a high presence of bioethics 
course but only three courses specifically dealing with biosecurity. 280  The 
survey on 35 academic degree courses in Israel found a wide presence of 
bioethics courses, but none on biosecurity (Minehata and Friedman, 2009). 
Revill surveyed the higher education offerings in the life sciences in the UK and 
                                                      
280 The Japan survey was also able to identify that potential misuse was discussed more widely than in 
European universities, even if the specific name of “dual-use” was widely unknown. 
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A-level modules in high schools and textbooks. He found that six courses 
included some references to BW and one to other biosecurity-related issues 
(but none mentioned the BTWC), and that mentions on potential misuse were 
not included in A-level secondary education courses, even if broader ethical and 
social considerations of science were (Revill, 2009). A survey on ten countries 
in the Asia-Pacific region (Minehata, 2010) used similar methods, finding 
biosecurity mentioned as a topic in five cases out of 197 degree courses, arms 
control in three cases, and dual-use in nineteen cases, while a majority of 
degrees clearly presented a bioethics component. A survey on a sample of 
universities in Ukraine by the National Academy of Science of Ukraine 
presented comparable results on levels of awareness and consideration of the 
topics in higher education (Kysil, 2012). 
At the Seventh BTWC Review Conference, Kenya reported that the level of 
awareness of misuse risks was limited in HEIs and research facilities, and that 
meanings attributed to the term biosecurity were competing (Australia et al., 
2011 p. 9). Switzerland reported results from surveys on awareness of security 
risks among life scientists, revealing a “well-developed sense for aspects 
related to biosafety, but a considerably limited knowledge of aspects related to 
biosecurity”, and that most scientists seemed to be unaware of the BTWC 
and/or of national legislation relevant for biological research (Australia et al., 
2011 p. 12). 
5.2 Demographics of students learners populations 
One of the first aspects for Analysis is characterization of the learner population. 
Characterization of students is important primarily for the education plan of 
analysis, and indirectly for the instruction design plan. Pre-service students may 
have some characteristics of adult learners (“twenty-two or older who participate 
to purposeful education after being out of education for at least two years”, 
according to Bonner (1982)) but be more apt than older learners to taking new 
knowledge in a structured educational environment. On the other hand, they will 
lack inputs of older learners: expertise, examples, practical skills, and 
prerequisites.281 
                                                      
281 It should also be considered, as Koo and Miner (2010 p. 255) summarize, that “adults are active and 
reflective learners. They learn best when they are fully engaged in the learning process, and they bring 
their learning and experience into their workplace, professional practice, and community. Adults need to 
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Characterizing the student audience includes understanding the context and 
perspectives of their education. Simple information to gather on the former is 
what degree are they pursuing: are they at undergraduate, graduate, or 
postgraduate level? Or are they in a non-degree curriculum, such as a 
certificate or diploma? At what point of the degree are they? 282  Other 
information is the area of specialization: is the student completing, for example, 
a Medicine, Biology, Microbiology, Pharmacy, Public Health, Veterinary, or 
Biotechnology degree? 
A useful way to characterize learners is task analysis, which has been applied 
to laboratory biorisk management in-service training student characterization 
(Delarosa et al., 2011; Grainger and Turegeldiyeva, 2015). Task analysis may 
be adapted to characterization of learners in higher education by asking: what 
tasks will this graduate have in their future job? Describing job perspectives and 
opportunities is common in higher education programs, as it is useful to explain 
to prospective students what they may do after graduating. For some degrees, 
job perspectives may be very specific, while for others (and in general for lower 
levels) there is a range of job opportunities.  
An overview of information on population of potential learners from projects (see 
Table 6) suggests that often the more easily reachable group in the education 
plan may be undergraduate students. Indeed engaged faculty members in 
different occasions argued that undergraduate students should be targeted with 
some basic, foundational education.283 
Analysis of learner populations within HEIs can provide indications on who 
should be prioritized among them, and if other cohorts should be added that are 
particularly in need of education. Anyway, prioritized groups may vary as it 
depends on the specific higher education context, job market, role tasks as well 
                                                                                                                                                            
know why they are learning, what the goal is, and whether they can achieve the goal. Also, they expect 
immediate relevance to what they learn”. 
282 Obviously, a student in the first year of a Bachelor will most likely have no previous technical knowledge 
or expertise; while a student who is completing a Master degree will recognize the scientific research 
process, how a laboratory is organized, and/or perform some techniques. 
283 It’s also interesting to note that professors in different countries have independently suggested that 
education would be more appropriately introduced in the second year of a Bachelor degree: after the very 
basic science courses have been completed, but before specific techniques are learned and students start 
getting into the laboratory.  
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as perceptions of the engaged community. In the considered projects, for 
example, Country B and Country A University 2 participants, independently 
suggested students of Medical Laboratory Sciences as a priority with the 
argument that they would have direct responsibilities on laboratory biosafety 
and biosecurity. Some participants from Country D universities, as well as 
several European professors in EUBARNet, on the other hand, argued that 
postgraduate students in degrees such as biotechnology or virology would be a 
priority, because in their research environments they are more likely to deal with 
dual-use issues.284 
                                                      
284 Different prioritizations within the learner population of students may also suggest different evaluations 
by respondents on the relative urgency of deliberate disease risks. Within the disease risk scenarios that I 
identified in Chapter 3, for example, the focus on Medical Laboratory Sciences students would suggest an 
intervention on the second risk scenario, with an external non-state threat seeking access to material or 
information assets. The focus on students in higher and/or more research-focused degrees suggests an 
intervention on the first and the third risk scenarios, in which broader biorisk management, security 
awareness, and dual-use ethics capacities would be more relevant as mitigation measures. 
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Table 6 - Overview of information on potential student populations 
                                                      
285 Questions and categories translated from the original French questionnaire. 
286 Eight seminars with students in seven Project 18 countries: Georgia, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Moldova, Ukraine, Morocco. 
287 Discipline and degree program for each type of student. 
288 Including Microbiology. 
 Surveys on Professors Surveys on Students 
Country Country D 
Country A 
University 2 
Project 18 Country B EUBARNet Morocco285 Project 18286 Pakistan 
Data/Tool 
Email Questionnaire, 
9 respondents 
Email 
Questionnaire, 27 
participants 
Email 
Questionnaire, 376 
respondents 
Email Questionnaire, 
17 participants 
Web-based 
Questionnaire, 20 
respondents 
Questionnaire, 
227 respondents 
Pre-seminar 
Questionnaire, 
453 respondents 
Questionnaire
, 448 
respondents 
Question 
Which students do 
you teach to (degree 
specialization and 
level)? 
What students do 
you teach to 
(degree, year)? 
Faculty of affiliation 
and level of 
teaching 
What types of 
students do you 
teach?287 
What level do you 
teach in? 
What is your level 
and discipline of 
intervention? 
Degree and 
Discipline/Subject 
currently studying 
Degree and 
Discipline/Su
bject currently 
studying 
Degree Level 
Undergraduate 69% 99% 59% 69% 36% 64% 11% 24% 
Master 23% 
1% 
29% 
22% 
31% 32% 65% 62% 
PhD/PostDoc 8% 9% 31% - 23% 9% 
Course/Field of teaching or studying 
Medicine and Medical 
Specializations and Degrees288 
33% 47% 
18% 
38% - 20% 29% 25% 
Medical Laboratory Sciences  30% 21% - - - - 
Biotechnology and Biomedical 
Engineering 
- - 19% 3% - - 20% 45% 
Biology, Biology-related degrees 
and Biochemistry 
50% 16% 28% 21% - 39% 45%  
Pharmacy 8% 29% 4% 11% - - - - 
Food Science and Technology, 
Nutrition, Agriculture, Environment 
- - 3% 21% - 7% - 15% 
Animal Health, Veterinary 8% - - - - - - 8% 
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5.3 Education situational analysis 
The next aspect to analyse pertains to the current status of education relevant 
for deliberate disease risks. This is key to identify gaps and needs, once it will 
be related to the learning objectives identified in Design.289 Such analysis may 
focus on two dimensions: existing knowledge and skills in the targeted learners 
population, and existing educational opportunities. Both dimensions are useful 
to draw a baseline of the status of education relevant for deliberate disease 
risks, and inform subsequent decisions on Design. 
5.3.1 Content mastery by student populations 
Baseline content mastery by learners can be evaluated with different methods, 
according to the cognitive domain and level of learning needed. These concepts 
and the discussion on how to measure learning will be developed under the 
Design and the Evaluation Chapters, however we can present here examples 
and results for Analysis. Methods can include pre- and post-intervention tests; 
questionnaire surveys; and observation by instructors. Also defining exactly 
what should be the content to master depends on the specific learning 
objectives; however examples may include awareness on concepts and terms 
relevant for deliberate disease risks; ability to distinguish between safety and 
security concepts; or knowledge of the dual-use issues. 
The survey on Pakistani students assessed their awareness of key terms, and 
asked to provide short definitions in their own words (Shinwari et al., 2011). A 
majority of surveyed students had at least heard of biosafety and bioterrorism; 
while only 38,6% had heard of biosecurity, 21,4% of dual-use research, and 
12,3% of the BTWC. Awareness of the “biosecurity” and “dual-use research” 
terms increased with degree levels, being lowest among undergraduate and 
highest among doctoral students, and was higher among those students 
already involved in research. 
  
                                                      
289 For this reason I prefer using “situational analysis” rather then “gap/needs analysis”. What are the 
actual education needs could be defined only with the definition of learning objectives, and the distance 
between the situation and such objectives. 
 158 
Table 7 - Pakistan students questionnaire survey 
Regarding students’ understanding of terms, the majority did not answer the 
questions “what do you understand from the following terms” – even many of 
those who claimed to have heard of the terms before.291 Only 7,3% of students 
provided a definition of biosecurity in line with the benchmark, and 13,2% of 
dual-use research. Clearly the difference between biosafety and biosecurity was 
a source of confusion, as many students attempted a definition for biosafety but 
left a blank for biosecurity.292 For biosecurity, one example of definitions judged 
in line with its benchmark is: 
“Awareness of the importance of material, culture you are dealing with. It 
can be moved, snatched, theft [sic] by someone who is not loyal to you, 
your lab, or your institution” [P8.02]293 
Among the few students who provided their own definition of dual-use research, 
while answers along the line of “research that can be applied both for good and 
bad purposes”, such as 
“Using both positive and negative aspects of scientific knowledge” 
[P1.01] 
“Scientific knowledge, ideas, techniques and materials are not only used 
for science of mankind but also for harmful aspects for human society” 
[P1.71] 
                                                      
290 Where B = Bachelor; M = Master; and D = Doctorate 
291 The term that received most definitions was “biosafety”, but of those only about a quarter provided a 
definition judged in line with the benchmark definition from the WHO and the CEN. 
292 Or wrote “same as biosafety”. 
293 As a reminder, quotes from questionnaires and other documents (such as design documents) are 
categorized following a coding scheme used throughout the thesis, in which the first letter and number 
identify the project and HEIs, respectively; and the second number the respondent. Thus in this case, for 
example, the quote is from participant 2 from HEI 8 in the Pakistan project’s survey on students. 
 %yes 
Have you 
ever heard 
of… 
%yes total Degree level290 Researcher ? Course/Field of Study 
 B M D Yes No Biology/Li
fe 
sciences 
Medicine Animal 
sciences 
Biosafety? 54,5 55,6 55,4 65,8 83,9 44,2 61,1 37,7 70,3 
Biosecurity? 38,6 25,9 42 63,2 62,7 29,7 40,7 22,1 54,1 
Dual-use 
research? 
21,4 18,5 23,6 26,3 33,1 17,1 25,7 6,5 24,3 
Bioweapons? 58,3         
BTWC 12,3         
 %yes total 
Do you know any local, national, or international organization working on regulating dual-use research and 
biosecurity? 
4 
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are considered in line with the benchmark definition, several students had a 
preconception of the concept that was distant from our benchmark and denoted 
various attempts to interpret the “dual” nature in the “dual-use” phrase, such as 
“Getting double benefits from one use with little costs” [P1.20] 
“Use of knowledge and ideas regarding science in personal as well as 
community benefits” [P2.14] 
Understanding by students was often closer to benchmarks for the “bioweapons” 
and “bioterrorism” terms.294 
Seminars within the EUBARNet series asked participating students, during pre-
seminar tests, if they had “any prior knowledge about the potential “hostile use” 
of life sciences”, to which 70% of participants answered affirmatively.295 The 
pre-intervention section of Project 18 questionnaires for students in conjunction 
with educational interventions included questions on students’ understanding of 
dual-use, safety and security, and the history of deliberate disease, in the form 
of multiple-choice questions. Results are reported in Table 8; “correct” options 
are highlighted.296 The majority of students had an understanding of the “dual-
use” term in line with deliberate disease risks literature, and a smaller majority 
grasped the concept of biosafety. However, the majority of students seemed not 
to have a “correct” understanding of biosecurity, laboratory versus broader risk 
mitigation, or international legal mitigation measures of deliberate disease risks. 
  
                                                      
294 One reason for this may be that terms have received media coverage, given that “newspapers” and “the 
Internet” were frequent answers to the question “from which source you mostly get your educational 
material”. 
295 Students learners participating to the seminars in Milan (2), Turin, Coimbra, Delft and Granada. Total 
181 students. Local partners in the Bradford seminar did not include the question in the questionnaire for 
students. Answers “not much” from Turin questionnaires were coded as “no” (5 occurrences). 
296 “Wrong” options were taken from past surveys with students in previous projects by the author, such as 
previous research described in 5.1 and the Pakistan survey. 
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Table 8 - Content mastery assessment, students, Project 18297 
5.3.2 Existing educational opportunities 
Analysing existing educational opportunities is useful to understand if and how 
relevant topics are currently considered in HEIs. In the situational analyses 
results summarized in Table 12, it can be noted that some investigations asked 
about biorisk management, as well as separately about biosafety and 
biosecurity; others only asked of biosafety and biosecurity; or merged all in the 
same question; and several also looked at bioethics. Contents relevant for 
deliberate disease risks could be addressed in different existing courses and 
not only in those devoted to biosecurity or biosafety. When using questionnaires 
however, it seems advisable not to ask respondents about “biorisk management 
education content” if they have not yet been introduced to biorisk management. 
Asking about biosafety and biosecurity separately would already provide 
sufficient information as well as allow understanding on how the two dimensions 
are covered differently.298 
5.3.2.1 Online investigations 
The EUBARNet online investigation on universities suggested that 7,1% of 
analysed courses clearly included some possibly relevant reference to “security”, 
                                                      
297 “Right” benchmark answers highlighted. 
298 Also, this further supports why referenced definitions of terms were provided in surveys: a professor 
could easily check “yes we teach biosecurity”, actually thinking to different meanings of the term. This is 
the same reason why, in some surveys, we asked if “biosafety” or “biosecurity” were used in other 
meanings than protection related to pathogenic microorganisms. 
What do you understand by the term “dual use” in the life sciences?  
The uncertainty on results characterizing new technologies 13% 
The potential of obtaining positive results beyond expectations 7% 
The possibility that they are applied both for peaceful and hostile purposes 76% 
The ambiguity of life science and technology 12% 
Laboratory biosafety refers to:  
Measures and policies for preventing the deliberate misuse of pathogens 25% 
Measures for preventing theft and loss of pathogens 10% 
Measures for preventing the unauthorized access to pathogens and toxins 30% 
Measures for preventing the unintentional exposure to biological agents and toxins, or 
their accidental release 
63% 
Which statement about laboratory biosecurity is NOT true?  
It comprises policies and practices that require life scientists to consider the ethical, 
social and legal implications of their work 
47% 
It comprises measures and policies against the theft and loss of pathogens 21% 
It comprises measures and policies against the unauthorized access to pathogens 
and toxins 
12% 
It comprises measures and policies that seek to prevent the intentional release of 
pathogens and toxins 
20% 
Which was the first International treaty to prohibit the use of toxic and 
biological weapons? 
 
The Hague Declaration, 1907 5% 
Geneva Protocol, 1925 18% 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 1972 54% 
Chemical Weapons Convention, 1993 5% 
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the majority being in graduate degree courses; safety-related topics were 
clearly mentioned in 18,2% of the analysed courses. The investigation in 
Region A suggested that 31% of the surveyed courses clearly included some 
references to BRM, safety or security management within or beyond the 
laboratory, 299  while 30% clearly included references to ethics, bioethics or 
responsible conduct of research content. The investigation on Country C 
universities’ degree courses suggested that 27% clearly included some 
references to biorisk management, safety or security management within or 
beyond the laboratory, and 38% to ethics, bioethics or responsible conduct of 
research. 
5.3.2.2 Questionnaire surveys 
The questionnaire survey on Moroccan faculty members suggested that about a 
fifth of respondents taught some biosafety while less than one out of ten taught 
something relevant for biosecurity. Contingency tables suggest a relatively 
higher awareness among genetics faculty members;300 a larger consideration in 
graduate courses301  (although still less than a quarter of respondents); and 
higher consideration in science and technology schools than in science ones. 
  
                                                      
299 For 13% there was enough data to judge there was no relevant content included, while for 56% it was 
unclear. 
300  The majority of respondents from each specialization, however, do not claim any reference to 
biosecurity at all. 
301 Master and License, in the Moroccan higher education system, respectively. 
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Table 9 - Educational opportunities, Morocco survey 
Responses suggest some confusion on the biosafety and biosecurity terms.304 
Indeed some references to biosafety are reported in the context of 
“management of risks connected to GMOs”, “the Cartagena Protocol” [MH.02], 
and “potential risks linked to the introduction of alien species and genetically 
modified organisms” [MN.19]. 305  However, many references to biosafety are 
reported in the context of laboratory biosafety such as “protection to avoid 
microbial infections” [MN.08], “systematic application of decontamination 
systems” [M.10].306 
Few comments are reported on relevant references on BW and dual-use, such 
as “dual-use and biological weapons are one of the themes for essays [by 
                                                      
302 Of the first indicated “filière d’intervention” with more than 5 occurrences. Categories translated from the 
original French questionnaire.  
303 Of the first indicated “filière d’intervention” with more than 5 occurrences. Categories translated from the 
original French questionnaire. 
304  This is not surprising even considering that definitions were included in the questionnaire, firstly 
because in French the term “biosecurité” is often used for the two meanings and secondly because the 
same is used not only as protection against pathogens but also regarding GMOs. 
305 Translated by the author from the original French: “la gestion des risques liés aux OGMs”, “le Protocol 
de Cartagena” [MH.02] and “risques potentiels liés à l’introduction d’espèces étrangères et d’organismes 
génétiquement modifiés” [MN.19] 
306  Translated by the author from the original French: “protection pour ne pas avoir des infections 
microbiennes” [MN.08], “application systématique de systèmes de decontamination” [M.10] 
In the courses/modules taught in the 
institution, are there references to the 
following subjects? 
% yes Most quoted courses/modules 
Biosafety? 18,5 Microbiology, physiology, food 
quality 
Biosecurity?  7,92 Quality control, environmental 
studies 
Dual-use 1,76 Biology, Chemistry 
Bioweapons 5,72 Genetics, Microbiology 
The BTWC 1,32 Quality control 
Are these subjects addressed during teaching seminars ? % yes 
TOTAL 12,33 
Institution  
Faculty of Science and Technology 34,0 
Faculty of Science 5,3 
Level302  
Master 23,1 
Bachelor 11,8 
Do you make any references to Biosecurity?  % yes 
Discipline303 
 
Physiology 16,7 
Genetics 31,3 
Chemistry area 14,3 
Other 11,1 
Ecology area 13,3 
Biology/Life sciences area 9,3 
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students]” [ML.08].307 These references are reported within ethics education308 
such as “in the framework of diagnostic techniques and transgenesis methods” 
[MM.05]; “laws on animal experimentation”; “confidentiality questions” 
[MF.03].309  
The survey of Pakistani students asked if and how they were ever presented 
with information regarding biosecurity or potential misuse of life sciences. 
Slightly more than a third of respondents replied positively, increasing with 
degree levels, and among those who perform some research.310 
Table 10 - Educational opportunities, Pakistan survey 
Twenty-five per cent of respondents to the EUBARNet survey on faculty 
members reported that their HEI included some training on biosafety. Among 
respondents to the Project 18 questionnaire survey, 63% replied “yes” to “do 
you or your institution teach any specific courses focused primarily on biosafety” 
and 51% regarding courses on biosecurity. However, for the most part teaching 
did not go beyond “some references during lectures”. “Bioweapons”, 
“bioterrorism”, “dual-use/misuse”, and “laws prohibiting Biological Weapons” 
were only reported as “ever mentioned” in modules taught at respondents’ HEIs 
in 25%, 28%, 28% and 21% of cases, respectively. 
  
                                                      
307 Translated by the author from the original French: “double usage et armes biologiques sont un des 
thèmes pour les exposés [des étudiants]” [ML.08] 
308 Mentions of other bibliographic references linked instead to biosafety or biosecurity include WHO 
biosafety guidelines; the ISO17025 and ISO22000 standards; and national occupational health and safety 
norms. 
309  Translated by the author from the original French: “dans le cadre de techniques diagnostique et 
méthodes de transgénèse” [MM.05]; “le lois sur la expérimentation animale” ; “questions de confidentialité” 
[MF.03]. 
310 Furthermore, answers suggest that the topics were not present in the scientific and academic debate, 
and that very few students had ever attended a conference or seminar on these topics. 
 %yes  Degree level Researcher ? Course/Field of Study 
B M D Yes No Biology/L
S 
Medicine Animal 
Sc. 
Have you 
ever studied 
anything 
related to 
these issues 
in your 
educational 
carrier? 
36,4 33,3 37,7 52,6 74,6 23,5 41,9 32,5 40,5 
 %yes 
total 
Have you ever attended any conference or seminar on these issues? 7,4 
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Table 11 - Educational opportunities, Project 18 survey 
Common patterns from questionnaire surveys from Country D, Region A, 
Country A University 2, and Country B (summarized in Table 12) are that 
existing educational opportunities included some considerations relevant for 
BRM. These considerations, however, were for the most part devoted to 
biosafety, and reported consideration of biosecurity was consistently lower. Still, 
content descriptions of reported biosecurity considerations included relevant 
examples even if mostly limited to laboratory biosecurity, such as: 
“Accountability of laboratory workers […] (equipment and specimens); security 
of laboratory premises […]” [RA.01]; “During Pre-PhD course in research 
methodology. One chapter of the syllabus is on biosecurity. There is one PPT 
lecture. One hour dedicated to Biosecurity” [C.02]. 
Ethics education311 is generally more widely present than biorisk management 
considerations, but still no sample reports more than 60% consideration. Even 
among those, only minorities report any ethical consideration connected to dual-
use, potential misuse, bioterrorism threats or deliberate disease risks. 
                                                      
311 Including bioethics, medical ethics, research ethics, responsible conduct of research. 
Do you or your 
institution teach any 
specific courses 
focused primarily on… 
Project 18 
Email Questionnaire, 376 respondents 
Yes If yes, to what extent? No If no, why not? 
Biosafety 63% 
There are one or more 
specific courses in the 
syllabus 
18% 
36% 
Because we don’t 
think this topic is 
relevant to our 
syllabus 
11% 
There are one or more 
specific sections in the 
courses 
38% 
Because of lack of 
teaching time in the 
curricula 
22% 
There are some 
references during 
lectures 
45% 
Because of lack of 
expertise and 
resources 
38% 
There are dedicated 
institutes organizing 
seminars or mentoring 
7% 
Other 3% There are mentions in 
the recommended 
readings and textbooks 
17% 
Other 4% 
Biosecurity 51% 
There are one or more 
specific courses in the 
syllabus 
12% 
49% 
Because we don’t 
think this topic is 
relevant to our 
syllabus 
19% 
There are one or more 
specific sections in the 
courses 
23% 
Because of lack of 
teaching time in the 
curricula 
25% 
There are some 
references during 
lectures 
40% 
Because of lack of 
expertise and 
resources 
49% 
There are dedicated 
institutes organizing 
seminars or mentoring 
5% 
Other 6% There are mentions in 
the recommended 
readings and textbooks 
18% 
Other 3% 
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Table 12 - Educational opportunities, overview 
Country Country C Country D Country A University 2 Country B  Region A EUBARNet 
Data/Tool 
Online investigation, 50 
degrees in 16 universities 
Email Questionnaire, 9 
respondents 
Email Questionnaire, 27 
respondents 
Email Questionnaire, 17 
respondents 
Online investigation, 138 
degrees in 14 universities 
Web-based 
Questionnaire, 20 
respondents 
Question 
Presence in degree syllabi 
of relevant educational 
content 
Do students currently 
receive education on… 
Do your courses currently 
include considerations on… 
Do undergraduate 
students currently receive 
instruction on… 
Presence in degree syllabi 
of relevant educational 
content 
Does the University 
include training on… 
BRM 
27% 
- 59% Limited, largely confined 
to safety. Security is not 
mentioned. 
31% 
- 
Biosafety 11% 62% 25% 
Biosecurity 0% 11% 20% 
Bioethics, Medical Ethics or 
Research Ethics 
38% 33% 59% 
Both stand-alone courses 
and training within 
broader courses 
30% 25% 
If yes, do they include 
considerations on dual-use 
issues, potential misuse 
and/or bioterrorism threats, 
relevant for biosecurity? 
Ethics courses in 
Biotechnology degrees 
include topics as 
“bioterrorism” 
11% - 
No mention of ethical 
topics related to misuse, 
dual-use, or social 
responsibility. 
Not clearly; some courses 
merge safety, ethical, legal 
and policy topics related to 
science. 
- 
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5.3.2.2.1 Existing opportunities to leverage 
Analysis should not only point out what is missing, but also identify and credit 
what could be leveraged. The absence of education on deliberate disease risks 
does not mean that the presence of laboratory biosafety education should be 
belittled, as it signals a curriculum that could be improved as well as faculty who 
perceive the importance of biorisks. For example, the projects identified relevant 
modules and courses reported in Table 13. Professors from Country B reported 
examples of existing educational opportunities, such as: 
“An Introduction on biosafety, biosecurity and biorisk principles is started 
to be given this year to fourth year students as a part of the Clinical 
Chemistry course.” [B.02] 
“Use of PPE. Safe disposal of infective material. Topics included in the 
lab courses under universal precautions and safe disposal of infective 
materials. No Biosecurity.” [B.03] 
In Country C, the syllabus of Biotechnology degrees include safety and ethics; 
some versions include safety and risk management as well as weapons ethics, 
but not laboratory biosecurity; others biosafety and bioterrorism, but not 
laboratory biosecurity. 
Table 13 - Examples of existing educational opportunities 
Project Year Language Where 
EUBARNet 2012 
Main course reading is Casarett and Doull's toxicology: "The 
new seventh edition features is updated throughout and 
includes many new contributors and new content on chemical 
terrorism" (Klaassen et al., 2013) 
Toxicology 
Master, 
Karolinska 
Institute 
Region A 2013 
Course of 3 hours weekly and 14 weeks, includes “Biosafety 
regulatory frameworks. Types of regulatory instruments […] 
Good Laboratory Practices. […] Risk analysis: risk 
assessment, risk management and risk communication. […] 
Fundamental ethical concerns of biotechnology” 
Biotechnology 
Master 
Country A 
University 2 
2014 
Course: Laboratory ethics and safety. Learning objectives 
include to describe principles and applications of ethics in 
medical laboratory research; […] to apply ethical code of 
conduct; general safety practices to laboratory work. […] to 
know employer and employee responsibilities for safety; […] to 
properly dispose laboratory waste. 
BSc Medical 
Laboratory 
Sciences 
Country B 2014 
Course on laboratory management includes laboratory 
biosafety and bioethics content. 
BSc Medical 
Laboratory 
Sciences 
Country C 2014 
Learning objectives include the use of standard safety 
measures while handling highly infectious material […] and 
ethics, responsibility, and first aid 
BSc in Medical 
Laboratory 
Technology 
Country C 2014 
Course on bioethics and biosafety includes in learning 
objectives to be aware of the ethical issues concerned with the 
field; bioterrorism; ethical implications of biotechnology; social 
and ethical implication of BW; dispose of biohazards, the 
Cartagena Protocol. 
MSc 
Biotechnology 
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5.3.3 Educators’ experience and content mastery  
Another useful aspect to analyse is the baseline experience and knowledge by 
educators, including the engaged faculty members of a project.312 The Project 
18 survey asked if participants had ever dealt in their courses with selected 
relevant topics. Reported experience was consistently lower for issues directly 
relevant for deliberate disease risks, such as dual-use/misuse, than for 
laboratory biosafety. Yet, positive replies are still higher than reported existing 
educational opportunities; a reason for this may be that survey respondents are 
a sub-group of faculty already more engaged than average on these topics, 
likely because of previous participation to awareness-raising initiatives. 313 
Responses from Moroccan faculty members suggested that only 11,5% of 
respondents were informed of laws and regulations on life sciences research. 
Results are similar across the sample: educators coming from different 
Faculties, teaching in undergraduate or graduate courses, or in different subject 
areas (see Table 14). 
Table 14 - Educators' experience, Morocco survey 
Among respondents to the Project 18 survey, only about a third reported to 
know any regulations or local or international organization working on regulating 
dual-use research or biosecurity, prohibiting non-peaceful use of life science 
                                                      
312 Yet not necessarily representative of the whole population of educators (in that country, in that sector) 
because of the lack of sample randomization and/or of statistical significance analysis, they would still 
provide an illustrative picture of educators’ experience based on sets of quantitative and qualitative data. 
313 Further supporting this, positive answers to “have you ever dealt in your courses with…” are higher than 
those to “do you or your institution teach specific courses on…”. 
314  Questions, items and categories are translated from the original French questionnaire (original 
question: “Etes-vous informé des lois, règlements ou des organes de contrôle régissant la recherche en 
sciences de la vie et/ou la publication des travaux de recherche?”) 
315 Of the first indicated “filière d’intervention” with more than 5 occurrences 
316 Of the first indicated “filière d’intervention” with more than 5 occurrences 
Are you aware of any new laws, regulations or oversight bodies governing life 
science research and/or the publication of research?314 
% yes 
TOTAL 11,5 
Institution                                                                     
Faculty of Science and Technology 12,0 
Faculty of Sciences 10,5 
Level315  
Master 7,7 
Bachelor 12,3 
Discipline316  
Biology/Life sciences area 11,6 
Ecology area 0,0 
Chemistry area 14,3 
Genetics 6,3 
Physiology 8,3 
Other 0,0 
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research or mitigation measures for deliberate disease risks from state threats 
as the BTWC. A third of professors participating from Country D mentioned they 
had previous training on biorisk management.317 
5.3.4 Motivations, attitudes, opinions 
Analysis is a good occasion to gain opinions from inside higher education 
systems on introducing or improving education relevant for deliberate disease 
risks. We can get a perspective on risk assessments from the higher education 
sector; opinions on current capacity and adequacy; the perceived urgency of 
education; suggestions on priority contents; existing teaching methods and 
resources; and information on accreditation contexts and processes. 
5.3.4.1 Risk assessment 
Surveyed Pakistani students were almost evenly divided on the question “do 
you think that your field of study involves such techniques that have the 
potential to be misused?”. However, a relative majority of students agreed that 
“undesired elements can gain access to scientific techniques for hostile 
activities”, suggesting a high assessment of laboratory biosecurity risks. 
However, students largely disagreed with a high dual-use risk assessment: the 
majority of students disagree with “laboratory setups at educational and 
research institutes can be used for preparation of materials for non-peaceful 
purposes”, a disagreement that grows with degree level and research 
experience.318 
  
                                                      
317 For those who added details, this training was mainly identified as based on Sandia’s GBRMC or from 
the WHO. 
318 We could infer that respondents would assess our third deliberate disease risk scenario (insider threat 
risk) higher than our second deliberate disease risk scenario (outsider threat risk). There is a higher risk 
assessment for dual-use risks only among medicine and microbiology students. Deliberate disease risk 
assessment was different for example on the side of Project 18 survey responding professors as 67% 
agreed to that their “field of study involves techniques that have the potential to be misused”. 
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Table 15 - Risk assessment, Pakistan survey 
5.3.4.2 Opinions on current capacities 
The majority (55,6%) of surveyed Pakistani students agreed or strongly agreed 
that “national policy related to dual-use research and biosecurity should be 
developed”. Slightly over half of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that 
“scientific journals should have policies regulating the publication of dual-use 
research”, something particularly interesting as publication oversight may 
impact the scientific career of especially young researchers who may be 
expected to see it as a potential limitation. 
Opinions and assessments from surveys on professors also suggest a 
perceived lack or inadequacy of capacities to deal with biorisks, including 
deliberate disease risks. Relative majorities of respondents to the Project 18 
survey consistently judged “poor” availability of skilled staff and biosafety 
training. Available training was judged insufficient especially regarding higher 
education learners and teaching resources (see Table 16).  
Similar assessments on inadequacy of capacity to teach in higher education 
were reflected in the answers to pre-workshop questionnaires by professors 
from Country C, Country D and Region A.319 
                                                      
319 When only 37%, 22% and 20% of respondents from Country C, Country D and Region A surveys, 
respectively, agreed that “current trainers at the university have the necessary background and training 
skills to deliver BRM content”. The most mentioned need by Country B professors to the question “what do 
you believe are the five most important needs related to biosafety, biosecurity and bioethics in your 
country?” was “train-the-trainer”. Such a need to develop instructional capacity was followed by other 
categories also relevant for educational capacities on biorisk management, such as 
“development/strenghtening of national guidelines and standards”; “develop coursework for undergraduate 
  % 
  Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
N/A 
Undesired elements can 
gain access to scientific 
techniques for hostile 
activities 
All 4,9 37,5 24,1 18,1 6,0 9,4 
Laboratory setups at 
educational and research 
institutes can be used for 
preparation of materials for 
non-peaceful purposes 
All 6,3 27,9 6,7 34,6 18,8 5,8 
Degree level Bachelor 5,6 26,9 7,4 26,9 28,7 4,6 
 Master 6,9 27,9 6,5 37,0 15,2 6,5 
 Doctorate 5,3 23,7 2,6 42,1 26,3 0,0 
Researcher? Yes 3,4 22,0 0,8 55,1 17,8 0,8 
 No 7,4 31,3 8,7 28,4 20,0 4,2 
Discipline Life Sci. 4,2 25,7 7,2 35,9 21,6 5,4 
 Medicine 19,5 22,1 7,8 18,2 26,0 6,5 
 Microbiology 0,0 41,7 8,3 38,9 11,1 0,0 
 Animal Sci. 2,7 29,7 2,7 54,1 8,1 2,7 
 Environ. Sci. 1,5 30,3 6,1 43,9 18,2 0,0 
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Table 16 - Current capacities, Project 18 survey 
5.3.4.3 Importance of education 
One of the reasons advanced by other experiences (Mancini and Revill, 2009; B 
Rappert et al., 2006) to explain difficulties in promoting education is the low 
perceived importance of biosafety and biosecurity in higher education. 
Analysing how educators perceive the priority of education is useful to know 
what to expect for engaging them in instructional design. It may however be of 
little value to ask, “Do you think knowledge on deliberate disease risks is 
important?” It may be more meaningful to put it in perspective asking to rank 
education with respect to other topics. If, for example, a course director would 
have to choose to make space between biorisk management education and 
another new subject area that the course is missing but is now regarded as 
necessary for technical training, what would be the choice? Safety and security 
should be integrated with the technical content, but this approach may force 
respondents to a more thoughtful assessment rather than just pick the “simple” 
answer. In this sense, in the more recent projects the question has been asked 
“how would you define the priority of incorporating new education on biosafety 
and biosecurity in educational programs?” (with respect to other subject areas 
you may have the opportunity to incorporate). The majorities of Country D, 
Region A, and Country A University 2 participants replied “high priority”, or that 
they should be prioritized before other topics. A large part of the rest chose 
“average”, or that they would have the same priority of other new topics, while 
virtually none indicated that there are other topics more urgent to incorporate. 
This certainly suggests that the surveyed professors believe education on 
                                                                                                                                                            
students”; “Technical or laboratory equipment, infrastructure (and relative funding)”; “more practice training, 
workshops, visits, special initiatives”; “education for university students (in general: graduate or undergrad, 
educational kits, etc.)”; “formal curriculum development”; and “broader awareness raising, including 
"relevant people" as well as the public”. 
 % 
Please give your professional opinion on the following issues… Excell. Good Avg. Poor N/A 
Availability of skilled biosafety professionals 2 12 29 29 23 
Availability of technically skilled workers for handling/transfer of 
potentially infectious material 
1 13 24 29 28 
Availability of infrastructure and professional staff to implement 
biosafety programs, including SOP’s (Standard Operating 
Procedures) 
1 12 20 38 25 
Availability of accredited biosafety training for senior scientists 1 7 15 41 30 
Availability of accredited biosafety training for university and 
graduate students 
0 6 19 40 30 
Availability of accredited biosafety training/teaching resources and 
materials 
0 5 23 38 29 
Availability of institutional biosafety oversight, such as laboratory 
(teaching & research) audits or regulatory compliance assistance, 
or institutional biosafety management committees 
1 10 17 36 31 
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aspects of (bio)risk management is important, and at the same time provides a 
sort of “commitment” statement: as they supported it so much, they will be 
expected to work for advancing it.320 
Particularly interesting from the Moroccan survey is the relationship between 
support to education and engagement of respondents. Those educators already 
mentioning biosecurity issues in their teaching have larger shares of “very 
important” and “important” on the need for awareness-raising for students, with 
respect to those not mentioning biosecurity or not answering that question at all. 
Professors aware of regulations on research give a similar support to education 
than those who are more ignorant of measures.  
Table 17 - Educators' experience and support to education, Morocco survey 
 
Comments from professors who qualified education on these topics as “very 
important” or “important” included for example: 
“Contemporary issues of bioethics, such as the use of human embryos, 
organ donation, chemical products in agriculture, biological weapons and 
bioterrorism… the student needs to be sensitized so to at least 
participate to the debate as youth today and decision-maker tomorrow” 
[MD.15] 
                                                      
320 Interviewees in other projects expressed support, such as the Project 18 and Morocco surveys suggest; 
however high support could be explained by how the questions were posed. Ninety-seven per cent of 
Project 18 survey respondents replied “yes” to “do you think that awareness on biosafety, biosecurity and 
dual-use (misuse) should be raised among current and perspective life scientists in your country; while 
81,9% of Moroccan professors qualified as “very important” or “important” “awareness-raising of students 
of life scientists on these subjects”. Furthermore, this is regardless of the institution, the level of the degree 
level taught in, or the discipline of specialization, as in all subgroups there are majorities qualifying at least 
important the awareness of students. 
321 Questions, items and categories are translated from the original French questionnaire. 
 How would you qualify the awareness raising of life sciences students on these issues?321 
 Very 
important 
Important Somewhat 
important 
Less 
important 
Not 
important 
at all 
Do not 
know 
No 
answer 
Do you make any reference to the following topics [biosecurity, biosafety, bioethics, biological weapons, the 
BTWC, “dual-use”/misuse, codes of conduct, laws prohibiting biological weapons] ? 
Yes 88,9% 5,6% 5,6% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
No 35,8% 47,3% 6,1% 0,6% 1,2% 5,5% 3,6% 
No answer 54,5% 18,2% 4,5% 0,0% 0,0% 4,5% 18,2% 
Are you aware of any new laws, regulations or oversight bodies governing life science research and/or the 
publication of research? 
Yes 69,2% 11,5% 11,5% 3,8% 0,0% 0,0% 3,8% 
No 40,5% 43,2% 5,4% 0,0% 1,1% 5,9% 3,8% 
No answer 37,5% 25,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 37,5% 
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“[Regarding] biosafety, it’s easier to make students interested because 
they feel personally concerned (their health) and in the daily practice. 
Biosecurity and bioethics do not regard the daily work but will be 
important depending on the professional domain they will work on and 
the responsibilities of their future jobs” [MF.01] 
“Today’s students are tomorrow’s researchers, scientists and decision-
makers, so their awareness-raising will allow introducing them now to this 
problem, whose dimensions increase with technological development” 
[MI.13] 
“It became necessary to introduce teaching biosafety, bioethics, dual-use 
in the university programme because the life sciences have witnessed a 
rapid evolution in the last years and it is indeed normal to follow this 
evolution updating the modules traditionally taught” [ML.08]322 
On the other hand, the minority who marked education as less important 
observed that it is key not to exaggerate and cause panic, that education is 
important but “awareness must be balanced and do not lead to paranoia” 
[MM.08],323 and the positive economic and social impacts of life sciences and 
technologies should be underlined. 
Also the majority of students responding to the survey in Pakistan agreed or 
strongly agreed with “education and research institutions should include study 
                                                      
322  Translated by the author from the original French: “Sujets d’actualité de bioéthique, comment 
l’utilisation des embryons humaines, le don d’organes, le produits chimiques dans l’agriculture, les armes 
biologiques et le terrorisme biologique… l’étudiant a besoin d’être sensibilisé pour au moins pouvoir 
participer au débat en tant que jeune d’aujourd’hui et décideur demain” [MD.15]; “[Sur la] biosécurité est 
plus facile de intéresser les étudiants pourquoi ils se sentent concernes personnellement (leur santé) et a 
l’immédiat. La biosûreté et la bioéthique ne l’interpellent pas a l’immédiat mais aura son importance selon 
le domaine professionnelle qu’ils vont intégrer par la suite, et les responsabilités afférentes au poste 
occupé ” [MF.01]; “Les étudiants d’aujourd’hui sont les futurs chercheurs ; scientifiques et décideurs, donc 
leur sensibilisation va permettre de les initier dès maintenant sur ce problème dont l’ampleur augmente 
avec le développement technologique” [MI.13]; “il est devenu nécessaire d’introduire l’enseignement de la 
biosécurité, de la bioéthique, du double usage dans le cursus universitaire car les sciences de la vie ont 
connu une évolution rapide ces dernières années et il est tout a fait normale de suivre cette évolution en 
apportant des modifications dans les modules enseignés classiquement”. [ML.08] 
323 Translated from the original French: “la prise de conscience doit restée mesurée et ne pas verser dans 
la paranoïa” [MM.08] 
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materials on dual-use, biosafety, and biosecurity in your course work”. 
Comments from students suggested educational initiatives such as 
“Seminars and classes should [be] arranged about the awareness 
according to biotechnological and bioscientific processes, uses and its 
misuses, and about its laws and implementations” [P5.54] 
“Such courses should be introduced at college and university level to 
create awareness among students” [P6.24] 
5.3.4.4 Optimal strategies for education 
Questions in the surveys asked for respondents’ opinions on a series of 
statements to analyse options for education. Responses include that, for 
example, instructional design training is needed for lecturers to be able to 
deliver education on the subject. Other items related to the ideal contexts and 
formats, such as: should it be a dedicated course, or rather spread over other 
courses to embed it with technical education? Should it be taught in courses, or 
be part of extra-curricular activities? Should education be mandatory or 
optional?324 
From the surveys on Country C, Country D and Region A participants, there is 
support for introducing education within formal credited courses, both newly 
developed and existing ones that could be reviewed or expanded. There is also 
support, yet smaller, on using more flexible extra-curricular activities for 
students. What receives less support is that education should be in elective 
activities of courses. Further discussion with Country C, Country D and Region 
A participants confirmed they supported education to be mandatory for students, 
not optional. 
                                                      
324  As introduced in the previous Chapter, each of these options has general advantages and 
disadvantages. Creating a dedicated course may be the best way to ensure biorisks have enough 
consideration in degrees, and do not depend from the initiative of an individual interested lecturer. On the 
other hand, it may be more effective in terms of integration with technical education if bits of it are taught 
within other discipline courses. Introducing education in formally structured courses, which generally have 
defined learning objectives and evaluation methods that assess if students actually achieve them, would 
raise chances that education is imparted, but on the other hand extra-curricular activities have more 
flexibility to introduce learner-centred techniques. Finally the risk of establishing a mandatory requirement 
is to have a “ticking the box” approach if students are not interested, while elective education would make 
sure only interested students take those modules, arguably with higher retention. 
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Regarding what existing educational avenues could be used, respondents from 
Region A suggested laboratory techniques and environmental health courses, 
while professors from Country B mentioned microbiology courses and first aid 
training, and European participants bioethics courses. 
Surveys were also useful to analyse what is available and desirable in the 
instructional context. For example, it was consistently reported by professors 
that undergraduate students classes are considerably larger than graduate 
students ones, in the order of hundreds versus tens of students, something that 
has to be taken into account during instruction Design, Development and 
Implementation of education. 
Interactions with Country B participants suggested that instruction modules 
should be set to two hours slots. Their proposals for modules included 
theoretical lectures, practical work in laboratories, visits, and activities such as 
case studies or fieldwork.325 Suggesting a potential international alignment, the 
relative majority of professors from Region A countries also believed that 
education on biorisks could fill a semester course.326 
5.3.4.5 Identified challenges 
Particularly interesting is how potential challenges identified by faculty members 
on introduction of education on management of biorisks, particularly deliberate 
disease risks, are common across different regions and countries, while yet 
some challenges are bigger or more pressing in some contexts than others. 
Reported challenges can be categorized in four main categories: lack of 
capacity in faculty members, on the subject matter, on teaching it or on both; 
lack of teaching time and space in curricula; bureaucracy for changing 
educational programmes and curricula; and lack of support from management 
and leadership. 
                                                      
325 According to that discussion, modules could be organized in semester-long courses with one theoretical 
two-hours module and one non-theoretical two-hours module each week. 
326 Alternate options and possibly more feasible than establishing new courses were also suggested in 
conversations with Region A professors, such as a module of ten to fifteen hours to be inserted in existing 
courses, possibly to be expanded; or an intensive, dedicated course that becomes a prerequisite for 
students before they can start laboratory work, do research, or graduate. 
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Lack of “subject matter knowledge” or of “expertise” was the most quoted 
reason for non-inclusion of education by respondents to Country D and Project 
18 surveys. Moroccan professors also addressed lack of capacity, for example: 
“It is necessary to give more means to teachers who want to invest in the 
subject” [MG.06] 
“A national law on bioethics, a coordination among teachers of the 
subjects in universities, and finally an available bibliography are 
necessary” [MN.16]327 
Comments from Region A professors regarding challenges and barriers to the 
introduction into academic curricula included: 
 “Faculty capacity: the faculty should have thorough understanding on 
biorsik management in order to figure out ways to integrate BRM in to 
academic curricula.” [RA.5] 
“Lack of qualified staff to handle and teach it.” [RA.17] 
Besides subject matter and instructional capacities, however, the other mainly 
quoted challenge is the lack of teaching time and space in curricula. So this was 
quoted from Morocco, with the difficulty of creating new courses or expanding 
existing ones: 
“[there is the] problem of hours workload, which is limited and does not 
allow having a longer course to introduce the issue of bioterrorism and 
laws regulating research” [MN.13]328 
While expansion of existing courses seemed feasible to some Region A 
respondents: 
“Including a chapter within an existing course, namely ‘Environmental 
Health’ is possible.  This course covers the topic of environmental risk 
                                                      
327 Translated from the original French: “Il faut donner plus de moyens pour les enseignants qui veulent 
s’investir dans le matière” [MG.06]; “Il faut une loi nationale sur la bioéthique, une concertation entre 
enseignants de la matière dans les universités marocaines et enfin une bibliographie disponible” [MN.16] 
328 Translated from the original French: “[Il y a le] problème de volume horaire qui est limité et ne permet 
pas d’avoir un cours plus long pour introduire la question du bioterrorisme et les lois régissant la recherche” 
[MN.13] 
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assessment.  This can be extended to Biorisk management then entitled 
Environmental and Biological Risk Management” [RA.12] 
But still there are comments about the difficulty: 
“Introduction of a new course in a program is always a challenge with 
regards to time allocation in a time table especially if it is already loaded” 
[RA.1] 
“Hours or credits as it is are quite congested and adding new content 
may be challenging “ [RA.8] 
Another challenge is bureaucracy to change formal curricula to insert new, or 
change existing, courses. Certainly this is different from country to country (and 
is further discussed in the next paragraph), as it appears more pressing in some 
surveys than others. So participants from Region A commented: 
“There is bureaucracy in curricula review that delays the process even 
when necessary.” [RA.9] 
“Institutional bureaucracy: curriculum approval takes too long.” [RA.10] 
Support from management and leadership in HEIs is hence fundamental to 
address and overcome other challenges. As professors from Region A put it, 
support is important: 
 “Not all is lost as the leadership of the faculty is keen on training in this 
area and some of the biosafety committee members have been trained” 
[RA.9] 
“Interest from top leadership including faculty on need for BRM” [RA.15] 
Something to also consider is the potential confusion on the key terms of 
biosafety and biosecurity. Especially in academia, there is the possibility that 
they are used in different ways; for this reason several surveys asked 
participants if HEIs also used the words in different ways. While results reported 
in Table 18 suggest that the majority of participants used biosafety and 
biosecurity in the same context of prevention of risks from pathogens and toxins, 
alternate meanings are also present and should be taken into account. 
 177 
Table 18 - Meanings of biosafety and biosecurity 
5.3.4.6 Accreditation systems and processes 
There is not an international model for how higher education contents are 
introduced in degrees. In some countries, HEIs are independent and can 
autonomously decide what to teach, and in some cases, individuals responsible 
for the single courses can make decisions. More commonly however, HEIs 
have to comply with guidelines on what to teach. The government may issue 
direct guidelines, through the Ministry competent for higher education, or by a 
subject matter Ministry (such as Ministry of Health for medicine degrees, 
Ministry of Agriculture for agrarian sciences degrees, etc.) In other cases 
influence on HEIs on what to teach may come from professional sectors, for 
example if a professional association issues minimal requirements for 
graduates, or if a certain set of skills are required to pass the national exam for 
becoming a practicing professional. 
Table 19 - Accreditation processes 
Different processes will require different approvers and decision makers. In 
some contexts, for example, inserting a new course would require approval by 
                                                      
329 Including 14 university professors 
330 Including 14 university professors. 
Country Country C Country D Region A Country B 
Data/Tool 
Email Questionnaire, 
9 respondents 
Email Questionnaire, 
9 respondents 
Email 
Questionnaire, 21 
respondents329 
Email Questionnaire, 17 
respondents 
Are alternative 
concepts of 
biosafety/biosecurity 
also used? 
 
No, they are used in 
the same context: 
prevention of harm 
from pathogens and 
toxins (37%); Yes, 
the are used in the 
context of GMOs 
regulation (25%) 
No, they are used in 
the same context: 
prevention of harm 
from pathogens and 
toxins (78%) 
No, they are used in 
the same context: 
prevention of harm 
from pathogens and 
toxins (44%); Yes, 
the are used in the 
context of control of 
agricultural 
contamination 
(20%); Yes, the are 
used in the context 
of control of 
protection of 
biodiversity (20%) 
No, they are used in the 
same context: 
prevention of harm from 
pathogens and toxins 
(55%); Yes, the are 
used in the context of 
GMOs regulation (22%) 
Country Country C Country D Region A Country B 
Data/Tool 
Email Questionnaire, 
9 respondents 
Email Questionnaire, 
9 respondents 
Email Questionnaire, 
21 respondents330 
Email Questionnaire, 17 
respondents 
What is the process 
of introducing new 
course(s) with 
dedicated credits 
into the academic 
program of your 
institution? 
 
The process to 
approve new courses 
is internal to the 
institution and 
decisions on 
changing programs 
can be taken and 
implemented directly 
(62%) 
The process to 
approve new courses 
is internal to the 
institution and 
decisions on 
changing programs 
can be taken and 
implemented directly 
(44%) 
The process of 
approving new 
courses is internal to 
the institution, but it 
does require multiple 
formal review and 
approval by various 
management levels 
(41%) 
The process of 
approving/accrediting 
programs requires 
approvals by 
Department, Faculty, 
University and finally by 
the Accreditation 
Council at the Ministry  
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various bodies.331 Region A participants also noted that curriculum review is 
often planned for pre-determined time windows. Another example comes from 
Country B: 
“[The] process [of approving a new curriculum] starts in the meeting of 
the Department staff and agree to design a new course curriculum, 
Heads of Departments, Faculty Dean, University Senate and finally it [is] 
approved by Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research”; 
[B.05] 
Table 19 reports results of a question where participants were asked which 
statement best described the process of introducing new courses, from one 
describing a very autonomous and flexible process, to another very formal and 
fixed.332 It is also useful to investigate if there are systems to introduce new 
contents in universities top-down, complementing the bottom-up approach of 
universities reviewing their curricula. In some countries, governmental or non-
governmental bodies issue guidelines to both assure minimal standards of 
quality of science education and to harmonize education on the same subjects 
across the country.333 Such a coordinator may help in promoting education in 
two ways: firstly, it may directly be received by academic decision makers (such 
as deans) who would decide to revise their courses; secondly it may help those 
lower level educators who are interested in inserting new education and can 
use it to press on their superiors.  
                                                      
331 For example as one participant from Region A commented, “Several steps and boards have to approve 
changes in curriculum before training can begin – the Department, the School, the Board, the College and 
the Senate” [RA.12] 
332 A relative majority of Country D participants responded that universities could approve introduction, 
however clarifying discussions during the ISD workshop suggested that for most universities approvals at 
higher levels are indeed needed. At the same time, professors responsible for a course could 
independently change up to ten per cent of course contents without having to formally resubmit the entire 
course. 
333 One example is an accreditation council in Country B. This Council is composed of scholars on the 
various disciplines and is tasked with drafting minimal requirements for higher education and promotes 
harmonization of degrees. However as described by Council members, its influence is still low as HEIs 
have historically had large freedom on what and how they teach. Notwithstanding challenges, the Council 
was drafting designs for reviewing Country B’s academic programs. As a result of our project’s 
instructional design, Council members were inserting learning objectives on biosafety, biosecurity and 
bioethics in the relevant public health, biosciences and medicine degrees as they were going through their 
review. See Chapters 8 and 9 for further discussion. 
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A similar experience was with the ISIS Euro-European Master in Neuroscience 
and Biotechnology. In the early discussions about the design of the ISIS Master 
syllabus, pointing at how the Dublin Descriptors334 required that the students 
gain the ability “to inform judgments that include reflection on relevant social, 
scientific or ethical issues” (Adelman, 2009 p. 28; Bologna Working Group, 
2005 p. 68) was important to decide on the inclusion of a mandatory course on 
ethics of biotechnology and neurosciences.335 Another aspect useful to analyse 
is the requirements on the formats and quantities for courses. Many HEIs use 
credits as metrics for educational and learning activities.336 
                                                      
334 New degree courses designed in the EU have to comply with the generic Qualifications Framework of 
the European Higher Education Area (also refereed to as the Bologna Process), also known as the Dublin 
Descriptors. 
335 And that course included a module on dual-use and security issues in neurosciences. 
336 In the Country B’s system, for example, one credit-hour equals fifteen contact hours of classroom 
lectures or activities or thirty contact hours of practical/lab activities or tutorials (hence a classroom contact 
hour equals two practical contact hours); however a course cannot be shorter than one credit-hour with at 
least one classroom or two practical contact hours a week for a fifteen-weeks semester. In both Country B 
and Region A, a one-semester course would total 45 contact hours corresponding to 30 credit hours. In 
Europe, the European Credit Transfer System suggests that one credit equals 25 hours of workload for the 
students, spread over classroom, group work, practical of self-study activities. 
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Table 20 - Motivations, attitudes, opinions: overview 
                                                      
337 Questions and categories translated from the original French questionnaire. 
338 Including 14 university professors. 
339 “Do you think that awareness on biosafety, biosecurity and dual-use (misuse) should be raised among current and perspective life scientists in your country?” 
340 “Comment qualifiez-vous la sensibilisation des étudiants des sciences de la vie à ces sujets?” 
341 Yes or agree + strongly agree, or excellent + good. 
342 Opinion on “availability of accredited biosafety training and teaching resources for university and graduate students” 
343 Relative majority. 
Country Country C Country D Region A Country A University 2 Project 18 Morocco337 
Data/Tool 
Email Questionnaire, 
9 respondents 
Email Questionnaire, 
9 respondents 
Email Questionnaire, 21 
respondents338 
Email Questionnaire, 
27 respondents 
Email Questionnaire, 
376 respondents 
Questionnaire, 227 
respondents 
How would you define the priority of incorporating 
new education on biosafety and biosecurity in 
educational programs? (% of High priority: it is 
more urgent than other new topics that could be 
incorporated) 
37% 77% 
48% 
 
70% 97%339 82%340 
Current trainers at the university have the 
necessary background and training skills to deliver 
BRM content341 
37% 22% 20% - 6%342 - 
BRM should be developed as a specific and new 
course with dedicated credits 
87% 66% 80% - - - 
BRM should be the topic of elective activities or 
courses 
50% 40% 31% - - - 
New content on BRM should be inserted in extra-
curricular activities, as expanding credits for 
existing courses is very difficult 
37% 44% 42% - - - 
New content on BRM should be integrated into 
existing courses, expanding their hours/credits 
87% 66% 95% - - - 
How many hours do you believe should be 
devoted to BRM in the academic curricula (relative 
majority) 
- - 
More than 20 hours 
(41%); between 5 and 
10 hours (31%) 
More than 20 hours 
(33%); Between 5 and 
10 hours (30%) 
- - 
Do you have any plans to change your course or 
module to accommodate such topics? 
- - - - 69% 46% 
Do you think your field of study involves 
techniques that have the potential to be misused? 
- - - - 67% - 
If biosafety or biosecurity are not taught, what is 
the reason in your opinion?343 
These subjects are 
currently not a high 
priority, compared to 
other subjects (50%) 
Lack of subject 
matter knowledge, 
teaching capacity or 
expertise (33%) 
- - 
Lack of expertise and 
resources 
- 
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5.4 Conclusions 
Information from investigations and surveys from several countries suggest 
results that have traits in common. Students’ content mastery of topics relevant 
for deliberate disease risks is basic or non-existent; students generally even 
have a low awareness of important concepts for deliberate disease, and 
evidence suggests that many do not know that the BTWC exists. Within the 
biorisk management spectrum, knowledge is higher for biosafety than for 
biosecurity, but confusion between safety and security is common. 
Existing educational opportunities are scarce and insufficient, especially for the 
deliberate disease side of biorisk management. However, existing opportunities 
were identified as useful to leverage during Design of education and for the 
instruction design plan of the research. In investigations that looked at safety 
and security together, current considerations stop at about a third of considered 
samples, but when viewed separately, references in education to deliberate 
disease risks (such as biosecurity, dual-use issues) are less common, ranging 
from less than a tenth to a quarter of occurrences. Possibly more importantly, 
existing references in education are generally qualified as not more than mere 
“mentions”, and mostly focusing on laboratory biosecurity. Existing educational 
opportunities on biorisk management seem more common for higher 
degrees;344 learners who already do research; and are higher in life sciences 
and biotechnology areas than in medicine and public health areas. 
While we could map some educators’ experience on laboratory biosafety, their 
knowledge of laws and regulations relevant for deliberate disease risks 
mitigation; prohibitions on deliberate disease; or organizations working on 
biorisk management, is scarce to non-existent. Developing capacities on biorisk 
management and teaching biorisk management is identified as one of the most 
pressing needs by participants and respondents in multiple countries. 
Indeed many engaged faculty members from higher education believe that 
incorporating new education on biosafety and biosecurity is a high priority. 
Furthermore, awareness among faculty members is related to heightened 
interest and commitment to support education implementation, which speaks to 
the value of faculty engagement and instructional design activities. 
                                                      
344 While suggestions from faculty members are that education should start earlier. 
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The support from educators is strong for the introduction of biorisk, including 
deliberate disease risks, management education in formal courses, either by 
designing new courses or reviewing existing ones. There is also support, yet 
smaller, for less formal extra-curricular educational formats; however education 
should be mandatory, not optional. Identified challenges, besides the primary 
one, and already mentioned, of lack of capacity, are time for education; 
bureaucracy for changes in higher education; and support from leadership. 
Challenges impact on accreditation for new or reviewed formal courses that 
should include education, that however have different processes in different 
countries and context, leaving more or less autonomy to HEIs. Considering 
these processes is useful for the instruction design plan of the research. 
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6. Design 
Design is a key component in the ADDIE ISD cycle and is central to the 
instructional design process. In fact, the phases of the ADDIE cycle are 
sequential but in some way also overlap each other, and Design has a central 
role (Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick, 2007).345 The Design phase “delegates” some 
tasks to the Analysis, Development, Implementation and Evaluation functions, 
while ultimately controlling the whole ISD process. Nonetheless, Design as 
Analysis is often overlooked by traditional instructional approaches to education, 
when lecturers may rush to the Development of instructional materials, leading 
to teaching “what the instructor wants” and not “what the student needs”. On the 
instruction design plan of the research, stressing the importance of Design is 
almost more important for designing pre-service education than in-service 
training. For example, institutional staff designated to become internal resident 
trainers in an in-service context often do not have previous experience in 
training others. They hence need coaching and practice on the Implementation 
of training contents. Educators in universities, conversely, have more 
experience of delivering education.346 They will need relatively more coaching 
on Design to address the specific educational context of HEIs, which is often 
more formalized than internal staff training in an organization. 
6.1 Learning objectives 
A key question to consider in Design is, based on the learner population(s) 
identified in Analysis, what do we want them to learn that will contribute to 
mitigating the risks of deliberate disease? That is, setting learning objectives. 
6.1.1 Preliminary objectives identification 
A preliminary overview towards learning objectives includes opinions of 
educators on the most needed competences for the students. Useful indications 
come from pre-ISD workshop surveys. Investigating educators’ opinions over 
needed competences for students is strategic at this point for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, it provides to the instructional designer an idea of what 
educators see as priorities within education, bridging the Analysis and Design 
phases of ADDIE. Secondly, it impresses on participants the concept of 
                                                      
345 As Hodell (2011 p. 55) describes it, “many of the separate components of the instructional design 
process occur in the other four elements and are simply managed by the design function”. 
346 As most likely they are professors and lecturers who teach students on a regular basis. 
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learning-by-design while they provide Analysis information on learners and 
instructional context. Thirdly, it entertains features of learning objectives to 
participants, such as cognitive domains (“knowledge”; “attitude”; “skill”).  
There are commonalities among competences for students on management of 
biorisk, including deliberate disease risks, most quoted by participants from 
different countries and projects. Table 21 reports categorized347 answers and 
examples from Region A; Country B; Country C; Country D; and Project 18 
educators. Competences that were quoted in all surveys include: knowledge of 
the basics of biosafety, biosecurity, biorisk management and biosecurity ethics; 
knowledge of risk assessment; knowledge on biological hazardous waste 
management. Competences among the most quoted ones in multiple surveys, 
but not all, include knowledge of ethics of dual-use and misuse; PPE use skills; 
handling, storing, transporting and shipping infectious substances; incident and 
emergencies management; assessing biorisk management performance; risk 
communication. 
                                                      
347 Quoted competences were categorized and divided in the broad “know” and “skills” domains. See 
Chapter 1 for more information about methodology for analysis of qualitative data from questionnaire 
surveys. 
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Table 21 - Needed competences for students, opinions of educators 
                                                      
348 Quotes are categorized following a coding scheme used throughout the thesis for questionnaires and documents such as design documents, in which the first letter (and 
number, in case multiple HEIs are involved) identify the project (and HEIs); and the second number the individual respondent. So, for example, RA.07 identifies participant 07 
in the Region A email questionnaire; D.04 participant 04 in Country D email questionnaire. 
349 Including 14 university professors 
Categorized 
Competence348 
Cognitive 
Domain 
Region A Project 18 Country B Country C Country D 
Email Questionnaire, 21 respondents349 
Email Questionnaire, 376 
respondents 
Email Questionnaire, 17 
respondents 
Email Questionnaire, 9 
respondents 
Email Questionnaire, 9 
respondents 
What do you think would be the most 
needed competencies for your 
staff/students related to biorisk 
management? 
What would you like to see 
those “educated” doing as a 
result of the process of 
[biosecurity and dual-use] 
education? 
Please Identify the three learning 
objectives that you believe are 
most important for your students 
related to biosecurity, bioethics and 
biosafety 
Please identify the three learning objectives that you 
believe are most important for your students related to 
biosafety and biosecurity (biorisk management) 
Basics of biosafety, 
biosecurity, biorisk 
management and ethics 
relevant for biosecurity 
Know 
Understand biosafety and biosecurity 
(RA.03); principles of biosafety and 
biosecurity (biorisk management) 
(RA.02, RA.07; RA.12; RA.13; RA.16)) 
Be more vigilant (locking 
doors) 
Principles of safety, security and 
ethics in the laboratory 
Basics of biosafety and 
biosecurity (C.01) 
Containment principles and 
how to prevent unintentional 
exposures (D.02); what is 
biosecurity (D.02) 
Risk assessment (risk and 
hazard identification, risk 
characterization and 
evaluation) 
Know 
Risk assessment (identification, 
characterization) (RA.05; RA.06; 
RA.07; RA.08; RA.13; RA.16; RA.20); 
Evaluate biological hazards and 
determine risks (RA.12) 
 Recognize biorisks and other risks 
Identify what they are 
handling; identify 
consequences of 
exposure or 
contamination (C.02) 
The risks (D.05; D.06); How to 
identify the hazards and 
evaluate the risks (D.03); 
recognize hazards (D.09) 
Biological hazardous waste 
management and disposal 
Know 
Management of laboratory waste 
(RA.07) 
 
How to manage and dispose 
biological waste 
Safe disposal of agents 
of biorisks (C.04) 
How to get rid of these risky 
materials in a safe way (D.05) 
Ethics related with dual-use 
and misuse 
Know 
Issues related with bioethics and dual-
use (RA.07) 
Refusing involvement in 
biological weapons-related 
activities; being more 
careful in their publications 
and research. 
Research, clinical and 
experimental ethics 
 
Ethical principles to ensure 
biotechnology is not abused 
(D.09) 
PPE Skill 
 
 Apply PPE 
 
Use PPE (D.04; D.07) 
Handling, storing, 
transporting and shipping 
infectious substances 
Skill 
Apply procedures for transporting and 
storing biological hazards (RA.07) 
 
Apply material control & 
accountability, inventory, storage; 
transport and shipping procedures 
for infective material 
 
How to transport dangerous 
pathogens (D.09) 
Incident/emergencies 
management 
(preparedness and 
response) 
Skill 
Incident management and response 
(RA.07) 
Reporting incidents that are 
suspicious 
 
Handle emergencies 
while working (C.01) 
Act and work in right way 
during biological and chemical 
accidents (D.02) 
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Performance of biorisk 
management 
Skill 
Measure and monitor the performance 
of a BRM system (RA.12) 
   
Do the continuous 
improvement of that system 
(D.03); 
Risk communication Skill 
Communicate risk information to others 
(RA.12; RA.13; RA.16) 
  
Communicate and 
explain risk 
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6.1.2 ISD learning objectives definition 
Notwithstanding useful indications from educators’ opinions on needed 
competences, ISD provides detailed indications on defining effective learning 
objectives. ISD guides (Hodell, 2011) on elements that should be included in 
well-written learning objectives: Audience, Behaviour, Condition, and Degree. 
Firstly, the learning objective should give a clear definition of the student, 
indicating the specific program they are pursuing, at what level in the higher 
education cursus they are, and any other information that helps defining them. 
The Audience part of the learning objective should be written with an individual 
student in mind, rather than a class, to later make evaluation easier.350 
Secondly, objectives should define the desired learning351  from the student. 
This is where specific levels and domains of learning should be identified. The 
concept of levels of learning derives from the taxonomy first proposed by Bloom 
(1956). As explained in Chapter 2, learning may be different both in terms of 
complexity (some learning cannot be achieved if others are not completed 
before) and of cognitive domain. For example, assessing risks and benefits of a 
situation is a relatively advanced capacity that cannot be mastered if basic 
concepts are not known. Being able to practically perform a task is a different 
cognitive domain (“do”, “skill”) than considering something theoretically (“know”, 
“knowledge”).352 The action verbs suggested by learning taxonomies (Krathwohl, 
2002)353 are of great help to design clear learning objectives. A theoretical, 
relatively low-level learning objective may be described as “list”, “memorize”, etc. 
A theoretical but higher-level learning objective could be described using 
“critically assess”, “judge”, or “forecast”. Practical learning objectives could be 
associated with action verbs as “perform”, “use”, “complete”, “build” etc. In any 
case, a specific verb is preferable than the generic “learn”. The achievement (or 
lack) of the desired learning should be observable and measureable. The 
                                                      
350 So for example rather than “students of biology”, a designer should be precise with “the student of the 
course ‘201 Biosafety, Biosecurity and Bioethics’, in the second year of the Bachelor of Science in Medical 
Laboratory Sciences”. 
351 Hodell uses “behaviour” to indicate the learning (even at theoretical levels), and it is different to the 
“Behaviour” discussed as Level 3 impact of education under the Evaluation Chapters of the thesis. 
352 The two layers are connected but independent: a practical skill may be higher learning level than a 
theoretical one, but also the other way around. 
353 See also Adelman (2009 pp. 68–70) on the “centrality of the verb” to explain learning objectives in 
different cognitive domains and levels of a qualification framework. 
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learning objective should also state any condition that is needed for the 
objective to be met.354 Finally, the learning objective should state the degree to 
which the behaviour has to be met, possibly mentioning indicators and 
acceptable thresholds.  
The concept of learning objectives is already established in HEIs in most 
countries. Different higher education systems, and even different HEIs within 
the same system, may define and refer to learning objectives in different ways 
and using different categories. This is important to consider, to make sure 
learning objectives are designed in the easiest way for inclusion in the local 
higher education system. Useful information can be leveraged from Analysis: for 
example, Country B’s academic context calls learning objectives Intended 
Learning Outcomes (ILOs)355 categorized in four categories crossing levels of 
learning and cognitive domains. The syllabus of an existing “Bioethics & 
Biosafety” credited course at a HEI in Country C uses “Course Objectives” for 
what we call instructional objectives, and “Course Outcomes” for what we call 
learning objectives. The system at Country A University 1 distinguished 
between “learning objectives” (what I would define “know” cognitive domain 
competences acquired during the course) and “learning outcomes” (what I 
would define “skill” cognitive domain competences for application at the end of 
the course).  
6.1.3 Learning objectives for the instruction design plan 
What could be relevant learning objectives for higher education professors on 
management of biorisks including deliberate disease risks? Examples for 
learning objectives of the instruction design plan of the research, with educators 
as learners population, come from the US National Academies of Sciences 
faculty development project on responsible conduct of research. The project’s 
learning objectives for participating faculty members included: “develop a 
                                                      
354 This may include educational prerequisites, specific learning media, necessary laboratory equipment, 
etc. 
355 During the ISD workshop, participating faculty members from Country B HEIs argued that from their 
point of view “learning objectives” is a more proper definition for the point of view of the instructor (“what 
the teacher wants to teach”), while ILOs is really “what the designer wants the students to achieve”. This is 
a meaningful point and in this perspective, “learning objectives” would derive from ILOs. However, for 
simplicity in the research I keep the consistent “learning objective” category from the ISD literature as 
explained above; and I would rather refer to “what the teacher wants to teach” with “instructional 
objectives”. 
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teaching module to illustrate the use of the concepts of responsible conduct of 
research; identify the difference between chemical and biological hazards; be 
able to describe biosafety guidelines and standards of practice to prospective 
trainees; identify policies and guidelines and regulatory statements of both 
international and local bodies and critique the applicability of these statements; 
be able to write standards of practice for their own institution, department, or 
laboratory”  (National Research Council, 2013 p. 113).356 
6.1.4 Learning objectives for the education plan 
In the ISD workshops with faculty members, participants were coached on 
designing learning objectives according to the above model and to an adapted 
matrix of levels and cognitive domains of learning (see Table 22). Thinking 
learning objectives in these terms is useful to Design objectives that are 
relevant, meaningful and achievable for the learner population and instruction 
context analysed; Develop and Implement appropriate educational materials in 
the subsequent ADDIE phases; and design correct evaluation methods. 
For example, a learning objective such as “at the end of the Biosafety, 
Biosecurity and Bioethics course the student must state the definitions of 
biosafety, biosecurity and dual-use” could be categorized as a “knowledge; 
know” learning objective according to levels of learning and cognitive domains. 
Conversely, a learning objective where the student is required to “complete a 
biosafety and biosecurity risk assessment of a research project, including 
biological hazards and risk scenarios identification, risk characterization and risk 
evaluation” could be classified as a “knowledge; evaluate” objective. Finally, a 
learning objective such as “at the end of the Laboratory Techniques and Biorisk 
Management module, given a simple scenario, the student is able to find the 
correct PPE, don and doff357 it in the correct order in less than five minutes” is a 
“skill; apply” type of objective.  
                                                      
356 It should be noted that for what regards learning objectives in the education plan of the research, i.e. for 
the learner population of university students, the NAS project formulated what I would call instructional 
objectives rather than proper learning objectives (see the discussion above), as they included: “use a 
historical case study to engage students and deepen their awareness of the various issues; offer a 
problem and ask students to describe any obvious hazardous situations; critique and discuss how these 
[policies] apply to participants’ own experience, laboratory, institution, or country”. 
357 Contractions of “do on” and “do off”, respectively, these verbs indicate the procedures to dress in and 
take off specific or technical clothing such as PPE. 
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An effective way to demonstrate the value of such categorization during design 
of learning objectives is to lead participants to think how different objectives 
would be linked to the following Development, Implementation and Evaluation 
ADDIE phases. Learning objectives have also to be based on what the learner 
needs and is able to achieve, and what is possible in the instructional context – 
all information available from Analysis. 
 
Table 22 - Taxonomy of levels and domains of learning used in ISD workshops 
While ISD workshops participants didn't achieve full mastery on designing 
learning objectives on biorisk management (as it will be further discussed in 
Chapter 9 on Evaluation in the instruction design plan), their exercises in 
designing learning objectives for students are a key result of this research. 
Faculty members from Country B for example defined learning objectives for 
students in each courses on biorisk management they drafted. Learning 
objectives (or, in Country B’s nomenclature, ILOs) were grouped according to 
Cognitive Domains 
Levels of Learning 
Cognitive domains 
Knowledge 
(Know) 
Attitude 
(Feel) 
Skill  
(Do) 
Theoretical Emotional Practical 
Level of Learning 
Examples of 
action verbs 
 
 
Evaluate 
Make value 
judgement; 
introduce 
innovations 
Judge, 
assess, 
defend, 
predict, infer, 
argument 
Higher, 
more 
complex, 
abstract, 
more 
critical 
thinking 
Knowledge; 
Evaluate 
Attitude; 
Evaluate 
Skill; Evaluate 
Analyse 
Being able to 
further 
abstract, 
understand 
why, and 
transfer 
learning to 
other, 
different 
situations 
Examine, 
compare, 
experiment 
 
Knowledge; 
Analyse 
Attitude; 
Analyse 
Skill; Analyse 
Apply 
Transfer 
what 
understood 
to other 
similar 
situations 
Use, perform, 
measure 
Knowledge; 
Apply 
Attitude; Apply Skill; Apply 
Understa
nd 
Process the 
meaning; 
being able to 
re-state 
Explain, 
describe, 
recognize 
Knowledge; 
Understand 
Attitude; 
Understand 
Skill; 
Understand 
Know 
Remember 
material in 
the same 
form 
Define, list, 
memorize 
Lower, 
simpler, 
factual, 
less 
critical 
thinking 
Knowledge; 
Know 
Attitude; Know Skill; Know 
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the categories of levels of learning used in Country B higher education system’s 
translation of Bloom’s Taxonomy.358 
Examples of results from Region A, Country C and Country D participants are 
reported in Table 23, Table 24 and Table 25, respectively. Participants were 
asked to categorize the learning objectives they drafted under cognitive 
domains and learning levels, and to match them to the characterization of their 
students and instructional context. 359  Participants who focused on graduate 
student populations generally designed more complex or specific learning 
objectives; also, more advanced students generally are matched with learning 
objectives of higher levels of learning. 
These exercises facilitated participants in assigning learning objectives relevant 
to different student populations, such as practical and/or “executer” learning 
objectives (for example of the Apply cognitive domain) to certain populations, 
and theoretical and/or “managerial” learning objectives (such as of the 
Understand or Evaluate cognitive domains) to other populations. Furthermore, 
the Analysis of the learning context and format, on the one side pushed 
participants to think what was needed to reach desired levels and domains; on 
the other side to consider if the teaching formats were feasible given class size 
and available infrastructures. 
                                                      
358  Participants’ definition of learning objectives could be improved but they already demonstrated 
consideration of the learning-by-design principle. 
359 Information in square brackets reports participants’ categorization of the learning objectives they drafted 
by learning level and/or by cognitive domain, when it was indicated. 
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Table 23 - Examples of learning objectives matched with analysis by Region A participants 
Table 24 - Examples of learning objectives matched with analysis from Country C participants 
                                                      
360 DD = design document; RA = Region A; C = Country C; D = Country D; the numbers identify the individual participant 
361 Future tasks analysis: “responsible for outbreak investigation, confirmation and declaration. Also responsible for outbreak prevention and control and immediate response 
where outbreaks are suspected and confirmed.” 
Code360 Title 
Analysis Design 
Student characterization Context/Format 
Learning Objectives 
Format 
Hour
s 
Prerequisites 
Stud
ents 
DD.RA.13 
Medical Waste 
Management 
Bachelor of 
Environmental Health 
Sciences, 2nd Year. 
Lectures, case 
studies, 
videos 
22 
Knowledge on 
microbiology. 
30 
Know the definitions and concepts related to medical wastes management; 
Know the categories of medical waste; 
Know the methods of collection, storage and treatment of medical wastes; 
Feel confident to manage medical wastes; 
Develop integrated waste management plans for laboratories and medical facilities. 
DD.RA.05 
Securing Field 
Collected 
Biological 
Materials without 
Unauthorized 
Access 
Research assistant or 
graduate student working 
on an infectious diseases 
research project 
Lecture; group 
discussion; 
practical 
activities on 
PPE, 
packaging, 
waste 
disposal 
8 
Bachelor in any 
biological science. 
12 
[Know] what methods are important for securing biological materials collected in the field; 
[Know] what methods can be used to securely and safely transport biological materials 
[Know] how to safeguard personnel, physical property and information; 
[Feel] confident that the right collection, labelling and transportation of biological materials during 
field work is applied.  
[Feel] comfortable in shipping samples in a secure way; 
Label, store and ship biological samples collected and/or being used in the field; 
Decide on the best method to use to secure project information, personnel and property in case of 
an emergency. 
DD.RA.01 
Bioethics in 
Biorisk 
Management 
and Outbreak 
investigation 
Field epidemiology and 
laboratory management 
student; Master level first 
year.361 
Lectures, 
brainstorming 
sessions, 
home 
assignments 
4 
Laboratory 
technician, medical 
doctor [or] program 
manager in 
diseases 
surveillance field.  
Know basics ethics 
principles. 
 
30 
[Know] expectations of laboratory ethical behaviour and proper conduct during outbreak 
investigation; 
[Know] what actions should be taken during ethical dilemmas both at work and in life;  
Feel ethically accountable for their own actions and that their actions reflect on the reputation of the 
institution; 
Identify potential concerns in own daily work as a field epidemiologist;  
Properly communicate or report issues where appropriate; 
Document and justify decisions as appropriate. 
Code Title 
Analysis Design 
Student characterization 
Context/Format Learning Objectives 
Format 
Hour
s 
Prerequisites 
Stud
ents 
 
DD.C.01 
Introduction to 
Biosafety 
Containment  
Graduate Student in Life 
Sciences 
Lectures 
integrating 
brainstorming; 
videos 
2.5 
Distinguish 
between risk and 
threat; 
Be able to 
characterize and 
10 
[Know] Introduction to biocontainment laboratory and design intent; 
[Know, Understand, Analyse the] difference between primary and secondary containment barriers;  
[Know, Understand] distinguish characteristics between different Biosafety Levels;  
[Understand, Analyse] identify different facility features; 
[Analyse, Understand, Evaluate] identify correct biosafety levels; 
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Table 25 - Examples of learning objectives matched with analysis from Country D participants 
 
evaluate risk [Analyse, Apply] recognize appropriate biosafety levels; 
[Apply] communicate with others and share the knowledge. 
DD.C.05 
Characterization 
of risk 
associated with 
working in the 
laboratory on 
biological 
hazards 
Undergraduate student of 
Life Sciences (Biology) 
Lectures; 
group 
discussions; 
simulations on 
mitigation 
strategies 
3 
Be aware of 
existence of 
biological hazards; 
realize the need 
for biorisk 
management; 
adhere to 
guidelines 
10 
[Know] list biological materials; 
[Understand] the consequences of biological hazards if identified; 
[Apply] [Feel] confident about the protocols; 
[Understand] perform the protocols; 
[Analyse] examine the risk associated 
Code 
Analysis Design 
Student characterization 
Context/Format Learning Objectives 
Format Duration Students  
DD.D.01 
Biology student (undergraduate) 
Lectures and 
activities 
15 weeks (15-30 hours) 30-50  
Be aware of safety and security 
Know basic principles of biological waste disposal or treatment according to the risk 
DD.D.03 Medical microbiology clinical 
biochemistry undergraduate student 
Small group teaching 
45 hours (15 theory, 30 
practical, case study) 
40 
Know definitions of: BRM, dual use, bioethics, hazard and risk; good lab work practices; PPE; 
decontamination; waste disposal; laboratory biosecurity 
DD.D.07 Undergraduate 2nd year student 
Lectures, data show, 
lab experiments, 
reports 
16 weeks; 2hours theory, 
2 hours practice 
35-50 
Know meaning of biosafety and biosecurity; 
Learn differences between biorisk (biosafety and biosecurity);  
Feel confident in dealing with biorisk facts and accidents. 
DD.D.09 
Undergraduate Biotechnology 
student 
Lectures, hand-out, 
seminars 
- 50  
Know biosafety and biosecurity definitions; 
Know what assessment is;  
Know mitigation measures. 
DD.D.11 MSc Genetic Engineering student 
Lectures, small 
groups discussions; 
class discussion 
- 25 Apply/Analyse: Biorisk management; waste management, decontamination, disposal 
DD.D.12 PhD Molecular Biology student 
Seminars, small 
group discussion, 
demonstrations 
- 16  Analyse and Evaluate: AMP; ethical issues 
 194 
Learning objectives for students, as with other aspects of Design, depend on 
the local context, interests and priorities. However, we can draw some generic 
considerations. It makes sense to assign to some student populations learning 
objectives of the “know” or “understand” levels that focus on learning pre-
assessed risks. However, other student populations should be assigned 
learning objectives advancing the risk-based approach rather than conventional 
approaches relying on prescription and “memorization of risk categories and 
levels”; these students will be expected to “apply”, “analyse” and “evaluate”. 
Besides being capable of “critical thinking that includes a thorough risk 
assessment” (Grainger and Turegeldiyeva, 2015), if students learn the 
principles of risk assessment and management, they are more likely to apply 
this critical skill in a range of cases, not just on deliberate disease risks and not 
just on biological risks management.   
Education should include designed learning objectives on understanding the 
factors contributing to risk; how risk is always relative and why; and the 
importance of assessment before, and of performance after, as well as on risk 
mitigation. Generally, instruction on deliberate disease risks in higher education 
will design more generic learning objectives than training on deliberate disease 
risks for experienced professionals.362 Also HEIs have an interest in considering 
the ethical components and implications of biosafety and biosecurity, including 
the issue of dual-use in relation to deliberate disease risks. Designed learning 
objectives for a higher education context would likely include the responsibilities 
of scientists or public health professionals in front of the community and society; 
responsibilities to take action to prevent unsafe or un-secure situations; and 
responsibilities to oversee the potential for misuse to cause harm, including 
managing the risks connected with dual-use. 
6.2 Designing options for learner-centred education 
Educational media selection is another Design aspect to consider. Clearly some 
learning objectives will need specific educational media; in particular, practical 
learning objectives will need practical activities and learning contexts. In general, 
learner-centred learning is more effective in achieving and retaining learning 
than traditional, instructor-centred learning, for any type of learning objective, at 
                                                      
362 This may mean that learning objectives for university students will likely be lower in the taxonomy of 
learning levels; or they could be high level (up to critically “evaluate”), but looking at wider cases than the 
specific scenarios used for in-service training courses. 
 195 
different levels of learning and in different cognitive domains, but especially in 
the sciences and regarding higher levels of learning and the cognitive domains 
besides knowledge (Colliver, 2000; National Research Council, 2000; Prince, 
2004; Michael, 2006; Salas and Cannon-Bowers, 2001; Armbruster et al., 2009; 
Haak et al., 2011; Ruiz-Primo et al., 2011; S. Freeman et al., 2014). 
However, in HEIs and especially in undergraduate, traditional instructor-centred 
learning is still the dominant mode in many countries (Halpern and Hakel, 2003). 
This implies that safety, security and risk management are largely taught in 
lectures. This has logistical reasons such as the size of classes of students, 
which may range from several dozens to hundreds, the absence of teaching 
time, and the lack of supplies like multimedia equipment. However, often the 
main challenges to introduction of learner-centred teaching in higher education 
are the lack of training on learner-centred techniques among teachers, a 
possible “business as usual” attitude on teaching styles, and the lack of 
instructional design in curricula. 
Nonetheless, teaching management of biorisks, including deliberate disease 
risks, in higher education, implementing components of learner-centred 
techniques, and coping with the requirements and limitations of the structured 
higher education system, seems possible. 
6.3 The design document tool 
In order to support education Design in the education plan of the research, as 
well as to facilitate participants in becoming instructional designers in the 
instruction design plan, it is useful to have a structured tool that organizes 
results from the Analysis and Design decisions. Such a tool is the design 
document, compatible with what is suggested by ISD literature as well as with 
existing educational resources (Grainger and Turegeldiyeva, 2015). 
ISD (Hodell, 2011) suggests a structure 363  for design documents that is 
meaningful from the point of view of a reader oriented to moving on to carry 
Development and Implementation. However, it is not the ideal order to write a 
design document. A designer should firstly describe the problem to address. 
Secondly, they should identify the broader requirements that the curriculum will 
                                                      
363 Which starts with a   rationale for the curriculum; then learning objective(s); description of target 
population; description of the curriculum including length, methods, materials needed, references; 
students’ prerequisites; instructors’ prerequisites; and evaluation strategy. 
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advance or contribute to: this may be connected with national, professional or 
international legal or regulatory requirements, and will become useful in relation 
to the organizational impact of education to be measured under Evaluation. It 
also pushes participants to think education in perspective of the strategic goal of 
reducing risk, and understanding that the reason for education is not learning 
per se.364 Subsequently the description of the target student population should 
be completed, including assumptions as level, degree, specialization; 
prerequisites; and possibly tasks analysis. Designers should then think to the 
anticipated steps after education, that may include further training or application, 
to check and position instruction in a broader capacity building framework. This 
should be followed by the definition of the learning objectives using the criteria 
discussed before, and description of corresponding evaluation strategies. It is 
important that the planned evaluation strategies are strictly connected with the 
defined learning objectives, and that they are thought of before looking at 
formats, as they may influence them. A section on course description should 
include length and credits of the course. Next, a description of the instructional 
environment should include required qualifications for the instructor of the 
designed course, such as competences, training or certifications;365 instructional 
environment conditions (supplies, materials, etc.); typical size of the class; 
delivery methods; references and educational resource materials. Finally, it is 
useful that the design document includes an agenda with topics, allocated time, 
instructional methods and existing or needed educational resource – this would 
be used during the Development phase to create or organize lesson plans and 
materials. An overview of design document examples developed by participants 
to ISD workshops from different projects is reported in Table 26. The depth and 
quality of education designs by participants varies. Possibly not surprisingly, the 
biggest struggles seem to be in drafting well-designed learning objectives and 
                                                      
364 This is reinforced to participants to ISD workshops through learning activities that will be discussed in 
Chapter 7. 
365 An instructional designer could also be a course instructor, or design courses that will be developed 
and/or implemented by others. 
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corresponding Evaluation strategies, as will be further discussed in the next 
paragraph.366 
 
                                                      
366 Also we noticed that when the evaluation strategy is kept at the end of the design document tool (as in 
the “reader” format), it is often just left blank. Moving that section up just after the learning objectives 
encourages making proposals that are specific and relevant to learning objectives. Another example of 
instructional design is from the TBL seminar format for life science students on deliberate disease risks 
used in some EUBARNet and Project 18 seminars. In that case, designed learning objectives were 
incorporated into a pre-designed course structure used for all subjects. Designed learning objectives 
included to “know what dual-use is”; “understand the risk/benefit components of the dual-use dilemma”; 
“evaluate recommendations on dual-use research management by the Fink and the Lemon-Relman 
reports”; and “explain the dual-use dilemma in own words”. The TBL format will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 7. 
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Table 26 - Examples of completed design documents by participants to ISD workshops 
                                                      
367 DD = design document; C = Country C; RA = Region A; A2= Country A University 2; B = Country B; the numbers identify the individual participants 
368 Note how these are in some cases formulated as instructional objectives 
369 Action verbs from our version of the Bloom’s taxonomy (see Table 22) are added in square brackets when not explicitly categor ized by instructional designers. 
370 Including Know/Know and Understand/Intellectual Skills in nomenclatures in different countries/regions 
Country Country C Region A Country A University 2 Country B 
Code367 DD.C.06 DD.RA.01 DD.A2.01 DD.B.01 
Problem/Rationale/Aim/Ove
rview368 
[…] reinforce the importance and 
consequences of following a set of 
rules. Emphasize on decontamination 
[…] and assess the risks involved […]. 
How proper practice in the lab makes 
the people in and around them safe. 
Acting ethically and with integrity both during lab 
activities and on field outbreak investigation. 
Enhance awareness of biorisk 
management tools 
Biorisk and bioethics concepts are little 
known and with limited […] a basic course 
in this field is essential 
Completion will help 
achieve these requirements 
 
Protect the environment from likely contagious 
biological agents; protect all personnel […] due to 
lack of respect of ethics. 
 
Teach […] basic principles of biorisk; train 
the student on basic requirements […]; 
transfer biorisk knowledge to the 
community. 
 Learner Description 
Target Learner Description 
Graduate student of Microbiology and 
Biotechnology 
[Student of] College of Medicine […] Master level, 
Year 1. […] 
Medical doctor; nurse; 
Pharmacist [student] 
All undergraduate students in medical, life 
sciences, agriculture Faculties. 
Learner prerequisites 
Know[s] about risk and threat; […] 
basics of risk assessment and 
mitigation 
[…] know[s] basics ethics principles in research; 
[…] document[s] and justify decisions […]; 
understand[s] BRM terms 
 High School certificate 
Anticipated next steps 
Start practicing and implementing; 
discuss with colleagues and batch-
mates 
[…] assessments as stipulated in […] academic 
regulations; draft a bioethics guideline adapted to 
their work settings; sensitization session […] for all 
the staff they work with […] 
 
[…] participate in biorisk mitigation and 
[…] spread the culture of biorisk 
management among the community. 
 Learning Objectives369 
Knowledge370 
[Know] good laboratory practices; 
[Know] categorize the various biosafety 
levels and cabinets; 
[Understand] decontamination 
strategies; 
[Know] various types of PPE; 
[Understand] different dual-use 
[Know] expectations of laboratory ethical behaviour 
and proper conduct during outbreak investigation; 
[Know] what actions should be taken during ethical 
dilemmas both at work and in life. 
[Know] terminology: Biorisk, 
Biosafety, Biosecurity and Dual-
Use Dilemma 
Understand basic concepts of biorisk, 
including theories, principles and rules; 
Analyse situations related to biorisk and 
evaluate biorisk impacts. 
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371 Including Feel/Communication and Transferable Skills in nomenclatures in different countries/regions. 
372 Including Do/Professional and Practical Skills in nomenclatures in different countries/regions. 
373 “Grading is based on 50 marks […] distributed as follows: 30 for final exams (theoretical 20 and practical 10), 15 for midterm exams (theoretical 10 and practical 5), and 5 
for assignments, reports, and participation.” 
material found in the lab […] 
Attitude371  
[Understand] feel ethically accountable for their 
own actions and that their actions reflect on the 
reputation of the institution; 
[Apply] capable of identifying and resolving ethical 
dilemmas. 
[Know] ethical conduct; apply the 
AMP model. 
[Apply] Communicate professionally with 
the community. 
Skill372 
[Apply/Analyse] follow Good 
Laboratory Practices: 
[Apply/Analyse] use proper PPE; 
[Analyse/Evaluate] assess methods of 
decontamination, decontaminate. 
[Understand] Identify potential concerns in own 
daily work […]; 
[Apply] Properly communicate or report issues 
where appropriate; 
[Analyse/Evaluate] Document and justify decisions 
[…] 
 
[Apply] Act efficiently towards biorisk 
issues. 
 Evaluation Strategy 
Level 1 (Reaction) 
Group discussion among the students; 
feedback forms. 
Number of students who complete the course; 
Students will complete a satisfaction questionnaire 
[…]. 
Practical Exercises  
Level 2 (Learning) 
[Student] can define biosafety, 
biosecurity, decontamination, 
disinfection, and sterilization; classify 
organisms […] [Student] knows [their] 
PPE, can segregate material based on 
the hazards […]. 
Students will produce adapted drafts of code of 
conducts related to their working areas […] 
Examination 
Evaluation will be based mainly, on written 
exams. Also participation, observational 
and practical skills, assignments, and 
reporting will be considered.373 
Level 3 (Behaviour) 
[…] how the student handles the 
laboratory instruments 
Three months after the training, […] check whether 
bioethics principles are complied with […] 
Questionnaires  
Level 4 (Result) […] test before admissions 
Review of the annual reports about incidents in lab 
[…] from various facilities to the line Ministries […] 
Audits of SOPs, Incident reports, 
etc. 
Change in biorisk policies and internal 
regulations. 
 Course Description & Instructional Environment 
Total duration 8 hours 4 hours 15 hours 8 hours 
Instructor’s prerequisites 
Doctoral student; [completed] course 
on Biorisk Management and Mitigation 
Instructor must have completed the GBRMC 
orientation […]. He/she also need[s] to be hired […] 
as a Faculty. 
  
Number of Students 20 30 150 25-50 
Delivery (teaching) 
techniques  
Show how to don and doff PPE; what 
areas of the lab/work bench should be 
decontaminated, checked after use; 
who is a good lab work practictioner? 
Demonstrate how he/she works in the 
Brainstorming sessions about ethics on biological 
agents and toxins (group discussion […]). Take-
home assignments about adapting their ethical 
guidelines to their respective work settings 
[Group] activity, tutorial 
Practical applications in lab. Field visits to 
[…] 
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lab. 
References, educational 
resources, bibliography 
GBRMC; WHO Guidelines 
GBRMC; 
[…] 
the Nuremberg Code; 
CITI Programme; 
On Being a Scientist; 
UNESCO Universal Declaration of Bioethics and 
Human Rights; IAP 2005 guidelines on codes of 
conduct 
Existing course’s curriculum; 
[…] Guidelines for Biosafety in 
Teaching Laboratories (ASM); 
WHO (Responsible Life Science 
Research for Global Health 
Security; 
Laboratory Biosecurity 
Guidance); GBRMC 
WHO 
Biosafety Manual 
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6.4 Designing evaluation 
While it may seem surprising that a part on instruction Evaluation is included in 
the Design phase, this should make sense following the learning-by-design 
pillar. It is indeed crucial that Evaluation is planned during Design and closely 
linked with learning objectives. 
Evaluation of education on deliberate disease risks follows the model of the four 
levels described in Chapter 2. While measuring evaluation takes place after 
implementation, and from Level 1 (Reaction) to Level 4 (Results), design of 
evaluation happens backwards and is planned before implementation. Desired 
objectives for each Level are based on how they contribute to achieve the next 
Level. First, Level 4 objectives have to be identified. In our case, Results 
objectives are lowering the risks of deliberate disease, by lowering their 
likelihood and/or consequences. Level 3 (Behaviour) objectives have to be 
identified as those behaviours, which, if retained and/or generalized, have the 
potential to lower the risk likelihood and/or consequence. Level 2 (Learning) 
objectives represent the learning, which, if achieved and transposed in regular 
practice, have the potential to become behaviour.374 Finally, Level 1 (Reaction) 
objectives correspond to the satisfaction needed to allow learning. As the model 
goes, if evaluation design is correct, students’ satisfaction would create the 
conditions for learning; students would achieve desired learning in appropriate 
levels and cognitive domains; learning transposed to regular practice and 
sustained over time would become behaviour; sustained and generalized 
behaviour would contribute to a situation with lower risk likelihood and/or 
consequence. 
Evaluating performance directly is often complicated or even impossible. It may 
require, for example, continuously checking learning on all possible knowledge, 
attitudes and skills, or a pervasive monitoring of behaviours. Representing, 
communicating and comparing these measures would also be challenging. 
Indicators should rather be used, which “indicate” what is happening: instruction 
designers plan on what indicator(s) would give a meaningful indication of the 
extent of actual learning, behaviour, and impact. The ideal format for learning 
objectives is particularly useful as it also represents a format for Level 2 
indicators. The second key component of an evaluation design is metrics, or 
                                                      
374 And they are exactly the learning objectives we have discussed earlier in this Chapter. 
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how the indicator will be measured. Finally, the Evaluation design has to plan 
how, where and/or when to collect the data for the metrics to measure the 
indicators. 375  In the examples of four-Levels evaluation strategies from ISD 
workshops participants’ design documents exercises reported in Table 27, it 
could be noted how some participants mixed, or only provided some among, 
indicators, metrics and data collection tools. 
Based on suggestions from Design Documents, as well as on the multi-year 
experience of instruction design on deliberate disease risks education, I 
propose matrixes of four-Levels as possible evaluation tools for education as a 
potential deliberate disease risks mitigation measure. These matrixes could be 
used to measure the education’s results on the risks of deliberate disease, as 
well as of instruction design programs for such education, i.e. the two plans of 
research we consider. 
6.4.1 Design evaluation for the education plan 
Table 27 reports the proposed evaluation matrix for the education plan of 
research. Learning, behaviour and results indicators have been grouped in four 
thematic areas whose mastery may be relevant in influencing likelihood and/or 
consequences of deliberate disease risks in the three risk scenarios described 
in Chapter 3. The (bio)risk management area would include capacities on 
understanding the nature and components of risks, assessing risk and taking 
risk-informed management decisions, that have the potential to influence risk in 
the three reference scenarios. The laboratory biosafety area includes capacities 
on preventing accidental and unintentional harm in the laboratory. 376  These 
capacities may have the potential to limit risk in the second scenario, as they 
would mitigate the possibility that a biosafety risk evolves into a biosecurity risk 
(for example because a non-state threat without access to assets, gains access 
because of inadvertent release). However, this potential influence would only be 
indirect and capacities in the laboratory biosafety area would mainly impact 
other biorisks than deliberate disease risks. 377  The third area includes 
                                                      
375 For each metric the designer can also plan a threshold that will make the educational action “successful” 
for that indicator, or just plan on observing results. 
376 Such as laboratory acquired infection; contamination; pathogen release in the environment. 
377 Though not the primary aim of this research, it’s still useful to consider them firstly to integrate the 
evaluation design and secondly because many of the capacities for biosafety and biosecurity reinforce 
each other. 
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capacities on laboratory biosecurity, and would be particularly relevant to 
mitigate deliberate disease risks under the second (non-state threats seeking 
access to assets and/or capabilities) and third (non-state threats with access to 
assets and/or capabilities) considered deliberate disease risk scenarios. The 
fourth area includes capacities related with biosecurity and dual-use 
management broader than the laboratory approach; these capacities have the 
potential to influence deliberate disease risks under all three deliberate disease 
risk scenarios. 
The first Level of Evaluation, Reaction, “measures how those who participate in 
the program react to it” (Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick, 2006 p. 21). Level one 
Evaluation is important for the instructors to know how students feel about the 
program, and for the students to know the instructors care about their opinion 
(Kirkpatrick 2007). Measuring this Level does not really depend on the subject 
matter, and indeed proposed strategies are the same for all four thematic areas. 
However, it is important that Evaluation is planned, even if methods do not need 
to be highly structured (Kirkpatrick, 1979), and can include data points as 
simple as students’ participation, their use of class materials, etc. Our designed 
indicator for Reaction is if and how students are satisfied, interested, and/or 
engaged by the instruction experience. Meters (i.e. metrics) of such satisfaction 
can include attendance of classes and feedback from students;378 but also if 
and how much students actively participate in activities; interact with the 
instructor with questions; express positive comments. Data collection methods 
for those metrics may include attendance sheets; satisfaction surveys or “smile 
sheets”; observation by the instructor; number of questions raised in class or on 
an e-learning forum; information collected to a group activity; follow-up 
communications with students. 
Evaluation at the second Level, Learning, looks at if the student achieved the 
learning objectives designed for them. The indicators of Learning are the 
learning objectives categorized according to the cognitive domain of knowledge, 
attitudes and skills; and to the levels of learning such as know; understand; 
apply; analyse; and evaluate. A careful Design of learning objectives makes it 
                                                      
378 The metrics can measure, using for example data from satisfaction surveys, the average appreciation 
from students and/or the share of students who appreciated. The choice largely depends if instructor value 
evaluating the enthusiasm (“level of satisfaction”) or that all students in the class have a minimal 
satisfaction (“spread of satisfaction”), or both.  
 204 
easier to design appropriate metrics and data for their evaluation. Level 2 
indicators in the matrix have been designed based on my and others’ 
experience in teaching on biorisks, and deliberate disease risks particularly; 
learning objectives drafted by faculty members participating to ISD workshops; 
and learning objectives from several existing educational materials, primarily the 
GBRMC and the ERM. Those included in the proposed matrix do not cover all 
possible Learning indicators.379 However, they are a meaningful collection and 
examples of Learning indicators that could be designed backwards from Level 4 
and Level 3 objectives. 
Evaluation at Level 3 looks at specific behaviours that would be expected if the 
learning on Level 2 is not only achieved but also translated to normal practice 
and sustained over time.380 Those specific behaviours are designed based on 
what would be needed in the hypothesis to influence risk factors, such as 
assess risks, develop and implement plans; maintain control over hazardous 
material; respond to incidents; or dissuade personnel with knowledge from theft, 
loss or misuse of pathogens (Young et al., 2014). The passage from Level 2 to 
Level 3 evaluation is crucial in the higher education context and was particularly 
stressed in the ISD workshops with professors. Indeed, HEIs and educators 
generally have extensive experience in evaluating Level 1 and Level 2, but may 
lack opportunities to go further. 381  Learning is a necessary condition for 
behaviour, as “if little or no learning has taken place, little or no change in 
behaviour can be expected” (Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick, 2006 p. 60). However, 
                                                      
379 As they are not all potentially useful or necessary learning objectives on deliberate disease risks and 
other biorisks management for public health, life sciences and technology, medicine or veterinary higher 
education students. 
380 The third level of evaluation tries to answer questions such as “did the training stick? How much of the 
training transferred from delivery to the workplace?” (Hodell, 2011 p. 74). Another definition of Level three 
could be “achieving behavioral generalization (i.e. applying the skill outside of the training simulation)” 
(Salas and Cannon-Bowers, 2001 p. 485). The transfer from Level two to Level three is sometimes 
overlooked in teaching, however “we only care about student performance in school because we believe 
that it predicts what students will remember and do when they are somewhere else at some other time … 
if we want transfer, we need to teach in ways that actually enhance the probabilities of transfer. The 
purpose of formal education is transfer”; and it has an impact on teaching design as “teaching for retention 
during a single academic term to prepare students for an assessment that will be given to them in the 
same context in which the learning occurs is very different from teaching for long-term retention and 
transfer” (Halpern and Hakel, 2003 p. 38).  
381 In some cases this is because they are not able to follow students’ instruction or professional paths, or 
it may also be due to a lack of perspective on the ultimate goal of education beyond learning per se. 
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university educators can relate with examples of cases when achieved Level 2 
indicators do not translate in Level 3 ones: such as students who pass courses’ 
final tests, demonstrate abilities in a mentored session, but months later do not 
remember the same notions, or do not keep the learned practice in their 
laboratory or research behaviour.382  Learning is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for behaviour, so Level 3 needs to be evaluated specifically.383 
Evaluation at Level 4 in general looks at the broader results of education. In this 
research it looks at factors influencing likelihood and/or consequences of 
deliberate disease risks, in the three deliberate disease risk scenarios. These 
factors should be influenced by a generalized, sustained and formalized 
adoption of behaviours from Level 3. Indicators at this Level will be connected 
to risk likelihood or consequence factors of hazards, threats or situation for 
deliberate disease risks. Examples of indicators from relevant studies looking at 
different Level four impacts include increased range of service delivery, 
improvements of clinical care, being involved in teaching, training, committees, 
international collaborations, co-author peer reviewed articles or books 
(Anderson et al., 2014); herd productivity and fertility (Knight-Jones and 
Rushton, 2013); or economic value added by the training (Buganza et al., 2013). 
Specifically for the context of higher education, it has been suggested that Level 
four should evaluate how those educated by HEIs would contribute to society, 
proposing indicators such as qualifications, socialization, subjectification (or 
how students have developed independent thinking) (Praslova, 2010), students’ 
character development and ethical readiness for their roles in society (Boyer 
and Hechinger, 1981; Sax, 2004). 
Correspondence between indicators in the four Levels is not 1:1, and they 
diminish raising Levels. Multiple learning objectives concur in nurture or modify 
a behaviour, and multiple behaviours may influence a risk factor. In case of 
specific or particularly important competences, one learning objective may 
correspond to one behaviour and one Level 4 goal. 
                                                      
382  Reasons for learning not translating to behaviour could vary, and include for example different 
equipment; complacency; or poorly designed learning objectives. In any case, translation from learning to 
behaviour is not granted at all, hence why Level 3 should be measured. 
383 It should also be noted that environmental factors may have a role in moderating the translation from 
learning to behaviour, such as commitments of hierarchy, opportunity, support from peers, and work 
context (Salas and Cannon-Bowers, 2001; Bates, 2004; Kontoghiorghes, 2004). 
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6.4.1.1 Indicators, metrics and data 
In the risk management area, knowledge Learning indicators include for 
example the capacity to define risk; distinguish between biosafety and 
biosecurity; and prepare a biorisk assessment. An attitude indicator is that the 
student feels confident in using a biorisk management approach, based on 
assessment, mitigation and performance. Level 3 indicators 384  include that 
students prepare actual risk assessments. In the laboratory biosafety area, 
theoretical learning indicators include the hierarchy of mitigation measures or 
types of PPE; practical learning indicators include donning and doffing PPE and 
washing hands. Behaviour indicators include that students continue to 
appropriately select mitigation measures, wash hands, or do not eat and drink in 
the laboratory. Proposed Level 4 indicators look at laboratory or hospital 
acquired infections, environmental releases, and cross-contaminated samples. 
In the laboratory biosecurity area, examples of Level 2 indicators include 
knowing different measures within the pillars of physical security, personnel 
management, material control and accountability, transport security and 
information security; while practical indicators include being able to apply those 
measures, such as securely labelling packages or protecting information. Level 
3 indicators examples include the extent to which participants changed their 
behaviours and applied learning to their usual work (Buganza et al., 2013), such 
as when physical security is considered in laboratory design or commissioning 
projects; or that the chain of custody of assets is maintained. Result indicators 
may include breaches, thefts, and losses of assets. Finally, in the biosecurity 
and dual-use management area, proposed Level 2 indicators include knowing 
experiments of concern and options to manage potential misuse; feel 
responsibilities deriving from dual-use issues; or being able to document 
decisions on dual-use as appropriate. For all thematic areas, I designed 
examples of learning objectives (and Level 2 indicators) not least based on 
input from the professors interviewed who have been involved for a number of 
years in promoting education on deliberate disease risks, but this is particularly 
true for the dual-use and broader biosecurity thematic area. So the idea of 
introducing learning objectives constructed in the knowledge and attitude 
cognitive domains and ranging from the simplest “know” level to the more 
                                                      
384 Level three indicators are also sometimes referred to as “transfer criteria” (Alliger et al., 1997). 
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advanced “analyse” or even “evaluate” levels of learning385 complies with what 
is suggested, for example, by Professors 1, 4 and 9: 
GMM: “what do you want them to know at the end of the course, and be 
able to do at the end of that course? 
Professor 1: at the beginning, that they are aware of this problem of dual-
use. It is necessary that they are aware, because clearly they are not. 
This is the first thing, raising awareness. Then, that they understand the 
danger…for society. Of this problem, this dual-use”386 
 
GMM: “so the goal was being aware? 
Professor 4: no, it’s very well defined […] how you define that? Because 
you know, raising awareness it’s just too… fuzzy, right? So you have to 
work an… ok… we introduced an ethical theory, we show that we trained 
them in argument, arguments, and you know in case, case system and 
so on, and again we had to have the students themselves to express in 
essays or in self assessment, ‘do I know enough about this’, to argue, or 
‘do I know enough about ethical theory’ to really, you know, use valuable 
arguments in a discussion and so on…” 
 
Professor 9: “regarding to… what is the ideal competence that… I would 
like to achieve… it would be, that when confronted with a case, they 
would be able to… understand it, interpret it, or react to it […]”387 
 
                                                      
385 The discussion on the different levels of learning related to learning objectives, on dual-use, and 
relative challenges, is discussed in Chapter 8 on Evaluation in the education plan. 
386 Translated from the original French: “Professor 1: d’abord, qu’ils soit sensibles de que ce problème du 
double usage. Il faut qu’ils soit sensibles, parce-que nécessairement ils ne sont pas sensibles à ça. Ça 
c’est la première chose, sensibilisation. En suite, qu’ils comprennent le danger… pour la société. De ce 
problème, ce double usage”. 
387 Translated from the original Italian: “Professor 9: rispetto a… qual è la competenza ideale che… mi 
piacerebbe poter raggiungere… sarebbe davanti a un determinato caso, che loro fossero in grado di… 
capirlo, di interpretarlo, o di reagire […]”. 
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Proposed Behaviour indicators in this thematic area are if students contribute to 
the development of oversight or other management and decision-making 
systems on dual-use; or reporting practices on managing dual-use material, 
equipment and information. 
Metrics can be more or less formal. At Level 2,388 quite informal tools may 
include observation, opinions of facilitators after interaction with students, and 
exercises completed during the curriculum. In some cases, Evaluation can be 
completed with self-assessment tools.389 In some cases, however, an informal 
and/or self-assessed evaluation may not be enough; this will depend on the 
“degree” component designed into the learning objectives. Some training may 
need a rigorous, defined and formal evaluation method and threshold 
(“passmark”). In the higher education context, formal evaluation is usually a 
requirement for curricula, 390  sometimes requiring formal pre- and post-tests 
(Arthur Jr et al., 2003). Appropriate metrics should also be planned with the 
cognitive domain in mind. For Learning indicators, proposed metrics use 
benchmark or reference definitions and minimal performance requirements. For 
know, and for some attitude, objectives possible data tools include instruction 
paper-and-pencil tests (Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick, 2007) in the form of multiple 
choice questions, logical sequences, statement corrections, quizzes; peer 
evaluation among students; matching exercises; class discussions; exercises 
based on scenarios or case-studies; essay writing; and presentations by 
students (Praslova, 2010). Data tools for practical learning objectives include 
simulation, drills, role-playing (Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick, 2007), or 
communication exercises. Metrics for Level three indicators can include ratings 
from supervisors or job outputs. Specifically for higher education, it has been 
suggested that metrics for indicators should include “evidence of student use of 
knowledge and skills learned in previously taken classes in their following class 
work, including research projects or creative productions, in application of 
learning during internship, and in other behaviours outside the context in which 
the initial learning occurred” (Praslova, 2010 p. 221). Typical data tools for Level 
                                                      
388 Level two indicators are also sometimes referred to as “learning criteria” (Praslova, 2010). 
389 Which may be an important option especially for adult learners (Kidd, 1974; Knowles, 1984; Kirkpatrick 
and Kirkpatrick, 2007). 
390 Furthermore, some ISD workshops participants argued that if a course is not formally evaluated, it 
could not be included in the syllabus and/or students and other faculty members would not take it 
“seriously”. 
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3 evaluation include surveys, interviews (with students or educators), visits, 
reports (including from alumni’s work supervisors), checklists, focus groups, 
Behavioural Observation Data (BOD) (Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick, 2007). Also 
for Level three, it is suggested that indicators could be measured before and 
after the training (Steensma and Groeneveld, 2010). While this is not always 
possible, it seems desirable that Level three indicators are measured some time 
after the training.391 Indeed this is in line with experiences or aspirations of 
interviewed professors, who indicate post-instruction direct behavioural 
observation of students or cooperation with employers of former students as 
strategies to measure Level 3 indicators: 
GMM: “… and, how would you see that… how would you assess that, at 
the end of that course? 
Professor 6: because… I think that if you watch them, if you are there 
with the students and it’s your department, you watch them work… you 
know what they are doing, I have to tell them, ‘ok you have a place, why 
are you eating in the lab?’. That means they are not… 
GMM: yes, that’s a good example, eating in the laboratory 
Professor 6: … yes, initially we were not saying them anything because 
we didn't have a place. But now that we have a place, now I can question 
them.  
GMM: yeah, there’s no excuse. 
Professor 6: ok? No excuse. So that means they have not still… you 
know, gone by the rules […]” 
 
GMM: “how will you look, how will you evaluate if their behaviour is 
actually following good practices ? 
                                                      
391  Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick (2007) suggest that Level three evaluation could be immediately after 
training courses, with instructors observing behaviour and correcting it, if necessary, as immediate 
reinforcement. I believe this would actually still be a Level two evaluation. With Level three, we should 
really focus on if the learning objective (knowledge, attitude, skill) sustains as situations change and time 
passes. 
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Professor 2: […] so, students will be in a network and we will actually 
plan so that they are followed. So this will follow them, via all channels, 
telephone, mail and all, until after their Master and see what’s coming 
from it […] I am approaching the private sector. So the laboratories that 
organize, to tell them, look, we have trained competencies, you can see it 
too, and you need them… well, because of national, international 
recommendations, you… and the laws… you need, it’s mandatory to 
have, and so that’s it, and this is part of their system, the system of 
business, of certifications, so they need these people.”392 
Metrics for Level 4 can be qualitative or quantitative, depending on the indicator 
and how it has been designed, and useful data tools include samples of 
academic accomplishments, awards (Praslova, 2010); incident reports, publicly 
available information, alumni records, internal and external audits, surveys, and 
interviews. 
                                                      
392 Translated from the original French: Professor 2:  […] Donc, ça, les étudiants vont être en réseau et on 
va même mettre à système pour que ils sont suivi. Donc on va les suivre, pour touts les moyens, 
téléphone, mail et tout, jusqu’à après leur Master et voir qu’est que ce vient […] je vais approcher le privé. 
Donc et les laboratoires qu’organisent, pour dire, voilà, nous avons formé des compétences, vous pouvez 
voir avec nous, et vous avez besoin d’avoir… bon, par les recommandations nationales, internationales, 
vous avez… et les lois… vous avez besoin, obligatoire d’avoir, et donc voilà, et ça fait partie de leur 
système de, le système d’entreprendre, des certifications, donc ils ont besoin de ces gents là. 
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Table 27 - Four-levels evaluation matrix in the education plan 
 
L1 Reaction L2 Learning L3 Behaviour L4 Result 
Indicator
s 
Metric Data 
Indicators (Domain: 
Level) 
Metric Data Indicators Metric Data Indicators Metric Data 
Education plan of research. Learner population: students in public health, life sciences and technology, human or veterinary medicine 
Risk 
Management 
The 
student 
is 
satisfied, 
intereste
d and 
engaged 
≥4,5/5 
average 
evaluation 
Post-
instruction 
survey 
Knowledge: Know: 
define the AMP model 
The student provides a 
definition of the AMP model 
that includes assessment, 
mitigation and performance 
Multiple 
choice 
questions; 
self-
assessments;  
case study; 
statement 
correction; 
essay writing; 
class 
discussion; 
peer review; 
quizzes 
Continuing to look at: 
possible risk scenarios 
(including what changed); 
risk likelihood and 
consequences 
One 
month/one 
year/three 
years after 
training 
≥70% of 
trainees 
retained and 
applied what 
learned 
Surveys; 
interviews; 
visits 
(planned or 
surprise); 
reports from 
supervisors 
Available biosafety 
and biosecurity risk 
mitigation 
measures 
% 
Annual biorisk 
assessment;  
incident 
reports; 
audits 
≥90% 
participants 
evaluating 
positively 
Knowledge: Know: 
define risk 
The student provides a 
definition of risk that 
includes: adverse event; 
likelihood; consequence 
All groups 
participate 
(notes from 
learning 
activities) 
Posters from 
learning 
activities 
 
Knowledge: Know: 
factors that influence 
risk likelihood and 
consequence 
The student lists at least 
five factors; and matches 
them with likelihood and/or 
consequence 
Appreciations, 
suggestions, 
and/or asking 
for additional 
trainings 
Follow-up 
communicatio
ns; letters; 
post-
instruction 
survey 
Knowledge: Know: 
define biosafety and 
biosecurity 
The student provides 
definitions that at least 
include accidental vs 
intentional (and/or hazard 
vs threat) 
Consideration of 
biosecurity risks 
increased; communication 
lines with law enforcement 
(where relevant) 
established 
Vulnerability. 
opportunities 
available to threats 
Qualit
ative 
% attendance 
Turnout at the 
event; 
attendance 
sheets 
Knowledge: 
Analyse/Evaluate: 
assess biorisk 
(characterization and 
evaluation) 
 
The student demonstrates 
risk assessment 
(characterization and 
evaluation) in own 
laboratory or setting, given 
a scenario 
 Actual risk assessment 
prepared for own 
institute/context 
Reviewed risk 
assessment 
Yes/N
o 
Student asks 
questions 
Active 
participation 
during 
training; 
forums; 
observation 
 
Attitude: Understand: 
feel confident about 
using the biorisk 
management 
approach 
The student describes a 
biorisk management 
process starting from 
hazard identification within 
risk assessment, then 
mentions mitigation, and 
performance evaluation 
and review. 
Laboratory 
Biosafety 
The 
student 
is 
satisfied, 
≥4,5/5 
average 
evaluation 
Post-
instruction 
survey 
Knowledge: Know: 
hierarchy of laboratory 
biosafety controls 
The student orders from 
the most to the least 
effective: elimination; 
engineering controls; 
Multiple 
choice 
questions; 
self-
Applying the highest 
appropriate mitigation 
measure;  
As soon as 
possible 
when student 
starts lab/field 
Behavioural 
Observation 
Data; 
Reduced 
laboratory/hospital 
acquired infections; 
Year-
over-
year 
numbe
Incident 
reports; 
audits; 
publicly 
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intereste
d and 
engaged 
≥90% 
participants 
evaluating 
positively 
administrative controls; 
practices and procedures; 
PPE 
assessments;  
case study; 
statement 
correction; 
essay writing; 
class 
discussion; 
peer review; 
quizzes 
select mitigation 
measures according to 
route of exposure 
work at 
university; 
Two years 
after 
graduation 
SOPs 
developed by 
students; 
follow-up 
surveys 
reduced cross-
contamination of 
samples; 
reduced cases of 
environmental 
release. 
r available 
information; 
annual 
documentatio
n 
All students 
participate 
(notes from 
learning 
activities) 
Posters from 
learning 
activities 
 
Knowledge: Apply: 
mitigation measures 
are based on risk 
assessment 
The student selects 
mitigation measures after 
assessment;  
explains appropriateness of 
measure with risk. 
Knowledge: 
Understand: 
advantages and 
disadvantages of 
laboratory biosafety 
controls 
The student provides 
information such as: 
elimination is effective but 
not always possible; 
engineering controls are 
expensive, need 
maintenance; 
administrative controls are 
based on authority; 
practices and procedures 
on human factors; PPE 
only protect worker, difficult 
to operate 
Appreciations, 
suggestions, 
and/or asking 
for additional 
trainings 
Follow-up 
communicatio
ns; letters; 
post-
instruction 
survey 
Knowledge: Know: 
decontamination, 
sterilization, 
disinfection 
The student gives 
definitions of 
decontamination (remove 
contamination; rendering 
reasonably acceptable risk 
of disease transmission), 
sterilization (destroys or 
eliminates all forms of life, 
categorically and 
absolutely); disinfection 
(elimination of nearly all 
recognized pathogenic 
microorganisms). 
Proper labelling of 
samples 
% attendance 
 
Turnout at the 
event; 
attendance 
sheets 
Knowledge: 
Understand: 
recognize safe and 
unsafe work practices 
The student distinguishes 
good and bad laboratory 
work practices 
Separation between 
samples and food/drink in 
fridges 
No eating, drinking, 
smoking in the lab 
 
Student asks 
questions 
Active 
participation 
during 
training; 
Skill: Understand: 
washing hands 
correctly 
During simulation, the 
student washes hands 
leaving no residues 
Simulations; 
practical 
exercises; 
role-play 
Washing hands properly 
and when required 
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forums; 
observation Knowledge: Apply 
select PPE 
The student correctly 
matches types of PPE with 
simple scenarios, based on 
routes of infection 
exercise; 
poster design; 
write an SOP; 
peer review 
SOPs involving PPE are 
developed 
Skill: Understand: don 
and doff PPE  
The student can don and 
doff in the correct order and 
at the first try: coverall, 
gloves, foot protection, 
respiratory mask 
Skill: Apply: classify 
and segregate 
biological waste 
The student matches 
wastes with categories 
(solid, liquid, sharps, 
pathological)  
Skill: Evaluate: 
evaluate 
appropriateness of 
operational, facility 
and management risk 
mitigation measures 
For each provided 
example, the student 
explains how the 
associated biological risk 
could be reduced 
Laboratory biosafety 
considerations are 
integrated in work 
presented at scientific 
conferences  
Occurrences, 
quantity and 
quality of 
consideration 
Surveys; 
interviews; 
events' 
programmes  
Laboratory 
Biosecurity 
The 
student 
is 
satisfied, 
intereste
d and 
engaged 
≥4,5/5 
average 
evaluation 
Post-
instruction 
survey 
Knowledge: 
Understand: 
importance and 
rationale of laboratory 
biosecurity 
The student is aware that 
deliberate disease risks 
exist. 
Multiple 
choice 
questions; 
self-
assessments;  
case study; 
statement 
correction; 
essay writing; 
class 
discussion; 
peer review; 
quizzes 
Biosecurity is considered 
in decision processes like 
lab design, procurement, 
etc.   
Breaches/thefts 
reduced; loss of 
access (keys, 
locks, etc) 
mitigated; staff 
more confident and 
feel more secure 
≥90% 
participants 
evaluating 
positively 
All students 
participate 
(notes from 
learning 
activities) 
Posters from 
learning 
activities 
 
Year-
over-
year N 
Knowledge: 
Analyse/Evaluate: 
complete a biosecurity 
risk assessment  
The student is able to 
identify, characterize 
specific biosecurity risks 
and related threats, assets, 
and vulnerabilities, and 
evaluate risks based on 
personal and institutional 
preferences 
Documented biosecurity 
risk assessment process 
regularly carried out and 
revised   
Incident 
reports; 
audits; 
publicly 
available 
information; 
annual 
documentatio
n 
Appreciations, 
suggestions, 
and/or asking 
for additional 
trainings 
 
Follow-up 
communicatio
ns; letters; 
post-
instruction 
survey 
 
Laboratory biosecurity 
considerations integrated 
in work presented at 
conferences 
Occurrences, 
quantity and 
quality of 
consideration 
Surveys; 
interviews; 
events' 
programmes 
Knowledge: Know: 
methods for 
establishing physical 
security 
The student lists at least 
three examples of methods 
for physical security 
Different/new physical 
security methods 
considered in physical 
security decisions; 
physical security included 
in new 
design/commissioning 
 
 
Skill: Apply: use 
information protection 
The student demonstrates 
use of unique user IDs, 
Protect personal 
password(s); do not 
Behavioural 
Observation  
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% attendance 
 
Turnout at the 
event; 
attendance 
sheets 
methods  passwords and encryption 
as appropriate. 
exchange users; change 
passwords regularly 
Data (BOD); 
follow-up 
surveys 
Student asks 
questions 
Active 
participation 
during 
training; 
forums; 
observation 
Dual-Use and 
Broader 
Biosecurity 
The 
student 
is 
satisfied, 
intereste
d and 
engaged 
≥4,5/5 
average 
evaluation  
Post-
instruction 
survey 
Knowledge: Know: the 
prohibition norm on 
deliberate disease 
The student mentions the 
prohibition on deliberate 
disease from legal or 
ethical, national or 
international, sources. 
Multiple 
choice 
questions 
The students looks for 
more information 
 
Behavioural 
Observation 
Data (BOD); 
follow-up 
surveys 
A well established 
"norm" of not 
doing, not helping, 
and preventing, the 
misuse of 
life/health sciences 
to cause harm 
(weapons) 
Cases 
Follow-up 
surveys 
≥90% 
participants 
evaluating 
positively 
All students 
participate 
(notes from 
learning 
activities) 
Posters from 
learning 
activities 
 
Knowledge: 
Understand: identify 
potential dual-use and 
broader biosecurity 
issues 
The student provides a 
definition that at least 
includes that peaceful 
research, material, 
equipment or information 
can be misapplied to cause 
harm; and/or explains the 
criteria to recognize dual-
use or potential misuse 
issues 
Multiple 
choice 
questions; 
essay writing; 
review of 
research/work 
proposals and 
reports 
Questions to instructors or 
supervisors on existing 
considerations in 
programs and systems  
Appreciations, 
suggestions, 
and/or asking 
for additional 
trainings 
Follow-up 
communicatio
ns; letters of 
praise; post-
instruction 
survey 
Knowledge: Know: 
actions to take when 
faced with a potential 
misuse ethical 
dilemma 
The student explains the 
institutional procedure to 
report an identified dual-
use or potential misuse 
issue. 
Questions on dual-use 
potential of material, 
equipment or information  
% attendance 
Turnout at the 
event; 
attendance 
sheets 
Knowledge: 
Apply/Analyse: 
options to manage 
dual-use and broader 
biosecurity issues 
Demands for an oversight 
system 
 
   
Student asks 
questions 
Active 
participation 
during 
training; 
forums; 
observation 
Attitude: 
Understand/Apply: be 
aware of the 
responsibilities on 
dual-use and broader 
biosecurity and feel 
ethically accountable 
The student discusses 
oversight and decision-
making options on dual-use 
and broader biosecurity. 
Documented decisions on 
dual-use issues; the 
student participates to the 
establishment of a Code 
of Conduct 
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Knowledge: 
Analyse/Evaluate: 
Document and justify 
decisions as 
appropriate 
Integration of 
considerations on dual-
use in work presented at 
conferences 
Occurrences, 
quantity and 
quality of 
consideration 
Surveys; 
interviews; 
events' 
programmes 
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6.4.2 Design evaluation for the instruction design plan 
Table 28 reports the designed evaluation matrix for the instruction design plan 
of research. In this case, the learner population are educators from public health, 
life sciences and technologies, human or veterinary medicine HEIs who 
participate to train-the-trainer ISD workshops and programmes to promote and 
implement education on deliberate disease risks. In the table and below we 
refer to learners as participants to distinguish them in this role from that of 
educators; and from learners in the education plan of research (“students”). 
It should not be a surprise that Level 1 evaluation is the same as the four 
subject matter areas under the education plan of research; as we have 
mentioned, Reaction evaluation doesn’t really depend on the topic of instruction 
as it precedes it. We hence reprise the same indicators, metrics and data tools 
that have been proposed in Table 27. The second Level should evaluate if 
participants achieved learning on designing and promoting education, and 
follows competences on the ADDIE phases. Indicators include understanding 
what to consider characterizing learners and instructional components 
(Analysis); knowing components of the training design cycle and draft learning 
objectives (Design); preparing educational materials that employ principles of 
learning-by-design and learner-centred education (Development); deliver 
instruction applying techniques and methods (Implementation); and evaluate 
education (Evaluation). Metrics are proposed for each of these Learning 
indicators. Data on this Level can be collected from post-workshops 
evaluations; design documents drafted by participants; peer review among 
participants on educational materials and teach-backs; or observation during 
workshop activities. 
Two Behaviour indicators are proposed that could derive from achieved learning, 
and could be prerequisites for a Result on education on deliberate disease: that 
participants apply what learned into teaching deliberate disease risks education 
to their students, implementing the pillars of learning-by-design and learner-
centred teaching, and leveraging educational resources made available by 
subject-matter experts; and that participants further develop via attending and 
completing more advanced training on deliberate disease risks and/or 
instructional design on deliberate disease risks. 393  Data sources for these 
                                                      
393 This approach is in line with the composite indicator of “Return on Relationships” proposed by Fair et al. 
(2016) to evaluate a cooperative engagement program. The metric for this indicator is based on a 
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indicators are similar to those from situational analyses described in the 
previous Chapter; questionnaire surveys; HEIs’ syllabi; as well as interviews 
with participants.  
However, the change in behaviour by participants doesn't necessarily imply an 
organizational change in the higher education instructional offer; specifically, as 
it depends on individual initiatives, it does not guarantee that education will be 
imparted to all students, credited with formal requirements, and embedded in 
the technical formation. We propose only one indicator for Level four (Result) 
that education on deliberate disease risks is institutionalized in HEIs, i.e. 
recognized at a higher and independent level than the behaviour of individual 
faculty members. 394  Metrics include that designed education is formalized, 
possibly with credits, made a requirement for degree completion or for 
professional abilitation, does not entirely depend on the choice of individual 
educator(s), and/or relevant learning objectives are documented in the 
educational program design. 
                                                                                                                                                            
weighted sum of stakeholders engaged and deliverables produced, including publications/posters, 
conferences and curriculum. However, the weighting, which should be based on an “intangible value” in 
such metric is not clear, and I prefer to propose simpler metrics. 
394 It should be noted that institutionalization, in the form for example of accreditation, has also been 
suggested as a driver for improved learning outcomes: “evidence of a connection between changes in 
accreditation and the subsequent improvement of programs, curricula, teaching, and learning”, (Volkwein 
et al., 2006 p. 277). In this sense, Level four indicators in the instruction design plan could also predict 
Level two achievements in the education plan. 
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Table 28 - Four-levels evaluation matrix on the instruction design plan 
 
L1 Reaction L2 Learning L3 Behaviour L4 Result 
 
Indicat
ors 
Metric Data 
Indicators (Domain: 
Level) 
Metric Data 
Indicato
rs 
Metric Data Indicators Metric Data 
Instruction design plan of research. Learner population: educators (lecturers, professors, course coordinators, deans) of public health, life sciences and technology, human or veterinary medicine programs/schools/colleges (HEIs) 
Instruction 
Design 
The 
partici
pant is 
satisfi
ed, 
interes
ted 
and 
engag
ed 
≥4,5/5 
average 
evaluation 
Post-instruction 
survey 
Knowledge: 
Understand: what to 
look at to characterize 
learners and 
instructional context 
The participant compiles an 
instructional characterization 
considering audience and 
context characteristics  
Post-
instructio
n survey; 
worksho
p 
activities
; Design 
Docume
nts 
Teachin
g to 
students 
The participant 
teaches to 
students applying 
what learned in 
Level 2 
HEIs’ 
syllabi; 
situational 
analyses; 
interviews  
Formal 
introduction 
in 
instruction 
programs 
(new or 
revised 
credited 
instruction)  
Education is 
integrated in an 
instruction 
program; 
formalized, 
including but not 
necessarily with 
credits; does not 
depend on 
individual effort; 
and/or learning 
objectives are 
stated in the 
program design. 
Formal introduction in 
instruction programs 
(new or revised 
credited instruction) 
≥90% 
participants 
evaluating 
positively 
All participants 
participate 
(notes from 
learning 
activities) 
Posters from 
learning activities 
 
Knowledge: Know: 
components of the 
training design cycle 
The participant lists 
components of the ADDIE 
cycle in correct order and 
describes it as a cycle 
Appreciations, 
and/or asking 
for additional 
trainings 
Follow-up 
communications; 
letters; post-
instruction survey 
Knowledge: Apply: 
draft learning 
objectives 
The participant designs 
learning objectives including: 
differences between cognitive 
domains and levels of 
learning; only one objective 
per statement; consistent with 
the learner characterization; 
evaluable 
Design 
Docume
nts 
% attendance 
Turnout at the 
event; attendance 
sheets 
Knowledge: Apply: 
design instruction 
The participant compiles a 
Design Document that 
includes identification of 
desired impact in terms of 
deliberate disease risks; 
identification of the 
instructional problem; learner 
characterization; learning 
objectives; evaluation 
strategy; course description; 
instructional environment; 
outline  
The participant 
asks questions 
Active participation 
during training; 
forums; 
observation 
Knowledge: 
Understand: different 
learner-centred 
delivery techniques 
The participant gives 
examples of learner-centred 
instruction techniques, such 
as principles; adaptation to 
sensory styles; Kolb’s cycle, 
etc. 
Post-
instructio
n survey; 
worksho
p 
activities
; 
instructio
nal 
materials 
develope
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d by 
participa
nts 
Skill: Apply/Analyse: 
use learner-centred 
education 
development and 
implementation 
methods 
The participant develops a 
lesson plan, a learning activity 
or a guided exercise for 
students using learner-
centred teaching techniques 
Instructio
nal 
materials 
develope
d by 
participa
nts; peer 
review 
“rubrics” 
by 
participa
nts 
The participant delivers a 
lesson plan, a learning activity 
or a guided exercise for 
students using learner-
centred teaching techniques 
Instructio
nal 
materials 
develope
d by 
participa
nts; Peer 
review 
“rubrics”
by 
participa
nts 
Knowledge: Evaluate: 
evaluate education 
The participant designs 
evaluation for their education 
including indicators, metrics 
and data for the four Levels 
Design 
Docume
nts 
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6.5 Conclusions 
This Chapter discussed the Design phase of the ADDIE ISD model applied to 
education on deliberate disease risks, within biorisks, for higher education. The 
first aspect introduced has been the definition of learning objectives. After 
reporting on preliminary identification of objectives, I have discussed guidelines 
from instructional design on defining learning objectives, as well as different 
examples of their characterization. I have detailed the taxonomy of learning 
objectives based on cognitive domain and level of learning, developed on the 
bases of science of learning introduced in Chapter 2. Specific designed learning 
objectives from the projects considered in the research have then been 
presented. Regarding the education plan of research, I have noted how learning 
objectives in higher education should include foundational aspects of biorisk 
management as well as advance capacities on the risk-based approach; and 
that learning objectives in pre-service are more generic (lower cognitive 
domains and/or applicable to a wider range of cases) than for in-service 
learners. Furthermore, I illustrated how learning objectives are matched to 
information collected in Analysis and introduced the design document tool, used 
both as a design instrument in the education plan and as an instructional 
instrument to train educators on instructional design in the instruction plan. I 
presented examples of designed education with and by educators in projects 
considered in the research.395 
The last part of the Chapter designed proposed strategies for evaluation of 
education to mitigate deliberate disease risks in the education and instruction 
plans of the research. Regarding the former, drawing from the experiences 
presented earlier, I designed learning objectives as Level two indicators in four 
thematic areas. I also designed corresponding indicators for Level three and 
Level four evaluation. I argued that capacities built through these objectives 
have the potential to influence likelihood and/or consequence of deliberate 
disease risks in the three risk scenarios described in Chapter 3. In particular, 
the (bio)risk management thematic area would have the potential to influence 
                                                      
395 Designed educational programmes included a “problem/rational/aim/overview” statement; target learner 
description, including their prerequisites; the anticipated next steps for the learner; defined and categorized 
learning objectives; evaluation strategies for the four Levels; and information such as duration of 
instruction, prerequisites of the instructor(s), number of students, planned delivery techniques, and 
references to educational resources. 
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risk in all three reference scenarios. The laboratory biosafety thematic area 
would have a less direct influence on deliberate disease risks but it would still 
have the potential to influence (though indirectly) risk in the second scenario. 
The laboratory biosecurity thematic area would have the potential to influence 
risk in the second (outsider threat and/or misuse) and third (insider threat) 
deliberate disease risk scenarios. The broader biosecurity and dual-use 
management thematic area would have the potential to influence deliberate 
disease risks under the three scenarios.  
Regarding the instruction design plan, similarly, indicators are designed that, in 
Level two, are learning objectives for educators as they learn to apply the 
learning-by-design and learner-centred pillars on education on biorisks, 
including deliberate disease risks management. Behaviour and Result 
indicators are also designed, in the fourth Level looking at formalization of 
education in the higher education context. In both plans, indicators in the four 
Levels are accompanied with possible metrics and data sources that complete 
the evaluation tools. These evaluation tools will be applied to data from the 
projects considered in this research in the Evaluation Chapters, where several 
among these indicators and metrics will be used. Before moving to that, 
however, we need to discuss the Development and Implementation phases of 
the ADDIE model of ISD applied to education on deliberate disease risks in 
higher education. 
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7. Development and Implementation 
This Chapter discusses the Development and Implementation phases within the 
ADDIE model of ISD for education to mitigate deliberate disease risks. 
Development and Implementation are discussed together firstly because they 
are strictly linked and secondly because Implementation is really the practical 
realization of everything planned during Development. Hence we don’t need 
here to devote specific and separate spaces for Development and 
Implementation, with the observation that what was described in this Chapter 
has actually been developed and implemented in real courses, or is based on 
the experience of actually implemented courses. 
The Development phase in ISD focuses on producing the lessons plans and the 
materials and tools396 to use in education for the student to reach the designed 
learning objectives, while the Implementation phase focuses on delivering those 
materials to students. The complex of products is referred to in different ways in 
the ISD literature; Hodell (2011 p. 60) uses “lessons plans”, while others refer to 
them as course plans or teaching guides. In our interaction with HEIs, it 
emerged that HEIs often have their own nomenclature for lessons plans.397 One 
useful step to move from Design to developed lessons plans, is drafting the key 
message(s) that the educational content will deliver (Grainger and 
Turegeldiyeva, 2015). Subsequently, instruction designers should consult and 
review the educational resources that had been mapped in the design 
document to match learning objectives and key messages. Education should 
build on learner-centred instruction (Jensen, 2005; National Research Council, 
2000). This impacts not only the content but also the order and the delivery 
methods of education.  
In the following paragraphs, models and insights from educational science that 
have been mentioned in Chapter 2 will be leveraged for the Development and 
Implementation of education based on Design, primarily including the nine 
events of instruction (Gagné et al., 1992), principles and elements of learning 
                                                      
396 Including educational materials but also teaching support and other materials for instructors, such as 
presentations, notes, handouts, scenarios, case studies, reading lists, videos, exercises, tests, questions, 
exams, teaching guides, etc. 
397 In the considered projects, the complex of teaching tools was referred to as “syllabus” (note that in 
some cases “syllabus” rather denotes the design document of a curriculum and not its lessons plan), 
“lectures package”, “course work”, or “document set”. 
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(Thorndike, 1932; Halpern and Hakel, 2003), the Jensen’s model for learner-
centred instruction (Jensen, 2005), and the Kolb’s cycle (Kolb, 1971; Kolb, 
1984; Kolb et al., 2001; Kolb and Kolb, 2005). It will also become apparent how 
often these models are connected and how instructional Development and 
Implementation can, in practice, follow their suggestions for effectively 
achieving learning objectives. 
7.1 Develop agendas for instruction 
Deciding the order in which instruction is imparted is not a trivial issue as it may 
have significant influence on if and how learning objectives are achieved by 
students (Schmidt and Bjork, 1992). The primary source for organization of 
agendas of instruction is the model of nine events of instruction as described by 
(Gagné et al., 1992),398 based on instructional psychology studies (Gagné and 
Rohwer, 1969).399 Most of the findings for the events of instruction model came 
from studies with young students, however subsequent applications with adult 
learners indicate they are successful with them as well (Bonner 1982). This is a 
particularly important finding for higher education, as lectures are the dominant 
delivery method in teaching life sciences in HEIs, mostly because it is perceived 
as cost effective method, and easier to control coverage of content (Goffe and 
Kauper, 2014). 
The nine events of instruction as proposed by Gagné and Briggs include: 
1. Gaining attention 
2. Informing learners of the learning objectives 
3. Recall of previously learned content 
4. Presentation of new material 
5. Guidance of learning 
6. Eliciting performance 
7. Providing feedback 
8. Assessing the performance 
9. Aid future retrieval and transfer 
                                                      
398 Learners are more likely to retain concepts and skills if these are presented in ways that support how 
the mind works (Gagné et al., 1992). 
399 This model is also compatible with other inputs I leverage from educational science, such as Jensen’s 
(2005), which suggests what instructional actions should be planned before, during and after delivering to 
students. 
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Hodell (2011) has proposed both a rebranding and a simplified and more 
practical repackaging of the nine events into three phases: Preparation for 
learning (including Gaining Attention, Direction and Recall); Delivery and 
practice of new material (including Content and three phases of feedback from 
students); and Wrap-up (including Evaluation and Closure). I use this simplified 
grouping in the discussion below.400 
7.1.1 Preparation for learning 
Preparation for learning should start with gaining the attention of the student; 
this is an event too often overlooked in traditional higher education settings. 
One way to do that in a university course may be to carefully choose a pre-
course reading assignment that is simple and engaging, such as a story in the 
news that is relevant to the topic, or starting the course with telling an 
experience from real life. The Direction event includes informing the students of 
the designed course’s objectives. Bonner (1982) suggests that for adult learners, 
educators should “choose the learning objectives” with the learners, rather than 
present them as pre-determined. However, as we discussed, objectives should 
at this point at least have been drafted, if Analysis and Design have been duly 
carried out.401 Even if learning objectives should or could not be changed, they 
should still be discussed with students at the beginning of instruction to check 
they are understood, and any additional expectations should be collected. The 
Recall event implies connecting with known or prerequisite information (Knox, 
1977); it also helps checking that students actually have all prerequisites 
assumed during Design. 
7.1.2 Delivery and practice of new material 
The following section of the repackaged nine events focuses on the delivery 
and practice of new educational material. The stimulus material should be 
presented with the features of learner-centred instruction in mind. They should 
be organized with increasingly autonomous activities assigned to students, use 
animation and face-to-face work rather than read lecturing (Gagné and Rohwer, 
1969), as well as take into account the Kolb’s cycle, moving from practice to 
abstraction to reapplication. Under “Content” (“Presentation of new material” in 
                                                      
400 However, it is still important that the nine events occur in the proposed order to assure information is 
presented in the way the learner processes it. 
401 Furthermore in the higher education context, learning objectives are usually formally defined before any 
interaction with students. 
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the original events), the student is presented with new stimulus material 
organized in a meaningful way. Suggestions for this organization include 
introducing “spikes” in difficulty (i.e. levels of learning) that have the potential to 
enhance retention (Ghodsian et al., 1997), while not discouraging students as it 
would keep a manageable level of “memory load”402  (Nesbit and Hunka, 1987). 
Subsequently, an instruction developer should plan to aid students in learning 
contents and resources; 403  help students internalize new skills and 
knowledge;404 and to provide immediate feedback to students.405 
7.1.3 Wrap-up 
The final step of wrap-up would include Evaluation and Closure, which not only 
should provide for methods to evaluate the achievement of learning objectives, 
but also include key steps to enhance retention, further application and 
guidance of the students on the relevance of what they learned. Regarding both 
Evaluation and retention, it should be noted that besides being considered at 
the end of the lessons plan, space should be provided also at points during the 
previous phases, so that Evaluation is continuous and builds up during the 
curriculum, and grasp of key messages is facilitated when they are presented. 
For higher education students, guidance by the facilitator during closure on 
where and how the completed curriculum relates with the larger course of study 
is fundamental for students to understand the integration of deliberate disease 
risks management with their technical formation. 
7.2 Delivery techniques that enhance retention 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 6, learner-centred instruction (or “active 
learning”) has increasingly been suggested as more effective than instructor-
centred lecturing (Colliver, 2000; National Research Council, 2000; Prince, 
2004; Armbruster et al., 2009; Haak et al., 2011; Ruiz-Primo et al., 2011; S. 
Freeman et al., 2014). However, I have also noted how the science of learning, 
including learner-centred modes of delivery, is not traditionally applied in higher 
                                                      
402 Or the “relative estimate of the inhibition effects contributing to the forgetting of prerequisites in a 
sequence with an underlying hierarchical structure” (Nesbit and Hunka, 1987 p. 142) 
403 “Guidance of learning” in Gagné et al. (1992) , “Application feedback Level 1” in Hodell (2011) 
404 “Eliciting Performance” in Gagné et al. (1992), “Application feedback Level 2” in Hodell (2011) 
405 “Providing feedback” in Gagné et al. (1992), “Application feedback Level 3” in Hodell (2011). It should 
be noted how the nine events of instruction, including in Hodell’s (2011) “repackaging and rebranding”, are 
also reflected in, and compatible with, Kolb’s suggestions on experiential learning and the cycle between 
abstraction and application. 
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education in many countries (Halpern and Hakel, 2003). What presented in 
Chapter 5 on Analysis seemed to confirm this indication, adding that sometimes 
lecturing may be necessary due to instructional context constraints such as the 
size of students’ cohorts or the availability of teaching aids and materials. In fact, 
lecturing would not always, or not completely, be a wrong instructional choice. 
Lectures could be acceptable, for example, for lower levels of learning and/or 
theoretical knowledge cognitive domains.406 Nonetheless, effective education to 
mitigate the risks of deliberate disease should try to apply learner-centred 
methods in Development and Implementation according to the possibilities 
outlined in Analysis and Design. Below are some guidelines and practical 
examples of application that have been drawn from the experience of 
developing and implementing education on biorisks, including deliberate 
disease risks, management. 
7.2.1 Applying principles of learning 
Principles, or elements, of learning, were proposed (Thorndike, 1932) as 
practical suggestions on developing instruction materials in ways that would 
enhance retention. They would include readiness, recency, exercise, intensity, 
effect, freedom, primacy and requirement.407 These principles are reprised by 
more recent pedagogy literature under different labels (Halpern and Hakel, 
2003), as well as compatible and overlapping with Gagné’s events of 
instruction408. Principles of learning can indeed be linked to specific events of 
                                                      
406  Lectures would be “a satisfactory arrangement for learning if the desired outcome is to produce 
learners who can repeat or recognize the information presented. But is one of the worst arrangements for 
promoting in-depth understanding” (Halpern and Hakel, 2003 p. 40). 
407  Readiness implies that instruction should be appropriate for the student’s previous capacities, 
prerequisites and expectations (they should be “ready” to learn), and as such is highly dependent on 
Analysis; recency suggests that recent information are more easily remembered; exercise implies the 
reiterated or repetition of information; intensity the use of colours, graphics, audio, highlighting, 
dramatization; effect suggests inserting change, surprise and the breaking of routine in instruction; 
freedom the possibility for the student to achieve learning objectives, and/or to follow instruction, with 
different options (for example by choosing exercises, essay questions, or taking a course at their own 
time); primacy suggests leveraging first impressions, and placing important content at the beginning of 
instruction; and requirement the importance of connecting new content to existing one, provide a starting 
point and explain the context of new topics. 
408 Gagné et al. (1992) suggest (a) techniques to gain and maintain the attention of the learner; (b) 
establish within the learner certain preconditions for learning by giving pretraining, by providing verbal 
directions, by stimulating recall; (c) present the stimuli directly involved in learning as actual objects and 
events, printed materials, or pictures, among other forms; (d) aid the learning process by methods of 
prompting and guiding, often in the form of verbal communications; (e) specify the conditions for 
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instruction, and practical examples of applications during Development and 
Implementation of education on biorisks, including deliberate disease risks, 
management, can be mentioned. 
The requirement principle, for example, pairs with the third event “Recall of 
prerequisite information”. Ways in which the instructor can apply the principle 
include asking students to think of experiences or cases they lived or know 
about that would be relevant for the learning objective. During the first event, 
“Gaining attention”, the instructor can plan to use the intensity and/or the effect 
principles surprising students with an unusual request, a new activity, new class 
set-ups, or though-provoking questions. During the second event, “Stating 
objectives” (“Direction” under Hodell’s version), the freedom and readiness 
principles can be applied by establishing with the learners criteria for instruction 
and performance, or developing together rubrics or scorecards for risk 
assessments. During the fourth (“Presentation of new material”, or “Content” in 
Hodell’s version) and fifth (“Guided learning”) events, several principles of 
learning should be used as guidelines for developing and implementing 
education, by including real-world examples and multimedia, or using pictorial 
elements that are more effective than verbal ones, and concrete verbal 
elements that are superior to abstract verbal ones (Gagné and Rohwer, 1969). 
Exercise can be applied within the fifth event “Guided learning” as well as the 
ninth one “Retention and transfer”.409 Practical ideas to practice the exercise 
principle in these phases would include asking the student to teach to other 
students, or compile a list of “frequently asked questions” to be answered by 
students in class or online, individually or as a group.410 During the sixth to 
eighth events (“Elicit performance”, “Feedback” and “Assessment”), ideas for 
Development and Implementation include application activities by students, 
elaboration, occasions to collect confirmatory or corrective feedback, questions 
post-presentation of new material. Techniques for Development and 
                                                                                                                                                            
responding as in the contract between overt and covert responses; (f) employ methods to provide 
feedback to the learner concerning the correctness or incorrectness of his performance at various stages 
of learning; (g) establish conditions to promote retention, including such factors as repetition and 
rehearsal; and (h) use techniques which enhance the transfer of learning to subsequent learning tasks or 
other performances. 
409 As Halpern & Haken (2003 p. 39) note, the “benefits of retrieving information learned earlier to produce 
answers in response to new questions are among the most robust findings in learning literature”. 
410 This also provides opportunities to practice the “freedom” principle of learning. 
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Implementation of learner-centred education in the “Retention and transfer” 
(Hodell’s “Closure”) ninth event of instruction should apply principles in looking 
at reapplication of learning outside and beyond the limited space and time of 
training, for example by having students develop specific security job-aids for 
their daily activities, drawing concept maps, or reapplying risk assessment 
methods in a real-world scenario.411 
Regarding instruction delivery techniques for desired skills, simulations, games 
and role-playing have the potential to enhance learning (Level two evaluation) 
and transfer to behaviour (Level three evaluation) with respect to lecturing 
(Gopher et al., 1994; Goettl et al., 1996; Jentsch and Bowers, 1998). Games 
(Ricci et al., 1996) and simulations (Kaufman et al., 2007) have also been 
applied and proved successful in training for in-service personnel 412  on 
managing safety and security risks in the chemical and biological sciences.413 
7.2.2 Addressing different types of students 
Learners have different learning styles (Tanner and Allen, 2004), which means 
they will learn (i.e. achieve Level two in Evaluation) and retain/transfer (i.e. 
achieve Level three in Evaluation) to different extents depending on ways in 
which instruction is presented to them (Halpern and Hakel, 2003), primarily 
during the fourth and fifth events of instruction. For example, Rosati et al. (1988) 
describe students along an intuitive-sensing scale. Intuitive students would have 
a preference for “abstract, global and theoretical” approaches, while sensing 
students for “practical, factual and specific” information. 414  Gardner’s (2011) 
“multiple intelligence theory” distinguished students based on their preference to 
absorb information, using categories such as linguistic-verbal, logical-
mathematical, visual-spatial, bodily-kinaesthetic, musical-rhythmic, 
                                                      
411 Note how these examples of techniques applying learning principles in the last event of instruction are 
very much in line with the third level of evaluation (“Behaviour”, also called “transfer” in literature) in the 
four-level model of evaluation of education that I also employ in this research. 
412 In the latter example, students were asked to construct a laboratory and place equipment in the 
appropriate areas; develop a communication message for an incident; conduct risk assessments; and 
package samples for shipment (Kaufman and Berkelman, 2007). 
413 A type of simulations, role-playing is based on “behavioural modelling” or “reproduction” by learners, 
and has the potential to increase generalization of desired behaviour time after education is imparted. 
414 Rosati et al. (1988 p. 209) evaluated achievements of learning objectives by students characterized by 
different preferences and presented with instructions with two different approaches, one with “emphasis on 
derivations, concepts, and theoretical treatments with extrapolations; the other with emphasis on details 
and numerical rather than algebraic in-class examples”. 
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interpersonal, intrapersonal, and naturalistic. Similarly, Felder and Silverman 
(1988) identified different “dimensions of learning” in the sciences, such as 
sensory-intuitive, visual-verbal, active-reflective, and sequential-global. Without 
discussing in detail these categorizations, or their cognitive and psychological 
basis, it seems reasonable to accept that learners may have different 
preferences impacting the achievement of Level two and Level three indicators 
for education Evaluation. This would be particularly relevant when education for 
groups of students has to be developed and implemented. It is desirable hence 
that instructors plan a variety of concrete, abstract, pictorial, active and 
reflective elements in their lessons plans to reach and help different types of 
students. Kolb (Kolb, 1971; Kolb and Kolb, 2005) also advanced the idea of 
different learning styles, which should be considered in combination with the 
Kolb’s cycle. He posits that affections and experiences would influence learners 
in being more or less extravert or introvert, sensing/feeling or thinking. Kolb 
suggests that these differences would influence where in the cycle of 
experiential learning a student would prefer to start to learn new material.415  
7.3 Development in the education plan 
In developing education to achieve learning objectives of deliberate disease 
risks mitigation, the above considerations on agendas of instruction and delivery 
techniques have been applied as much as possible. At the same time, these 
experiences, including challenges, were useful to inform the general guidelines 
and examples organized in the previous paragraphs of this Chapter. The most 
pressing requirement for Development and Implementation of education on 
deliberate disease risks, however, remains that of the learning-by-design pillar: 
instruction has always to be based on Design and activities have to be 
consistent with the level and cognitive domain of the set learning objective(s). 
                                                      
415 Kolb groups learning styles in Diverging, Assimilating, Converging, and Accommodating. In the cycle, 
Kolb identifies two “dialectically related models of grasping experience: Concrete experience (CE) and 
Abstract Conceptualization (AC) – and two dialectically related modes of transforming experience – 
Reflective Observation (RO) and Active Experimentation (AE)” (Kolb et al, 1999, p 3). Different learning 
styles would hence not change the experiential learning cycle model, but influence from what experience 
different students would prefer to start – some students may prefer to start from the Abstract 
Conceptualization, while others from Active Experimentation. In this sense, Kolb’s structure can be read as 
a complex of a model for the learning process, a categorization of learning styles, and a guidance for 
developers and implementers of education to organize content in agendas of instruction. 
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7.3.1 Customize existing educational resources 
One of the options when developing education is to use existing educational 
material resources, such as the Sandia National Laboratories’ GBRMC (Sandia 
National Laboratories, 2013), the ERM by the Bradford Disarmament Research 
Centre, the National Defence Medical College and the Landau Network-Centro 
Volta (Whitby and Dando, 2010a), or the University of Bradford’s Guide and 
Handbook of Biosecurity (Whitby et al., 2015; Novossiolova, 2016), and 
configuring or customizing them according to Design. In the experiences 
considered in the research, a similar option has been pursued for example for 
the development of the course work for the credited course in Country A 
University 1; and during the EUBARNet seminars for students, courses from the 
ERM were leveraged to customize contents according to guidelines discussed 
with local professors. 
7.3.1.1 Team-based learning format 
One practical example comes from the seminar format on dual-use issues 
related to biosecurity designed within the EUBARNet and Project 18 projects. 
The seminar format implemented a Team-Based Learning (TBL) approach to 
teach dual-use issues to life sciences students.416 TBL is a special form of 
collaborative active learning417 that uses a specific sequence of individual work, 
group work and immediate feedback to create a motivational framework. TBL 
has been tested in different forms and evaluated with positive results (Bowers et 
al., 1993; Cannon-Bowers and Salas, 1998). The TBL structure used in these 
seminars included a pre-instruction reading activity, an evaluation questionnaire, 
an Individual Readiness Assurance Test (iRAT); a Team Readiness Assurance 
Test (tRAT), a Feedback Session, one or more Team-Based Application 
Exercise(s), and a final evaluation questionnaire (Novossiolova et al., 2013).  
                                                      
416 The format has been used for the UK seminar within the EUBARNet series (the approach had been 
used by the same university to teach the entire undergraduate programs in the school of Pharmacy). 
Similar applications of the TBL format were carried out with higher education students in three Project 18 
seminars, as well as with professionals in another Project 18 seminars and with either students or 
professionals in four more TBL seminars in various countries. Experiences and formatted materials for 
instructors were organized in the Handbook for Biosecurity (Novossiolova, 2016), which confirms how the 
TBL format can be applied to different areas of biorisk management instruction, including deliberate 
disease risks management. 
417 Collaborative learning denotes “situations where trainees are trained in groups, but not necessarily to 
perform a team task” (Salas and Cannon-Bowers, 2001 p. 482). 
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In an example of a seminar from Project 18 developed with the TBL format, the 
phase of “Preparation for learning” included stating and explaining the learning 
objectives418 to students and conducting Readiness Assurance Tests on the 
assigned reading materials, both individually and in small groups. The phase of 
delivery and practice of new material included a first exercise on a scenario 
based on the H5N1 gain-of-function research, which asked students to discuss 
and explain options on regulating the research and/or its publication; a second 
exercise in which each small group was asked to develop a poster to raise 
awareness and explain to other students the issues of dual-use in biosecurity; 
and a third exercise on a scenario based on the Mousepox IL-4 experiment. 
The Wrap-Up phase included an evaluation with feedback from students on 
what they liked, what they learned, their opinions on dual-use and how they 
could apply what learned in their practice. 
7.3.2 Develop new instructional material 
In other cases, when it was not possible or appropriate, based on insights from 
Analysis and Design, to customize existing educational resources for some 
learning objectives, work has been done to create new instructional materials. 
This was often realized in connection with the ISD workshops with local higher 
education teachers; and products often took the form of learning activities for 
students focused on specific learning objectives. Development of this material 
served two goals: on the education plan of the research to Develop appropriate 
instruction materials for the end students; and on the instruction design plan of 
the research to have ISD workshops’ participants exercising in applying the 
learning-by-design and the learner-centred419 pillars for instruction Development 
and Implementation. 
For example, in the Country B project, the doubts of HEIs professors on the 
suitability of existing instructional material as direct resources for education 
emerged during the first ISD workshop focusing on Analysis and Design, and 
led to proposing the Development of specifically-designed learning activities for 
students that would complement available materials. The project team 
mentored participating professors on developing learning activities, each 
                                                      
418 That included “know what dual-use, misuse and security issues are; be able to communicate dual-use 
issues; discuss and defend positions on dual-use governance”. 
419 Including effective agendas for instruction; effective delivery techniques; and consideration of different 
learning styles. 
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focused on a single learning objective derived from the design documents they 
had previously drafted and deliverable in a 30 minutes to one-hour lesson.420 
Professors were requested to include at least one learner-centred component in 
the activity, which could be complemented with lecturing and assignments for 
students. This proved useful for the professors to practice in developing course 
work following Design; and for me and other facilitators to test mentoring in 
developing guided exercises, which is relevant for the instruction design plan of 
this research. Each participant was asked to develop both the lessons plans of 
the learning activity and the specific instructional materials to Implement it. The 
ideal document set included a compiled form serving as “Develop Document” 
and a guide for instructors; a slide deck for a presentation; supplemental 
material like scenarios and reading lists for students; Evaluation tools such as 
feedback questionnaires, test questions and behavioural indicators to evaluate 
both Level two and Level three impact of education. Obviously not all guided 
exercises resulted in such an ideal product, but several were more than 
satisfactory.421  
Different examples of Development of new instructional materials come from 
the experience with the ISIS Master in Biotechnology and Neurosciences. This 
included using distance-learning options to deliver education on deliberate 
disease risks, as the module on “Dual Use and Militarization of Neuroscience” 
within the course on “Bioethics, Regulations and Laws”, was largely imparted at 
distance. Nonetheless, we applied principles of the learning-by-design and 
learner-centred pillars to the Development and Implementation of distance-
learning education on deliberate disease risks.422 The lessons plan included two 
sessions on Skype between students and instructors, that were anticipated by 
an invitation with background information and pre-reading via email and roughly 
followed Hodell’s sections for instructional agendas discussed above. They also 
interposed lecturing with dedicated questions & answers moments when 
students could submit in writing in real time. Later students had the opportunity 
                                                      
420 This requirement was rather arbitrary and decided as something that was feasible to present at the 
second ISD workshop focusing on Development, Implementation and Evaluation. It then became clear that 
the standard “lesson module” format in Country B is 50 minutes long. 
421 During the drafting period leading to the second ISD workshop focused on Development, Professors 
were also asked to Implement (“test”) their guided exercise with their students, if possible. 
422 I prepared Design and Development, and Implementation was carried out by me and two colleagues 
from the Bradford Disarmament Research Centre. 
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to access the recording of the sessions from the Master’s Learning 
Management System (LMS) platform. 423  Furthermore, it included an online 
forum on the LMS, where each student was required to post at least one 
question relevant to the topics of dual-use and security issues in neurosciences 
discussed in the live sessions, and to respond with their opinions to other 
students’ questions. Finally, students were required to submit a one thousand 
words essay to solicit the higher level learning objectives. Students could 
choose between a more practical and experiential theme and another more 
abstract and reflective. 
7.4 Development in the instruction design plan 
While for most of this Chapter until now I discussed Development and 
Implementation in relation to the education plan of the research (i.e. where 
users of lessons plans and educational materials are students of life and 
connected sciences and technologies), these phases of the ADDIE instructional 
design cycle have also been applied to the instruction design plan of the 
research, where the learner population is made by educators (lecturers, 
professors) from HEIs. Development and Implementation on this plan follows a 
simple train-the-trainer 424  concept, implying that educators would first learn 
about the subject matter of deliberate disease risks management within biorisks 
management, and then learn how to teach it applying the learning-by-design 
and the learner-centred pillars in their education of students. Development and 
Implementation of train-the-trainer lesson plans and instructional materials, as 
for any instruction and as described under the education plan, has to be based 
on Analysis and Design; hence for this research it has been geared towards 
achieving the learning objectives for the instruction design plan, presented in 
Chapter 6 as Level two (Learning) indicators.425 
Lessons plans and instructional materials for the instruction design plan strove 
to strategically apply guidelines such as those on agendas for instruction and 
                                                      
423 As an effort to apply the “freedom” principle – tough students were strongly invited, by both us “external 
lecturers” and their own local professors, to attend the live session. 
424 Also known as trainer development and training-of-trainers. 
425 As a reminder, they include: Knowledge: Understand: what to look at to characterize learners and 
instructional context; Knowledge: Know: components of the training design cycle; Knowledge: Apply: draft 
learning objectives; Knowledge: Apply: design instruction; Knowledge: Understand: different learner-
centred instructional techniques; Skill: Apply/Analyse: use learner-centred education development 
methods and implementation; and Knowledge: Evaluate: evaluate education. 
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delivery techniques such as the principles of learning; addressing different 
learning styles; and the Kolb’s cycle of experiential learning. Developed 
instruction in this plan is also based on the ADDIE cycle and facilitates 
participants through analysing, designing, developing, implementing and 
evaluating education for their students on deliberate disease risks. For Analysis, 
materials such as the questionnaires and ISD workshops’ contents presented in 
Chapter 1426 have been developed to guide participants on collecting valuable 
information on their student population and educational context. Some of the 
instructional activities for Analysis started before the actual meeting with 
participants, typically through pre-workshop email surveys. These were also 
occasions to send participants clear information about the objectives of the 
workshop as well as suggested (or required) reading materials, in line with the 
Direction event of instruction. Most of the learner-centred train-the-trainer 
instruction however took place during in-person ISD workshops, 427  where 
participants are guided through collaborative learning exercises. Activities 
planned at the beginning of these events included collecting expectations from 
participants, before presenting again and, if necessary, discuss and revise, the 
learning objectives. In-person guided exercises for achieving Analysis were 
developed to review and revise pre-workshop surveys. To introduce participants 
to Design, facilitated teaching activities have been developed, such as 
brainstorming over the seemingly simple question of “why do we teach?”. In this 
case participants were encouraged to come up with any meaningful idea, while 
the designed role of the facilitators was to lead them to realize that the ultimate 
goal of education on deliberate disease risks is “to reduce deliberate disease 
risks”. This exercise has been quite appreciated in the higher education context 
to make participants look further than just attaining students’ learning, but to 
keep in mind the more general goal.428 The concepts and categorizations of 
learning objectives were subsequently introduced for Design, and participants 
                                                      
426 Including those that led to results presented in Chapter 5. 
427 As mentioned in Chapter 1, typically agendas for ISD workshops were developed over an intensive five 
working days schedule to cover the various phases of ADDIE. However, in some cases they were split in 
two workshops, a first one covering Analysis and Design, and a second one covering Development, 
Implementation and Evaluation. In these cases, the time between the two workshops was used for 
mentored Design and Development of lessons plans and materials. 
428 And, even if participants don’t know it yet at this point of instruction, prepares them to appreciate Level 
four in the four levels model of evaluation of education. 
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guided in exercises in which they identified and assigned appropriate learning 
objectives to their analysed student population(s). Participants were also 
presented with the Kirkpatrick’s model of four levels of evaluation of education, 
and facilitated in planning Evaluation methods feasible in their higher education 
context but appropriate for each learning objective. 429  At this point, the 
instructional material of the design document template proved helpful for 
participants to collect and organize information, as described in Chapter 6. 
Regarding Development, participants were presented with insights from the 
science of learning, such as the principles of learning, developing agendas for 
instruction, different learning styles, and the Kolb’s cycle.430 Learning activities 
and exercises included the facilitated preparation by participants (in groups or 
individually) of new instructional materials for students, applying the learner-
centred educational techniques, as those described in the previous paragraph. 
Train-the-trainer instruction for participants on the phase of Implementation of 
deliberate disease risks education was developed including structured 
occasions for participants (individually or in groups) to teach-back the materials 
they developed to the rest of the ISD workshop group. Participants were invited 
to exercise the techniques of the learning-by-design and learner-centred 
delivery pillars.431 Finally, and moving to the Evaluation aspect of the ADDIE 
cycle, participants are guided through not only evaluating the effect of education 
(via devising Evaluation methods for Levels one to four, connected to the 
learning objectives they designed for their students), but also on evaluating the 
use of the training-by-design and learner-centred delivery pillars in 
instruction.432  A useful activity in this phase was the creation of rubrics, or 
scorecards, to peer-review and provide feedback on each-others’ products of 
                                                      
429 This exercise is particularly useful, for example, to highlight how Level two Evaluation cannot limit to 
pen-and-pencil tests if the learning objective requires a practical skill. 
430  Participants to ISD workshops were not presented with detailed theoretical background on these 
instructional theories, nor with an extent of references comparable with what discussed earlier in this 
Chapter. Rather, participants were offered a “toolbox” of learner-centred instructional methods to practice 
during Development – it should be reiterated that the primary goal of these train-the-trainer programs was 
in fact to promote education on deliberate disease risks, not learner-centred education per se. 
431 Regarding practicing Implementation it should be noted that the ISD train-the-trainer format often 
includes occasions for participants to co-train with already developed instructors in subsequent 
instructional events teaching the subject matter of biorisks management to other groups. 
432 This is useful for them also as self-evaluation, it responds to events of instruction, and is an important 
capacity for participants, as they become instructional designers. 
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Development and Implementation. 433  This was useful not only to provide 
occasions for “Elicit performance” and “Feedback”, but also to practice the 
principles of exercise as well as freedom (as criteria are not pre-determined by 
the instructor, but selected by participants).434 Development of lessons plans 
and materials for the ISD workshops included planning recaps and reviews at 
key points, including before moving from content on one ADDIE phase to the 
other and before and after breaks, in line with the primacy, recency and 
exercise principles. Materials include colourful pictures, graphical 
schematizations, as well as activities requiring the participants to move around 
the class, not only to apply the intensity and effect principles, but also to 
hopefully keep the attention of participants with different learning styles. 
7.5 Implementation 
The Implementation phase within the ADDIE cycle can also be described along 
the two plans of the research, education and instruction design. The goals 
would be, respectively, implementing education as delivering it to students, and 
implementing education as formally introducing it in the HEIs’ curricula, 
connected to Level four and Level three evaluation in the instruction design plan, 
respectively. 
Regarding the former goal, short-term Implementation seems feasible. 
Professors engaged in education projects should be encouraged to Implement 
what they have designed and developed in the teaching to their students. Often 
professors have the autonomy to introduce new modules in the courses they 
already teach, or to organize extra-curricular activities or seminars. Sometimes 
they can frame the new education within already existing learning objectives. 
Educators who participated in ISD workshops and became instructional 
                                                      
433 Here the instructor facilitated participants in selecting items and criteria for desirable or standard 
performance that they would seek in well developed and implemented educational materials on deliberate 
disease risks, and then they used it to peer-review and provide feedback (the instructor/facilitator(s) would 
make sure that is anonymous and constructive feedback) on teaching materials. 
434 Experiences with ISD workshops suggest that participants indeed select very meaningful criteria for the 
Evaluation of Development and Implementation products. Examples include: “was the activity 
memorable?”, “was the activity relevant to the lesson’s objective?”, “did the training address different types 
of learners?” (from Region A ISD workshop); “is the activity relevant to the learning objective?”, “is the key 
message states at the beginning […and…] at the end?” (from Country B ISD workshop); “the training 
contributes to the larger objective for societal benefit (biorisk reduction)”, “the training addresses different 
types of learning styles”, “the training was relevant to the audience for which it was designed” (from 
Country C ISD workshop). 
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designers on deliberate disease risks education, should also be encouraged to 
test the developed materials as an occasion to review and improve them. It 
should be noted that, often times, Development and Implementation are carried 
out by different people: the person who develops lessons plans and 
instructional materials may not be the same person who delivers it to 
students. 435  This stresses the importance of sound and comprehensive 
Development, so that different implementers have the possibility of applying the 
materials, hopefully having students achieving the same learning objectives. 
Developers and implementers may also need different capacities, for example 
the former being stronger in developing agendas for instruction and the latter on 
learner-centred teaching techniques. 
Implementation of developed education materials has been experienced by 
several Professors engaged from Country B’s universities; some of the 
professors from Region A universities; and professors from the European 
universities participating in the EUBARNet project. The large majority of 
Implementation with students was realized in classroom-based teaching 
environments, even if I have accounts from professors of discussion seminars, 
laboratory sessions, and field visits implemented according to Development. In 
some cases, interest for distance-learning Implementation has been raised, 
including bringing examples of successful experiences with e-learning programs.  
Implementation as education delivery to students in existing courses, while 
achieving the short-term objective of introducing the designed and developed 
curricula and generating feedback, however, does not guarantee sustainability. 
Courses could be changed, and new topics could rotate in the “flexible” shares 
of courses. More importantly, short-term initiatives often depend on the 
individual educators (or coordinators or deans) and new staff member may not 
be as aware of the importance or interpret learning objectives the same way. If 
education on management of biorisk, including deliberate disease risks, is 
analysed as a necessary component of technical education, it should be 
explicitly introduced in learning objectives and built into the formal course 
designs. Implementation on this plan would be assessed in Level three and 
Level four Evaluation in the instruction design plan of the research, and will be 
discussed in more detail in the following Chapter. 
                                                      
435 As for a lecturer who employs teaching material from a professor or a course coordinator.  
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7.6 Conclusions 
The Development phase in the ADDIE model of ISD consists in preparing 
lessons plans and all instructional material needed to realize the educational 
programme, based on the Analysis and Design phases. The Implementation 
phase consists in carrying instruction to students according to Design and using 
the developed lessons plans and materials. In the instruction design plan of the 
research, Implementation also refers to educators teaching to their students and 
education becoming formalized in higher education contexts. I presented in this 
Chapter guidelines on Development that would help in retaining the learning-by-
design and learner-centred delivery pillars from educational science; as well as 
presenting examples of practical applications of those guidelines taken from, 
and informed by, the experience from the projects considered in the research in 
different countries and socio-cultural contexts. I discussed deciding agendas for 
instruction, leveraging Gagné’s nine events of instruction (though regrouped 
following more recent ISD literature), principles or elements or learning, issues 
of addressing different types of students (i.e. students with different learning 
styles and preferences for learning), and the Kolb’s cycle, which describes a 
learning process but also provides further suggestions on agendas and learning 
styles. Furthermore, I presented results of experiences in developing 
instructional materials relevant for deliberate disease risks education, including 
cases of customization of existing educational resources; application of 
collaborative learning formats; and creation of new educational materials with 
ISD workshops participants, that is at the same time Development of instruction 
in the education plan and a way to reach some Level two objectives in the 
instruction design plan. In the next two Chapters on Evaluation, I will describe 
data and experiences from the projects considered in this research in relation to 
the evaluation tools advanced in Chapter 6, to understand how education on 
deliberate disease risks could be evaluated after instruction has been 
developed and implemented. 
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8. Evaluation in the education plan 
This Chapter will discuss the application of the evaluation tools for the 
education plan of research designed in Chapter 6. Data from the projects are 
used to provide examples on how – at least some of – the indicators and the 
respective metrics presented in Table 27 have, and could, be measured. This 
leads me to suggest if and how education, particularly in the higher education 
context, could influence assessed risks of deliberate disease in the three risk 
scenarios, by building foundational capacities in Level 2 (Learning) that lead to 
behavioural transfer (Level 3) and eventually result (Level 4) on risks. The 
Chapter will firstly address examples of Evaluation of Reaction (Level 1) from 
students who received education on biorisk management and deliberate 
disease risks. Subsequently, I will present data to evaluate the proposed 
learning objectives organized in the four thematic areas of (bio)risk 
management; laboratory biosafety; laboratory biosecurity; and dual-use and 
broader biosecurity – that is, Evaluation at Level 2. Examples on Evaluation of 
Level 3 (Behaviour) and Level 4 (Result) indicators are then presented, and the 
potential influence of education on the risks of deliberate disease is discussed.  
8.1 Level 1 – Reaction 
As discussed during Chapter 6 on Design, a positive reaction facilitates 
achieving the further levels of impact of training. Instructors can evaluate 
reaction during or after courses, using a range of tools. Indeed HEIs have 
generally established practices to evaluate students’ reaction with, for example, 
feedback questionnaires; often these are the same for the whole institution, 
which allows comparing reaction across different courses. However, Evaluation 
of reaction can also use less structured tools such as direct observation of 
students by instructors. In Chapter 6, I proposed one indicator for Level 1, i.e. 
“the student is satisfied, interested and engaged”, and metrics to measure it 
such as the average evaluation and the share of students evaluating the 
education positively according to satisfaction surveys; participation of students 
(or groups thereof) in the learning activities; and comments, attendance and 
questions from students.  
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Some of the projects included educational actions involving multiple thematic 
areas, while others focused on specific ones.436 While it would be interesting to 
investigate differences in Reaction from students among the different thematic 
areas, the available data would not allow controlling if differences in reaction 
would be due to other variables than the subject matter itself (such as teaching 
techniques). Hence, data is presented on projects focusing on different thematic 
areas combined. 
8.2.1 Results from post-instruction surveys on students 
Examples for measurement of satisfaction from post-instruction surveys come 
from students from the Pakistan, Country C, EUBARNet and Project 18 projects. 
These satisfaction surveys used a common approach asking students, 
anonymously, opinions using Likert-scale questions. While asked items were 
similar, post-instruction satisfaction survey questionnaires derived from two 
main models as described in Chapter 1.437 
As presented in Chapter 6 on Design, the satisfaction indicator from Likert-scale 
questions in surveys could be measured with the average score from the group 
of respondents to an item, with the spread of support to an item among the 
group, or with both. In some way, the former metric looks at the level of interest 
raised in students, while the latter is more concerned that interest is spread in 
the class and all students are engaged. Table 29 reports results of satisfaction 
surveys from students in the Pakistan, EUBARNet, Project 18 and Country C 
projects. Their feedback has been generally positive or very positive. Over 90% 
of students in the Pakistan and EUBARNet courses qualified the seminar as at 
least “interesting”, and all students from the Country C course were at least 
satisfied.438 Feedback on other questions was also positive, such as that “the 
                                                      
436 In particular, the courses at Country A University 1 and Country C did not cover the dual-use and 
broader biosecurity thematic area; the seminar with students in the Pakistan project covered only the dual-
use and broader biosecurity thematic area; and most seminars from Project 18 did not cover the laboratory 
biosafety thematic area. 
437 The Pakistan, EUBARNet and Project 18 questionnaires integrated questions on Level 1 and Level 2 
Evaluation. Project 18 questionnaire included a project-specific section and a standardized section 
developed by UNICRI that focused on Level 1 and also aligned to what piloted in 2008-2009 (Mancini and 
Revill, 2009). In the seminar at the University of Bradford a local version of post-instruction survey 
questionnaire had to be employed, which was customized limitedly to some items to evaluate Level 2. 
438 Hence the “interest” item also received the highest score with 4.8 out of 5. 
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overall quality was high”, and “the workshop lived up to my expectation”.439 
Further questions asked more specific aspects of satisfaction, a useful feedback 
for instructors on the appropriateness of Design and Development. Large 
majorities of students think that the course was articulated in a coherent 
framework, that their previous knowledge was sufficient to follow the course, 
that it was relevant to their job or position, and that it touched on contemporary 
themes related to research. The last three items especially not only confirm 
students’ interest but also suggest the relevance of education on deliberate 
disease risks management designed and developed along the pillars discussed 
in the previous Chapters, and more specifically that the courses attended by 
these students were, generally, well designed based on Analysis.440 Reinforcing 
the relevance of education are the answers to the questions regarding previous 
knowledge and other educational opportunities on the subject. Respondents 
generally did not think that education on deliberate disease risks was already 
sufficiently covered in other courses; majorities of students from all projects 
thought that the subject was not covered in other courses, even if most students 
also mentioned they had some prior knowledge regarding the potential “hostile 
use” of life sciences. Finally, large majorities of those students who where 
presented with the question would recommend courses like the one they 
attended to others.441  
                                                      
439 We have discussed under Development how it is important to clarify and manage expectations and 
objectives from the students. 
440 Furthermore it should be noted how students from the Country C course also strongly supported the 
item “the instructor or teacher was aware/familiar with the topic they discussed and its relevance to my 
country”, suggesting appropriate instructional design not just in educational terms but also for the 
relevance in the scientific, social and cultural context. 
441 Additionally, 86% of the EUBARNet courses’ students also agreed that the same type of seminar could 
be recommended to improve education on biosecurity issues. 
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Table 29 - Level 1 evaluation results from post-instruction satisfaction surveys 
                                                      
442 Where 1 is “strongly disagree” and 5 is “strongly agree”. 
443 “Strongly agree” to the item “I am satisfied with the training event”. Not all students attended all 
sessions or were present for the survey completion session, so respondents in tables and questions may 
be less than the total class number (min 12; max 15 students). 
444 To the item “the quality and content of the training materials and presentations met my expectations” 
445 “Strongly agree” to “the workshop presented information clearly”. 
446 To the item “The ability, clarity and completeness of the trainer were adequate when responding to 
trainee questions”. 
447 “Agree” to “the workshop presented information clearly”. 
448 “Neither agree or disagree” to “the workshop presented information clearly”. 
449 “Neither agree or disagree”. 
450 “Disagree” to “the workshop presented information clearly”. 
451 “Disagree”. 
452 “Strongly disagree” to “the workshop presented information clearly”. 
453 “Strongly disagree”. 
 Pakistan EUBARNet Project 18 Country C442 
The topics of the seminar are interesting Avg 
Very Interesting 39% (7) 31% (56) - 69% (9)443 
4,8 
Quite Interesting 56% (10) 58% (105) - 31% (4) 
Not so much 0% (0) 9% (16) - 0% (0) 
Not at all 0% (0) 1% (1) - 0% (0) 
Unanswered 6% (1) 1% (2) - 0% (0) 
The overall quality of the seminar was high 
Strongly agree - - 42% (189) 54% (7)444 
4,6 
Agree - - 47% (212) 46% (6) 
Neither agree or disagree - - 5% (22) 0% (0) 
Disagree - - 1% (3) 0% (0) 
Strongly disagree - - 0% (1) 0% (0) 
Unanswered - - 6% (26) 0% (0) 
The seminar lived up to my expectations 
Strongly agree - - 32% (145) 54% (7) 
4,5 
Agree - - 52% (235) 46% (6) 
Neither agree or disagree - - 7% (33) 0% (0) 
Disagree - - 2% (7) 0% (0) 
Strongly disagree - - 0% (1) 0% (0) 
Unanswered - - 7% (32) 0% (0) 
Are contents of the seminar articulated in a coherent framework? 
Yes/strongly agree 78% (14) - 42% (188)445 69% (9)446 
4,7 
Contents are not very 
connected with each 
other/agree 
17% (3) - 46% (208)447 31% (4) 
No, teachers can’t show clearly 
the connections 
6% (1) - 3% (13)448 0% (0)449 
- - - 1% (3)450 0% (0)451 
- - - 0% (1)452 0% (0)453 
Unanswered 0% (0) - 6% (26) 0% (0) 
Was your previous knowledge sufficient to follow the seminar?  
Yes 44% (8) 28% (51) 40% (182) -  
Yes, even if having further 
information would have been 
helpful 
50% (9) 31% (55) 33% (150) 
-  
No, but I could follow the 
seminar easily anyway 
6% (1) 37% (67) 16% (74) 
-  
No, and this proved difficult 0% (0) 2% (4) 5% (22) -  
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Post-instruction surveys can also provide more detailed comments that may 
help in qualitatively measuring the satisfaction indicator, looking this time at the 
metrics of appreciation, suggestions or desire for additional training. Comments 
in open questions from students generally confirm the positive feedback on both 
the subject matter and the educational approaches. Suggestions for 
improvement from the EUBARNet post-instruction questionnaires open 
questions included for example the suggestions for more interaction and more 
practical case studies, while open feedback questions from Country C students’ 
post-instruction questionnaires included for example: 
“It was a very interactive workshop, learning was made easier & 
enjoyable” [C.01] 
“Training methods was new for me and I enjoyed it a lot” [C.06] 
Positive feedback in post-instruction satisfaction surveys is also reported by 
interviewed professors who continued implementation of education on 
                                                      
454 To the item “The information I learned within the course was important and relevant to my current 
position”. 
455 Includes 5 “not much” answer from the Turin seminar questionnaire version, re-coded as “no”. 
Unanswered 0% (0) 2% (3) 6% (25) -  
The seminar is relevant to my job 
Strongly agree - - 32% (146) 77% (10)454 
4,8 
Agree - - 41% (186) 23% (3) 
Neither agree or disagree - - 10% (45) 0% (0) 
Disagree - - 7% (33) 0% (0) 
Strongly disagree - - 2% (8)  0% (0) 
Unanswered - - 8% (35) 0% (0) 
Did the seminar touch upon contemporary themes related to research? 
Yes and I found it interesting 78% (14) 72% (129) - - - 
No, but this is due to the type of 
the seminar 0% (0) 9% (16) 
- - - 
Yes, but too much 17% (3) 3% (6) - - - 
No, this is an important aspect 
not addressed in the seminar 0% (0) 4% (7) 
- - - 
Unanswered 6% (1) 3% (6) - - - 
Were the topics addressed discussed in other courses?  
No 11% (2) 61% (110) 24% (109) - - 
Yes, but useful to deepen 
understanding 39% (7) 16% (28) 
36% (164) 
- - 
Yes, a few 50% (9) 20% (36) 27% (121) - - 
Yes and too many 0% (0) 0% (0) 7% (33) - - 
Unanswered 0% (0) 3% (6) 6% (25) - - 
Had you any prior knowledge about the potential “hostile use” of life sciences? 
Yes 94% (17) 70% (126) 60% (274) - - 
No 6% (1) 27% (49)455 32% (144) - - 
Unanswered 0% (0) 3% (15) 8% (35) - - 
Would you recommend seminars like today’s to other students? 
Yes 89% (16) 91% (164) - - - 
No 0% (0) 4% (8) - - - 
Unanswered 11% (2) 4% (8) - - - 
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biorisks/deliberate disease risks after our direct interventions (see also the 
paragraph on Level 3 and Level 4 in the next Chapter on Evaluation on the 
instruction design plan), as for example Professor 3 (regarding a course on 
dual-use and broader biosecurity) and Professor 7 (on a course on laboratory 
biosafety and biosecurity) mention: 
Professor 3: “[…] in our country there is a system of teacher evaluation 
by students. Then we do some sort of sample evaluation for the whole 
university, and we ask them, which course you liked the most? […] and, 
can you believe, this was the one that take majority of them, whoever 
came to this course, and ‘this was interesting’”. 
 
Professor 7: “[…] I, I to be honest I didn’t make it in the form of a survey. 
Because it’s so long, but what I have been… 
GMM: your impression… 
Professor 7: not my impression, feedback actually. Came to… from the 
head of department. That, er, the student is very happy”. 
And while survey satisfaction tools are common in HEIs, direct post-instruction 
feedback from students can also be elicited with questions, as Professor 8 
reports: 
Professor 8: “they liked the topic. Because… er… okay, as a coordinator 
in this, in biorisk management, I tried to… er… to ask to facilitators… 
okay, no… ask the students about how they liked when they take… took 
them through the topics… they said ‘yeah, it was very good’. 
GMM: so you asked them, explicitly 
Professor 8: I asked them. Because I had… […] sometime after they 
were going through, going through the exams, I said ‘but how did you like 
the work, whatever’, they said ‘that was good. It was good, it was 
interesting’…” 
8.2.2 Results from other evaluation tools 
Level 1 Evaluation could also rely on less structured and formal metrics, 
including but not limited to the observation by an instructor. An example is from 
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group exercises in facilitated learning activities on biosafety and biosecurity, 
where an instructor uses coloured notes to collect ideas and answers from 
groups of students. Instructors would assign different colours of notes to the 
different groups in the class. This allows having an idea of how groups are 
participating just looking at the different activities’ flipcharts.456 
On the other hand, interviewees suggested that a good metric might also be the 
requests from students for formal education on the subject, as Professor 2 
reports regarding a Master in biosafety and biosecurity: 
Professor 2: “so… the students are very interested… so, […] an indicator 
is the launch of the Master. When we announced the Master, we 
received almost two hundreds applications from students who wanted to 
attend the Master. Hence, this was a good indicator.”457 
Another metric would be measurable through online platforms, websites or LMS 
used in connection to the instruction project.458 Also regarding the “questions 
from students” metric of the indicator, in the ISIS module on dual-use and 
security issues in neurosciences, the engagement and interest by the students 
was included in the evaluation. Metrics included participation to the two live 
distance sessions and of each student posting questions in the course’s online 
forum.459 Twenty-two out of twenty-five students attended at least one of the 
two live sessions; while nine students attended both. Five students posted 
questions on the forum.460 
                                                      
456 Even before looking at what students have written as examples and answers to the activity in their 
notes, which would be a way to evaluate Level 2, Learning. 
457 Translated from the original French: Professor 2: “alors… les étudiants sont très intéressés… donc, […] 
un indicateur c’est l’ouverture du Master. Lors ce que on a annoncé l’ouverture du Master, on a eu près de 
que deux cents demandes, d’étudiantes qui veulent intégrer le Master. Alors, ça c’était un bon indicateur.” 
458 For example, the EUBARNet project included a website used, inter alia, to promote the seminars series 
conducted in partner universities for life sciences students. As Mancini and Fasani (2012b) noted, 
EUBARNet website accesses from each country increased in the two-weeks period around the seminar in 
that same country, hopefully (but reasonably) indicating students and their local professors seeking for 
information. 
459 It should be noted that students were incentivized by that participation criteria would constitute one third 
of the final mark for the module, so in a way achieving Level 1 also became part of Level 2 objectives. This 
was anyway designed in the specific learning objectives for Level 2, which included awareness raising. 
460 Level 1 indicators for this example focused on quantity of participation, while qualitative feedback from 
students were not collected. 
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8.2.3 Drivers for achieving reaction indicators 
More detailed opinions from interviewed educators may provide suggestions on 
what may raise the interest of students in issues of biosafety and, especially, 
biosecurity. Indeed, it seems that students are rarely engaged by the topics at 
first, as Professor 1 notes: 
GMM: do you think they were interested, engaged, by the subject? 
Professor 1: “er, at first, at first, not, not necessarily, because they do not 
understand what that’s really about.”461 
And that anyway students do not see it as engaging as other, possibly more 
technical, areas: 
Professor 9: “[for them to be] ‘happy’ I see things that they really enjoy 
doing… I mean, doing this thing rather gets them curious, I mean, I don’t 
see them as active on this type of topic to tell they are strongly…[but] 
there is absolutely not a refusal…”462 
Interestingly, there is quite an agreement among interviewed professors on 
what stimulated positive reactions from students about this education and that, I 
think, confirms the importance of investing in the learning-by-design and 
learner-centred-delivery pillars discussed earlier in the thesis. Firstly is that 
teaching methods, particularly learner-centred, are more important than content 
to reach Level 1 objectives, as has been observed by different professors: 
Professor 5: “the… communication must be more interactive, otherwise 
they will be there… watching the slides… this is just… more contents 
for… 
GMM: so you don't think it really depends on the subject? 
Professor 5: no.” 
                                                      
461 Translated from the original French: Professor 1: “er, au début, au début, pas, pas nécessairement, 
parce-que ils ne comprennent pas de quoi se traite en réalité”. 
462 Translated from the original Italian: Professor 9: “per happy io vedo delle cose dove loro si divertono 
molto a farlo… cioè, facendo questa cosa li incuriosisce, cioè, non li vedo così attivi su questo tipo di 
argomento da essere giudicati come fortemente… non c’è assolutamente né un rifiuto…” 
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Professor 1: “this depends on how education is done, how the course is 
done, if it is very interactive, if it is innovative, and creative, to push 
students to ask questions to themselves, not just to lecture, formal[ly], 
just to give them information, clearly it’s not interesting, the information 
exists on the web, now it’s not a problem”463 
 
Professor 3: “because we mix it, to make it attractive, we make 
interactive learning, we do case studies, we ask the groups.” 
The second factor to improve reaction identified by interviewees is that interest 
is related to relevance, something discussed under the previous Chapters and 
preached by the learning-by-design pillar: 
GMM: “Do you think that those students were interested by the topics 
raised on biosafety and biosecurity? 
Professor 6: yeah, why not, because it relates to their daily life. And 
ultimately who is going to be affected? It is us, we all. Because… the way 
you put things across, because when you want to drill in something, you 
tell them that if you are not taking care in the lab, what you are throwing 
out, ultimately is going to be bound back on us. It is through the 
environment that it is going to come back to us […] 
GMM: mmh. So, so you would say that what really raised their… 
attention… is… 
Professor 6: yes 
GMM: … making something directly related… 
Professor 6: directly relevant” 
 
                                                      
463 Translated from the original in French: Professor 1: “ça dépende comme on fait la formation, comme on 
fait le cours, si est très interactif, si est innovatif, et créatif, pour amener les étudiants à se poser les 
questions, pas uniquement pour magistral, formel, juste lors de donner l’information, c’est pas intéressante 
justement, l’information elle existe sur le web, maintenant ce n’est pas un problème.” 
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Professor 7: “yes, relevance. They see… you can see even the benefit. 
Even if they are selfish [laugh]. Er… this is risk for them, I mean benefit 
for them. If you will say that, for example in patient safety. You are doing 
blah blah blah to save the patient. Maybe, maybe some people who are 
selfish will say ‘bah’, but now, they are seeing things which help others 
and help themselves. Protect themselves from being infected. Or being 
harmed.” 
 
Professor 9: “some interest… you have to push them a bit for them to 
understand that actually it concerns them, and that’s why I think it’s 
important to have an approach that keeps very close to the subjects that 
have been discussed… and that are close to the subject of the course, 
and not to the issue [of deliberate disease/biosecurity] itself”.464 
8.2 Level 2 – Learning 
The second level of Evaluation looks at the achievement of intended learning by 
students. Indicators to measure are indeed the learning objectives set during 
Design, according to the planned cognitive domains and levels of learning. 
Tools for Level 2 Evaluation could include quite informal ones such as 
observation by instructors and their opinions after interaction with students and 
exercises completed during the course. In some cases, evaluation can be 
completed with self-assessment tools. In other cases, however, an informal 
and/or self-assessed evaluation may not be enough; this will depend on the 
“degree” component designed into the learning objectives.465 
In the design of Evaluation, I have advanced a number of learning objectives as 
examples of Level 2 indicators, and corresponding metrics and data sources for 
their measurement, organized in four thematic areas in which capacity would 
have the potential to mitigate deliberate disease risks: (bio)risk management; 
laboratory biosafety; laboratory biosecurity; and dual-use and broader 
biosecurity. In this paragraph, some data from projects are illustrated to put in 
                                                      
464  Translated from the original Italian: Professor 9: “un interesse… bisogna un po’ spingerli perché 
capiscano che effettivamente li riguarda ed è per quello che per me è importante fare un approccio che sia 
molto vicino a delle cose che sono state discusse… e che sono vicino all’argomento del corso, e non 
all’argomento [della biosicurezza/abuso] in sé.” 
465 See Chapter 6 on the design of learning objectives. 
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practice proposed metrics and data, including assessment methods actually 
used in education initiatives for higher education students, such as multiple 
choice questions; self-assessments; open questions; and essay writing. 
8.2.1 Risk management thematic area 
Learning objectives set for the risk management thematic area include to define 
the AMP model; to define risk; to know factors that influence risk likelihood and 
consequence; to define biosafety and biosecurity; to apply mitigation measures 
based on risk assessment; to assess biorisk (characterization and evaluation); 
and to feel confident using the biorisk management approach. These learning 
objectives have been designed with specific cognitive domains, including 
knowledge and attitude, and levels of learning, from “know” to 
“analyse/evaluate”. 
Multiple-choice questions were used in Project 18 seminars with students 
before and after instruction that could be used to test the learning objective 
“define biosafety and biosecurity”. The metric advances that a satisfactory 
achievement would be for students to at least distinguish the focus of biosafety 
on accidental risks versus the focus of biosecurity on intentional risks – 
regardless of the laboratory or broader context. Results from questionnaires are 
reported in Table 30. While a majority of students selected the “correct” 
definition for laboratory biosafety, it should be noted that the share of students 
identifying the correct option decreased from before to after instruction. A 
reason for this may be that during the seminars students have been introduced 
to the concept of biosecurity, of which they likely had no or lower previous 
awareness than of biosafety. 466  Finding out the biosecurity side of biorisks 
possibly led to confusion as in the post-instruction question some students 
changed their answers to options more precisely referring to laboratory or 
broader biosecurity rather than biosafety. This may actually be a positive 
outcome as introducing the concept of biosecurity is a learning objective itself 
under the laboratory biosecurity thematic area (“understand importance and 
rationale of laboratory biosecurity”).467 
                                                      
466 Something that would be in line with the general awareness and content mastery of students as 
discussed under Analysis (see Chapter 5). 
467 However, the specific Level 2 indicator to be measured in this case looked at the capacity of the 
student to distinguish between biosafety and biosecurity, and we can comment that seminars under 
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Table 30 - Project 18 results, pre- and post-instruction questions, Level 2 risk management 
evaluation 
After the course on basics of biorisk management for the class of Country C 
students, participants completed self-assessment surveys. Questions can be 
connected with six out of the seven learning objectives/Level 2 indicators in this 
area.469 Results of self-assessment are reported in Table 31. In all cases except 
one (“know how to describe risk as a function of likelihood and consequence”) 
all students agreed or strongly agreed that they achieved the designed learning 
objectives. The items where students felt more strongly to have learned were 
“know what the AMP model represents” and “know the difference between a 
hazard and a threat”. 
  
                                                                                                                                                            
Project 18 did not appear to be as effective in this regard, and possibly some lessons plans or instructional 
materials could be improved for clarity. 
468 Some respondents selected more than one option thus the total numbers are higher that the number of 
respondents. 
469 As I would argue that the learning objective “assess biorisk (characterization and evaluation)” being a 
too high level of learning to be tested with such a metric. 
Indicator Question – multiple choice Results Pre Results Post 
Knowledge: 
Know: Define 
biosafety and 
biosecurity 
Laboratory biosafety refers to: Stud=453 
N=579468 
Stud=453 
N=570 
Measures and policies for preventing the 
deliberate misuse of pathogens 
25% (112) 35% (157) 
Measures for preventing theft and loss of 
pathogens 
10% (45) 19% (87) 
Measures for preventing the unauthorized 
access to pathogens and toxins 
30% (134) 21% (93) 
Measures for preventing the unintentional 
exposure to biological agents and toxins, or 
their accidental release 
63% (287) 49% (220) 
Unanswered 0% (1) 3%  (13) 
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Table 31 - Country C results, post-instruction self-assessment questions, Level 2 risk management 
evaluation 
In the work with Country A University 1, students who attended the course on 
biorisk management had to take a formal assessment test compliant with their 
HEI’s regulations. Metrics for the appropriate learning objectives/Level 2 
indicators were hence designed and introduced in the course’s paper-based 
test. Metrics and results for the risk management thematic area are reported in 
Table 32. Students were presented with a true/false question on the difference 
between biosafety and biosecurity, which all students in the class answered 
correctly. The second example is an open question in which students were 
asked to describe the AMP model for biorisk management: the “degree” 
                                                      
470 Where 1 is “strongly disagree” and 5 is “strongly agree”. 
Indicator Question Class470 Avg 
Knowledge: Know: 
define the AMP 
model 
I know what the AMP model represents 
Strongly Agree 80% (12) 
4,8 
Agree 20% (3) 
Neutral 0% (0) 
Disagree 0% (0) 
Strongly Disagree 0% (0) 
Unanswered 0% (0) 
Knowledge: Know: 
define risk 
I can described risk as a function of likelihood and consequence 
Strongly Agree 53% (8) 
4,4 
Agree 33% (5) 
Neutral 13% (2) 
Disagree 0% (0) 
Strongly Disagree 0% (0) 
Unanswered 0% (0) 
Knowledge: Know: 
Factors that 
influence risk 
likelihood and 
consequences 
I can analyze the factors that contribute to risk characterization and 
evaluation 
Strongly Agree 27% (4) 
4,3 
Agree 73% (11) 
Neutral 0% (0) 
Disagree 0% (0) 
Strongly Disagree 0% (0) 
Unanswered 0% (0) 
Knowledge: Know: 
Define biosafety and 
biosecurity 
I know the difference between a hazard and a threat 
Strongly Agree 87% (13) 
4,9 
Agree 13% (2) 
Neutral 0% (0) 
Disagree 0% (0) 
Strongly Disagree 0% (0) 
Unanswered 0% (0) 
Knowledge: Apply: 
Mitigation measures 
are based on risk 
assessment 
I know the importance of doing a thorough risk assessment prior to 
implementing/evaluating mitigation control measures 
Strongly Agree 73% (11) 
4,7 
Agree 27% (4) 
Neutral 0% (0) 
Disagree 0% (0) 
Strongly Disagree 0% (0) 
Unanswered 0% (0) 
Attitude: 
Understand: Feel 
confident about 
using the biorisk 
management 
approach 
I feel confident about using the biorisk management approach 
Strongly Agree 27% (4) 
4,1 
Agree 60% (9) 
Neutral 13% (2) 
Disagree 0% (0) 
Strongly Disagree 0% (0) 
Unanswered 0% (0) 
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component for this metric was to mention the three phases of assessment, 
mitigation and performance, with additional marks for explaining how they were 
connected. Almost all students got more than 50% of the mark for the question, 
however with an average of only 7,7 points out of 10. 
Table 32 - Country A University 1 results, post-instruction test questions, Level 2 risk management 
evaluation 
8.2.2 Laboratory biosafety thematic area 
Designed learning objectives for the laboratory biosafety thematic area include: 
to know the hierarchy of laboratory biosafety controls; 471  to understand 
advantages and disadvantages of laboratory biosafety controls; know 
decontamination, sterilization and disinfection; to recognize safe and unsafe 
work practices; to wash hands correctly; to select PPE; to don and doff PPE; to 
classify and segregate biological waste; and to evaluate the appropriateness of 
operational, facility and management risk mitigation measures. Importantly, the 
empirical data I have available from projects of education to students only allow 
providing examples of Evaluation on some of these learning objectives/Level 2 
indicators. In particular, the research lacks Evaluation data on “skill” cognitive 
domains learning objectives that are particularly important in laboratory 
biosafety (though examples of Evaluation of two “skill” objectives is included 
through self-assessment questions). This is certainly something where further 
research would be important, possibly testing and leveraging some of the Level 
2 metrics and data proposed under Chapter 6 also for “skill” objectives not 
evaluated here. Nonetheless, below I present evidence on, mostly, “knowledge” 
indicators in the “know”, “understand” and “apply” levels of learning.472 
                                                      
471 See Chapter 3 for a discussion on risk mitigation measures and controls. 
472 Also note that, as discussed under Chapter 3, capacities under the laboratory biosafety thematic area 
would probably only indirectly impact factors influencing likelihood and/or consequences of deliberate 
disease risks, suggesting that for this research the other three areas are a more important focus. 
Learning 
objective 
Question Type Marks
/Total 
Students 
over 50% 
of the mark 
Avg 
marks/s
tudent 
Knowledge: 
Know: Define 
biosafety and 
biosecurity 
 
Biosafety refers to preventing 
accidental exposure to biological 
materials, while biosecurity often 
refers to theft or intentional access 
by unauthorized people. 
True/Fals
e 
2/69 100% 2 
Knowledge: 
Know: define the 
AMP model 
 
Explain and describe the AMP 
model for biorisk management 
and its components. 
Open 
question 
10/69 90% 7,7 
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Answers to self-assessment questions from Country C students, based on pre-
designed learning objectives for the course they attended, suggest that students 
felt strongly that they achieved the learning objectives on laboratory biosafety. 
The whole class either agreed or strongly agreed on achieving the indicators; 
the item receiving most support was “I am able to wash hands properly” (see 
Table 33).473 
Table 33 - Country C results, post-instruction self-assessment questions, Level 2 laboratory 
biosafety evaluation 
                                                      
473 It may be useful to note that, while the course did not include any formal Evaluation for “skills” learning 
objectives (assessment tests with simulations or practical exercises), the course did include simulations 
and practical exercises during Implementation of instruction for both “skills” learning objectives (washing 
hands and segregate waste) that received very high self-assessment rates in this Level 2 Evaluation. This 
reinforces the idea that Development and Implementation needs to be appropriate for the cognitive domain 
and level of learning of learning objectives; if this is the case, it will be reflected in higher impact in learning. 
474 Where 1 is “strongly disagree” and 5 is “strongly agree”. 
Indicator Question - Self assessment Class474 Avg 
Knowledge: Know: Hierarchy 
of laboratory biosafety 
controls 
I can categorize various mitigation efforts into the hierarchy 
of controls 
4,7 
Strongly Agree 73% (11) 
Agree 27% (4) 
Neutral 0% (0) 
Disagree 0% (0) 
Strongly Disagree 0% (0) 
Unanswered 0% (0) 
Knowledge: Understand: 
Advantages and 
disadvantages of laboratory 
biosafety controls 
I understand the various categories of control measures 
used to reduce risk and their advantages and limitations 
4,7 
Strongly Agree 73% (11) 
Agree 27% (4) 
Neutral 0% (0) 
Disagree 0% (0) 
Strongly Disagree 0% (0) 
Unanswered 0% (0) 
Knowledge: Know: 
Decontamination, 
sterilization, disinfection 
I know the difference between disinfection, 
decontamination, and sterilization 
4,6 
Strongly Agree 60% (9) 
Agree 40% (6) 
Neutral 0% (0) 
Disagree 0% (0) 
Strongly Disagree 0% (0) 
Unanswered 0% (0) 
Knowledge: Understand: 
Recognize safe and unsafe 
work practices 
I am able to recognize potential unsafe work practices and 
conditions 
4,6 
Strongly Agree 53% (8) 
Agree 47% (7) 
Neutral 0% (0) 
Disagree 0% (0) 
Strongly Disagree 0% (0) 
Unanswered 0% (0) 
Skill: Understand: Washing 
hands correctly 
I am able to wash hands properly 
4,8 
Strongly Agree 80% (12) 
Agree 20% (3) 
Neutral 0% (0) 
Disagree 0% (0) 
Strongly Disagree 0% (0) 
Unanswered 0% (0) 
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The final assessment test taken by Country A University 1 students included 
three questions to evaluate Level 2 indicators in the laboratory biosafety 
thematic area. One question asked to list the five categories of mitigation 
measures, select one and explain its advantages and disadvantages: all 
students successfully remembered the categories (the “know” level of learning 
component of the assignment), but only half of the class successfully explained 
pros and cons (the “understand” level of learning component of the assignment). 
With a second question, we wanted the student to recognize a piece of PPE 
and infer which routes of exposures it would provide protection on. It tested a 
higher level of learning, “apply”, as it required students to take what they 
learned into a situation similar, but different, from what we had discussed in 
class. This was the metric where the class performed worst.476 A third question 
asked to identify unsafe practices from a list of laboratory work practices, a 
metric for a “knowledge: understand” learning objective in which almost the 
whole class performed excellently. 
  
                                                      
475 Where 1 is “strongly disagree” and 5 is “strongly agree”. 
476 In this case, the question showed a picture of a N95 mask. Students remembered that a N95 mask 
would protect from the inhalation route of exposure better than other masks (something we had discussed 
in class), however most students forgot that the mask would provide protection not only against the 
inhalation route but also against the ingestion route. Hence, this metric would suggest that students 
achieved the learning objective on PPE only until a “know” or “understand” level of learning, but many are 
not yet able to “apply” their selection capacities to new situations, which is the required degree of the 
designed indicator. 
Indicator Question - Self assessment Class475 
Knowledge: Apply: Select 
PPE 
I know which types of PPE are appropriate for different 
settings and risk levels 
4,5 
Strongly Agree 43% (6) 
Agree 57% (8) 
Neutral 0% (0) 
Disagree 0% (0) 
Strongly Disagree 0% (0) 
Unanswered 0% (0) 
Skill: Apply: Classify and 
segregate biological waste 
I can classify and segregate different types of biological 
waste 
4,7 
Strongly Agree 73% (11) 
Agree 27% (4) 
Neutral 0% (0) 
Disagree 0% (0) 
Strongly Disagree 0% (0) 
Unanswered 0% (0) 
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Table 34 - Country A University 1 results, post-instruction test questions, Level 2 laboratory 
biosafety evaluation 
8.2.3 Laboratory biosecurity thematic area 
Learning objectives/Level 2 indicators included: to understand the importance 
and rationale of laboratory biosecurity; to complete a biosecurity risk 
assessment; to know methods for establishing physical security; and to use 
information protection methods. As noted for the laboratory biosafety thematic 
area, I do not have empirical data from projects to provide examples of 
Evaluation of all of these learning objectives; however, I think it’s important to 
consider the Design of Evaluation including learning objectives beyond those 
discussed in this paragraph, that could contribute to capacities with the potential 
to influence risk likelihood and/or consequence.477 Examples on Evaluation are 
presented here on two learning objectives of the “knowledge” cognitive domain 
and the “know” and “understand” levels, based on data from Project 18 and 
Country C experiences. Students from Project 18 were presented with a 
multiple choice question on laboratory biosecurity (see Table 35); the “correct” 
answer is the one statement that is not true on laboratory biosecurity, i.e. that “it 
comprises policies and practices that require life scientists to consider the 
ethical, social and legal implications of their work”, as this would pertain to the 
broader concept of biosecurity under the next thematic area. Similarly to the 
                                                      
477 Furthermore, the laboratory biosecurity thematic area may well include additional objectives than the 
examples presented under Design, including specific ones under the physical security, transport security, 
material control & accountability, information security and security awareness pillars discussed in Chapter 
3. 
Learning objective Question Type Marks/Tota
l 
Students 
over a 
50% of 
the mark 
Avg 
mar
ks/st
ude
nt 
Knowledge: 
Understand: 
Advantages and 
disadvantages of 
laboratory biosafety 
controls 
 
Please list the 5 categories 
of biorisk mitigation 
measures. Select one of 
them and state the 
advantages and 
disadvantages. 
List 5/69 for the 
list 
 
100% 5 
5/69 for the 
adv and 
disadv 
50% 2,6 
Knowledge: Apply 
Select PPE 
 
For what route(s) of 
exposure would this piece 
of PPE below provide 
protection? 
Recognise 
with picture 
2/69 25% 1,2 
Knowledge: 
Understand: 
Recognize safe and 
unsafe work practices 
 
Which items below are 
NOT good laboratory work 
practices? 
Recognise 
from a list 
5/69 90% 3,9 
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question discussed above from Project 18 seminars’ students, less students 
after the instruction selected the “correct” answer.478 
Table 35 - Project 18 results to pre- and post-instruction questions, Level 2 laboratory biosecurity 
evaluation 
Students from the class of Country C, based on Level 2 indicators relevant for 
the course they attended and the laboratory biosecurity thematic area, self-
assessed that they learned (see Table 36) both on the “importance of laboratory 
biosecurity and the reasoning behind it”, and on “different methods for 
establishing physical, information, and transport security” (with stronger 
agreement on the former learning objective). 
  
                                                      
478 Again, we can argue that such a result may be due to the introduction of the biosafety/biosecurity 
dichotomy to students, who likely are not aware of the latter or used the terms interchangeably before 
instruction. While the value of introducing the biosecurity considerations to students is to be recognized, 
these results suggest that instructional materials from some of the seminars could have been clarified 
regarding the specificity of (laboratory) biosecurity. This consideration should be taken with precautions 
though: Project 18 was a networking undertaking that covered a number of seminars in different countries, 
using different formats (both traditional and learner-centred), different languages and focusing on different 
thematic areas. It wouldn’t be fair hence to dismiss those seminars with criticism only based on 
comparison with other project experiences that were focused on specific countries (like Country A 
University 1, Country C, or Pakistan projects) or that involved smaller numbers of courses and students 
(like EUBARNet), furthermore considering that the primary goal of Project 18 was “raising awareness” at 
the very foundational level rather than building specific capacities, and specifically on dual-use and 
broader biosecurity rather than on the laboratory components of deliberate disease risks management. 
479 Some respondents selected more than one option thus the total numbers are higher that the number of 
respondents. 
Indicator Question Results 
Pre 
Results 
Post 
Knowledge: 
Understand: 
importance and 
rationale of 
laboratory 
biosecurity 
Which statement about laboratory biosecurity is NOT 
true? 
Stud=453 
N=457479 
Stud=453 
N=466 
It comprises policies and practices that require life 
scientists to consider the ethical, social and legal 
implications of their work 
47% 
(212) 
44% 
(200) 
It comprises measures and policies against the theft 
and loss of pathogens 
21% (95) 21% (95) 
It comprises measures and policies against the 
unauthorized access to pathogens and toxins 
12% (54) 18% (80) 
It comprises measures and policies that seek to 
prevent the intentional release of pathogens and 
toxins 
20% (92) 14% (62) 
Unanswered 1% (4) 6% (29) 
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Table 36 - Country C results to post-instruction self-assessment questions, Level 2 laboratory 
biosecurity evaluation 
8.2.4 Dual-use and broader biosecurity thematic area 
Learning objectives and Level 2 indicators for the dual-use and broader 
biosecurity thematic area proposed under Chapter 6 on Design include to know 
the prohibition norm on deliberate disease; to identify potential dual-use and 
broader biosecurity issues; to know actions to take when faced with a potential 
misuse ethical dilemma; to apply/analyse options to manage dual-use and 
broader biosecurity issues; to be aware of the responsibilities on dual-use and 
broader biosecurity and feel ethically accountable; and to document and justify 
decisions as appropriate. As for cognitive domains, they are five “knowledge” 
and one “attitude” objective, and they go from the “know” to the “evaluate” levels 
of learning. There is quite a wealth of data from the research that could be 
applied as examples to measure the metrics also suggested in Table 27 in 
Chapter 6. The largest attention to this thematic area, with respect to the other 
three, should not be surprising given the focus of the research on deliberate 
disease risks education within biorisk management education. The empirical 
work provides data from tools including post-instruction multiple-choice 
questions; self-assessments; and essay writing both directly collected and 
reported by interviewed professors. I don’t have data from a tool like “review of 
research work, proposals and reports” that I suggested to measure the metric 
especially for the higher level learning objective, “document and justify 
decisions as appropriate” which would look at if and how the student evaluates 
options on managing dual-use and broader biosecurity issues. However, such 
an indicator and metrics should be kept in mind as important ones in this 
                                                      
480 Where 1 is “strongly disagree” and 5 is “strongly agree”. 
Indicator Question - Self assessment Class480 Avg 
Knowledge: 
Understand: 
importance and 
rationale of 
laboratory 
biosecurity 
The importance of laboratory biosecurity and the reasoning behind it 
4,8 
Strongly Agree 71% (10) 
Agree 21% (3) 
Neutral 0% (0) 
Disagree 0% (0) 
Strongly Disagree 0% (0) 
Unanswered 0% (0) 
Knowledge: 
Know: methods 
for establishing 
physical 
security 
Different methods for establishing physical, information, and transport 
security 
4,6 
Strongly Agree 57% (8) 
Agree 43% (6) 
Neutral 0% (0) 
Disagree 0% (0) 
Strongly Disagree 0% (0) 
Unanswered 0% (0) 
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thematic area, and ones that critically bridge learning with Level 3, behavioural 
transfer. 
The post-instruction questionnaires of the courses for students organized in the 
framework of the Pakistan and EUBARNet projects shared several questions on 
this thematic area. Questions were designed as metrics for the indicators on 
knowing the prohibition norm on deliberate disease and on identifying dual-use 
and broader biosecurity issues. In both projects, the absolute majority of 
students demonstrated having become aware both about legal international 
prohibition measures on deliberate disease (even if some confuse between the 
specific prohibitions of the Geneva Protocol and of the BTWC), and on the 
concept of dual-use (see Table 37).481 
Table 37 - Pakistan and EUBARNet results, post-instruction test questions, Level 2 dual-use and 
broader biosecurity evaluation 
The Level 2 evaluation tools in those projects also shared self-assessment 
questions and one opinion question (see Table 38). Large majorities of students 
from seminars in both projects thought their knowledge and understanding was 
developed on the BTWC; the history of biological weapons; the problem and 
                                                      
481 The first question was designed as a metric for a “know” learning objective, so it asked content in the 
same form it was presented during instruction; nonetheless, it was a bit “tricky” as it assumed attention 
from students between the prohibition on use of the Geneva Protocol and the absolute prohibition of the 
BTWC. The second question was designed as a metric for an “understand” learning objective, so it 
presented options paraphrased from which it was presented in class. Answers are in line with what found 
by pre-2011 experiences using similar questionnaires (Mancini and Revill, 2009). See Chapter 6 for the 
discussion on the levels of learning objectives and the difference between “know” and “understand” levels. 
482 For the first question respondents from five seminars as the question was not included in the post-
instruction questionnaire used by the University of Milan.  
Indicator Question Pakistan EUBARNet482 
Knowledge: 
Know: the 
prohibition norm 
on deliberate 
disease 
Which was the first International treaty to prohibit the use of toxic and biological 
weapons? 
The Hague Declaration, 1907 6% (1) 4% (6) 
Geneva Protocol, 1925 56% (10) 46% (78) 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 1972 39% (7) 21% (36) 
Chemical Weapons Convention, 1993 0% (0) 1% (1) 
Unanswered 0% (0) 2% (4) 
Knowledge: 
Understand: 
Identify potential 
dual-use and 
broader 
biosecurity issues 
What do you understand by the term “dual-use” in the life sciences? 
The uncertainty on results characterizing new 
technologies 0% (0) 
2% (4) 
The potential of obtaining positive results beyond 
expectations 11% (2) 
1% (1) 
The possibility that they are applied both for 
peaceful and hostile purposes 89% (11) 
88% (150) 
The ambiguity of life science and technology 0% (0) 9% (15) 
Unanswered 0% (0) 1% (1) 
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risks of dual-use; and tools and policies of biosecurity.483 A question asked 
students if, after attending the seminar, they thought some aspects of the 
science they study could present dual-use issues (a metric of the “attitude” 
learning objective “being aware of the responsibilities on dual-use and broader 
biosecurity and feel ethically accountable”). A large majority of EUBARNet 
seminars students replied they didn’t see dual-use issues in their research, with 
only 24% answering affirmatively (in the Pakistan seminar class, of a smaller 
number of students, the answers where evenly divided). Post-instruction 
questionnares for students of the seminars organized in the framework of 
Project 18 also resulted in a majority of students self-assessing that their 
learning in this thematic area improved.484  
However, using such direct questions as metrics cannot measure the 
correctness of the answer (i.e. if the students’ research or field of science 
actually has dual-use issues they should recognize), but rather that the student 
considers the topic. Furthermore, such a metric could only partly evaluate a 
learning objective of the cognitive learning domain of “attitude” and a level of 
“understand” or “apply” (that requires the student to re-elaborate the concept or 
translate it to new situations). An alternate or additional option may be to 
include multiple-choice questions with no simple or univocal answers. For 
example Project 18 post-instruction questionnaires asked, “what are important 
things to remember about dual-use”, with the possibility to select different 
options. Students selected a range of equally relevant statements, but the one 
that clearly got the relative majority of preferences was that “life scientists 
should be aware of the social, ethic and legal implications of their work”.485 
However to capture the necessary nuances and elaborations from students on 
the “attitude” indicator, the best strategy may be to include open questions or 
spaces for students to comment. Indeed comments by EUBARNet students in 
the questionnaires suggest that some of them were led to “becoming aware of 
the responsibilities and feeling ethically accountable”. One student for example 
noted the necessity to “think always about the subjects of the research, to have 
                                                      
483 The strongest feedback from EUBARNet students being regarding the history of biological weapons, on 
which over 80% replied “yes” or “very much”; and the lowest regarding tools and policies of biosecurity, on 
which 60% thought their knowledge and understanding was developed. 
484 56% of 453 respondents replying “yes” to “I learnt about dual-use, misuse and security issues”. 
485 With 49% per cent of the selections. More than one selection was possible. 
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an autonomous opinion, which may be moral and ethical” [EB.01], and others 
underlined the role of education to make risk mitigation stronger and more 
relevant: “I think it’s necessary to develop the culture of responsibility and a 
strong ethical protocol among life scientists. In my opinion it’s important to 
include programmes like (and stronger that) this one, in scientific curricula to 
rise the knowledge of potential dual use and biological weapons and to train 
people, that will become scientists, to biosecurity awareness” [EA.07]; “All the 
knowledge means power, and everything can be used for good or bad issues, 
it’s just the way of thinking and your principles. So in order to avoid a hostile 
application work should be done in the basic level = changing the way people 
think”. [EC.03] 
The challenges for evaluating Level 2 as designed indicators move from testing 
mere “knowledge”, in the same form it was presented to higher levels (testing 
“application” to new a situation or “analysis” and “evaluation” to construct and 
assess new concepts) are recognized also by professors interviewed regarding 
their experience in implementing education on deliberate disease risks. Indeed 
Professor 9 reports that they were able to evaluate, formally, learning objectives 
for the “know” level of learning, and confirmed that students achieved it 
regarding knowing what dual-use is. However, at the same time they 
recognized that learning objectives on dual-use should really aim at the “apply” 
and higher learning levels. They were not able yet to develop materials or 
evaluate learning at those levels, as their description illustrates, but their ideal 
metrics would include some elaboration by the student:486 
Professor 9: “Er… from that point of view the idea… at least, compared 
to when I start the course when on dual-use they have no idea, they 
never heard of what we’re talking about… when I ask this question, they 
know it. And so… anyway, on that I would say that from a point of view… 
really the most basic… [laugh] that we couldn’t go below of… at least the 
idea… that concept, you are aware of it… I would say yes. Really with… 
it’s not a question that they skip, or… they do answer it, they answer 
correctly and that’s it. If we try to go further, the limitation I see… 
regarding to… what is the ideal competence that… I would like to 
                                                      
486 Note how Professor 9 is clear about the differences between a “know” capacity and higher levels of 
learning, and that they need different materials and evaluation to be developed. 
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achieve… it would be, that when confronted with a case, they would be 
able to… understand it, interpret it, or react to it, if one tells them ‘you are 
in this situation’ or ‘you got three options, which ones actually presents…’, 
I mean, something more as, by the way, I already do for the rest of the 
course, I do not give them the same example again that I used in class, 
but I put them in front of a completely new case and I evaluate how in 
front of this new case they are able to read it, to interpret it… on the rest 
of the programme I do it, on this topic… I don’t have enough examples, 
myself, to be able to first train them, and second check them. And so, at 
the end… what I think is failing, but not it’s not the students’ fault, it’s 
mine, is… if we go on one example… it’s a just a tale they would tell 
me… and they wouldn't be able to go beyond the simple tale… but that’s 
because I didn’t train them beyond the example of the specific case… so 
I am able to reach awareness, but on the efficacy should they find 
themselves in a situation of this type, I’m afraid it wouldn’t be enough.”487 
Discussions with educators also highlighted how metrics beyond formal tests 
may be useful to gain information on the “apply” or “analyse” objectives, for 
example observing that students ask questions during the courses relating their 
new awareness on dual-use to their work, as Professor 8 observed: 
                                                      
487 Translated from the original Italian: Professor 9: Er… da quel punto di vista l’idea… almeno, rispetto a 
quando io li prendo a lezione che il dual-use non ne hanno idea, non hanno mai sentito di cosa ne stanno 
parlando… quando io faccio questa domanda, lo sanno. E quindi… comunque io su quello direi da un 
punto di vista… proprio quello più basic… [ride] credo al di sotto non si possa andare… l’idea almeno… 
quel concetto lì ce l’hai presente… direi sì. Con grande… non è una domanda alla quale non rispondono, 
non fanno… rispondono, rispondono in modo giusto e bon. Se si cerca di andare oltre, il limite che io 
vedo… rispetto a… qual è la competenza ideale che… mi piacerebbe poter raggiungere… sarebbe 
davanti a un determinato caso, che loro fossero in grado di… capirlo, di interpretarlo, o di reagire, se uno 
gli dice ‘ti trovi davanti a questa situazione’, o ‘tu ne hai tre di questo tipo qua, qual è quella che presenta 
effettivamente…’, cioè qualcosa in più come faccio per il resto del corso, dove non gli rifaccio lo stesso 
esempio che ho fatto a lezione, ma li metto davanti a un caso completamente nuovo e lo valuto che 
davanti a questo caso nuovo, loro sono in grado di saperlo leggere, di saperlo interpretare… io sul resto 
del programma lo faccio, su questo… non ho abbastanza una casistica, io stessa, per poter uno allenarli, 
e due fare la verifica. E quindi, alla fine… la cosa che ritengo ma non per colpa degli studenti ma per colpa 
mia, fallimentare…. Se si va su un esempio… è una storiella che mi raccontano… e oltre la storiella non 
riescono ad andare… ma perché io non li ho allenati oltre l’esempio del caso specifico… perciò io riesco a 
raggiungere la consapevolezza, sull’efficacia se dovessero trovarsi in una situazione di questo tipo qua, 
temo non sia sufficiente. 
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Professor 8: “and… you know, some of them started, you know… relating 
to what research they are going to do…  
GMM: that’s very interesting 
Professor 8: you know, and they… started asking questions, ‘how am I 
supposed to do with this’, and ‘how can I do it’, just because… they 
have… gotten that… so it means they are relating to ideas to what they 
are going to do, and they are seeing… the… class… the lessons are 
important.” 
Or as Professor 9 thinks regarding a debate they stimulated in their classes on 
publishing-versus-not-publishing research with dual-use issues: 
Professor 9: “…er… well actually often there are discussions exactly 
because… there is no consensus… so that… exactly because there is an 
argument and an evolution… and by the way I… we were talking before 
of test questions on this thing… it’s not… there is not the right answer. I 
mean, I… try to get as many arguments as possible and that one is able 
to practice their discussion there… so that while definitions and stuff… 
that, let’s say, has its own formats, with the case then we leave it exactly 
to say that there are… some positive aspects, some negative aspects, 
and some risk factors and how can you… and the pre… the majority let’s 
say is always in favour of publishing...”488 
                                                      
488 Translated from the original Italian: Professor 9: “… er… beh in realtà spesso ci sono discussioni 
proprio perché… non c’è l’unanimità… per cui…proprio perché c’è una argomentazione e una 
evoluzione… e tra l’altro io… parlavamo prima delle domande di esame su questa cosa… non è… non c’è 
la risposta giusta. Cioè io… cerco di far venire più argomentazioni possibili e che uno sia in grado anche lì 
di esercitare la sua discussione… perciò mentre la definizione, le cose… quello diciamo ha una sua 
formalizzazione, nel caso dopo lo si lascia proprio per dire che ci sono… degli aspetti positivi, degli aspetti 
negativi, e dei fattori di rischio e come si riesce a … la pre… la maggioranza diciamo è sempre a favore 
della pubblicazione…” 
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Table 38 - Pakistan and EUBARNet results to post-instruction self-assessment questions, Level 2 dual-use and broader biosecurity evaluation 
Indicator Question  
 Do you think that your knowledge and understanding of the following specific aspects have been developed after this seminar? 
Knowledge: Know: 
prohibition norm on 
deliberate disease 
The Biological and 
Toxin Weapons 
Convention 
 
Knowledge: Understand: 
Identify potential dual-
use and broader 
biosecurity issues 
History of Biological 
Weapons 
 
 
The problem and the 
risks of “dual use” 
 
Knowlegde: 
Apply/Analyse: options 
to manage dual-use and 
broader biosecurity 
Tools and policies of 
“biosecurity” 
 
Attitude: 
Understand/Apply: be 
aware of the 
responsibilities on dual-
use and broader 
biosecurity and feel 
ethically accountable 
After attending the 
seminar, do you think 
that some aspects of 
research that you study 
could present a “dual 
use” issue? 
  
4
25
9
103
5
32
0
2 18
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Pakistan
EUBARNet
Yes, very much
Yes
Not very much
Not at all
Unanswered
6
36
10
117
2
21
0
4
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Pakistan
EUBARNet
Yes, very much
Yes
Not very much
Not at all
Unanswered
10
43
7
93
1
40
0
22
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Pakistan
EUBARNet
Yes, very much
Yes
Not very much
Not at all
Unanswered
3
5
12
103
3
35
0
2 35
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Pakistan
EUBARNet
Yes, very much
Yes
Not very much
Not at all
Unanswered
9
48
9
118
0
14
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Pakistan
EUBARNet Yes
No
Unanswered
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In developing the Level 2 evaluation tools for the module on dual-use and 
militarization issues in neurosciences in the ISIS Master experience, we indeed 
used the form of short essays for students as a better way to not only evaluate 
lower level indicators but potentially also objectives of the “apply”, “analyse” and 
“evaluate” levels of learning. Students had the freedom to choose between two 
themes for their assignment of a one thousand words essay. The first 
assignment was titled “Position of your country in the international conventions 
on chemical, biological and toxin weapons”, while the second assignment “Case 
study on dual use and militarization potential, and possible measures to prevent 
misuse and risks”. Each assignment was evaluated against two metrics: 
knowledge and research, i.e. the ability to, following the class discussion, find 
information and references on national positions in the international prohibition 
regime; and critical thinking, i.e. the capacity to illustrate and defend options to 
manage dual-use and security issues. While the correspondence was not strict, 
the first metric focused largely on learning objectives of “know” and “understand” 
levels (the students could repeat some notions and facts presented in class, 
and describe them in their own words); and the second metric focused largely 
on higher levels of learning (the students were expected to select a case or a 
field, identify potential issues, propose options to manage them and justify their 
decisions).489 Students performed well on the essays, with an average of 83 
points out of 100 for the metric on “know” and “understand” indicators, and 
slightly lower at 79 out of 100 for the metric on “apply/analyse” and 
“analyse/evaluate” indicators. However, the large majority of students chose the 
first theme, confirming the challenge in moving from lower to higher levels of 
learning (see Table 39). 
  
                                                      
489 Both assignments should have shown achievement under both metrics, but the first assignment had 
more room for the first one, while the second had more potential for the critical thinking bit. The evaluation 
of the essay constituted two thirds of the mark for the module. Students were presented with all this 
information and the evaluation strategy; the essays were independently evaluated by two lecturers (myself 
and a researcher from BDRC). 
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Table 39 - ISIS Master results, post-instruction assessments, Level 2 dual-use and broader 
biosecurity evaluation 
Some students considered and discussed the options of committees that 
evaluate risks and benefits of projects under the ethical perspectives including 
dual-use potential. Students who were evaluated well on the first essay reported 
national positions in the CWC and the BTWC, the existence of national 
legislation, as well as in some cases historical cases they found of dealing with 
chemical and/or biological weapons during the XX century. Essays received 
higher points if they demonstrated understanding of the international prohibition 
norm as well as of the importance of its universality. Regarding the second 
theme, students who excelled presented examples of dual-use issues in 
neurosciences, and of militarization issues, including for improving and 
degrading performance. They found and referred appropriate references within 
and beyond what was discussed in class.490 
8.3 Level 3 – Behaviour 
Under the design of Level 3 Evaluation, I proposed some indicators and metrics 
to assess if learning was sustained over time and space and translated to 
behaviour. Indicators included, for example, that students perform actual risk 
assessment in real situations; proper separation in laboratory fridges; following 
good safety practices; integration of biorisk management considerations in 
scientific work; integration of biosafety and biosecurity considerations in the 
design of new facilities or organizations; questions raised to supervisors 
regarding biorisks in their work. Not surprisingly, considering the challenges of 
evaluating Level 3 discussed in Chapter 6, university professors often struggle 
                                                      
490 It should be noted that discussions in faculty meetings revealed this was the only written essay required 
to these students in the semester. According to faculty members it was a very useful exercise for their own 
students to practice academic writing. 
Assign
ment 
N 
stude
nts 
Indicator Metric Knowledge 
and Research 
Indicator Metric Critical 
Thinking 
   Avg. Median  Avg. Median 
1 20 Knowledge: Know: 
the prohibition norm 
on deliberate 
disease 
84 84 Knowlegde: 
Apply/Analyze: 
options to manage 
dual-use and 
broader 
biosecurity 
 
78 78 
2 5 Knowledge: 
Understand: Identify 
potential dual-use 
and broader 
biosecurity issues 
80 83 Knowledge: 
Analyze/Evaluate: 
Document and 
justify decisions 
as appropriate 
84 87 
Tot. 25  83 83  79 78 
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with these indicators. However, interesting suggestions may come from 
interviewed professors who had the occasion to observe behaviours of students 
who took education on biorisks and deliberate disease risks management. 
Some professors reported plans, ideas and practices of behavioural evaluation 
strategies that I also considered as inputs in designing the proposed Level 3 
evaluation tools, such as to look at considerations given by students to 
biosafety and biosecurity once they will start being responsible for a research 
project or managing a laboratory; or integrate formal and informal assessment 
tools at planned intervals after instruction, as Professor 7 suggests: 
Professor 7: “So… the first thing in my opinion is that, we will ensure 
that… new generations of lab technicians who are going to work in the 
labs, they know about these things. So they can easily understand, when 
they make standard operating procedures, or when they say, strictly… if 
they are becoming for example a manager of a lab, when you’ll 
become… the … he has, he has a concept so he will become, for 
example, he can say from the beginning, ‘why there is no guard in the lab, 
in the door of this? This is against the rules’ […] I want to arrange with 
the technician labs, of biosafety that… we have first year, we have 
second year. You know, ok? What I am planning to do is that… to make 
observation. […] What is the difference in their… behaviour regarding 
this? […] The other issue is that, we want to compare between these 
students in the second year, and the first year students. Who have spent 
now about one year… in their behaviour, in their, I mean, dealing with the 
lab. […] In order to make it… objective rather than subjective […]” 
Certainly interviewed professors seem to share the idea that behavioural 
change depends on learning, that learning depends on education, and that a 
formal education may be more powerful than an informal one, supporting the 
value of evaluating Level 3, as Professor 1, Professor 7 and Professor 9 made 
quite clear: 
Professor 1: “and, I think that’s the same thing, education is fundamental, 
education is fundamental. 
GMM: mmh 
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Professor 1: in changing people’s behaviours.”491 
 
Professor 7: but… I think now… the hope is in the scientists, in the 
students, will be scientists, technicians. In the future. So, from the start, 
since they are students, we will implant these concepts in their mind. […] 
They should not think that intentionally… people are good, nobody will 
do…. No, keep in your mind that. It might be… one day, somebody will 
take this, theft, abuse, release intentionally, anyhow, so… once they 
know, er, the concerns that have to take in mind, they will take action. 
 
Professor 9: “in my opinion, it does have an influence. Because, when 
things have been institutionalized, they anyway matter more. So it may 
be true that in the short term you don’t exactly do everything that you 
were told, but anyway it sits in a box in your brain, and so…the fact of… 
or, in a longer term of reviewing it, rethinking to it, or coming back to it… 
in my opinion it does have an effect. […] that maybe after time it may 
come back. Or... trigger something. I think it’s very different… with not 
having received an education, or an education in which someone told 
you something somehow but it never was institutionalized…”492 
Regarding empirical data, certainly Professor 1 reported observation of different 
behaviour regarding laboratory biosafety and biosecurity practices among 
Master students that took education introduced by one of the projects, 
compared to previous students who were not exposed to such education, when 
they had the opportunity to observe those students who proceeded to PhD: 
                                                      
491 Translated from the original French: Professor 1: “and, je pense que c’est la même chose, la formation 
est fondamentale, la formation est fondamentale. 
GMM : mmh 
Professor 1: dans le changement des comportements des individus.” 
492 Translated from the original Italian: Professor 9: “secondo me una influenza lo fa. Perché, quando delle 
cose sono state istituzionalizzate acquisiscono comunque un peso maggiore. Perciò magari è vero che sul 
momento non fai esattamente tutto quello che ti è stato detto, ma comunque rimane [in] una casella del 
tuo cervello, e quindi… il fatto… o a più lunga scadenza di rivedere, o ripensarci, o ritornare… secondo me 
un effetto ce l’ha. […] che magari a distanza di tempo può anche tornare. O… far scattare qualcosa. 
Secondo me è molto diverso… tra non aver ricevuto una formazione o una formazione che qualcuno ti ha 
detto così ma che non è stata istituzionalizzata…” 
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Professor 1: “there are few students who have benefited of this 
information, but I know that some of them who have accessed to PhD 
studies […] And I, er, I see that their behaviours are different […]. 
GMM: actually one of my questions is exactly that, behaviour. You know, 
you teach something to students, you want the students to know 
something […] but then you also have behaviour. And you said ‘I see 
their behaviour is different…’ 
Professor 1: it’s different 
GMM: do you mean from others? 
Professor 1: I mean the use, the use of solvents, how they manipulate 
the chemicals, how they protect themselves, so behaviours are very 
different. Very different from other students who have not taken that 
course.” 
Despite this example however, there are not enough data and reports from 
educators to measure many of the specific metrics I have advanced under 
Design, especially for practical behaviours under the laboratory biosafety and 
laboratory biosecurity thematic areas. On the other hand there are several 
mentions by professors of instances relevant to Level 3 indicators such as 
increased consideration of risks by students; students looking for more 
information; and students raising new questions to instructors and supervisors. 
So Professor 3 and Professor 8 report cases of students identifying biosafety or 
biosecurity problems and raising them to themselves or other faculty members: 
Professor 3: “We had an event where we talked about this. My teachers, 
my colleague faculties, mine and in other universities, these sometimes 
complain, “oh you raised too much awareness, now the students ask us”, 
the… for example the waste disposal in the lab, ‘oh, what are we doing? 
This *** is having… a ****** ******* and this makes us cancer, so why are 
we discarding it like this?’” 
 
Professor 8: “… it changed them somehow… because, the first lot, there 
was a student, who… you know, when he enters the lab, he starts 
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commenting on certain things, like ‘oh, I think this one… are we 
supposed to do like this?’. So… if he remembers… are we supposed to 
do like this or are we supposed to…” 
GMM: yeah, yeah… I understand what… and so… you have seen 
something like that, from students who took that course… er… and it’s a 
different behaviour than students that never had […]? 
Professor 8: yeah… er… okay, particularly for this one who took it… I 
was, I was with them… but now, even… other students, like I called this 
one bachelor of … even if they don't name it as… biorisk management… 
but somehow it is tucked in there…” 
On the other hand, Professor 4 was positive in describing change in the 
behaviour of students especially in considering issues under the dual-use and 
broader biosecurity thematic area: 
Professor 4: “…what we see is an increased interest in our students to 
discuss problematic aspects of research… […] now we see a much 
bigger willingness to identify risks and to discuss them. So we have sort 
of opened their mind to see problematic views of projects that... they 
couldn't see before… […] now we get lots of good suggestions, and good 
views which makes me think that maybe we did help them in doing this, 
and I think we gonna move… […] previously as I said [it was] ‘we don't 
see any ethical problems’, now they all sit down and do that individually, 
now we get lots of good suggestions, and good views which makes me 
think that maybe we did help them in doing this…” 
Furthermore, consider the opinion from this student who participated in one of 
the EUBARNet seminars and then wrote an article for the University’s student 
magazine:  
“as a young and naive student I found the seminar overwhelming. These 
were questions I had not stopped to ask myself. I was upset by the 
thought of politicians regulating research and censoring science. I believe 
the wish to explore the world a foundation of research, and sharing 
information an irreplaceable part of development. Realizing that there is a 
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potent risk that scientific research be exploited and misused makes me 
insecure. Maybe we need better guidelines.” (Sandell, 2012). 
Interviewed professors also recognized the challenges in designing and 
measuring Level 3 evaluation tools, including that they have to be structured to 
allow comparability but flexible enough to consider variance among learners, 
with different students achieving behaviours in different ways and at different 
times, and that observing behavioural change is a long-term process, which 
may be challenging in a higher education context: 
Professor 6: “yes, that is again in the individual, responses are different. 
Because some people are very very receptive, and again… it’s not that I 
will say, again there is a degree of change or impact, I would say will vary. 
It will vary. One person may be really be more conscious, maybe putting 
it to practice, another will just… you know, ignore it.” 
 
Professor 4: “it’s of course very much based on individuals here… 
GMM: …have you noticed any difference in behaviour? 
Professor 4: oh, that’s very difficult. We have… we have, with this… 
continuous, very thorough project, and I am talking about now that we 
have courses with goals and so on, we haven’t gone that far, so I think 
maybe two years or something like that.” 
Furthermore as we discussed under Level 2 evaluation, the goal and the 
challenge is to push students to higher levels of learning, so that they transfer 
into behaviour not only consideration and awareness, but actually develop 
critical thinking and assessment capacities: 
Professor 4: “…and I think we gonna move… er… the problem that we 
have seen so far is that it is quite, a lot of… thinking, I think this and I 
think that… so, we need to have that a more arguing and a more 
professional way, and I think that is something we have to work on, it’s 
not just personal views, although they are important. You have to argue 
for your case and also bring in some good general arguments, so some 
students forget those, they just tell us what they think. And we need to 
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have them in a more professional attitude, to also argue for projects and 
cases, and problems that may be related to what they are doing.” 
Another challenge, that we have discussed in theory under Design regarding 
setting learning objectives, is if the risk management aspects that are being 
targeted for improvement do not really depend on training, or if they are not only 
training problems. If there are other problems besides the lack of capacities of 
students, it may be more difficult that learning achievements are translated into 
behavioural ones. Professor 6 makes the example of supervisors and managers 
needing to be role models for students to facilitate the creation of behaviour 
based on learning; and Professor 9 argues that students have to find an 
environment welcoming the biorisk and deliberate disease risks management 
knowledge, attitudes and skills to be able to transfer them. The danger is for 
students not to be able to initiate a change, and eventually even becoming 
complacent to unsafe and un-secure practices. Along the same line may be 
read the argument by Professor 7 to educate and train in parallel both students 
and current staff, to avoid that when educated students enter the labour market 
find an un-conducive environment on safety and security:  
Professor 6: “… you know, and I have to be the role model also, for them 
to learn things. If I am doing it in the wrong way, I cannot think that my 
students will do that. […] Ok, so I have to tell them.  
GMM: yeah. And, and, act… 
Professor 6: act, yes” 
 
Professor 9: “…to put in practice… it’s one of the things in these cases, 
it’s that perhaps the student knows it, but then when he is in a laboratory 
and the senior, or who supervises him, let’s say, ‘oh well, but you really 
don’t need to do this and that’, then he doesn't have the strength… […] 
Because… actually in this transition phase… the student then is in a too 
weak position. He cannot be the one who… 
GMM: who maybe changes a decision… 
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Professor 9: …he does not have the… he is not equipped, he does not 
have the chance to do it, so maybe he gets it… we should, ‘do you 
realize that you’re not working in the right conditions?’… maybe he does. 
[…] …but if the laboratory itself, because it does not have the equipment 
or because it is not in the conditions, the student is not in the position to 
be able to… have an influence […]”493 
 
Professor 7: “[…] The other issue is that… what we are going to do with 
the people who are already… in service training. We have to make tailor-
made courses for them. Upgrade their skills in this, so that… when… the 
newly graduated people enter to that level market, there will be a 
harmony with the people… 
GMM: yeah 
Professor 7: … no conflict. They are… speaking with a common 
language. […] we want to apply that, nobody is allowed, nobody will say 
‘what you are doing, we are twenty years working like this, and nothing 
happened’…” 
8.4 Level 4 - Result 
Levels 4 of Evaluation looks at the broader result or impact of education; in 
case of managing biorisks, and specifically deliberate disease risks, we look at 
results on risks after education is implemented.494 Opinions and experiences 
reported in the interviews confirmed that education has the potential to impact 
on risk, and that evaluation on this Level would be challenging to quantify or 
                                                      
493 Translated from the original Italian: Professor 9: “… mettere in pratica… è una delle cose in questi casi 
qua è che magari lo studente lo sa, però quando si trova in un laboratorio  e che il senior o chi lo segue, 
diciamo, ‘figurati mica hai bisogno di fare questo e quell’altro’, quello non ha la forza… […] Perché… in 
realtà in questa fase intermedia… lo studente dopo è in una posizione troppo debole. Lui non può essere 
quello che… 
GMM: che cambia una decisione magari… 
Professor 9:… non ha il… non è attrezzato, non ha la possibilità di farlo, perciò magari se ne rende 
conto… bisognerebbe, ‘ti rendi conto che non stai lavorando nelle condizioni giuste?’… magari lui ce l’ha. 
[…] … se però il laboratorio stesso comunque perché non ha le attrezzature o perché non è nelle 
condizioni o non ce le ha, non è lo studente che è nella posizione di poter… incidere […]” 
494 Achievement of results would be dependent on students reaching learning (Level 2) and sustaining it to 
behaviour (Level 3), and expected results should be consequential to learning and behaviour objectives as 
planned during design of education. 
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qualify, but nonetheless possible, as the reasoning by Professor 5 and 
Professor 9 suggests: 
Professor 5: “when… maybe when they link to the society… to the 
industry, to the pharmaceuticals…[…]… I am sure they can pass, the 
scientists or the educators can pass to the industry areas, or to define an 
area.” 
 
Professor 9: “…that would remain as all your experiences, that for good 
and bad anyway shape your personality and what you can do. So… I 
think things are measured on a time span that is much longer and so we 
will never be able to have tangible data, if not indirect indicators, on the 
fact that some accidents don’t happen which means that at the end in 
some way you achieved the effect.”495 
Professor 9’s point on indicators for Level 4 is in line with the specific evaluation 
tools I proposed during Design. Those indicators for Level 4 included the 
availability of risk mitigation measures; reduction of LAIs, cross-contamination, 
or environmental release; reduction of thefts, breaches, or losses; and a well-
established norm on the prohibition of misuse of science and material. Besides 
the mention of incidents and accidents quoted also by Professor 9, Professor 7 
mentioned the reputation of the organization and the availability of biorisk 
mitigation measures: 
Professor 7: “I think, one of them as you said, incident reports. Er, 
frequency, er, if there is outbreaks, as you said… and… the other issues 
that… also the reputation of, of the lab… if I feel that… the work of the 
lab become[s] better… specially in… that means its, I mean, service it’s 
improving […] The other issue I think that, I can, I can ask technicians 
who work in this lab, and the other labs. Specially… if they… er… if they 
                                                      
495 Translated from the original Italian: Professor 9: “… che rimanga come tutte le tue esperienze, nel bene 
e nel male comunque plasmano la tua personalità e quello che riesci a fare. Perciò… io penso che le cose 
si misurano su un arco di tempo che è molto più lungo e quindi noi non riusciremo mai ad avere dei dati 
che siano tangibili, se non indicatori poi indiretti, sul fatto che non si verifichino certi incidenti che fa sì che 
poi alla fine vuol dire che in qualche modo l’effetto l’hai ottenuto.” 
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were working in this and they were transferred or by any… so to give us, 
er, like comparison.” 
Level 4 Evaluation extends over time - even more than behavioural 
observations - possibly beyond the period when students remain in the 
university. So as noted in Chapter 6, different methods could be needed to 
observe results of education, such as alumni networks that allow contacting and 
surveying graduates in their different workplaces and careers. Furthermore, 
faculty members point out that education of technical students is a necessary 
but often not sufficient condition to reach desired Level 4 indicators. Professors 
identified other conditions that should be present or built, 496  to make sure 
learning and behaviour can actually translate to results, such as general 
awareness; appropriate regulation and legislation; and an oversight system and 
structure which scientists and science educators can confidently interact with: 
Professor 1: “They are three things that go together. Zero risk does not 
exist, […] but they would help in reducing risk the most, so they are 
education, training; awareness raising, the largest, general; and then 
regulation 
GMM:  yeah I like this, the three strands, and levels. Awareness raising… 
Professor 1: for the majority of population… 
GMM: …general. Knowledge and education, especially for those people 
in those specific roles… 
Professor 1: yes, yes 
GMM : and regulation 
Professor 1: regulation, yes […] you must go with the three together. 
Because as it is often members of parliament or politicians don’t make 
regulations, because themselves are not competent. Because it’s not 
scientists who make policies, decisions rest on policy, it’s not scientists. 
[…] so this thing of going on the other side to do the war, the war in Syria, 
                                                      
496 And that may be considered in the web of prevention of deliberate disease risks. 
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or… this is… because of this a control is really needed… [unclear]… 
laws are also needed”497 
Professor 9: “[…] to be able to have… that the system controls itself… 
there must be a diffused awareness… but then when problems come out 
there must be interfaces to reach to.”498 
Also as Professor 9 reinforces regarding potential threats, education of young 
and future scientists is needed to have the awareness and the necessary 
capacities to identify and understand biorisks; but then the scientific community 
- yet autonomous in their risk identification responsibilities - cannot alone 
manage all deliberate disease risks. Structures to contact, and which can 
provide guidance or assistance, are needed:  
Professor 9: “[…] however at some point, once you understood and you 
don't know… because it’s difficult to assess… if it is a real risk or not… 
not necessarily, right? Not everyone who has risk behaviours en up… 
[…] to on the one side understand that there is a radicalization problem… 
and maybe this is the information part, but the next step is who do I turn 
to.”499 
                                                      
497 Translated from the original French and English: Professor 1: “Sont trois choses qui vont ensemble. Le 
risk zero n’existe pas, […] mais seront réduire au maximum du risque, donc c’est l’éducation, la formation; 
la sensibilisation, la plus grande, générale; et puis la règlementation 
GMM : yeah I like this, the three strands, and levels. Sensibilisation… 
Professor 1: pour la majorité de la population 
GMM : general. Knowledge and education, especially for those people in those specific roles… 
Professor 1: yes, yes 
GMM : and regulation 
Professor 1: regulation, yes […] you must go with the three together. Parce-que de façon-ci parfois les 
parlementaires ou les politiciens ne font pas de règlementation, parce-que eux-mêmes, ils ignorent. Parce-
que ce sont pas le scientifiques qui font les politiques, la décision reste on politique, ils ne sont pas les 
scientifiques. […] Donc ce fait de aller de l’autre coté a faire la guerre, la guerre en Syrie, ou… ça c’est… 
pour ce là il faut même qu’on contrôle… [unclear]… il faut des lois aussi. ” 
498  Translated from the original Italian: Professor 9: “[…] per riuscire ad avere… che il sistema di 
autocontrolli… ci deve essere la consapevolezza diffusa… ma dove poi dopo sorgono i problemi ci devono 
essere le interfacce con le quali rapportarsi.” 
499 Translated from the original Italian: Professor 9: “[…] Però a un certo punto, tu una volta che hai capito 
e non sai… perché è difficile capire… se è un vero rischio o meno… non è detto, no? Non è che tutti quelli 
che hanno dei comportamenti a rischio finiscono… […] da un lato capire che c’è un problema di 
radicalizzazione… e forse questa è la parte di informazione, ma l’atto successivo è a chi mi rivolgo.” 
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After considering the consensus on the potential for education to influence 
result, the consistency of indicators, and views on the other conditions that have 
to be integrated into the web of prevention, we should look at how can 
education actually mitigate deliberate disease risks; and at the suggestions from 
empirical data using the evaluation tools proposed.500 
An important discussion before looking at measurements of Level 4 indicators is 
the different risk characterization and evaluation by different professors among 
the deliberate disease risk scenarios. In particular, I collected different opinions 
regarding the non-state threats, and between the insider and outsider non-state 
threats. The likelihood of deliberate disease risks waged by non-state actors, 
such as bioterrorism, is often characterized as low likelihood by professors. 
Some educators clearly think that the possibility of insider threats involving 
scientists, i.e. that science students could become compromised in the future 
and hence that education would have a role in limiting that risk via inculcating a 
norm against those actions or increasing the changes that the other scientists 
mitigate it, is improbable. See the comment from Professor 5: 
Professor 5: “they have a project together […] they want to have the 
private sectors also involved. […] So, I am guessing if they work together 
in a project, more related to organisms or bacteria, or fungi or something, 
er… I am sure they can pass, the scientists or the educators can pass to 
the industry areas, or to define an area… more about this… precautions, 
and procedures… it’s hard for me to believe that someone intentionally 
would do this, but they would be certainly be more aware if they worked 
together…” 
                                                      
500 I argued in Chapter 3 that results of education in the four thematic areas have the potential to impact in 
the three deliberate disease risk scenarios. In the first scenario, characterized by the state threat, 
education would influence risk through the ability of scientists to recognize the offensive nature of a 
program and reducing their willingness and availability to being employed in a biological weapons program. 
In the second risk scenario, characterized by the non-state outsider threat, education would influence risk 
through, for example, improved and more relevant physical security and good practices on material control 
& accountability; responsible management of dual-use material and research; capacity on laboratory 
biorisk management measures; and freeing-up resources for R&D on public health by saving on 
prescriptive risk mitigation measures. In the third risk scenario, characterized by the non-state insider 
threat, education would again influence risk through some of the above capacities, but also via, for 
example, scientists being able to recognize insider threats, and the instilled norm of prohibition of 
deliberate disease in the individual and scientific community.  
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However, other educators think the likelihood of the non-state insider threat 
deliberate disease risk actually exists and that it should be considered. This 
position sustains the role of education within deliberate disease risks mitigation, 
which may involve an insider threat with scientific capacities. Besides the quote 
above from Professor 9, also consider the reasoning from Professor 1: 
Professor 1: “[…] we have the problem with chemical products. […] so… 
controlling chemical products that get out of the Faculty, that are used 
during practical classes, that are used during… we remain vigilant on this 
products so that a student never… they can be very quickly manipulated, 
unfortunately we see it with… with what’s going on in the Middle East… 
and so many young people who rapidly diverted from their… they are 
very easily manipulable… Some, who have difficulties maybe… that are 
psychological. Not everyone, some.”501 
Regarding empirical or potential results on Level 4 indicators highlighted in 
conversations with educators, firstly I would count mentions of biorisk mitigation 
measures being implemented and promoted by students as a result of their 
behaviours after the educational interventions. Improvements according to the 
“available risk mitigation measures” indicator also has the potential to impact on 
indicators such as reduced LAIs, cross-contaminations, and environmental 
releases. See for example Professor 6’s reports of improved hazardous material 
control & accountability, and Professor 8’s quotes on biological waste 
management: 
Professor 6: “So… those students who are working with something which 
is… dangerous… which has some potential… [they] can take care of it. 
Ok? Sometimes certain things happen in ignorance… you may not… 
want to do it, but it happens. Because of… lack of awareness… So, there, 
the education is important so that the person at least… if… deliberately 
somebody does it, that's a different story. […] But… something should 
                                                      
501 Translated from the original French: Professor 1: “[…] nous avons le problème avec les produits 
chimies. […] donc… un contrôle des produits chimie qui sort de la faculté, qui sont utilisés pendant les 
travaux pratiques, qui sont utilisés dans… on est vigilantes pour ces produits parce-que qu’on jamais un 
étudiant… qui peut être manipulés très rapidement, malheureusement le voit avec le… avec le qui se 
passe en Moyen Orient… et donc beaucoup des jeunes qui sont rapidement détournés de leur… ils sont 
très facilement manipulable…. Certains, qu’on des difficultés, peut être… qui sont psychologiques. Pas 
tous, certains.” 
 278 
not happen because of just ignorance. So, there comes the role of the 
education in security. Like, in my lab, we are not dealing with something 
that can be dangerous, ok? But we do work with pathogens, which are of 
mild nature, but you know after this… this workshop, I told them to… you 
know, catalogue things, there is a… somebody opening the minus twenty, 
puts a sign of what they have taken, what they have kept…  so that, at 
least they can recall it. If there is a something missing, I am doing it for 
that purpose, how much is that thing used, whether it’s there, in our 
possession or not, simply because that… the same thing can be applied, 
in situations when you are dealing with the most deadliest things.” 
 
Professor 8: “Because he is already conscious about it, and if you explain, 
it means he takes it. Because at the first time they are not interested, you 
finish class, maybe you finished the class two months ago, and… he, by 
the time they finish they are starting their research, then someone comes 
to the… and asks particular questions. You know? Ok, for example I can 
tell you that… […] so I came to this lab before… somehow there’s a way 
they were disposing [waste] […]” 
The potential for education to impact specifically on the results regarding 
security has also been recognized, as Professors 7 and 4 infer: 
Professor 7: “can insure people who are shy of this that… within five 
years, six years, things will be changed. We will have new qualified 
technicians, who are well provided theoretically and they are conceptual 
for work regarding security, is different from others. So, they can make, 
they can make change. Towards this more… security…” 
 
Professor 4: “I think there’s just raising the question and saying, this 
might be a problem, makes them talk among each other, ‘what are we 
doing and why are we doing it’, and I like to think that is one of the best 
ways to actually secure our environment and the things they are doing, 
because we can’t lock [all] doors, and we can not be in full control of 
what they’re doing” 
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A more general argumentation by Professor 4 regarding results touches on 
promoting and improving risk-informed practices. They also reprise a theme 
underlined by other interviewees, that ignorance is a risk itself and becomes a 
risk factor for deliberate disease, and that the educational action could help in 
mitigating both:  
Professor 4: “so just having you know groups of students talking to each 
other, ‘what are we doing and how are we doing it’, I think is really 
important. And if we lowered sort of the… er… some of them think it’s a 
little bit ridiculous to talk about risk, ‘we know what we are doing’, and 
some teachers actually have that attitude too, that… how to… explain, 
‘how dangerous could it be for us to modify a bacteria?’ and so on, so 
they say ‘we know about the risks’ and so on, so I think this attitude that 
‘we know what we’re doing’ is…er… sometimes sent over to the students 
that there are no risks, and I think that is a risk. If they don’t understand 
that what we are doing constantly, actually raises risks, and that the 
students among themselves talk about, you know, ‘could it be dangerous 
for us’, or for me or for you…” 
Other educators reinforce this concept, less generally on risk and more 
specifically on deliberate disease risks. Results they argue would be relevant for 
the Level 4 indicator of promoting a “well established norm of prohibiting 
misuse”. Clearly we devote particular attention to this area, as it is especially 
relevant to the deliberate disease risks focus within the biorisk spectrum. The 
mechanisms in which implemented education would mitigate deliberate disease 
risks are, firstly that young and future scientists are not easily compromised due 
to ignorance and become insider threats themselves; and secondly by creating 
a safeguard and group stewardship among the community of scientists against 
future insider and outsider threats: 
Professor 1: “ignorance is much more dangerous than knowledge. 
GMM: mmh 
Professor 1: er, ignorance it’s much more dangerous because if there is 
no knowledge, the whole group does not have knowledge. And so it’s the 
whole group that can be manipulated much more easily. On the other 
hand, if they have knowledge, there is one from the group who can 
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become disloyal and who can be manipulated, but it’s not the whole 
group. Because what is dangerous is ignorance. More dangerous is 
really ignorance, it’s not… […] For example, [unclear] because they 
[grew up] in ignorance, of religion’s truth, […] etcetera etcetera etcetera, 
or simply of the true [unclear], with weak understanding, and actually the 
look for [utopies], for things that… because, actually, it’s ignorance, 
because if they really knew religion […], they would not do this. [laugh] 
Because this is not religion… it’s not… it’s no religion… 
GMM: it’s much closer to ignorance 
Professor 1: ignorance, exactly.”502 
Particularly in view of the former mechanism, given the long-term and close 
relationships that are created among students and between students and 
educators, higher education could be a valuable context to assess the potential 
for insider threats, and possibly to address them before they concretize in 
deliberate disease risks: 
Professor 1: “when I take a student in the PhD, there isn’t more than, 
there isn’t more than his knowledge, than his brain, his behaviour, his 
communication, his vision, more or less these are the things I am 
interested in. So besides what I am aware or not on if he is a good 
technician or a good [unclear] or what, and so with the relationship over 
three years, over four years, we’ll see how he behaves, and so a student 
who risks… be it what it takes with him, of material, or that he does not 
                                                      
502  Translated from the original French and English: Professor 1: “l’ignorance est beaucoup plus 
dangereuse de que la connaissance. 
GMM : mmh 
Professor 1: er, c’est beaucoup plus dangereuse l’ignorance parce-que s’il n’y a pas de connaissance 
c’est tout le group qu’il n’a pas de connaissance. Et donc tout le group qu’il peut être manipulé beaucoup 
plus facilement. Par contre, si ils ont la connaissance, c’est un du group qui peut virer infidèlement et qui 
peut être manipule, mais il n’est pas tout le group. Parce-ce que ce qu’est dangereuse c’est l’ignorance. 
Plus dangereuse c’est vraiment l’ignorance, c’est pas la… […] Par exemple, [unclear] parce-ce qu’ils sont 
[grandis] dans l’ignorance, de la vérité de la religion, […] etcetera etcetera etcetera, ou simplement de la 
vrai [unclear], du faibles psychologique, en fait ils cherche des [utopies], des choses… parce-que, en fait, 
c’est l’ignorance, parce-ce s’ils connaitraient vraiment la religion […], ils ne vont pas faire ça. [laugh] 
Parce-que ça c’est pas la religion… c’est pas… c’est aucune religion… 
GMM : it’s much closer to ignorance 
Professor 1: ignorance, exactly” 
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do what he should, normally… is rejected at some point. A student who 
risks becoming other things, we are also going to exclude him.”503 
On the other hand regarding the latter mechanism, the result of “well 
established norm of prohibiting misuse” emerging from education would limit 
deliberate disease risks especially in both the outsider and insider non-state 
threats scenarios giving future scientists the tools to identify risks in their 
technical areas and contexts (as well as, particularly in the outsider non-state 
threat scenario, helping future scientists not to inadvertently raise deliberate 
disease risks): 
Professor 9: “on this specific risk…education is very important for 
awareness, and so to obtain of course first so that you in the first place 
don't do something dangerous with dual-use, and so self… restrain 
yourself. And this is one aspect. And then because to be able to… no 
regulation, policy system… is able to control everybody… I mean, it’s not 
like… it would be crazy to think… and so to get that… that the system 
self-controls… diffused awareness must be there… […]”504 
Finally, the result of education measured by the “well established norm of 
prohibiting misuse” indicator would provide future and young scientists with the 
capacities to identify and assess deliberate disease risks (either from insider or 
outsider threats) faster and more clearly, as well as to communicate them: 
Professor 9: “well from a certain point of view, and also in this case… I 
very much make the comparison to what happened now with terrorist 
acts… because… because we don't have other options to defend 
                                                      
503 Translated from the original French: Professor 1: “quand je prends un étudiant en Doctorat, il n’y a pas 
que, il n’y a pas que son savoir, que son cerveil qui m’a, son comportement, sa communication, sa vision 
plus ou moins ça fait les sont qui m’on intéressent. Donc au de là que je sais ou pas qu’il est un bon 
technicien ou bon [unclear] ou ce là, et donc avec la relation sur trois ans, sur quatre ans, on voit comment 
il se comporte, et donc un étudiant qui risque de… soit qu’il ne prend pas soi, de tout le matériel, ou qu’il 
ne faut pas qu’il faut faire, normalement… le rejet à un certain moment. Un étudiant qui risque de dévier 
de autres choses, on va il exclure aussi.” 
504 Translated from the original Italian: Professor 9: “su questo rischio specifico… l’education è molto 
importante per la consapevolezza, e quindi per far acquisire assolutamente uno per non fare tu stesso sul 
dual-use qualcosa di pericoloso, e quindi auto… frenarti. E questo è un aspetto. E poi perché per poter… 
nessun sistema di regulation, di policy… è in grado di controllare tutti… cioè non è che… non sta né in 
cielo né in terra questo… e quindi per riuscire ad avere… che il sistema di autocontrolli… ci deve essere la 
consapevolezza diffusa… […]” 
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ourselves, if not general awareness and that when in front of given 
behaviours one can… more in advance… identify that potentially there is 
a problem. If that means to have as it can be in some cases, there could 
be in some cases some central offices where you can send a warning, 
where it’s possible to… so there can be a feedback on the warnings, it’s 
one of the things that I can imagine could be a trace… er… and in this 
case I would probably need that level [of competence]. Because if I 
have… then I can spot behaviours which are not right.”505 
8.5 Conclusions 
Examples of evaluation of reaction of students to education suggest that 
objectives for Level 1 were achieved by actions in the considered projects. 
According to the proposed indicator, students were generally “satisfied, 
interested and engaged” with educational interventions. Metrics to support it are 
particularly measured from post-instruction questionnaire surveys, where 90% 
or more of students were interested in the topics and thought that the quality of 
instruction was high. Feedback also suggested that students thought that 
education on biorisk/deliberate disease risks was particularly relevant for their 
position, country, and scientific formation; and that they favoured learner-
centred-delivery approaches, as those described in Chapter 7, rather than more 
traditionally lecture-based formats. 
Empirical data from considered projects and experiences of interviewed 
professors, suggest that students in the four thematic areas generally achieved 
testable learning objectives/Level 2 indicators to acceptable degrees. Some 
learning objectives were more easily achieved than others. It is easier to 
evaluate lower levels of learning, on which I have presented a range of possible 
evaluation tools. Particularly in the dual-use and broader biosecurity thematic 
area, being aware of and understanding the dual-use issue is a basic learning 
                                                      
505 Translated from the original Italian: Professor 9: “beh da un certo punto di vista, e anche in questo 
caso…io faccio molto il parallelo con quello che è successo adesso con gli atti di terrorismo…perché… 
perché noi non abbiamo altre possibilità per difenderci, se non la consapevolezza generale e il fatto che di 
fronte a certi comportamenti uno…con più anticipo… è in grado di identificare che c’è potenzialmente un 
problema. Se quello vuol dire avere come può essere in alcuni casi, possono essere in alcuni casi delle 
centrali dove si può segnalare, dove si possa… allora si può avere un riscontro sulle segnalazioni, è una 
delle cose che posso immaginare possa essere una traccia… er… e in questo caso probabilmente avrei 
bisogno di avere questo livello [di competenza]. Perché se io ho degli… riesco a vedere dei 
comportamenti che non sono giusti”. 
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objective that was achieved in the experiences that addressed it, which provide 
useful examples for evaluation tools. Evaluating indicators at higher levels of 
learning requires more complex evaluation strategies, however some ideas for 
evaluation tools for these levels have also been presented. The research was 
mainly able to evaluate indicators of the “knowledge” and “attitude” cognitive 
domains, while it lacks Level 2 evaluation data on the “skill” cognitive domain, 
although some ideas presented in this Chapter and the designed metrics and 
data sources proposed in Chapter 6 could remain valid.506 Finally, it should be 
reminded how differences in students and their learning styles may influence 
the ways and rates in which they learn. As one interviewed professor noted – 
not least confirming the power of exercise, one of the principles of learning 
discussed in Chapter 7: 
Professor 6: “[…] you have to… emphasize it once and again, it’s not one 
go… there are, there are people, you know, in the group, who are very 
receptive in one go, that again depends on the sensitivity of the person, 
that will be individual attitude. So, some may take it immediately, others 
will need some more… you know, reaffirming the same thing over the 
time…” 
Interviewed professors shared the view advanced by this research’s design and 
evaluation tools that behavioural change depends on learning, and that the 
latter depends on education. There are examples of observed behaviours in 
students who took education designed as a mitigation tool of deliberate disease 
risks, which were improved, compared to students who were not subjects of 
such programmes. These reports of empirical observations however are scarce 
especially for what regards the laboratory biosafety and laboratory biosecurity 
thematic areas, not least because structured evaluation tools for behaviour are 
lacking or because it’s difficult to observe students some time after they 
                                                      
506 Another aspect to highlight is any difference between experiences of instruction applying the learner-
centred-delivery approach and those using a more traditional instructor-centred approach. Previous 
analysis on the post-instruction survey data from EUBARNet seminars (Novossiolova et al., 2013) for 
example compared learning results among seminars finding that students who attended the two seminars 
in the series with a higher degree of active learning (employing different collaborative learning formats, 
including TBL) showed a considerably higher percentage of correct answers to the question on defining 
the dual-use dilemma than students who attended the four seminars in the series with a higher degree of 
instructor-based lecturing. 
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completed a specific course. Other identified challenges include observing 
behaviours that implement higher levels of learning, and making sure that 
behavioural transfer is not prevented by non-training problems, such as a work 
environment that is not receptive to the awareness and capacities on biosafety 
and biosecurity that students acquired. On the other hand however, a number of 
the interviewed professors reported change related to increased consideration 
of risks, particularly regarding dual-use and broader biosecurity issues.  
Evaluation of results seems to confirm that education of young and future 
scientists, specifically in the higher education context, has the potential to 
mitigate the risks of deliberate disease risks.507  Furthermore, education has 
been defined a necessary but not sufficient condition to achieve risk mitigation, 
and educators reinforced the idea that components such as legislation and 
regulatory systems to support scientists in risk management should be 
integrated in the web of prevention of deliberate disease risks.508 
Nonetheless, conversations with educators confirmed that tools proposed in 
Chapter 6 of this thesis could be useful to evaluate results on risks, as well as 
provided data that - although not representative – provide useful illustrations. 
These indicators include the availability of risk mitigation measures, where 
some professors reported improvements connected to students’ behaviours 
emerging from education; reduced LAIs, cross contaminations, and 
environmental releases; reduction of thefts, breaches, or losses; and a well 
established norm among students of prohibition of misuse. The latter, which is 
deemed particularly relevant to mitigate the risks of deliberate disease within 
the biorisk spectrum, was frequently quoted in interviews with educators as a 
reasonable development promoted by education. Professors who had 
experience of promoting and implementing education with their students confirm 
the view that education would mitigate deliberate disease risks largely by 
affecting risk likelihood in the three considered risk scenarios, in line with what 
theorized in Chapter 3. According to the accounts of their experiences, 
                                                      
507 Conversations with educators who implemented instruction indicated that empirical data are scarce due 
to the long-term nature of expected results and challenges in following-up with students after their 
academic formation. 
508 In this regard, it could be interesting for further research to design and assess models of outreach 
between law enforcement and the scientific communities on a collaborative and open basis, on the line for 
example of the FBI-universities initiatives (Lempinen, 2011; AAAS, 2013), see Chapter 4. 
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education would have the potential to reduce the likelihood of future and young 
scientists of becoming involved in state programs of developing biological 
weapons (under the first risk scenario); reduce the likelihood of themselves 
becoming insider threats, and make them better able to identify and counter 
insider threats (under the third risk scenario); and mitigate the opportunity for 
outsider threats to misuse (under the second risk scenario) by improving 
scientists’ awareness and capacities to protect their science and to identify and 
mitigate misuse risks. 
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9. Evaluation in instruction design plan 
This Chapter will discuss Evaluation in the instruction design plan of research, 
applying the evaluation tools designed in Chapter 6. Data from the projects are 
presented and discussed on if and how instructional design based on the 
learning-by-design and learner-centred-delivery pillars have been useful in 
promoting effective and sustainable examples of education on deliberate 
disease risks. The discussion is based on indicators and respective metrics 
presented in Table 28. The Chapter starts from the reaction of participants in 
ISD workshops, moves to evaluating the achievement of learning objectives, 
followed by evaluation of the creation of actual instruction and of its 
formalization within higher education programmes, based on the experiences of 
the considered projects. That is, Level 3 and Level 4 evaluation in the 
instruction design plan whose indicators correspond to the Implementation 
component of ADDIE as discussed in Chapter 7. 
9.1 Level 1 - Reaction 
The first level of Evaluation in the instructional design plan measured the same 
indicator used in the education plan regarding students, but this time focusing 
on educators participating to ISD workshops. Hence the indicator “the 
participant is satisfied, interested and engaged” measured their reaction to the 
training aimed at promoting education on biorisk, and deliberate disease risks, 
management. The data to measure the indicator’s metrics come from 
satisfaction surveys completed by participants after ISD workshops; other data 
from those workshops, as well as from interviews with professors. 
Examples for measurement of satisfaction from post-ISD workshops surveys 
come from participants from projects in Region A, Country A University 2, 
Country B, Country C and Country D who participated to different ISD 
workshops. The surveys used one model already used for discussion in the 
previous Chapter and presented in Chapter 1, and used for trainings on biorisk 
management by Sandia National Laboratories.509 The satisfaction indicator has 
been measured in three cases with both the “average score” and the “spread of 
support” metrics, and in two cases with only the “average score” (see Table 40). 
Feedback from instructors on ISD workshops have been positive or very 
                                                      
509 It asked participants, anonymously, opinions on items to understand their satisfaction, interest and 
engagement, using Likert-scale questions. 
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positive, with all items receiving strong majorities of at least “agree” answers 
and/or average scores above 4 out of 5, and all participants from courses that 
used the “spread of support” metric evaluating the programme as relevant to 
their position. 
Table 40 - Level 1 evaluation results from post-ISD workshops satisfaction surveys 
 
Comments in open questions from participants tend to confirm the positive 
feedback on both the subject matter and the approaches to instructional design; 
and on the plans for transferring instruction to students, see for example: 
“I have learnt new things that I will pass down in my future trainings” 
[RA.ISD.01] 
“Excellent training. Opened my eyes on methods of training skills I did 
not have prior knowledge on” [RA.ISD.02] 
“Implementation of this idea in many colleges in Country B and practical 
approach” [B.ISD.2.01] 
 Region A Country A 
University 2 
Country 
B 
Country 
C 
Country D 
I am satisfied with the event/workshop 
Strongly agree 74% (17) 
4,7 
52% (15) 
4,4 4,3 4,8 
65% (13) 
4,6 
Agree 26% (6) 41% (12) 30% (6) 
Neutral 0% (0) 7% (2) 5% (1) 
Disagree 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Strongly 
disagree 
0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Unanswered 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
This  event/workshop met my prior objectives and expectations 
Strongly agree 57% (13) 
4,5 
24% (7) 
4,1 4,6 4,9 
45% (9) 
4,4 
Agree 39% (9) 66% (19) 50% (10) 
Neutral 0% (0) 10% (3) 5% (1) 
Disagree 4% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Strongly 
disagree 
0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Unanswered 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
The ability, clarity and completeness of the trainer were adequate when responding to trainee 
questions 
Strongly agree 70% (16) 
4,7 
66% (19) 
4,7 4,6 5,0 
65% (13) 
4,6 
Agree 26% (6) 34% (10) 25% (5) 
Neutral 4% (1) 0% (0) 5% (1) 
Disagree 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Strongly 
disagree 
0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Unanswered 0% (0) 0% (0) 5% (1) 
The information I learned within the course was important and relevant to my current position 
Strongly agree 57% (13) 
4,7 
62% (18) 
4,8 - 4,3 
70% (14) 
4,7 
Agree 26% (6) 21% (6) 30% (6) 
Neutral 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Disagree 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Strongly 
disagree 
0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Unanswered 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
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 “It will help me in including some of the training/learning principles in my 
class” [C.ISD.05] 
Participants’ engagement in ISD workshops can also be evaluated through the 
metric of groups’ involvement in learning activities. The indicator of the interest 
and engagement of educators can be assessed by the continuing participation 
of engaged individuals in subsequent projects on education on deliberate 
disease.510 
In summary, engaged academics have generally been interested in the idea of 
learning and developing education for students, and advocates of the 
importance of teaching management of biorisks and deliberate disease risks to 
students. Another possible underlying motivation for increased interest by 
educators on education on these subjects, and on considering education as a 
possible risk mitigation tool, is proposed by Professor 9 in terms of risk 
perceptions and evaluation by educators:  
Professor 9: “[…] it would be thought that the risk would only be from the 
south Mediterranean, and I have to say that the reinterpretation with what 
happened… with terrorist acts in Europe, carried however by Europeans, 
[…] suggests… how… the importance of the theme within the European 
countries themselves, and not seen as a risk coming from the outside, 
gained a certain… er… it reinforced let’s say an initial interest which was 
more of just curiosity.”511 
9.2 Level 2 – Learning 
The second level of Evaluation in the instruction design plan focuses on the 
achievement of learning objectives by participating educators on designing 
effective education, according to the ISD principles. Proposed learning 
objectives/Level 2 indicators from Chapter 6 include: knowing the components 
                                                      
510 It has been noted in the projects overview in Chapter 1 for example how members of the network of the 
2008-2009 project “Fostering the Biosecurity Norm” then became promoters of the EUBARNet project in 
2011-2012; and as they, as well as previously engaged professors in the Morocco and Pakistan projects, 
initiated the international network which constituted Project 18. 
511  Translated from the original Italian: Professor 9: “[…] si pensasse che il rischio fosse soltanto 
proveniente dal sud mediterraneo, e devo dire la rilettura con quello che è successo… con atti di 
terrorismo in Europa, svolta però da europei, […] fanno capire… come… l’importanza del tema all’interno 
dei paesi europei stessi, e non visto come un rischio che viene da fuori ha trovato un suo… er… ha 
rinforzato diciamo un interesse iniziale più di curiosità.” 
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of the training design cycle; understanding what to look at to characterize 
learners and instructional context; drafting learning objectives; designing 
instruction; understanding different learner-centred instructional techniques; 
using learner-centred education development and implementation methods; and 
evaluating education’s impacts on the four levels. The designed learning 
objectives include five in the knowledge and one in the skill cognitive domains; 
and span from the “know” to the “evaluate” levels of learning. 
The projects provide data to measure some of the metrics included in the 
design of evaluation tools and organized in Table 28 in Chapter 6. Possible data 
sources include post-instruction self-assessment questionnaires by faculty 
members; evaluation questions on instructional design and development; 
rubrics for peer-review of instruction development and implementation 
exercises; developed instructional materials by professors participating in train-
the-trainers programs; and interviews with educators involved in promotion of 
education on deliberate disease risks.512 
Examples of answers by participants to post-ISD workshops self-assessment 
questionnaires in the framework of the projects with Region A, Country A 
University 2, Country B and Country D HEIs indicate that after the train-the-
trainer programmes instructors generally felt confident on a number of key 
capacities related to phases of the ADDIE instructional design model. In Table 
41, results from questionnaires are reported (with the spread of support and/or 
the average score metrics) for different self-assessment questions connected 
with the Analysis, Design, Development, Implementation or Evaluation phases 
of instructional design. 
  
                                                      
512 Post-instruction evaluation questions to students can also be useful to understand if some instructional 
design principles have been applied in education they received. The questionnaire used in Project 18 
seminars for example asked students if they were well informed about the objectives of the event, which 
can be useful to test the application of the Development principle of clearly stating objectives and 
developing in line with students’ expectations (84% of the 453 students to Project 18 seminars on dual-
use/deliberate disease risks at least agreed to the item). 
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Table 41 - Results to post-ISD workshops self-assessment questions, Level 2 
However, self-assessment and multiple choice questionnaires alone often do 
not provide the necessary depth and resolution to measure achievement of 
Indicator Question Region A Country A 
University 2 
Count
ry B 
Country D 
Knowledge: 
Understand: what 
to look at to 
characterize 
learners and 
instructional 
context 
I know what resources are available on biosafety, biosecurity and bioethics 
education 
Strongly 
agree 
- 
- 
45% (13) 
4,3 - 
65% (13) 
4,7 
Agree - 38% (11) 35% (7) 
Neutral - 14% (4) 0% (0) 
Disagree - 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Strongly 
disagree 
- 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Unanswered - 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Knowledge: 
Know: 
components of 
the training 
design cycle;  
 
Knowledge: 
Understand: 
different learner-
centred 
instructional 
techniques 
I know useful models from learning science that will make developing training 
easier and also more effective 
Strongly 
agree 
68% (15) 
4,6 
31% (9) 
4,3 4,1 
- 
- 
Agree 36% (8) 62% (18) - 
Neutral 0% (0) 3% (1) - 
Disagree 0% (0) 0% (0) - 
Strongly 
disagree 
0% (0) 0% (0) - 
Unanswered 
0% (0) 0% (0) - 
Knowledge: 
Apply: design 
instruction 
I am able to select and use resources to configure educational materials for target 
audiences 
Strongly 
agree 
- 
- 
31% (9) 
4,2 - 
- 
- 
Agree - 62% (18) - 
Neutral - 3% (1) - 
Disagree - 0% (0) - 
Strongly 
disagree 
- 0% (0) - 
Unanswered - 0% (0) - 
I am able to match desired objectives with available resources 
Strongly 
agree 
- 
- 
41% (12) 
4,3 - 
55% (11) 
4,6 
Agree - 45% (13) 45% (9) 
Neutral - 10% (3) 0% (0) 
Disagree - 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Strongly 
disagree 
- 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Unanswered - 0% (0) 0% (0) 
I am able to use validated instructional design processes to plan biorisk 
management training session 
Strongly 
agree 
59% (13) 
4,5 
- 
- 4,1 
- 
- 
Agree 45% (10) - - 
Neutral 0% (0) - - 
Disagree 0% (0) - - 
Strongly 
disagree 
0% (0) - - 
Unanswered 0% (0) - - 
Skill: 
Apply/Analyse: 
use learner-
centred education 
development and 
implementation 
methods 
I am able to design and practice brain-friendly activity to highlight an aspect of 
biorisk management 
Strongly 
agree 
45% (10) 
4,4 
- 
- 4,4 
- 
- 
Agree 55% (12) - - 
Neutral 5% (1) - - 
Disagree 0% (0) - - 
Strongly 
disagree 
0% (0) - - 
Unanswered 0% (0) - - 
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instructional design learning objectives, especially those of higher levels of 
learning. Products developed by participants during ISD workshops on the other 
hand can be a powerful data source for metrics of the designed indicators. One 
example is the design documents produced by participants in which they at the 
same time practice the learning-by-design pillar and draft instruction on biorisk 
management for their students. Contemplating design documents by 
participants is a way to measure how training programmes were successful in 
achieving learning objectives on the Analysis and Design components of the 
ADDIE model of ISD. The data from actual design documents presented in 
Chapter 6 illustrate how participants achieved, to different degrees, the learning 
objectives of understanding what to look at to characterize learners and 
instructional contexts; knowing the components of the training design cycle; 
drafting learning objectives; and designing instruction. Similarly, the instructional 
materials on biorisk management that participants produced during training 
activities on the Development ADDIE phase (as described in Chapter 7), can be 
a data source to assess the achievement of the learning objectives 
understanding and using different learner-centred-delivery techniques. 
Professors participating to Region A and Country B projects, for example, 
practiced the instructional design pillars by producing learning activities for 
students. While again the quality of the products varied, they were useful 
evaluation tools to assess that participants at least improved and in many cases 
were successful in achieving those Level 2 indicators. Peer-review rubrics 
created during ISD workshops are another example of a useful tool for the 
evaluation of those learning objectives related to Development and 
Implementation, as well as an occasion for participants to improve on the 
learning objective related to the Evaluation skill. Table 42 reports results from 
two ISD workshops where the peer-review evaluation tool was applied on 
participants’ instructional materials on biorisk management. 513  Results are 
positive, possibly not surprisingly with higher averages for simpler learning 
objectives related to the Analysis and Design components. Bigger challenges 
may be related to addressing different types of learners and communication 
                                                      
513 I remind that the items and criteria included in the peer-review tools are selected by participants and 
hence are (to some degree) different every time. See Chapter 7 on the reasons for the peer-review as a 
training activity itself. 
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modes, something that may be related to a higher level of learning but also to 
the practicality of the exercise being limited to a short and focused activity.  
Table 42 - Results of peer-review assessments on developed and implemented instructional 
materials 
Finally a useful data source for measuring indicators of instructional capacities 
among professors are the interviews where I asked educators about their 
instructional practices or how they felt about effectiveness of educational design 
and delivery methods. In this sense, the conversation with Professor 9 provided 
a number of interesting empirical confirmations of the value of instructional 
design pillars, especially the learner-centred-delivery one. In the interview for 
example, they made suggestions that clearly connect with principles discussed 
in Chapter 7, and that would suggest grasp of learning objectives on the 
Development and Implementation components of the ADDIE model. Here they 
reflect on something similar to what we referred to as “surprise”, and that the 
dual-use issue has a stronger catch on students if it is presented as a dilemma 
                                                      
514 Average peer-review score from three groups. 
515 Average peer-review score from five groups. 
516 “The training addresses different types of learning styles giving freedoms to the learners.” 
Indicator Question Country 
C514 
Region 
A515 
Knowledge: 
Understand: what to 
look at to characterize 
learners and 
instructional context 
The audience was well defined 4,5 - 
The training was relevant to the audience for which it 
was designed 
4,4 - 
Knowledge: Apply: draft 
learning objectives 
Did the activity meet your expectations? - 4,4 
Was the activity relevant to the lesson’s objectives? - 4,5 
The training contributes to the larger objective for 
societal benefit (biorisk mitigation) 
4,5 - 
Skill: Apply/Analyse: 
use learner-centred 
education development 
and implementation 
methods 
How adequate was the organization of the activity? - 4,3 
How clear was the message? - 4,3 
How effectively was interaction used? - 4,4 
Did the methods utilized help you understand the 
topic? 
- 4,3 
Was the activity enjoyable? - 4,3 
Was the activity memorable? - 4,3 
How adequate was the organization of the activity? - 4,3 
Was the activity designed to overcome communication 
barriers? 
- 4,1 
How effective was the communication mode?  4,2 
Did the training address different types of learners 
(theorist, reflector, pragmatist, activist)? 
4,1516 4,1 
The training uses recaps and summaries 3,9 - 
The training uses principles of learning (e.g. primacy, 
recency, exercise…) 
4,0 - 
The learning objective is better achieved with 
facilitated learning techniques 
4,2 - 
The training has a compelling relevance to real life 
situations 
4,3 - 
The training meets the learning objective 4,6 - 
The principles and practices of the training are 
appropriate 
4,3 - 
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emerging from a scientific case, rather than as a specific problem addressed 
separately: 
Professor 9: “to have the student actually interiorizing it, it’s not enough 
to give him a list […] … an emotional shock, I don't know how to call it, I 
mean the fact that the student has to see himself in the condition… so if I 
tell you this example, this or that, and I give you some kind of a general 
overview…er… in my opinion it strikes the student much less, or… it 
doesn't link it to what he is studying specifically, while… if I introduce it 
for some aspects in the virology course, for another aspect in a course, 
let’s say, of pharmacology, or simply in that of cellular biology or of 
immunology, that I think it’s the more relevant one, because actually the 
problem is that I move it on what its effect is… and so, I can much more 
strongly link it to all the other stuff that we covered and that didn't have 
anything to do with that problem, but I move, if I just move a little bit, and 
there I fall in it, which is different to say ‘now… a completely independent 
course will tell you about that problem’… I mean, at least I see it… this 
way […] I can lead the student almost to introduce him to an activity that 
does not… and so it starts, in a very featureless way… that has inside… 
but then instead of concluding with scientific information, actually it opens 
up this discussion. And one got there almost without even realizing it. 
GMM: realizing it, yes 
Professor 9: which by the way is much closer… to what actually happens 
in reality.”517 
                                                      
517 Translated from the original Italian: Professor 9: “perché lo studente in realtà lo faccia proprio non basta 
fargli un elenco […]… uno shock emozionale non so come dire, cioè il fatto che lo studente deve vedersi, 
lui, nella condizione… allora se io ti racconto questo esempio, questo o quell’altro, e ti faccio una specie di 
panoramica generale… er… secondo me colpisce molto di meno lo studente, oppure… lo svincola da 
quello che sta studiando in modo più stretto, mentre… se io lo metto per alcuni aspetti nel corso di 
virologia, per altro in un corso che sia di farmacologia, oppure quello di biologia cellulare semplicemente o 
di immunologia, che per me è la cosa più vicina, perché in realtà il problema è che lo sposto su quello che 
è l’effetto… e quindi, riesco molto di più a collegarlo a tutte le altre cose che abbiamo visto tranquillamente 
che con quel problema non avevano niente a che vedere ma mi sposto, basta che mi sposto un pochino e 
in realtà ci casco dentro, che è diverso rispetto a dire ‘adesso… un corso completamente indipendente va 
a parlarti di quel problema lì’… cioè almeno io lo vivo…così […] Posso portare lo studente quasi quasi a 
proporgli una attività che non… e quindi parte, in modo molto anonimo… presenta all’interno… ma invece 
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While here on utilizing and tailoring media resources: 
Professor 9: “…what I would like to find is some discussion or 
presentation on YouTube because… I mean, YouTube, Vimeo or 
whatever… accessible… as I found a system to make it interactive, so I 
can add text and make it more integrated with the lecture, it’s not just ‘go 
watch this on YouTube’, and to have students answer to quiz questions, 
and… so I mean if there’s something that you can suggest me that can 
be useful, that would be a very useful tool.”518 
And here proposing ideas to achieve and test higher levels of learning 
objectives for students, demonstrating understanding of how Development of 
instructional materials needs to be consequential to Design (e.g. “analyse” or 
“evaluate” learning objectives are hard to teach or evaluate with simple tests): 
Professor 9: “like, for example, an activity, an exercise could be… there 
again… it would be necessary to prepare some material but, could be to 
put the student in role of being a commission deciding on some funding, 
or whatever could be the situation… 
GMM: and maybe evaluate that too, because it could somehow be the 
development… it would introduce this learning objective of a higher… 
level… 
Professor 9: yes […] I mean, we would need an exercise book on this 
thing… I mean what could be presented as… fictional case studies…”519 
                                                                                                                                                            
di concludersi con un dato scientifico, in realtà apre a questa discussione. E uno ci è arrivato quasi quasi 
senza rendersene conto. 
GMM: rendersene conto, sì 
Professor 9: che poi è molto più… vicino a quello che ti succede nella realtà.” 
518 Translated from the original Italian: Professor 9: “… la cosa che mi piacerebbe trovare è qualche 
discussione o presentazione di qualcosa messo su Youtube perché… dico Youtube o Vimeo o altro 
sistema… accessibile… più che altro perché ho trovato un sistema per poter renderlo interattivo, e quindi 
per poterlo aggiungere del testo e quindi farlo parte più integrante della lezione, non soltanto vai a vederti 
questa cosa su Youtube, e di poter sia far rispondere a delle domande a quiz, sia… cioè e quindi questo 
se c’è qualcosa che mi segnali che possa essere utile questo sarebbe uno strumento molto utile.” 
519 Translated from the original Italian: Professor 9: “come ad esempio una attività, un esercizio che 
potrebbe essere, anche lì… bisogna preparare un po’ di materiale, è mettere lo studente nella posizione di 
essere una commissione che decide per dei fondi, o quella che è la situazione… 
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9.3 Level 3 - Behaviour 
The third level of Evaluation, behaviour, looks at if the principles of instructional 
design for education on managing specifically deliberate disease risks and other 
biorisks have been transferred by educators in the practice in HEIs and 
sustained over time. As discussed in Chapter 7, this is related to the 
Implementation component in the ADDIE model. Indeed a sustainable 
implementation of education on biorisk management and to mitigate deliberate 
disease risks is one that is imparted by local educational systems and 
instructors, rather than what was tested by external instructors as me and 
others (the latter being courses and programs whose results have been 
presented in the previous Chapter on Evaluation in the education plan). This 
implementation is what is evaluated in Levels 3 and 4 of evaluation in the 
instructional design plan. Level 3 looks at implementation centred on individual 
professors, assessing if after being engaged in projects to promote education to 
mitigate deliberate disease risks, and in some cases completing ISD workshops, 
they go and implement something in the instruction to their students. The 
designed indicator proposed in Chapter 6 is indeed that participants teach to 
their students. 
Some of the experiences from the projects that were analysed during interviews 
suggest that they reached this level of impact, as some professors actually went 
back to their teaching practice and HEIs and introduced some teaching to their 
students; promoted educational initiatives; and/or transferred the designed and 
developed instructional materials to their courses. So for example Professor 9 
has, as already mentioned, introduced a lecture on dual-use in their introductory 
course on cellular biology for Master students of life sciences degrees, using 
instructional material developed in the framework of the project they participated 
in; as well as included a question on the topic in the final test: 
Professor 9: “[…] I have to say that for what regards me, in the Master 
degree course of cellular and molecular biology, and I have all… I have 
the students from all specializations, so I have them all, I always kept in 
                                                                                                                                                            
GMM: e magari fare una valutazione anche su questo, perché sarebbe anche un po’ il passaggio… 
inserirebbe questo obiettivo formativo un po’ più… er… elevato… 
Professor 9: sì […] cioè ci vorrebbe un libro di esercizi su questa cosa… cioè è quello che si presenta 
come… dei casi finti…” 
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my course, including… er… one lecture on this type of topic, and… 
making students reflect on it. 
GMM: so on… on biosecurity… because biosafety is already there… 
Professor 9: actually on dual-use. […] yes, I continued to do it because 
what… is easier to present is the story of mice in Australia. Because 
actually for us it’s… for this type of education, being it a genetic 
manipulation… and with me covering sections that are really inspired by 
these opportunities… to modify the genome, to introduce new sequences, 
to improve, to make transgenic animals, to be able to do all that, it’s 
really close… 
GMM: to what… 
Professor 9: … then again, my colleague covering virology, covering… 
they could probably do it better than I can… however… I always thought 
it would have been important to keep it… so I… I kept it. 
GMM: yes, yes. Using the… 
Professor 9: using the [instructional] material that was collected, initially, 
in some of the initiative that we did… […] obviously I can’t always put the 
same question [in the test] or it becomes too easy, but I regularly 
included an open question specifically on dual-use or on reprising some 
of the examples we had seen in class so that they could comment it.”520 
                                                      
520  Translated from the original Italian: Professor 9: “[…] io devo dire personalmente nella laurea 
magistrale di biologia cellulare e molecolare, e ho tutti i… ho gli studenti di tutti gli indirizzi, e quindi li ho 
totalmente, io ho sempre continuato nel mio corso, a mantenere…er… una lezione su questo tipo di 
argomento, e… e a far riflettere gli studenti su questo. 
GMM: quindi su… sulla biosecurity… perché biosafety è già… 
Professor 9: proprio sul dual-use. […] sì, ho continuato a fare perché è la cosa che si presta… più 
facilmente è la storia dei topi in Australia. Perché in realtà per noi è… per questo tipo di formazione 
essendo una manipolazione genetica… e facendo io tutta una parte che prende proprio spunto da queste 
possibilità… di modificare il genoma, di poter introdurre nuove sequenze, di poter potenziare, di poter fare 
gli animali transgenici, di poter fare tutta questa cosa, è molto vicino… 
GMM: a quello che… 
Professor 9: …poi, ripeto, il collega che fa virologia, che fa… potrebbe farlo probabilmente meglio di 
quanto lo posso fare io… però… ho sempre ritenuto fosse importante mantenere… perciò io l’ho… l’ho… 
mantenuto. 
GMM: sì, sì. Usando il… 
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Other instances of implementation by individual professors engaged in projects 
have also been claimed by Professor 3 (who teaches biotechnology students); 
Professor 4 (who teaches engineers), Professor 5 (who teaches life sciences 
students); and Professor 7 (who teaches medical students). 
GMM: “have you seen something changing in how the topics were 
incorporated… or… 
Professor 3: yeah. People are reporting about it. It was really… I 
sometimes feel that I am lucky. I am involved in this, because of me, 
people consider in [this country] me as pioneer now, wherever there is a 
meeting, there is a special session on conduct of responsible science, 
and they usually invite me…” 
 
Professor 4: “yes, so, embarrassingly enough… it’s only, you know… 
mainly our own contribution through me and other teachers in biology, we 
had some initiatives by the engineering program who introduced an 
ethical course for engineers, but it’s more directed towards product 
development, sustainability, what kind of responsibility you have to your 
customers, to your company, to society, so it’s not really a bio…er… 
direction, although it does talk about the responsibility you have as a 
researcher… 
GMM: and in engineer[ing] respect 
Professor 4: engineer, but not really the bio… er… direction of it, so they 
do not talk about biosafety and biosecurity, so the things that the 
students have today, the subjects and the modules that… through myself 
and our professors in biology, has happened. So I saw it as a sort of big 
responsibility now that we have more formalized it and the way we have 
done with the first initiatives that we had seminars, we had lectures, on 
biosecurity and biosafety for engineers, er, and also for our biology 
                                                                                                                                                            
Professor 9: usando il materiale che era stato, poi alla fine… inizialmente… raccolto in alcune delle 
iniziative che avevamo… […] Ovviamente non posso sempre mettere la stessa domanda, se no diventa 
troppo telefonata, ma in modo ricorrente fatto una domanda aperta e quindi dove su in particolare il dual-
use o oppure su il fatto di riprendere alcuni degli esempi che avevamo visto a lezione che loro potessero 
commentarlo.” 
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students through me or other teachers or through the centre for bioethics 
[…]” 
 
Professor 7: “yes, open… so I told them, this is from security wise… 
safety… should address… er, shoe cover. Er, we showed them also a 
video on the entrance of the lab without authorized… this is security. So, 
this start now, we start to… to teach students that not anybody is allowed 
to enter the lab. Not because of infection or contamination, but for… bad 
intention.” 
While Professor 6 was not yet able to implement education but does plan on 
introducing something: 
GMM: “Er, have you seen, you know, since the new academic year has 
started, have you seen or do you, er, anticipate any change in the 
educational offering in this direction, do you see these topics, biosafety 
and biosecurity, biorisk management more in general, being inserted in 
the curricula, in the future? 
Professor 6: why not, because this is very very important. This is very 
important and should be, and some part is already as I told you, it is 
already there and since I am now having more of awareness and access 
to… er… the things, I would want it to be strengthened, because I don't 
say that they are not there, they are already introduced, but 
strengthening is required, which I can do after, you know, attending the 
workshop. So… definitely, I see future, in future that these things should 
be incorporated if they are not there, but in our curriculum it is there, and 
you know, after doing this workshop I saw to it that it is… you know… 
incorporated into the pre-PhD program. I will do that.” 
Data for Level 3 evaluation are also available from content analysis of publicly 
available secondary data. Professors at the University of Granada in Spain and 
the Quaid-i-Azam University in Pakistan, for example, who were involved in the 
EUBARNet and Pakistan projects, independently continued to organize 
awareness raising seminars on dual-use and broader biosecurity issues also 
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after the specific projects ended up to 2016 (Tanveer and Shinwari, 2015a; 
Universidad de Granada, 2016). 
Notwithstanding the above reports from many of the interviewed professors that 
they started implementation of education on biorisk/deliberate disease risks 
management to students following up to our engagement and training projects, 
these experiences are not generalized for example to all participants to train-
the-trainer programmes as many faculty members did or could not follow up as 
much. Challenges could on the one hand be due to training problems (those 
that the ISD train-the-trainer programmes would aim at solving), and on the 
other hand to non-training problems of external limitations such as a rigid 
curriculum system in HEIs. The interviews with professors provided some 
insights on these types of challenges that educators could face introducing new 
instruction. Professor 4 for example illustrates well what could be training 
problems in faculty that may hamper Level 3 impacts: 
Professor 4: “I think what we are missing is a discussion among the 
teachers, how are the areas been changing and what possibilities does it 
bring that we can order things from companies, and so on. We have tried 
to have teachers’ meetings, and especially now when we have these 
ethical modules on courses, we have to include the teachers, because 
we say ‘we can’t bring in the experts all the time, you have to talk about 
this’. And some teachers say ‘ok, I will not do it’, but we do have a 
growing group of teachers that also like working with the students, 
because… you were talking about teaching methods, and we actually tell 
the teachers ‘you cannot lecture only, you have to do other things’, 
because if you don't introduce or have the students themselves talk, you 
know, do things, we cannot prove that they actually gain awareness, 
during this process. So some of the teachers… er… opposed to, you 
know, that we said, ‘lecture is not enough’, yes so the methodology, 
the…. ‘Oh, my gosh, cant I do my lecture’… and we said ‘no, you have to 
do it in a different way’, but some teachers… really like that, so we try to 
work from those teachers. So I think we are growing also in awareness 
with the teachers, that we have to talk to the students and we have to 
bring in the new technologies also, with a risk assessment.” 
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On the other hand, Professor 2 notes that in their national higher education 
systems professors don’t have a lot of autonomy to change courses521, and 
hence they could introduce the subject but had to opt for extra-curricular 
seminars rather than having it structured into courses: 
Professor 2: “[…] at the level of universities *******, professors cannot 
change courses as they please… 
GMM: directly 
Professor 2: …directly. And [courses] must be accredited by the Ministry 
of Higher Education 
GMM: the government 
Professor 2: … by the government, by the Ministry of Education, and 
notably by a national commission called the *****, the Accreditation 
National Commission. And so, our colleagues, after our action, what they 
introduced are rather some seminars.”522 
Which is similar to what Professor 4 reports, but with their opinion on the 
weaker learning effect such format can have on students: 
Professor 4: “[…] I think in that sense we have targeted a lot of the 
students, but when we measure it, we ask the students what have you 
done in this, and they say ‘oh, we had the seminar’, they don't remember 
it.” 
                                                      
521 While in most other cases interviewed professors reported revision processes for courses in which 
professors of local departments have some degrees of autonomy from a central approval agency. See for 
example this description from Professor 6 that is a good example: “yes, there is a committee which is 
known as the board of control. So, the curricula that… whatever curricula that we make, it goes to… into 
that… for meeting into that committee, and then people decide. And then it goes from approval, then it 
goes to the higher authority, where there is a science research board which gives a, a larger body, which 
gives it approval, finally, for… a particular course to run in the department”. 
522 Translated from the original French: Professor 2: “[…] au niveau des universités ******, les professeurs 
n’ont pas le droit de changer des cursus comme ça… 
GMM: directement 
Professor 2: …directement. Et il faut que ils sont accrédités par le Ministère de l’Enseignement Supérieur 
GMM: l’Etat 
Professor 2: …par l’Etat, par le Ministère de l’Enseignement, et notamment par une commission nationale 
qui s’appelle la ****, la Commission Nationale d’Accréditation. Et donc, comme fait les collègues, suite à 
notre action, ce que ils ont introduit des séminaires.” 
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Indeed this comment by Professor 4 suggests that even when some Level 3 
result was possible (and even more so when it was difficult), a formalized 
introduction in the educational system is more desirable for sustainable, 
generalized implementation, that is, more effective education. While results on 
Level 3 are important, stopping there is not just less effective from the learning 
point of view, but also leaves instruction dependant on the initiative of the 
individual, and hence not sustainable, as Professor 5 notes: 
GMM: “so this course is taught to various students, in various degrees, 
and has a… a small part that also considers these subjects 
Professor 5: now it has. So, for instance next year, next January I am not 
in charge of this discipline anymore 
GMM: so, you wont be there… you don't think it will stay 
Professor 5: I don't know, I have to talk with my colleague, if she… for 
instance if she wants me to give a talk 
GMM: so you don't think that it is something that right now is sustainable 
enough… because it depends from you 
Professor 5: no, we have to… of course we have to present to the 
scientific committee to… 
GMM: to make it… 
Professor 5: to make the change” 
9.4 Level 4 - Result 
The limitations of the achievements measured by Level 3 indicators considered 
above explain why it is important to look at formalized implementation in 
educational programs, what we have designed as Level 4 results in the 
instructional design plan. If education is analysed as a necessary (yet, as 
observed, not sufficient) component of technical formation to mitigate risks of 
deliberate disease, it should be explicitly included in learning objectives and 
built into the formal course designs of HEIs. The indicator for evaluating Level 4 
results proposed in Chapter 6 was the “formal introduction in instruction 
programs (new or revised credited instruction)”. 
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In the projects considered by this research, such result was achieved in a 
number of cases in connection with the collaborative work with professors and 
decision-makers in HEIs, which in some cases included the ISD train-the-trainer 
programmes. In one of the HEIs involved in a project, while the university had 
already decided the inclusion of a course on biorisk management in the syllabus 
of one of their Master courses before designing and developing it, awareness 
raising of educators and ISD train-the-trainer was instrumental in creating 
effective instructional materials: 
GMM: “[…] did you see a change in the course degree? 
Professor 8: definitely 
GMM: in the syllabus 
Professor 8: definitely 
GMM: because you have a course, right, a new course… and… so you 
have seen a change 
Professor 8: I think, that time when we did the course review…” 
Country A University 1 and Country A University 2’s faculty members planned to 
move in a similar direction of creating a “cross-cutting” course covering 
biosafety and biosecurity for all undergraduate students of life science and 
technology degrees before they specialize in the various subject matters.  
Partly as a result of engagements over the years, Quaid-i-Azam University in 
Pakistan introduced a core 3-credit hours course in Bioethics & Dual-Use 
Education for Masters in Biotechnology students as well as an optional 3-credit 
hours course in Biosafety & Biosecurity (QAU, 2014; Tanveer and Shinwari, 
2015a). At least one of the professors engaged in the Region A ISD workshop 
was tasked by their leadership at the home HEIs to redesign an existing course 
on Good Laboratory Practice and Quality for Master students of Immunology to 
expand and introduce biosafety and biosecurity teaching. 
Some of the interviewed professors who firstly achieved “individual” results that 
have been discussed under Level 3, then reported on Level 4 outcomes as well. 
Professor 2 reported in their interview that, also based on the experiences 
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gained in the collaborative projects on promoting education with me and other 
colleagues, they established a Master degree in biosafety and biosecurity: 
Professor 2: “[…] finally we created, starting in September, a Master, the 
Master in biosafety and biosecurity, and that’s a first at the national 
level… and even I would say at the international level, because this is a 
degree recognized by the government, that is going to train trainers, 
people who are going to be experts, and who will then work.”523 
However, interviewed educators seem clear that the primary goal would be to 
formally introduce the subjects into new or existing courses of a large range of 
life sciences and health degrees, rather than aiming at forming specialists on 
managing biorisks. So the same Professor 2, following up from the mentions of 
challenges in Level 3 for “informal” introduction in seminars presented in the 
previous paragraph, that 
Professor 2: “[…] so this… […] it used to be a problem, but starting this 
year we had a, how to say, reform of higher education system at the level 
of universities and there colleagues introduced some teaching modules. 
GMM: ok. 
Professor 2: so, these modules, which are now accredited by the 
government and hence it’s something very important. Now, and I would 
say not all universities, but a good part of the ******* universities, within 
courses, within their curricula, some modules on biosafety, biosecurity, 
and dual-use. And this is something very important, it’s… and this is 
going to continue, will continue.”524 
                                                      
523 Translated from the original French: Professor 2: “[…] dernièrement nous avons créé, a partir de 
Septembre là, un Master, le Master de biosécurité et biosûreté, et c’est une première au niveau national… 
et même je dirait au niveau international, parce que c’est un diplôme reconnue par l’état, qui vais former 
des formateur, des gents qui vont être des experts, et qui vont travailler plus tard. ” 
524 Translated from the original French: Professor 2 : “[…] Donc, ça… […] était un problème, mais là a 
partir de cette année on a eu toute une, comment dire, reforme de l’enseignement LMD au niveau des 
universités et là les collègue ont introduit des modules d’enseignement. 
GMM: ok.  
Professor 2: alors, des modules, qui sont accrédités maintenant par l’Etat et donc c’est quelque chose de 
très important. Maintenant, et je dirais pas toutes les universités, mais une bonne parte des universités 
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Furthermore, Professor 4 describes the reasons and the ways of their move 
from a “Level 3” to a “Level 4” implementation, as well as the extent of the latter: 
Professor 4: “So what we have moved on to right now is to make it more 
visible, so we have introduced it into every program… that we have…so 
what we are moving on to, like the last two years we worked on having, 
so ***** prepared, she went through all our curricula for biology, er, 
Bachelor, Master and engineer program which has bio direction, and she 
went through that and made suggestion for including in all the curricula 
that we are responsible for, er…. Parts of ethical, you know, character, 
so it includes biosafety, biosecurity, dual-use, but also… er…publication 
ethics… 
GMM: […] has not… has still not been incorporated in the normal 
curriculum or… 
Professor 4: oh, it is, absolutely 
GMM: ah ok 
Professor 4: ok, so for every course, like the introductory course that I 
teach, we have one goal for that course that concerns bioethics, so that 
was one part of making it more visible, so even if I am not the teacher 
anymore, this is the goal for the course, which means that whoever 
teaches this course, has to write or, you know, be aware of this goal, and 
also show what the content to reach this goal, and also how to assess 
that the students really have done this, so they have to show in different 
ways you know, depending on if we have a seminar, they have to 
participate in that seminar.” 
While Professor 7 had a course formally introduced covering biorisk 
management and bioethics within the syllabus of a Bachelor of medical 
laboratory sciences: 
GMM: “so, er… do I understand correctly that in the course you have 
now, you do not teach biosecurity, to students? 
                                                                                                                                                            
*********, en seine des courses, dans leurs cursus, des modules de biosécurité, de biosûreté, et double 
usage. Et ça c’est quelque chose de très importante, c’est un… et ça va continuer, ça va continuer.” 
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Professor 7: no, we teach, but… 
GMM: some of that 
Professor 7: yes, but, but our focus was on biosafety. 
GMM: mmh. I see 
Professor 7: but for this reason, we called the course biorisk, we didn't 
call it biosafety. Because… we are planning to include both. Biosafety, 
biosecurity. We didn't call it biosafety only. We called it biorisk. And we 
agreed before that, when we say biorisk we mean two. Biosafety, 
biosecurity.” 
Other professors who had not witnessed results that could be ascribed to 
metrics for our Level 4 indicator, indeed reported some ideas and plans for 
future formal implementation, such as Professor 1 and Professor 4: 
Professor 1: “[…] all students who enrol in a PhD are obliged at the end 
the three years, they cannot defend their thesis, and documented to have 
followed two hundreds hours of training. There are two hundreds hours of 
training, they are not fixed, there is no defined programme. We could 
have sixty hours on science, forty on pedagogical approaches, or on 
pedagogical innovation, and [unclear] thirty or forty hours of courses on 
bioethics, on… property rights, law, the problem of plagiarism, the 
problem of… 
GMM: intellectual property 
Professor 1: exactly. And the problem for all those who will attend, who 
will attend PhDs in exact or natural sciences, all that is in relation with 
biosafety and biosecurity. And the problem of raising awareness 
regarding the issue of possible dual-use. Because not everybody is 
aware.”525 
                                                      
525 Translated from the original French: Professor 1: “[…] tous les étudiants qui s’inscrivent au Doctorat ils 
sont obligés au bout de trois ans, ils ne peuvent pas soutenir leur thèse, et justifiés pas d’avoir suivi deux-
cents heures de formation. Ils sont deux-cents heures de formation, elles ne sont pas fixées, il n’y a pas 
un programme définitif. On peut mettre soixante heures de scientifique, quarante heures d’approche 
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Professor 4: “I have to check when I get back home, but what I told our… 
our Dean for the natural sciences and technology is that, ‘ok we’re sort of 
leading it in biology because, you know, these questions are just, you 
know so important to us, but what we do can be used for the other 
educational programmes’, so that’s what happened this fall, that we got 
funds to coordinate all the educational programmes in natural sciences 
and technology in ***** [university], and that’s a bit overwhelming, so I 
said you know, we gonna use our project in biology and do some of the 
modules for other educational programmes.” 
An interesting theme regards the opinions on effective drivers for Level 4 
achievements according to the interviewed professors. Responsibility for course 
design may be with central national coordination bodies, which should be 
engaged to facilitate a generalized introduction. Depending on national 
education systems, these bodies could be governmental, as those mentioned 
by Professor 2 in the quotes in the Level 3 discussion, or academic as in the 
experience reported by Professor 9: 
Professor 9: “as far as I know, that topic… at the national level, it didn't 
catch, and we didn't have the time to consolidate it because we got out 
[…] from the [national academic coordination committee] […] 
GMM: so that could have been a… a strategy or a… to generalize it… 
Professor 9: yes, because they continued working on other topics… 
GMM: that had been… 
Professor 9: … I still know people active there whom I could contact back, 
one in particular… er… works with me on a working group of the 
                                                                                                                                                            
pédagogique, ou d’innovation pédagogique, et vont [unclear] trente ou quarante heures des cours sur la 
bioéthique, sur… le respect de la propriété, du droit, le problème du plagiaire, le problème de… 
GMM: intellectual property 
Professor 1: exactly. Et le problème pur tous qui vont suivre des, qui vont faire des Doctorat en sciences 
exactes ou sciences naturelles, tous qui est en relation avec la biosécurité, la bio sûreté. Et la 
problématique du sensibiliser au problème qui peut avoir de double usage. Parce-que tout le monde l’est 
pas consciente.” 
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[national evaluation agency for HEIs] and so we are in very close contact, 
actually I could even raise the topic with them… 
GMM: so but, why do you think, in that case, in the [national academic 
coordination committee], it didn't continue, it didn't catch? 
Professor 9: I think because nobody took the responsibility [being ‘the 
advocate’] of the issue.”526 
The above quote at the same time strongly underlines the need for individual 
action (promotion, advocating) to be sustained within the national coordination 
bodies. Other drivers quoted by interviewed professors point to international 
collaborations to raise the interest especially on deliberate disease risks, as 
Professor 9 below, and audits on instructional systems by national coordination 
bodies on HEIs, as Professor 4 relates: 
Professor 9: “in my opinion the most interesting thing was the interaction 
at the international level, I mean from my point of view I noticed the 
biggest progress when that topic was brought into this project [project 
name] […] The biosecurity aspect, in my view is much more bound to 
teaching strictly speaking, because I have to stimulate a reflection, I have 
to shape, it would fall we could say… er… more in the Dublin 
descriptors…”527 
                                                      
526 Translated from the original Italian: Professor 9: “a mia conoscenza quel tema lì… a livello nazionale, 
non è riuscito a sfondare, e noi non abbiamo avuto il tempo di consolidarlo perché siamo uscite […] dal... 
[comitato accademico di coordinamento nazionale] […] 
GMM: quindi quello avrebbe potuto essere una… una strategia o una… per generalizzarlo 
Professor 9: sì, perché hanno continuato a lavorare su altri temi…  
GMM: che erano stati… 
Professor 9: … conosco ancora gente attiva sui quali potrei riprendere anche alcuni contatti, perché una in 
particolare… er… lavora assieme a me in un gruppo di lavoro dell’[national evaluation agency for HEIs] e 
quindi sono in contatto molto stretto, in effetti potrei anche sollevare il problema con lei… 
GMM: ma, quindi, perché, secondo lei in quel caso, nel [comitato accademico di coordinamento nazionale], 
non ha continuato, non ha fatto presa? 
Professor 9: secondo me non c’è nessuno che si è fatto portavoce del problema.” 
527 Translated from the original Italian: Professor 9: “per me la cosa interessante è stata il confronto a 
livello internazionale, cioè dal mio punto di vista il salto più importante l’ho visto quando quella tematica è 
stata portata all’interno di questo progetto ****** […] L’aspetto di biosecurity, a mio avviso è molto più 
legato alla didattica nel senso stretto, perché devo aprire una riflessione, devo formare, rientra potremmo 
dire….er… più nei descrittori di Dublino…” 
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Professor 4: “[…] This is something we have also worked on, to make it 
more visible, because we had from our education ministry, they had an 
audit of all our education, and one of the things that they actually failed 
us on, we had really good grades, and actually they could have failed us 
saying you know, ‘you do not reach the goals set by the ****** education 
system’… 
GMM: which includes… 
Professor 4: …which includes ethics. And actually it was something that 
it was noted for all… I think almost all universities in [country] that, the 
goal for to reach that the students are aware of the ethical, you know, 
considerations, has not been fulfilled with any university, so we went 
back to ourselves and said ok, next time when they come, how do we 
prove that, because the students will say ‘oh, I did have a seminar, cant 
remember’ and so on, so we would have to show them proof, that from 
my course, we had these and those contents that, you know, were raised 
against these things, we had the goal, we had the assessment, so I have 
to show them exactly in detail which were the questions for the exam for 
that goal…” 
9.5 Conclusions 
Evaluation of reaction of educators to ISD train-the-trainer workshops and 
collaborative programmes on promoting education for students as a tool to 
mitigate deliberate disease risks (and other biorisks) suggests that Level 1 
objectives were achieved by such efforts. Metrics for the indicator that 
participants were “satisfied, interested and engaged” include that strong 
majorities of participants were satisfied with the training events and thought that 
the train-the-trainer programmes were important and relevant to their position; 
positive comments on post-ISD workshops questionnaires; and continued 
participation of educators to collaborative projects on education over the years. 
Empirical data regarding learning objectives/Level 2 indicators suggest that 
designed learning objectives were achieved on key capacities on the Analysis, 
Design, Development, Implementation and Evaluation components of the 
instructional design model, though at different degrees. Indicators were 
measured using results from self-assessment surveys, instructional design 
documents and materials produced by participants, who in many cases felt and 
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demonstrated to understand instructional analysis, to be able to draft learning 
objectives and design education, and to use learner-centred-delivery methods. I 
also presented empirical data to support that actions in considered projects 
supported the achievement of Level 3 indicators with the initiation of locally 
driven educational activity. These included several examples of professors 
introducing lectures and seminars for their students on biorisk management and 
deliberate disease risks. Identified challenges for achieving Level 3 objectives 
include both possible training problems (such as the need to train the 
educational staff) and non-training problems such as rigidity on the curricula 
contents. 
I have reiterated however the considerations from Chapter 6 on educational 
Design that achievements limited to Level 3 would not assure an effective 
impact on the instruction design plan, a view confirmed by interviewed 
professors. The indicator for Level 4 results indeed looks at if instruction has 
been formally introduced in educational programs in higher education systems, 
something that makes education to mitigate deliberate disease risks a 
recognized (or even required) component of technical instruction and doesn’t 
leave it dependent only on initiatives of individuals. Empirical data I presented 
suggest that such level of result was achieved in a number of situations 
supported by considered projects, including examples of courses or modules 
introduced or revised to include capacities on biosafety, biosecurity, and/or 
related risk management, as well as similar plans for the future. Interviewed 
professors mentioned a combination of “bottom-up” and “top-down” facilitating 
factors for formal introduction of education to mitigate deliberate disease risks, 
based on their experience. The former would include efforts by interested 
individual educators who take leading roles in promoting the idea onto decision-
makers and raise the awareness of other faculty members; the latter would 
include the work through central coordination bodies of curriculum design for 
higher education at the governmental or academic level. The engagement of 
educators to raise the awareness on education to mitigate the risks of deliberate 
disease, and their training on ISD to implement it, seems important especially 
for the “bottom-up” mechanism as in some way it would improve the likelihood 
that educators move from Level 2 on the instruction design plan to Level 3 and 
finally contribute with their actions to Level 4 results.  
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At this point it should be noted how Evaluation in the instruction design plan of 
research does not only mean assessment of reaction, learning, behaviour and 
results on instructional design, but also includes the follow-up feedback to 
review, revise and if necessary improve initiatives on the instructional design 
plan. Considerations I would advance for example regarding the Analysis and 
Design of train-the-trainer programmes, based on achievements and challenges 
from past experiences, include to make sure that participants have at least a 
basic grasp of the thematic area they should then design instruction on. This 
would include achievement by participants of some “know” and “understand” 
learning objectives in the education plan before moving them to the instruction 
design plan. Furthermore, selection of participants (which too relates to sound 
Analysis and Design decisions when preparing train-the-trainers programmes) 
to collaborative and train-the-trainer projects is key to improve chances of 
achievements on Levels two, three and four. Participants who have stronger 
roles on lecturing, for example, would be more likely to achieve Level 3 
indicators (provided there are not other non-training problems in their context), 
however if they have no course design, review and approval responsibilities 
they may not be able to influence Level 4 results. In this view, the engagement 
of participants with decision-making responsibilities such as Deans, course 
coordinators, and members of national curriculum coordination committees (in 
addition to, rather than instead of, participants with largely lecturing 
responsibilities) has proved effective to achieve Level 3 and especially Level 4 
objectives quicker and to a wider extent. Thirdly, these experiences suggest to 
more strongly include methods and techniques of instructional design and 
development in the instruction design plan, such as making sure to “prepare” 
participants, for example with the use of pre-workshop readings. 
Finally, while it would be difficult to irrefutably demonstrate that Level 4 results 
were a consequence of the engagement projects and/or the train-the-trainer 
programmes on education to mitigate deliberate disease risks, certainly the 
conversations with professors who were involved in promoting education to their 
students suggest their actions were at least initiated by the work in those 
projects. Consider for example these quotes from Professor 2, Professor 5, 
Professor 9 and Professor 4: 
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Professor 2: “there are many experiences that have been collected, 
notably, so, thanks to the cooperation with the Landau-Volta centre. And 
so, in that framework, we had looked after a first situational analysis, of 
knowledge in the field, I… I understood biosafety, biosecurity and dual-
use, after this situational analysis, we realized that it was important to… 
er… going deeper into education at the university level, and into 
education of, of… not just awareness raising… education at the level of 
universities”.528 
 
Professor 5: “my first contact with this, kind of topic, was during [project 
name] when… you… there was the conference, not the conference, it 
was like... 
GMM: like a seminar 
Professor 5: a seminar, or something. And… 
GMM: in [your university]? 
Professor 5: in [my university]. So… I had never thought about this, I 
didn't have content, and in the, the curriculum, in biology, […] we don't 
really think about this. So after [project name] and filling the 
questionnaire… ‘oh my god, I am not… I don't know what this means! I 
really need to learn a little bit more.’” 
 
GMM: “but… er… so… also following or as a result or in relation to the 
activities carried also in those projects […] did educational offerings 
change, that included this topic? One I think may be the example of 
[project name], which had… 
Professor 9: which integrated it 
                                                      
528  Translated from the original French: Professor 2: “il y a beaucoup d’expériences qui ont été 
accumulées, notablement, donc, grâce à la coopération avec le centre Landau-Volta. Et, donc, dans ce 
cadre là, nous avons vu après un premier état de lieu, de connaissance dans le domaine, je… j’entendait 
biosécurité, biosûreté et double usage, après ce état de lieu, nous avons vu qu’il était important 
de…er…d’aller très profondément dans l’éducation au niveau universitaire, et l’éducation de, de… n’est 
pas uniquement la sensibilisation… l’éducation au niveau des universités.” 
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GMM: … It integrated it, also… er… in relation to your proposals, your 
opinions that also derived from… 
Professor 9: … from the previous experience… yes.”529 
 
Professor 4: “Of course the terminology and the works and the projects 
was all new terminology and a new kind of people to meet, but I’ve seen 
it since we started like a constant… contribution to my work in [university] 
because it taught me where to find material, and where to find people, 
that I could connect to, to make the content of our curriculum in 
[university] more professional…. er… more specifically to questions… 
[…] so I am really glad because this… these projects, I should say, have 
been a lot of inspiration and a lot of gain in knowledge for me to work 
with that in ****, and for our very much on the ground level with our 
students in our daily activities, so that has been good.” 
I think it’s hence possible to conclude that the examples of projects considered 
in this research to engage the life sciences/public health higher education 
community and to train educators on instructional systems design, include tools 
that could support an effective design and evaluation of education of students 
on biorisks and deliberate disease risks as a tool to mitigate the latter. 
  
                                                      
529 Translated from the original Italian: GMM: “ma… er… quindi… anche in seguito o in conseguenza o in 
relazione alle attività fatte anche in quei progetti […] sono cambiate delle offerte formative che hanno 
incluso questo? Uno credo sia l’esempio di [progetto], che ha avuto… 
Professor 9: che l’ha integrato 
GMM:… l’ha integrato, anche… er… appunto in relazione alle sue proposte, alle sue opinioni che 
derivavano anche da… 
Professor 9: … dall’esperienza pregressa… sì.” 
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10. Conclusions 
The objectives of this thesis were to examine how education was constructed 
as a potential security tool to mitigate the security risks of deliberate disease, 
discuss if and how education could influence deliberate disease risks, and 
propose options and tools for effective education to mitigate deliberate disease 
risks. With “effective”, I meant education that can be relevant, generalized and 
sustained. How the thesis pursued these objectives was through firstly applying 
securitization categories to analyse the role of education in security; secondly 
using a research framework to connect outcomes in terms of education to 
outcomes in terms of risks; and thirdly leveraging empirical data (including both 
original and pre-existing primary data, as well as secondary data) to develop 
and illustrate possible design and evaluation tools for education as a risk 
mitigation measure.  
10.1 Overview of findings and activities of the thesis 
The thesis defined the research framework in Chapters 1 and 2. The former 
presented the research situation, its opportunities and criticalities, 
methodological and data generation and management aspects. The latter 
explained the theoretical framework, which critically combined components of 
securitization, discourse analysis, risk assessment, science of education, and 
the web of prevention. Three main conceptual areas and categories interplayed: 
security, risk, and education, all within a (weak) social constructionist approach. 
Securitization has been used to analyse attempts to advance education of 
scientists as a tool to mitigate the risks of deliberate disease. Risk assessment 
has been used to identify and characterize risk scenarios and understand if 
education may impact risk likelihood and consequence. Finally, models from 
educational science have been applied to the design of instruction and to 
evaluation of its impacts on learning, behaviour and risk. Three main models 
have been leveraged: Instructional Systems Design (ISD); the Kirkpatrick four-
levels evaluation model; and a range of techniques for “learner-centred” 
teaching. 
Chapter 3 dealt with the possibilities of deliberate disease in both historical and 
comparative perspectives. The concepts and the relationships among 
biosecurity, biosafety, biorisk management, biological weapons, and dual-use 
have been discussed, with the challenges of defining deliberate disease risks. 
The identification, characterization and evaluation phases of risk assessment 
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have been explained, including how characterization can be described as 
“objective but relative”, and evaluation as “subjective”. I explained why I chose 
three deliberate disease risk scenarios for further discussion: one with state 
threat; one with non-state outsider threat; and one with non-state insider threat. 
I also discussed the characterization of hazard, threat and situation factors as 
well as of types of risk mitigation measures, which can influence likelihood 
and/or consequence of risks. I then argued what factors could be influenced by 
education under the three risk scenarios. In Chapter 4, I analysed calls for 
education applying the historico-political securitization model, looking at 
securitizing actors, intended audiences, referent objects, and discursive devices. 
Attempted securitization moves by international governmental organizations, 
national governments, scientific organizations, academia and civil society have 
been identified and assessed, mainly directed to States and the scientific 
community. With Chapters 5 to 9 educational science models were applied to 
education as a potential security risk mitigation tool.530 Both the ADDIE and the 
four-levels models were applied on the education and instruction design plans 
of the research.531 Original and pre-existing primary data as well as secondary 
data were used to illustrate design and evaluation tools. Chapter 5 presented 
the Analysis phase, including characterization of student audiences and results 
suggesting that students generally have a low awareness of concepts regarding 
deliberate disease risks, and that existing educational opportunities are often 
scarce and insufficient. I discussed how many engaged faculty members from 
HEIs believe that incorporating education on biosafety and biosecurity is a high 
priority, and how awareness among educators seems related to heightened 
interest and commitment to support the implementation of education, which I 
think supports the value of faculty engagement and instructional design 
activities. Chapter 6 dealt with Design, the central phase of ISD. Extensive 
discussion was devoted to the topic of learning objectives, including their 
features, a taxonomy that integrates cognitive domains and levels of learning, 
their matching with analysis, and proposed learning objectives for deliberate 
disease risks mitigation. These were organized in four thematic areas, and I 
                                                      
530 These Chapters were organized along the phases of the ADDIE model of ISD, integrated with the 
application of the four-levels impact evaluation model of instruction for the Evaluation phase. 
531 In the education plan the target of interventions are future and young scientists and practictioners. The 
instruction design plan focuses on instruction for educators of those future and young scientists and 
practictioners, which is one factor to facilitate the “sustained” component of “effectiveness” of education. 
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explained how competences in each area contribute to risk mitigation. Finally, 
the design of evaluation in the education and instruction design plans of the 
research has been discussed, presenting specific indicators, metrics and 
possible data sources along the four levels of impact evaluation. Chapter 7 
addressed the Development and Implementation phases under the ADDIE 
model, for both the education and instruction design plans of the research. It 
mainly focused on the learner-centred teaching pillar of education, including 
discussion and actual examples from the considered projects of delivery 
techniques, events of instruction, consideration of learning styles and 
preferences, learning processes, and examples of instructional materials. 
Chapter 8 dealt with Evaluation on the education plan, and Chapter 9 with 
Evaluation on the instruction design plan. This included measuring some of the 
indicators and applying the evaluation tools proposed earlier in the thesis, 
presenting results on the four levels of reaction, learning, behaviour and risk, as 
summarized below. 
10.2 Original contributions by the thesis 
I think the thesis brings at least three main contributions to knowledge: 
regarding the constructed role of education as a potential security measure; 
regarding the employed research framework; and regarding the proposed 
design and evaluation tools for education to mitigate deliberate disease risks. 
Firstly, while literature had addressed education and training on risks, security 
risks, and biosecurity risks, there had not been a structured analysis on the role 
attributed to education as a security tool in a security arena, and on how the 
construction of this role happened. This research contributed a securitization 
discourse analysis that recognized, identified and described securitization 
attempts on the security role of education. 
Secondly, the research framework included, on the one hand, original data and 
methods of analysis, along existing ones that were used in new ways; it came 
from more contexts; and it embraced a wider time window than pre-existing 
works, to come up with new insights on education on deliberate disease risks. 
Although the research also used data from analyses previously published; 
previously carried but not published; or carried out by others, it also included 
entirely original data notably in the form of the semi-structured interviews that 
provided valuable materials for the discussions on Design and Evaluation. On 
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the other hand, the research framework was original in integrating the 
conceptual areas of security, risk and education and in proposing ways to 
connect outcomes in terms of education to outcomes in terms of (security) risks. 
In this way, I think the methodologically and theoretically informed work in the 
thesis made a contribution to knowledge. 
Thirdly, the thesis proposed some tools, based on the experiences contributing 
to the research framework, to design and evaluate education that could be 
effective as a measure to mitigate the security risks of deliberate disease. 
These tools are based and tested on the data informing the research, 
advancing a novel contribution to knowledge.  
10.3 The research questions revisited 
The first research question asked: 
How was education constructed as a measure to mitigate the security 
risks of deliberate disease? 
and addressed if, why and how education became a potential measure in an 
arena traditionally focused on “security”. The thesis argued that education has 
been constructed, through discursive devices by a number of actors, as one tool 
to mitigate what were presented as urgent security threats of deliberate 
disease. Furthermore, the thesis argued that some of the analysed 
securitization discourses have been effective, to different extents, as they were 
accepted by their intended audiences and led to new actions and measures. 
The analysis led to identify six main securitization moves addressed to States 
and three main securitization moves addressed to scientific communities. 
Among the former, the moves to recognize the value of education as a risk 
mitigation measure; on reporting to the BTWC on education efforts; and on 
funding initiatives and projects on education were successful to different extents. 
The moves to consider education as part of national implementation of the 
BTWC; and to involve national organizations competent on education, had 
mixed success; and the move to develop national and international action plans 
on education were largely not implemented. Among the latter, the urge on 
scientists to become aware and recognize the relevance of deliberate disease 
risks has gradually moved from being resisted to being accepted, though far 
from widespread implementation. Some actions followed up to the calls to 
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develop and implement education, and to integrate education in higher 
education systems, however I suggest that implementation has not been 
widespread or necessarily sustainable. 
The second research question asked: 
How could education mitigate risks of deliberate disease? 
and addressed how the mitigation potential of education on deliberate disease 
risks could be assessed. The thesis argued that improved competences built 
with education have the potential to mitigate deliberate disease risks in the 
three identified risk scenarios by impacting on factors influencing risk likelihood 
and/or consequence. For example, education could improve capacity on 
laboratory biorisk management measures, thus impacting on hazard factors and 
reducing risk likelihood under all three scenarios; it could instil the ethical norm 
of prohibition of deliberate disease thus impacting on threat factors and 
reducing risk likelihood under the non-state insider threat scenario; it could 
introduce responsible management of research with dual-use potential thus 
impacting on threat factors and reduce risk likelihood under the non-state 
outsider threat scenario; or could increase the potential for whistleblowing thus 
impacting on situation factors and reduce risk likelihood under the state threat 
scenario. It has also been explained how education has a larger potential to 
mitigate risks through likelihood, rather than consequence, factors. 
Competences in the (bio)risk management thematic area would have the 
potential to influence risk in all three reference scenarios. The laboratory 
biosafety thematic area would have a less direct influence on deliberate disease 
risks but it would still have the potential to influence risk in the second scenario. 
The laboratory biosecurity thematic area would have the potential to influence 
risk in the second and third deliberate disease risk scenarios. The broader 
biosecurity and dual-use management thematic area would have the potential 
to influence deliberate disease risks under the three scenarios. 
Data from interviews with educators supported the view of this thesis that 
behavioural change depends on learning, and that learning depends on 
instruction. Furthermore, evaluation of results supports that education of young 
and future scientists, specifically in the higher education context, has the 
potential to mitigate the risks of deliberate disease. Empirical data especially on 
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the levels of behavioural change and results on risks are however still scarce, 
often due to their long-term nature and to challenges in following-up with 
students. Nonetheless, I presented some relevant examples of empirical 
observations on some behavioural and results indicators, some of which were 
recognized as reasonable developments promoted by education. Analysis of 
interview material also confirmed the view that education would mitigate 
deliberate disease risks largely by affecting risk likelihood, and that education 
has the potential to reduce the likelihood of future and young scientists 
becoming involved in state programs of developing biological weapons; reduce 
the likelihood of themselves becoming insider threats, and make them better 
able to identify and counter insider threats; and mitigate the opportunity for 
outsider threats to misuse by improving scientists’ awareness and capacities to 
protect their science and to identify and mitigate misuse risks. 
Finally, two assumptions connected with the second research question can be 
reviewed, firstly that education would be considered a measure in the web of 
prevention of deliberate disease risks, and secondly that, to be able to argue 
that education has the potential to mitigate deliberate disease risks, the 
possibility to assess those risks has to be assumed. Regarding the former issue, 
education has been defined a necessary but not sufficient condition to achieve 
risk mitigation. Primary data analysis reinforced the idea that components such 
as legislation and regulatory systems to support scientists in risk management 
should be integrated in the web of prevention of deliberate disease risks. 
Regarding the latter issue, the thesis reinforced the idea that factors influencing 
risks could be characterized, however it didn't try to offer a new characterization 
(let alone, evaluation) of those factors within a new risk assessment of 
deliberate disease risks, but rather to identify if education could lower those 
risks; (some of the) specific risks that could be lowered; and how that could 
happen. 
The third research question asked: 
What would the tools be to improve effectiveness of education as a 
mitigation measure of risks of deliberate disease? 
and focused on ways in which education could be designed to maximise 
potential risks mitigation, have its effects evaluated, and be effective as defined 
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above. The thesis advanced a number of design and evaluation tools that could 
help in this sense, which were both informed and illustrated by examples from 
primary and secondary data. Tools included: an application of the ISD 
approach; an application of instruction evaluation models that define objectives 
on four levels including reaction, learning, behaviour and result, and that allows 
evaluating outcomes in terms of education connected to outcomes in terms of 
risks; applications of what have been termed the “learning-by-design” and the 
“learner-centred-teaching” pillars of instruction; the engagement of educators 
and their training in ISD, integrating the instruction design plan to support 
sustainability; and practical tools such as documents to support design and 
matrixes with specific indicators, metrics and data sources to support evaluation. 
I argued that an approach employing some or all of these tools can improve 
effectiveness of education as a deliberate disease risks mitigation measure, 
increasing the relevance of built capacities; reaching larger numbers of those 
who may have a role in mitigating those risks; and improving the likelihood that 
it is sustained over time. 
Presented data contributing to these conclusions include, on the education plan, 
that testable objectives for the first (reaction) and second (learning) Levels were 
achieved to acceptable degrees by actions in considered projects. Particularly 
in the dual-use and broader biosecurity thematic area, being aware of and 
understanding the dual-use issue is a basic learning objective that was 
achieved in the experiences that addressed it. Conversations with educators 
confirmed that the tools could also be valuable to evaluate the third (behaviour) 
and fourth (results) Levels, and provided data on indicators bringing useful 
illustrations.  
On the instruction design plan, empirical data from projects applying the 
relevant tools suggested that objectives were achieved, though on different 
degrees, on reactions and key capacities. I presented data to sustain that 
actions employing these tools supported the achievement of proposed 
behavioural indicators, with the initiation of locally driven educational activities. 
The thesis advanced the idea, supported by educators’ views, that sustainability 
would be improved by formal introduction in educational programs, something 
making education to mitigate deliberate disease risks a component of 
instruction. Empirical data suggested that such a level of result was achieved in 
some situations, and while it would be difficult to irrefutably demonstrate that it 
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was a consequence of the actions employing proposed tools, certainly 
conversations with involved educators suggested their actions were at least 
initiated by the work in those projects. 
Also, two assumptions connected with the third research question can be 
reviewed here: the training or non-training nature of problems preventing the 
transfer from learning to behaviour (and results); and the focus on the higher 
education context. Regarding the former issue, I argued that education can only 
ameliorate training problems, and collected data confirmed that other problems 
may be affecting risk mitigation or preventing improvements from instructional 
actions, including infrastructure or funding problems; the lack of other necessary 
components in the web of prevention, such as legislation or support, oversight 
and reporting systems; rigidity in educational programmes; as well as work 
environments not receptive to the awareness and capacities that students 
acquired. Regarding the latter issue, I explained that the focus on higher 
education had both practical (due to the research situation and the access to 
data), and theoretical (due to the effectiveness potential) reasons. Findings of 
the thesis, including what presented on Levels three and four of impact 
evaluation in both the education and the instruction design plans, are 
indications to support the value of actions in the higher education context. 
However, the thesis also underlined that higher education would not be the only 
possible, and indeed desirable, context for education to mitigate deliberate 
disease risks, with other channels including continuing professional training – as 
well as possibly education at the secondary level.532 The thesis also discussed 
similarities and differences of the higher education and professional training 
contexts, as well as how some design and evaluation tools could be applied and 
adapted beyond higher education, for example regarding the relative 
importance of the Design and the Development phases. 
10.4 Limitations of the research 
A number of limitations of the research can also be identified. The nature of the 
data as discussed could be challenging in terms of reliability, however the 
explanations on how the data was collected; the level of detail; the triangulation 
among different methods; and the convergence of general results suggested by 
                                                      
532 Something advanced and implemented already in the chemical security and chemical weapons risks 
mitigation field (Hay and Mahaffy, 2013; Schouteten, 2013). 
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primary and secondary data can mitigate the risks connected with reliability of 
the results. 
Regarding validity, the research had no claim of generalizability from the 
presented data. What suggested or confirmed by primary data should and could 
not be generalized to any larger population than the groups and samples it is 
collected from. Nonetheless, these groups and samples were numerous and 
diverse and the research presented a very large number of illustrations, 
examples, experiences and suggestions based on quantitative and qualitative 
data from a range of contexts and years. Certainly, while the research did 
leverage experiences in a range of different socio-economic and cultural 
contexts, as can be gathered from Chapter 1, we cannot irrefutably say if and 
how much of the results are transferable or dependent on socio-economic and 
cultural contexts, especially as we have discussed construction of education 
and that there are training and non-training problems that may strongly depend 
on social and cultural factors. 
A few more specific limitations of the research could be identified on its 
education and risk mitigation sides. Regarding the former, limitations include 
empirical data available on higher levels of learning; “skill” and “attitude” 
cognitive domains; Level three (behaviour) indicators for the education plan, 
especially in the laboratory biosafety and laboratory biosecurity thematic areas; 
and experimental design of testing different impacts of learner- and instructor-
centred education on learning. The limited availability is probably due to the 
longer-term nature of the expected effects than the already considerable time 
window embraced by this research, which anyway brings together more 
information than any before. Regarding the risk mitigation side, limitations 
include empirical data available on Level four (results on risks) indicators for the 
education plan, and the lack of experimental design, due to the research 
situation and the considered projects. Suggestions to overcome these 
limitations are included in the next paragraph on possible further research. 
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10.5 Further research 
The experience and findings of the thesis open a number of possible areas that 
would be interesting to further investigate. These ideas could be arranged into 
two main categories, firstly specific ones raised by this research which could be 
checked, tested or further expanded; and secondly more general ideas for 
further research related to the subject matter and/or to the research framework. 
Among specific ideas, firstly it would be interesting to continue tracking the 
implementation of securitization moves such as considering education (in 
particular in the context of higher education) as part of national implementation 
or compliance measures of the BTWC; develop action plans on education; 
awareness of scientists on deliberate disease risks; and especially integration of 
education into national systems. Many of these measures, if accepted and 
feasible at all, would need considerable time for implementation and would be 
different from country to country and context to context; at the same time, they 
are still stressed and called by securitizing actors. 
Projects considered in this research addressed the four different thematic areas 
in which I organized the design, development, implementation and evaluation of 
education in different ways and responding to different priorities and goals. 
Some actions involved multiple thematic areas, others focused on specific ones. 
As such, it was not possible to compare and investigate differences in 
evaluation among the different thematic areas. Designing different thematic 
areas in an educational action from the beginning, it would be possible to 
investigate if and how students react better, learn more, and/or transfer to 
behaviour more successfully regarding laboratory biosafety or dual-use and 
broader biosecurity, for example; and to control if and how differences are due 
to the subject matter or to the teaching techniques. 
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While the research proposed within design and evaluation tools a range of 
learning objectives and level two indicators, I could provide examples of 
evaluation on only some of them. Further research would be needed focusing 
and collecting specific data on learning objectives of the “skill” cognitive domain, 
including but not necessarily limited to the learning objectives, metrics and 
possible data sources proposed here. Further research is also suggested that 
looks at measuring learning objectives and relative indicators, as well as 
behaviour and results levels, for higher levels of learning. Suggested metrics 
that could be particularly interesting, and, I think, relatively easy to investigate 
are “review of research work, proposal and reports” and “integration in work 
presented at conferences”. 
Among more general ideas for further research, firstly the soundness of the 
research framework could be further tested and possibly refined by applying it 
to other capacity building contexts. A similar approach connecting outcomes in 
terms of education to outcomes in terms of risks could be adapted upwards to 
the context of continuous professional development (in-service training) and 
downwards to secondary education. Similar design and evaluation tools can 
also be tested for risk mitigation in areas beyond deliberate disease, biorisks 
and even security risks.  
Regarding both the education and the instruction plans of research, hopefully 
further research can help in refining the proposed design and evaluation tools 
that support implementation of relevant, generalized and sustainable education. 
This should on the one side contribute to risk mitigation, and on the other side 
not unduly hamper science and technology development.  
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Appendices 
Online investigation on content data tabulation model 
 
 
Survey of HEIs on existing biosafety, biosecurity, biorisk management, laboratory management and bioethics contents and contact persons 
N 
Countr
y 
Nam
e of 
HEI 
Typ
e of 
HEI 
Affiliatio
n, Dept., 
Institute, 
School 
or 
Campus 
Activit
y or 
Degre
e 
Type 
or 
Level 
Activit
y or 
Degre
e Title 
or 
Name 
Lin
k 
Commen
ts and 
Notes 
 Y/N/
? 
Biorisk 
Management/Safety/Security/Labor
atory Management Content 
Y/N/
?  
Ethics/Bioethics/Respon
sible Conduct of 
Research Content 
Contact 
Person(
s) 
1             
 
            
2             
 
            
3             
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Sample of questionnaire survey model on professors 
Name (optional): 
Country (optional): 
Institution (optional): 
Function/Role/Job Title/Position (optional): 
Email address (optional, if applicable):  
Area of your Institute/Department/Faculty of affiliation (optional): 
☐ Biology 
☐ Biomedicine 
☐ Biotechnology 
☐ Engineering 
☐ Environmental Sciences 
☐ Humanities 
☐ Medicine 
☐ Natural Sciences 
☐ Pharmacy 
☐ Other 
Discipline(s) taught: _________________________________ 
Level/Degree of intervention: 
☐ Bachelor 
☐ Master 
☐ Doctorate 
 
Approximate number of students taught per year: _________ 
Does your university currently include considerations/Do students currently receive 
education on biosafety (as defined below) in the education of students? 
Biosafety: the containment principles, technologies and practices that are 
implemented to prevent unintentional exposure to biological agents and toxins 
or their accidental release (WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual, 2004) 
☐ Yes, in courses I teach 
☐ Yes, in other courses 
☐ No 
☐ I do not have such information 
If yes, could you provide more information on the extent, nature and context of such 
considerations/education? 
Description Included Referen Modes of Hou Notes 
 365 
 
Does your university currently include considerations/Do students currently receive 
education on biosecurity (as defined below) in the education of students? 
Biosecurity: Protection, control and accountability measures implemented to 
prevent the loss, theft, misuse, diversion, or intentional release of biological 
agents and toxins and related resources, as well as unauthorized access to, 
retention, or transfer of such material (WHO Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance, 
2006); not limited to biosecurity within the laboratory. 
☐ Yes, in courses I teach 
☐ Yes, in other courses 
☐ No 
☐ I do not have such information 
If yes, could you provide more information on the extent, nature and context of such 
considerations/education? 
 
In the taught modules, do you make any reference to the following topics: 
Biosecurity 
☐ Yes (course: ___________) 
☐ No 
Biosafety 
☐ Yes (course: ___________) 
☐ No 
Bioethics 
☐ Yes (course: ___________) 
☐ No 
 
 
 
Biological weapons/ the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention  
☐ Yes (course: ___________) 
☐ No 
"Dual-Use"/misuse  
☐ Yes (course: ___________) 
☐ No 
"Codes of Conduct” 
☐ Yes (course: ___________) 
☐ No 
Laws prohibiting Biological Weapons  
☐ Yes (course: ___________) 
☐ No 
in the 
course… 
ces teaching rs/c
redi
ts 
      
Description Included 
in the 
course… 
Referen
ces 
Modes of 
teaching 
Hou
rs/c
redi
ts 
Notes 
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Are alternative concepts of biosafety/biosecurity to the above ones also used? 
☐No, they are used in the same context: prevention of harm from pathogens and toxins 
☐Yes, they are used in the context of control of agricultural contamination 
☐Yes, they are used in the context of protection of biodiversity 
☐Yes, they are used in the context of GMOs regulation 
If biosafety and/or biosecurity are not taught, what is the reason in your opinion? 
☐These subjects are currently not a high priority, compared to other subjects/we don’t 
think these topics are relevant to our syllabi 
☐Lack of subject matter knowledge, teaching capacity, resources or expertise 
☐Lack of teaching time in courses/curricula 
☐Other (please describe): _________________________________ 
Have you ever attended any training, workshop or seminars on biosafety, biosecurity, 
biorisk management, and/or potential misuse/dual-use issues? 
☐Yes (please provide detail _______________________) 
☐No 
If yes, could you incorporate what you learned into your teaching? 
☐Yes  
☐No  
☐Not Applicable (I do not have teaching responsibilities) 
Do you have any plans to change your course or module to accommodate such topics? 
☐Yes  
☐No  
☐Not Applicable (I do not have teaching responsibilities 
Are you aware of any national or international law, regulation or oversight body 
governing life science research and/or the publication of research/prohibiting the non-
peaceful use of life science research? 
☐Yes (please provide detail _______________________) 
☐No 
Do existing training programs include courses on bioethics, medical ethics or research 
ethics? 
☐Yes, in the courses____________________________________________ 
☐No, they are not included 
☐I don’t know 
If yes, do they include considerations on dual-use issues, potential misuse and/or 
bioterrorism threats, relevant for biosecurity? 
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☐Yes, ethics considerations relevant for biosecurity are included 
☐No, ethics considerations relevant for biosecurity are not included 
☐I don’t know 
Please identify the three learning objectives that you believe are most important for 
your students related to biosafety and biosecurity. 
a. ________________________________________________________ 
b. ________________________________________________________ 
c. ________________________________________________________ 
 
How would you define the priority of incorporating new education on biosafety and 
biosecurity (biorisk management) in the academic programs of your institution/do you 
think that awareness on these topics should be raised among current and perspective 
life scientists in your country? 
☐Currently there is no need for new education on biosafety and biosecurity/Not 
important/No 
☐High priority: more urgent than other new topics that could be incorporated/Very 
important/Yes 
☐Average priority: they should be incorporated together with other new 
topics/Important 
☐Low priority: there are other, more urgent, new topics to be incorporated/Less 
important/Neutral 
If new biosafety and biosecurity (biorisk management) education were to be integrated 
in the programs, what would be your opinion of the following possible strategies? 
 
Which of the following best describes the process of introducing new course(s) with 
dedicated credits into the academic program of your institution (check all that apply)? 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disa
gree 
Neut
ral 
Agre
e 
Stron
gly 
Agree 
New content on biorisk management 
should and can be integrated into 
existing courses/modules, expanding 
their hours/credits 
     
New content on biorisk management 
should be inserted in extra-curricular 
activities, as expanding hours or 
credits for existing courses is very 
difficult 
     
Biorisk management should be the 
topic of elective activities or courses 
     
Biorisk management should be 
developed as a specific course with 
dedicated credits, that will be added 
to curricula in the next available 
review  
     
Current trainers at the institute/faculty 
at the university have the necessary 
background and training skills to 
deliver biorisk management content 
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☐The process to approve new courses is internal to the institution and decisions on 
changing programs can be taken and implemented directly 
☐The process of approving new courses is internal to the institution, but it does require 
multiple formal review and approval by various management levels 
☐The process of approving new courses proposed by the institution depends on the 
review and approval of organizations external to the institutions, which should 
authorize and provide resources (such as the Ministry, or the University Senate) 
☐ New courses are designed via coordination mechanisms self-managed at the 
professional or academic level (such as professional associations/orders; 
association of deans; associations of course coordinators, etc) 
☐The introduction of new courses is derived from external national standards, like 
training programs or curricula decided at the level of competent Ministry (Higher 
Education, Public Health, or Animal Resources) 
☐None of the above (please explain):_____________________________ 
Are you interested in being involved in activities aimed at raising awareness on these 
topics and/or discussing at a national or international conference, workshop or training 
event? 
☐Yes  
☐No 
Please use the space below to include any further comments, thoughts, remarks or 
ideas you would like to share. 
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Sample of questionnaire survey model on students 
Name (optional): 
Age (optional):  
Sex (optional): 
Degree studied:  
Discipline/subject studied: 
University/Institution: 
Country/Province/District: 
Email address (optional): 
Have you ever heard about the following? 
Bioethics 
☐ Yes 
☐ No 
Biosafety 
☐ Yes  
☐ No 
Biosecurity 
☐ Yes 
☐ No 
Biological weapons/bioweapons  
☐ Yes  
☐ No 
Bioterrorism  
☐ Yes 
☐ No 
Dual use research/ “dual-use” 
☐ Yes 
☐ No 
Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention  
☐ Yes 
☐ No 
Codes of Conduct 
☐ Yes 
☐ No 
What do you understand of the following terms (“one line definitions”)? 
Bioethics: 
Biosafety: 
Biosecurity: 
Bioweapons: 
Bioterrorism: 
Dual-use research/dual-use: 
Have you ever studied anything related to the above-mentioned concepts in your 
educational career? 
☐Yes (please specify what and where? ________________) 
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☐No 
Which source of information you consider more useful in developing concepts and 
learning? 
□ Lectures 
□ Reading 
□ Visual Animations 
□ Video Films 
□ Workshops 
□ Others (specify) __________ 
Are you involved in any kind of life science or biological-related research? 
☐Yes 
☐No 
Do you think that your field of study involves techniques that have the potential to be 
misused? 
☐Yes 
☐No 
Do you know any local or international organization/ Research group working on dual-
use research regulation? 
☐Yes (please specify ________________) 
☐No 
 
Do you know any national or international legislation or regulation prohibiting the non-
peaceful use of life sciences research? 
☐Yes (please specify ________________) 
☐No 
 
Do you know any examples of “codes” of responsible conduct which apply to life 
scientists, biotechnologists and related professionals? 
☐Yes (please specify ________________) 
☐No 
 
Have any of your teachers delivered a lecture dealing with topics such as dual use 
research, biosecurity, bioterrorism etc.? 
☐Yes 
☐No 
Is your University/College offering a separate course covering topics like bioethics, 
biosafety, biosecurity and dual use research? 
☐Yes 
☐No 
If YES, can you briefly describe the contents of the course(s) 
Have you ever attended any conference or seminar on topics like bioethics, biosecurity, 
biosafety and responsible conduct of science? 
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☐Yes 
☐No 
Have you ever heard about the concept of “Responsible Conduct of Science”? 
☐Yes 
☐No 
Please indicate your opinion on the following items:  
 
Any Comments/Remarks you would like to share: 
 
 
 Strongl
y 
disagr
ee/No 
Disa
gree 
Neutr
al 
Agr
ee 
Strongl
y 
Agree/
Yes 
Laboratory setups at educational and 
research institutes can be misused or 
exploited for preparation of materials for 
hostile purposes/Do you think that 
laboratory set-ups can be used for 
preparation of material for terrorist 
activities? 
     
Undesired elements can gain access to 
scientific techniques for hostile 
activities/Do you think that terrorists can 
access the scientific techniques? 
     
Educational and research institutions 
should include study material on dual use, 
biosafety and biosecurity in your course 
work./Do you think that your institution 
should include study material about dual-
use, biosafety and biosecurity in your 
course work? 
     
National policy related to dual use 
research and biosecurity should be 
developed in your country/Do you support 
the national policy development about 
dual-use and biosecurity in your country? 
     
Scientific journals should have policies 
regulating the publication of dual use 
research/Should scientific journals have 
policies regarding publication of dual-use 
research? 
     
The misuse of biological knowledge and 
techniques is potentially destructive. 
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Samples of post-instruction questionnaire survey models 
Sample 1 
Pre-seminar questions (if applicable) 
What is currently meant with “dual use” in the life sciences? 
  The uncertainty on results characterizing new technologies 
  The potential of obtaining positive results beyond expectations 
  The possibility that they are applied both for peaceful and hostile purposes 
  The ambiguity of life science and technology 
 
Laboratory biosafety refers to: 
 Measures and policies for preventing the deliberate misuse of pathogens 
 Measures for preventing theft and loss of pathogens 
 Measures for preventing the unauthorized access to pathogens and toxins 
 Measures for preventing the unintentional exposure to biological agents and toxins, or 
their accidental release 
 
Which statement about laboratory biosecurity is NOT true? 
 It comprises policies and practices that require life scientists to consider the 
ethical, social and legal implications of their work 
 It comprises measures and policies against the theft and loss of pathogens 
 It comprises measures and policies against the unauthorized access to 
pathogens and toxins 
 It comprises measures and policies that seek to prevent the intentional release of 
pathogens and toxins 
 
Which was the first International treaty to prohibit the use of toxic and biological 
weapons? 
 The Hague Declaration, 1907 
 Geneva Protocol, 1925 
 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 1972 
 Chemical Weapons Convention, 1993 
 
What do you hope to gain from today’s session 
 To learn about dual use/misuse/security issues  
 To learn about the broader context of life science (e.g. social, ethical, legal 
aspects, etc) 
 To have contacts with diverse opinions and experiences 
 To interact with fellow colleagues 
 To acquire new skills and experience 
 Other_______________________________________________ 
 
Post-Seminar questions 
Are the topics of the seminar interesting? 
 Very interesting 
 Quite interesting 
 Not so much 
 Not at all 
 
Was your previous knowledge sufficient to follow the seminar?  
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 Yes 
 Yes, even if having further information would have been helpful 
 No, but I could follow the seminar easily anyway 
 No, and this proved difficult 
 
Were the topics addressed discussed in other courses?  
 No 
 Yes, but useful to deepen understanding 
 Yes, a few 
 Yes and too many 
 
Did the seminar touch upon contemporary themes related to research? 
 Yes and I found it interesting 
 No, but this is due to the type of the seminar 
 Yes, but too much 
 No, this is an important aspect not addressed in the seminar 
 
Had you any prior knowledge about the potential “hostile use” of life sciences? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Do you think that your knowledge and understanding of the following specific aspects 
have been developed after this seminar? 
• History of Biological Weapons 
 Yes, very much 
 Yes 
 Not very much 
 Not at all 
• The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
 Yes, very much 
 Yes 
 Not very much 
 Not at all 
• The problem and the risks of “dual-use” 
 Yes, very much 
 Yes 
 Not very much 
 Not at all 
• Tools and policies of “biosecurity” 
 Yes, very much 
 Yes 
 Not very much 
 Not at all 
 
What are the important things to remember about dual-use/misuse? 
 Life scientists should be aware of the social, ethic and legal implications of their 
work 
 Life scientists should be aware both of the national and international regulations 
relevant to their work 
 Cost-benefit analysis is an essential element in mitigating the risks associated with life 
science research of concern 
 There are potential risks and impacts on society to consider 
 It is important to balance freedom of research and regulation of science 
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 Other _____________________________________________ 
 
Laboratory biosafety refers to: 
 Measures and policies for preventing the deliberate misuse of pathogens 
 Measures for preventing theft and loss of pathogens 
 Measures for preventing the unauthorized access to pathogens and toxins 
 Measures for preventing the unintentional exposure to biological agents and toxins, or 
their accidental release 
 
Which statement about laboratory biosecurity is NOT true? 
 It comprises policies and practices that require life scientists to consider the 
ethical, social and legal implications of their work 
 It comprises measures and policies against the theft and loss of pathogens 
 It comprises measures and policies against the unauthorized access to 
pathogens and toxins 
 It comprises measures and policies that seek to prevent the intentional release of 
pathogens and toxins 
 
What is currently meant with “dual-use” in the life sciences? 
  The uncertainty on results characterizing new technologies 
  The potential of obtaining positive results beyond expectations 
  The possibility that they are applied both for peaceful and hostile purposes 
  The ambiguity of life science and technology 
 
Which was the first International treaty to prohibit the use of toxic and biological 
weapons? 
 The Hague Declaration, 1907 
 Geneva Protocol, 1925 
 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 1972 
 Chemical Weapons Convention, 1993
 
Do you think that some aspects of research that you study could present a “dual-use” 
issue? 
 Yes 
 No 
▪ If yes, please explain what you think could be done to prevent the potential 
hostile applications of this research and minimize concerns over the possibility of 
dual use  
____________________________________________________________ 
What you would suggest to improve this seminar? Can you identify any other relevant 
topics which should be incorporated into our future seminars? 
___________________________________________________________
Would you recommend seminars like today’s to other students? 
 Yes 
 No 
Are you enrolled in a course? 
 Yes 
 No 
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What is the level of your current degree course/research? 
 Undergraduate 
 Graduate (Master) 
 PhD 
 Post-Doctoral 
 
What is your field of study/research? 
 Biology 
 Biotechnology 
 Microbiology 
 Medicine 
 Chemistry 
 Toxicology 
 Non-Life Science (please indicate): ________________ 
 Social Science (please indicate):___________________ 
 Other (please indicate): __________________________ 
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Sample 2 
Title of the event/seminar/workshop/course:______________ 
I am satisfied with the event/seminar/workshop/course 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
I was informed of the objectives of the event/seminar/workshop/course 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
The quality and content of the event/seminar/workshop/course and training materials 
met my expectations / The overall quality of the event/seminar/workshop/course 
was high 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
The event/seminar/workshop/course lived up to my expectations / This 
event/seminar/workshop/course met my prior objectives and expectations 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
The event/seminar/workshop/course presented information clearly / The ability, clarity 
and completeness of the trainer were adequate when responding to trainee 
questions / Are contents of the seminar articulated in a coherent framework? 
 Strongly agree / Yes 
 Agree / Contents are not very connected with each other 
 Neutral / No, teachers can’t show clearly the connections 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 
The event included relevant group participation, discussions and interaction  
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral 
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 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
The information I learned within the event/seminar/workshop/course was important and 
relevant to my current position/job / The event/seminar/workshop/course is 
relevant to my job 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
What improvements would you suggest for the event/seminar/workshop/course? 
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Sample 3 
Title of the event/seminar/workshop/course: 
After this event/seminar/workshop/course, I… 
Know [learning objective] 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
Feel [learning objective] 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
Am able to [learning objective] 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
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Semi-structured interview information and content sheet 
Information and Consent Sheet 
Please read this page, it describes the purpose of the research, your involvement, what 
information will be collected and how it will be used and stored. 
Researcher: Giulio Mancini, g.m.mancini@student.bradford.ac.uk  
Research Supervisor: Dr. Simon Whitby 
Thank you for considering participating to this research. The purpose of this study is to 
investigate the role of education of students of life and health sciences and technology 
about security issues, in particular but not limited to the risk of deliberately caused 
disease. We hope to understand if and how educational programmes can raise the 
awareness of young scientists on a highly debated topic in policy circles, so that 
scientists can contribute to, on the one hand, risk mitigation and, on the other hand, 
formulation of risk assessment and governance that does not unduly burden scientific 
practice and research. 
The research uses, among other quantitative and qualitative data collection methods, 
interviews to learn about status and opinion of educators and course coordinators in life 
science faculties. We would like to interview you as an educator who has been involved 
in initiatives regarding this topic. 
All the information that we collect about you during the interview will be kept 
confidential and only the research team will have access to it. The information may be 
used for analysis in the research and in connected academic publications, but you will 
not be identified in any material. The audio recordings of the interview will be kept 
secure and accessible only by the research team; they will be transcribed in an 
anonymous way and they will be destroyed at the completion of the research. Ethics 
approval has been granted by the Chair of the Humanities, Social and Health Sciences 
Research Ethics Panel at the University of Bradford on 3rd December 2014. 
If you decide to take part, you should sign one copy of this sheet and give it back to the 
researcher, and retain a second copy. Should you decide to withdraw from the study 
and/or have your information cancelled, you can request it at any time to the 
researcher. 
Also if you would like to discuss the research further or have any questions please do 
not hesitate to contact us. 
Thank you! 
Printed name:_________________________________ Date: __________ 
Signature______________________________________________________ 
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Semi-structured interview schedule 
• Information and consent form; ask permission to record.  
• Introduction; explanation of objectives of the study; how the interview will fit in the 
research; who I am interviewing, how and why are interviewees selected.  
• Can you walk me through how did you get involved into education on these 
subjects? What is your recollection? 
• What do you think can be the role of education on these subjects, if any?  
• Do you think there has been an evolution or change of the educational offerings 
since you first started being interested/involved in these topics? If yes, can you 
elaborate more? What would that change be/has been? 
• Explanation of the four-levels models to evaluate impact of training and education. 
• Do you think (your) students liked these subjects? If yes, how, how much, and how 
can you tell? If not, why not? 
• Do you think the initiatives to promote education on these subjects developed 
students’ learning (knowledge, skills)? If yes, how, how much, what learning, and 
how can you tell? Could you tell me why you think that happened? If not, why not?  
• Do you think students changed their behaviour as a consequence of these 
educational initiatives? Or, if observing this change on the same students was not 
possible, do you have the impression that cohorts of students who took this 
education have a different behaviour than those who did not? If yes, how could you 
observe or measure this difference? If not, why did this not happen? 
• Did you notice a result at the organizational level that you would link completely or in 
part to educational initiatives? Did you notice an impact on the level of biosafety or 
biosecurity risks, but especially the latter and deliberate disease risks? If yes, how 
could you observe these changes? If not, why not? Could that happen in the future? 
How could we tell that? Some examples to elicit responses, if necessary, may 
include: changes in safety or security incidents, new procedures being drafted, 
increased use of screening processes; reformed oversight systems to include 
security considerations; other result (risk) indicators. 
 
